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


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COLLEGE SERIES OF GREEK AUTHORS

EDITED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO. *Gorgias*

G O R G I A S

EDITED

ON THE BASIS OF DEUSCHLE-CRON'S EDITION

BY

GONZALEZ LODGE

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PREFACE.

THIS edition is based on Deuschle-Cron's fourth edition, Leipzig, 1886, but the original has been treated with considerable freedom.

In more than sixty cases, where the text varies from that of Cron, the readings of Schanz have been adopted. A few conjectures have been introduced, but the editor has endeavored to follow a middle course between those who do not allow emendations, and those who, like Schanz, employ them too freely.

The introduction is a free rendering of the original, with additions.

The commentary will be found to differ materially from the German, especially in grammatical matters. The editor has not thought it advisable to deviate from the line of literary interpretation adopted by the German editor, but the exact study, which has been bestowed of later years in the United States upon the subject of Greek Syntax, has rendered it possible to make this part of the book to a certain extent American.

The appendix, which is much more extensive than that of the German edition, will be found to contain, in addition to the register of textual variations, much matter which could not be inserted in a commentary, but which students should know.

Much assistance has been drawn from other editions, especially those of Hirschig and Thompson. Woolsey's edition also has been in the hands of the editor.

The editor is under great obligations to Professor Gildersleeve, who examined the commentary in manuscript and made many

valuable suggestions. Those who may use the book will share the editor's regret, that owing to delay in the printing he was unable to avail himself fully of Professor Gildersleeve's kind offer to read and criticise the proof-sheets.

The edition owes much also to Professor Seymour, who has read all the proof, and has cheerfully given the editor the benefit of his scholarship and editorial experience.

Reference is made throughout to Riddell's *Digest of Platonic Idioms* (Rid.), printed with his edition of the *Apology* (Oxford, 1877). Occasional references are made to Madvig's *Griechische Syntax*, and to Meisterhans' *Grammatik der Attischen Inscriften*.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, October, 1890.

INTRODUCTION.

1. THE BEGINNINGS OF RHETORIC.¹

THE mighty impulse which the Hellenic spirit, throughout the 1 whole extent of the Hellenic nationality, received from the successful result of the great conflict waged by the might of the people against the overwhelming power of the Barbarians, had made Athens, the city which had distinguished itself beyond all others by the sagacity and self-sacrificing courage of its citizens, the centre of all the intellectual effort and life of Greece. Poetry, which in conjunction with its sister arts had not become merely inseparably associated with all religious and national feasts, but had acquired also a recognized position in every-day life, obtained by the new and especially brilliant productions of this period a much wider influence upon the culture and public life of the people. Meanwhile the political activity and progress of the time was pushing forward with rapid and irresistible strides to the development of Prose, to which up to this time the artistic genius of the Greeks had been less directed than to Poetry. With the fortunes of this new medium of human thought were inseparably connected those of a new department of Literature, — History, — which had its real beginning, artistically considered, in that magnificent work whose worthy subject was the famous struggle between the Greeks and the Barbarians, so remote in its origin, so long in its duration, so momentous in its character, so fortunate in its result. An inexhaustible opportunity for practice in the art of public speaking was afforded by the assemblies of the people and the courts of law. From these

¹ Principal source: *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν sive artium scriptores ab initiis usque ad editos Aristotelis de rhetorica libros. Composuit L. Spengel, Stuttgartiae, 1828.* — In addition: Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit*

in Griechenland und Rom. Leipzig, 1833. — Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Uebersicht*, 2d ed. Leipzig, 1885, — and especially Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, 1², Leipzig, 1887.

were derived two varieties of political oratory, the Forensic (τὸ συμβουλευτικόν or τὸ δημηγορικόν) and the Judicial (τὸ δικανικόν γένος). Very soon it became the duty of those most noted for their talents in speaking, to deliver speeches in honor of those citizens who had fallen in battle for their country. Hence Aristotle in his Theory adds to the two varieties already mentioned a third, — τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν γένος.

- 2 But it was not in accordance with the intellectual character of the Greek people to rest content with a merely practical skill in the employment of language. They rather, by virtue of their disposition towards investigation and science, turned their attention to the discovery of the means through which speech might attain its greatest power, and thereby be the more likely to bring about any desired result. The unprejudiced mind could not but see that this oratorical success was not always due to a deeper insight and more thorough knowledge of the question at issue. Consequently their attention was directed to the formal side of the art, and thus the first rude beginnings, naturally empirical, were made of a Theory, *i.e.* of a scientific conception, which claimed for itself the ability to communicate to others the skill and knowledge which had been acquired, or in other words, to teach to others this new art, so useful, nay, almost indispensable for practical life.
- 3 That such an art should find ready acceptance and cultivation in Athens is but natural. We need only refer to the orator Antiphon, who both as the founder of a school of oratory and as a composer of written speeches, as well as from his political activity, exercised a wide influence there. But Athens was not the earliest home of this art. That honor belongs to Sicily. Under similar circumstances the beginnings of oratory would probably have been made simultaneously in Attica and Sicily. But in the latter country the conditions were somewhat different. The population was very composite, given to disputation, and less fully organized than that of Athens. Besides, the severe measures of the tottering tyrants to preserve their power had caused many changes in the ownership of land and the rights of property. Consequently the overthrow of the tyranny was

followed by a perfect tempest of litigation out of which oratory emerged as a fully established art. Its invention is ascribed to Corax,—a man who had taken a leading part in the political upheavals and governmental changes of his country, but who in the new order of things devoted himself to the teaching of Rhetoric—especially that in use in the courts—of which he composed also a short ‘*techne*.’ His pupil and successor was Tisias, who, according to the story,² used his newly acquired skill in speaking to defeat his teacher in a lawsuit,—a course of action which could not but show the tendency of the new art, and which drew down a scathing rebuke from the judge.³ Tisias had many pupils who afterwards became famous; among them Lysias and Isocrates, as well as Gorgias, after whom this dialogue is named.

2. GORGIAS’ LIFE AND ACTIVITY.⁴

Gorgias was the son of Charmantides⁵ of Leontini. The year⁴ of his birth as well as that of his death is uncertain. Apollodorus and Quintilian state that he lived to the age of 109, while others allow him only 105 years. Quintilian also says that he outlived Socrates, a statement which may or may not be confirmed by *Apol.* 19 e.⁶ With these data alone to build on, it is not strange that authorities have been unable to agree on the dates to be assigned for his birth and death. We may assume that he was born between 492 and 483 B.C. and died between 384 and 375.⁷ Of his family and early life and training we have very scanty notices. We hear of a sister married to a certain Deicrates and of a brother Herodicus. It is likely that he early became acquainted with the teachings as well as the dia-

² Spengel, p. 26.

³ The indignant exclamation *κακοῦ κόρακος κακὰ φ’ ἑ*.

⁴ See Foss, *De Gorgia Leontino*, Hallae, 1828. Frei, *Quaestiones Protagoraeae*, Bonnae, 1845.

⁵ The inscription on a statue of Gorgias at Olympia reads *Χαρμαντίδου Γοργίας Λεοντίνος*. Suidas and Pausanias give it wrongly as *Καρμαντίδου*.

⁶ Sittl, *Gesch. d. Gr. Lit.* ii. 36 n. thinks that Quintilian’s statement may be based on Socrates’ words.

⁷ Foss gives the dates 496–388; Deutschle, 492–384; Frei, 483–375, which is agreed to by Zeller, Diels, and Susemihl; Fränkel, 487–379; Unger, 507–500. Blass thinks Gorgias was born probably before 480. *Att. Bered.* i. p. 47 n.

lectic of the Eleatic school, as we may judge from the fact that he employed their arguments in his philosophic work. It was reported in antiquity that he had been a pupil of Empedocles, and it is probable that he wrote a philosophic treatise in the spirit of the Empedoclean theory. His natural gifts, however, as well as the spirit of the times, inclined him to the newly invented art of speech. And if Empedocles was really the inventor, as Aristotle declares, it is probable that he gained some light from him. Tradition made him also the pupil of Tisias as already mentioned, but Blass does not believe in the truth of the story. It is certain that he soon became a formidable rival of Tisias. He gained a great reputation in his native city as an orator and teacher of rhetoric, and many students flocked to his lectures. Among these was his truest follower Polus, who accompanied him on his travels afterwards. Soon came an opportunity for him to make his art felt and his name famous outside of his country. The inhabitants of Leontini were hard pressed by the Syracusans, and in their distress sent Gorgias as ambassador to Athens in 427 B.C. to plead the claims of kinship and to beg assistance. Gorgias was eminently successful in his mission.⁸ The Athenians—the most loquacious people of Greece—were charmed by the magic of his graceful eloquence. Never before had they heard an orator who was such a master of form as Gorgias, or whose words fell so sweetly and melodiously upon the ear. Consequently he was soon able to return to Leontini and announce the prosperous issue of his mission. But he did not stay. The poison of Athenian life had penetrated, and he was drawn back. He had recognized also that the field was more favorable there for the practice of his profession than in Sicily. The Athenians were seized with enthusiasm for him. Crowds of young men and older men also of the best families in the state

⁸ *Hippias Mai.* 282 **b** Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντίνιος σοφιστῆς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἰκοθεν πρεσβεύων, ὥς ἱκανάτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν τε τῷ δήμῳ ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ

συνὸν τοῖς νέοις χρήματα πολλὰ εἰργάσατο καὶ ἔλαβεν ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως. Thucydides does not mention the name of Gorgias in his account of the matter (iii. 86), but Diodorus does (xii. 53).

crowded around him and paid gladly extraordinary sums for the privilege of hearing his instructions. The days on which he lectured they called festivals. His phrases were compared to gleaming torches, and Plato⁹ himself goes so far as to compare him with the Homeric Nestor, the ἡδυεπὴς λιγύς Πυλίων ἀγορητής.

Gorgias was especially happy in the discourses he delivered 5 for display, or on festive occasions, called ἐπιδείξεις, and found many occasions to show his ability. But he also came forward as a teacher of oratory and found a ready body of pupils among the higher classes. See *Apol.* 19 e, *Gorg.* 449 b. He does not, however, appear to have remained very long at Athens despite his success. This may have been due to the fact that Athens soon became the resort of a numerous company of Sophists, whose mutual relations were not always pleasant, and the bustle and instability of Athenian life may have become somewhat irksome to a man now well advanced in years. He therefore soon left Athens, — though he must have returned thither several times. He travelled considerably, but when or where, we cannot with certainty state. We only know that he discussed in Olympia, before the concourse of assembled Greeks, with great applause, a purely national theme, — afterwards treated by many others, — the ‘Eastern question.’¹⁰ The most of his time, however, he spent in Thessaly, for which he seems to have conceived a great fondness. There the tyrants, especially those of Larissa, honored him, and the rich young nobles became infatuated¹¹ with him and flocked in great crowds to hear his teaching.¹² Among his pupils were Meno, one of Cyrus’ generals

⁹ *Phaedr.* 261 b. It is likely also that the fact that Gorgias, like Nestor, ‘saw three generations of men,’ had something to do with this comparison.

¹⁰ Philostr. *Epis.* 73, ii. p. 257 K. Blass, i. § 54.

¹¹ The expression γοργιάζειν, which we find applied to this infatuation, is probably of later origin, and has some allusion to the story of the charmed Gorgon head.

¹² *Meno* 70 b τούτου δὲ ὑμῖν αἰτιὸς ἐστὶν Γοργίας (i.e. that the Thessalians, especially those of Larissa, are so noted for their wisdom). ἀφικόμενος γὰρ εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐραστὰς ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ εἰληφεν Ἀλευαδῶν τε τοὺς πρώτους, ὧν ὁ σὸς ἐραστὴς ἐστὶν Ἀρίστικπος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Θετταλῶν. καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἴθικεν ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἔάν τις τι ἔρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκός τοὺς εἰδότας, ἅτε

in the march of the Ten Thousand, Proxenus, another of these generals, and Aristippus, an Aleuad, and of noted Athenians, at least Philostratus, Thucydides, Critias, and Alcibiades, besides the celebrated teachers Isocrates and Antisthenes. Gorgias was not a cheap teacher; his charge was 100 minæ for each pupil. It seems, therefore, strange that he should have left only 1000 staters,⁷ or 200 minæ, behind him when he died; that too, when he had neither wife nor family to spend his money for him. But although he lived simply, he loved parade and to make an imposing display in public. In imitation of the priestly garb of his old master, Empedocles, he used to wear a purple mantle and golden sandals.¹³ It is said also that he had a golden statue of himself set up at Delphi, at the dedication of which he delivered a great oration.¹⁴ Otherwise even his enemies could find nothing in his manner of life to criticise, and were obliged to feel the highest respect for him. To his simple manner of life is attributed the fact that he not only reached a very great old age, but retained his bodily freshness and vigor until the end. Anecdotes are related of him to show his preference for old age instead of a disgust at it.¹⁵ When finally his death was approaching, — a death which was without sickness and rather like a falling asleep, — he is said to have murmured, 'Now Sleep is beginning to conduct me to his brother Death.'

- 6 Gorgias left behind him various writings, six speeches — he seems not to have written a work on rhetoric — and a philosophical treatise *περὶ φύσεως ἢ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*. It is not certain that any of these have come down to us. It is true that we possess two declamations which pass under Gorgias' name, the Encomium of Helen and the Defence of Palamedes; but the genuineness of these speeches cannot yet be said to be beyond question.¹⁶ We

καὶ αὐτὸς παρέχων αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλευμένῳ ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται.

¹³ Aelian, *V. H.* xii. 32.

¹⁴ Whether Gorgias had it set up, or it was set up in his honor by friends, and whether it was solid gold or only gilt, are questions not yet set-

tled. Cf. Blass, i.² 58, n. 1, where the authorities are given.

¹⁵ Blass, i.² 51, ns. 6, 7.

¹⁶ In his first edition Blass restricted himself to the view that these speeches were either genuine, or had been designedly counterfeited, inclining rather to the latter alternative.

also know the contents and arguments of the philosophical treatise from two sources.¹⁷ Gorgias tries to prove: 1, that nothing exists; 2, if anything exists, it cannot be recognized or known; 3, even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated by words. To prove these statements he employs two modes of proof, — one of his own invention, and the other an adaptation of the arguments of the Eleatics.¹⁸ If one considers the result desired only, there appears to be a contradiction between the theory of Gorgias and his actual practice. How, we may ask, can a man come forward as an orator and profess to teach the art of speaking (or communication) who denies the possibility of communicating knowledge? On closer examination, however, the inconsistency disappears. What Gorgias attempted to prove was, in the first place, the impossibility of objective existence or of a knowledge of such existence; in the second place, granted that there was such a thing as existence and a knowledge of it, the impossibility of bringing this fact by means of speech to the knowledge of others. He was not, however, bound by this view to deny the appearance of existence, or the possibility of conception and opinion. On the contrary, he rests the proof of his second point just on this argument, that the existent is of itself not a matter of thought, because otherwise what every one thinks must exist, and this would do away with the possibility of a false conception. He denied, therefore, that there was any connexion between human thought and conception, and existence, but he by no means denied the existence of conceptions. Hence the use of the art of speech must be on the supposition that the art of speech is designed to inspire in the hearers, without any reference to the

In his second edition, p. 79, n. 1, he distinctly abandons his earlier position, saying he was too much influenced by the spirit of the times, and comes out squarely on the side of the genuineness of the speeches. Diels had done the same in 1884, *Ber. d. Ber. Akad.*

¹⁷ Pseudo-Aristoteles *de Gorgia*, c. 5. 6, and Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.*

vii. 65–87. These two versions do not agree in all respects, and have been made the subject of careful study lately by O. Apelt in *Rhein. Mus.* 43. 202–219. Apelt shows that the account of Aristotle must be held as more accurately giving the mode of argument of Gorgias than that of Sextus Empiricus.

¹⁸ Apelt, p. 204 f.

actual existence, simply those conceptions which will be useful to the design of the speaker. In addition, however, the speaker is at liberty so thoroughly to acquire the power of expression that he may be able, by the perfection of form, to awaken in his hearers feelings of pleasure and assent.

- 7 Such, then, was Gorgias' view of Rhetoric. The contents, or subject of the speech, were a matter of indifference to him; the form was the great object. Hence he undertook to speak on any subject whatever, no matter whether he was acquainted with it or not. He challenged his hearers to put to him any question they pleased, and pledged himself to speak concerning it better and more elegantly¹⁹ than any one else, and at whatever length might be desired.²⁰ Through the art of speech he undertook to make the great appear small, the small great, the old new, the new old; in short, to make anything appear its exact opposite. He cared nothing for the real nature of anything, but only sought to make it assume some particular appearance. His pupils were to acquire the same skill in the use of form, and to this end he imparted to them certain rules and artistic conceptions, or a technique of speech. Of course the most of his directions applied to the outward form merely; and his great merit lies in the fact that he was the first to direct attention to this side of oratory. He was the first to recognize the importance of figures of speech, and is said to have invented the names 'antithesis,' 'paronomasia,' 'pariosis' (or repetition of the same expression in different connexions), etc. He loved to give a poetic coloring to his ideas, and he laid especial weight on the symmetrical balancing (*ισοκωλία*) and rhythmical swing of his clauses. Probably, however, because he was a pioneer, he did not reach the degree of perfection in his treatment of form, which either himself, or the laws of symmetry and beauty demanded. His metaphors were

¹⁹ *Gorg.* 447 c, *Cic. de Or.* i. 22. 103 (Gorgias) permagnum quiddam suscipere ac profiteri videbatur cum se ad omnia de quibus quisque audire vellet, esse paratum denun-

tiaret. Cf. also iii. 32. 129, *de Fin.* ii. 1. 1.

²⁰ *Gorg.* 449 c, *Phaedr.* 267 b (Τεισίας Γοργίας τε) συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνεύρον.

often harsh and bald, and his affectation of distinctly poetic words and phrases drew upon him the ridicule of later critics.²¹ He could not get beyond a certain uniformity; for example, he seems to have considered the mere division into two corresponding or opposing halves to be entirely sufficient for symmetry. In short, the means at the command of Rhetoric were still too limited for perfection. But Gorgias nevertheless exercised an immense influence upon the later Attic literature, and his merit cannot be over-estimated, in awakening in the Greek mind the consciousness that the laws of beauty should prevail in every literary effort, in prose as well as in the domain of poetry. His example was followed by many men of high literary importance. Besides those already mentioned, the influence of Gorgias can be traced in Antiphon, Thucydides, Critias, the dramatist Agathon, Aeschines, and others.

3. AIM AND PRINCIPLE OF THE DIALOGUE.

The culture of the time in which the activity of Gorgias fell 8 is called the Sophistical. Its peculiar characteristic lies in the fact that it denied the reality of knowledge, morality, and justice, and admitted only an appearance of knowledge, morality, and justice, or rather, declared to be true, moral, and just only that which appeared so subjectively, to this person or that, — and this, of course, was different with every different individual. Gorgias, it is true, looked down upon the Sophists with scorn, and refused to be classed with them;²² but this scorn was not directed against the immoral view of life which the Sophists held, in looking towards the appearance, and not the reality; for, as we have seen from the sketch just given of his teaching, he agreed with them in this; what he found ridiculous was that the others who called themselves Sophists should claim to teach wisdom and virtue, or human culture, while imparting knowledge of every variety. For him there was but one art, which was the

²¹ See references in Blass, p. 64.

²² Μενο 95 c καὶ Γοργίου μάλιστα ταῦτα ἔγχαται ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῦ τοῦτο (ἀρετὴν διδάσκειν) ἀκούσαις ὑπὶ-

σχνουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταγελά, ὅταν ἀκούσῃ ὑπισχνουμένων· ἀλλὰ λέγειν οἶεται δεῖν ποιεῖν δεινούς. The feeling is shared by Callicles.

essence of all arts, and made all knowledge unnecessary, the acquisition of the so-called virtue needless; namely, the art of speech or Rhetoric. But the Sophists also were well aware of the great value of a ready command of language, for it was this on which their mental superiority over others rested; and the most important of them, *e.g.* Protagoras and Prodicus, had paid great attention to linguistic investigation. Hence Gorgias, in point of fact, came to their assistance with his art of speaking; for it was just in so far as he declared the contents of the speech a matter of indifference, and laid the greatest emphasis on the development and perfection of form, that the art of speaking became the means of commending to the minds of others, according to the pleasure of the speaker, an appearance of truth, morality, and justice. Thus behind Rhetoric, so defined, lay hidden the worst and most dangerous form of Sophistic. For it not only urged the man who employed it to the practical accomplishment of any design, no matter how arbitrary, but provided him with the means best suited to it. Under the constitutional government of the majority of Hellenic states, a man's success in politics depended largely upon his ability to address an audience with readiness and force. This ability Gorgias professed to give by his new art of speaking. But when thus equipped what else could his pupils expect or strive for by means of their new weapon but the highest possible power in the state? And by power, what else could they understand but the power of doing whatever they pleased and of managing affairs according to their own caprice? And only then would the orator have achieved his object most completely when he had succeeded in raising himself to a tyranny and putting his fellow-citizens under his feet. Such was in reality the necessary aim of this rhetorical training; for it recognized beside itself no other knowledge as legitimate, and not only offered itself no moral view of state relations, but even declared the knowledge of justice to be useless, inasmuch as it was the office of the orator to decide first for himself what justice was, and then to make use of the art of speaking to compel from others the acknowledgment and acceptance of his view.

Now of course Gorgias did not recognize these necessary consequences of his principles, much less did he declare them. He did not even seem to see the close relationship of his efforts with those of the other Sophists. And this was one reason, perhaps, why so many of the cultured men of the period who were seeking certain practical ends in politics — that is, the rising statesmen — flocked so eagerly to hear him. Behind their praise of Rhetoric they concealed their sympathy with Sophistic. It was not long, however, before they ventured to proclaim their designs openly. For the moral sense of the period was declining so rapidly that but few, at least in Athens, its home, were disposed to object to the new culture. Plato therefore rendered the Athenian state a great service when he drew off the mask from this influential art of appearances, and showed it in its true nature as a form of Sophistic, and the worst form, too, because the emptiest. He had inherited likewise from his master Socrates the calling of scientifically destroying Sophistic in all its forms, and the founding and defence of a moral view of life in opposition to it. His theory of Ethics, as can be abundantly recognized from the dialogue before us, was already fully developed in its essential characteristics, and was quite strong enough to carry through this struggle successfully. If, however, the opposition in which Ethics stood to this so-called Rhetoric and its results was to be entirely understood, and if it was to be brought out a victor over its opponent, then it was necessary to lay quite bare the immoral principles on which Rhetoric rested, whether any one of his rhetorically trained contemporaries was acquainted with the real bearing of those principles or not. The aim of that method of training was seen to be the domination of the individual's caprice, wantonness, or arbitrary will. This assumes as the true principle of action, since it denies the validity of the existing laws of the state, the so-called law of nature, so widely defended by the Sophists, which is nothing more nor less than the law of the stronger. But this principle also can be traced to a far deeper-lying spring, the source of all immoral views of life; namely, the idea that the guide of a man's action should be not his mental but his sensual nature, and the therefrom resulting

impulses and passions. Satisfaction of these, therefore, or in other words, sensual enjoyment, is obedience to this law of nature, which was synonymous with happiness according to the spirit of the times. The idea of happiness is common to both the moral and immoral views of life; but they look at it in different lights, and define it differently in consequence. Plato conceived happiness to lie in the absolute freedom of the mental and spiritual nature of man from the domination of sense. His opponents, on the other hand, looked upon this Platonic freedom as a matter of no consequence, and held that happiness could be reached only when the sensual nature was as free as possible, and could hurry without restraint from pleasure to pleasure. This opposition was the chief motive which led Plato to the composition of this dialogue, with which he may be said to have entered the lists in his contest with the tendency of the age.

- 10 To this motive for the composition of the dialogue must be added certain external causes which are of value for its correct understanding. The trial and condemnation of Socrates in open court had really been a contest between the old and dominant system and the new ethical theory. In this conflict Ethics experienced a defeat at the hands of its enemy, which showed that it must not extend its operations too far into the domain of political life. If it was to conquer, it must be in the domain of scientific and philosophical investigation and criticism. The Socratic theory of Ethics was confined to the teaching of virtue to the individual. Plato widens the circle of investigation. He starts the question, What relation does the Socratic ethical theory hold to the state, and has the dominant political principle any real justification in opposing it? If, as is to be supposed, the death of Socrates gave a mighty impulse to these investigations of the young philosopher, it must have led him to a sharper limitation and deeper conception of the department of science which he had entered. Another probable supposition may be added. Plato must have undergone much unfavorable criticism for holding himself aloof from all political activity, and making philosophy his calling; for the cultured men of his time looked upon politics

as the only worthy pursuit for a free man. And Plato may have wished to defend himself against such attacks.

Plato was led, therefore, both by sincere differences of opinion 11 as well as by external circumstances, to make the question of the false and true theories of life—the former claimed and taught by the rhetorical culture of the time, the latter by philosophy—the subject of discussion for a public treatise. We should not, accordingly, expect in the *Gorgias* a full criticism of Rhetoric from all sides, for the various rules which it laid down for the correct arrangement of a speech have no place here; but we must also not lose sight of the fact that the discussion of the moral question already mentioned necessarily involves also the question as to the real nature and principles of Rhetoric. We cannot, therefore, consider Rhetoric as the general subject of the dialogue, as the *περὶ ῥητορικῆς* which the manuscripts affix to the title would indicate. Rhetoric enters into the discussion only as far as its relation to actual life is concerned; that is, so far as it was the means through which the business of the state was conducted. Now because, according to the general view, the duties of the citizen began, continued, and ended in politics, Rhetoric soon claimed and was admitted to be the real art of life. In this way, then, the consideration of Rhetoric may easily and naturally be made the occasion for a consideration, also, of the more general question of the true principle of life. This hand-in-hand consideration can, however, only continue to a certain degree, for the opposition of the two questions soon becomes evident as the discussion proceeds. The proper opposite to Rhetoric is Philosophy; but just as the former is represented by politics, the latter also appears in the form of ethics. Plato shows first, that real, genuine politics can only be founded upon the same ethics which prescribes the rules of life for the individual man; secondly, that the individual is only justified in turning his attention to politics, when he has made himself ethically perfect; and thirdly, that he must enter politics only in order to discharge his duty to his fellow-citizens,—in a word, only to make them better. In this way, philosophy becomes also the true art of life, not merely for the individual, but also for the association of individuals

which is called a state. The aim of the false art of life is to satisfy the caprices of an ever-changing passion; that of the true, is to bring about the supremacy of the good. Hence Plato undertook in this dialogue to set forth scientifically the distinction that exists between the good and the pleasant.²³

4. SCENERY OF THE DIALOGUE.

A. *Persons.*

12 In the artistic development and arrangement of a dialogue in which alone, as an artistic form of prose, it can be opposed to the poetic drama, a matter of the utmost importance is the choice of the characters which are to carry on the conversation. That it is not those who give their names to the dialogues who are to be considered as the chief characters, is shown by a cursory glance over the various works of Plato. None of these works bears the name of Socrates, although (or rather because) not in one only, but in the majority of them, he is the leading character, *i.e.* the one whom the author makes the exponent of his own opinions, feelings, and efforts. Thus in our dialogue, likewise, Plato has assigned this role to his beloved teacher. He is throughout the leader of the conversation, for even the sections which seem to form exceptions to this rule serve only to show the inability of any one else to fill this position. In the most intimate connexion with this skill of Socrates stands the moral feeling, which he defends with especial emphasis and earnestness against a very different method. He shows himself here, as in other dialogues, to be a man in whom reason and will, thought and action, have been blended, by conscientious effort, into an almost ideal harmony. According to 461 c, we must suppose him to be already well advanced in life.

13 Compared with Socrates, all the other characters who take part in the dialogue fall somewhat into the background, because no single one has been chosen to bear alone the role of respondent,

²³ The various opinions of modern commentators are well discussed in the introduction to Cope's translation of the *Gorgias*. They agree, gener-

ally, with the view expressed by Cron. Cope bases his opinion on 527 b, c, which seems to be an explicit statement of the results of the dialogue.

which is divided, but unequally, between three persons. Hence it is that Gorgias cannot be called the leading character next to Socrates, as may be said of Protagoras in the like-named dialogue, but he rather has a position analogous to that of Laches in the dialogue which bears his name. The fact, however, that he is less prominent in this dialogue than his importance would seem to require, is more than balanced by the marked respect which all parties to the discussion show him, as a man of upright aims and high attainments. For even though his theory did contain the germ of that immoral view of life which Plato made it his business to combat, yet it was only an undeveloped germ, and his whole life had been so honorable, and had borne testimony to such a high degree of moral feeling, according to the general Greek conception, that he could scarcely be held responsible for the results which were first drawn by his pupils and followers. As far as he was himself concerned, he only desired to be a master of language and of speaking, with skill to communicate to others also the art which he had practised with so much success. It was his fault that he had no clear insight into the nature of this art, and did not notice the inconsistency in which it involved him as regards his own moral feelings and opinions. The immoral principles which naturally corresponded to the art which he practised were championed not by him, but by his followers. He himself, the aged master, retires with unimpaired dignity from the discussion, in which he has shown no dialectical skill, it is true, but still a certain appreciation of dialectical methods. With him, Socrates reaches his aim without difficulty. But even when he has been defeated he does not take offence, but still shows a lively interest in the investigation, and when the excitement or sensitiveness of his pupils threatens to put an end to it, he comes to the rescue, and by his personal dignity causes its continuance.

Polus is one of the pupils of Gorgias, and assumes immediately 14 after him his position as respondent in the discussion. As regards the facts of his life, we know that he was born in Acragas, a Sicilian city of great wealth and power, and was therefore a countryman of the celebrated philosopher and statesman Empedocles. He became a disciple of the new school of rhetoric, and

attached himself to Gorgias, whom he also accompanied on his travels, partly still to profit from his instruction, partly to obtain some reputation for himself by his dexterity in the handling of words. In this way he had now come with him to Athens. He is still young, as Plato emphasizes, but doubtless, according to 462 b, had already composed his treatise on Rhetoric.²⁴ But we must not look upon this so-called τέχνη as a theory based upon acknowledged principles. For such a work Polus was much more incapable than Gorgias. He had only learned from him the means of dazzling the minds of his hearers, a species of word-jugglery²⁵ in the practice of which he had obtained considerable readiness. The picture which Plato draws of him shows him to be an immature young man, not yet beyond the phrases of his student life, the height of whose self-conceit is only to be measured by the shallowness of his performances. He has absolutely no appreciation of dialectical methods; hence he has to be instructed in them repeatedly by Socrates, only to make the same mistakes again.²⁶ In moral questions he displays weakness and uncertainty.²⁷ He cannot deny a certain innate feeling for a moral standard in human actions (τὸ καλόν); and yet all his efforts are directed to the acquisition and possession of external power. Whenever this comes before his vision in all its glitter, he is filled with admiration for it, and overlooks entirely the immoral means which are employed in the attainment of his end. The examples of good and bad rulers, of well-ordered and lawless government, which his own country furnished, have taught him nothing. Nay, rather, his own case serves to show most clearly how small a foundation of truth lies in the admission wrung from Gorgias, that some knowledge of the principles of right and morality was an indispensable necessity for his instruction in rhetoric.

²⁴ Chronological accuracy is hardly to be demanded.

²⁵ In *Phaedr.* 267 b he is said to be the inventor of such devices of εὐπεία as διπλασιολογία, γνωμολογία, εἰκονολογία, and artistic word-coinage after the fashion of Licymnius. See Thompson's note on this passage.

²⁶ What Socrates says with unmistakable irony of the pupils of Gorgias in *Meno* 70 b, applies excellently to Polus: καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔθος ὑμᾶς εἶθικεν (Γοργίας), ἀφόβως τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐὰν τίς τι ἐρηται, ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς εἰδότες κτέ.

²⁷ Cf. 470 c.

The small formative power of this instruction is well shown by the case of the trained disciple himself, while the opposition of its pretended aims to all moral principles is clearly brought out by the inconsistency and self-contradiction displayed in the views which he advances. For a refutation of these false views, nothing further is necessary than the exposition of the few remnants of truth still remaining in them. From what has been said, we can easily appreciate the importance of the character of Polus for the artistic development of the dialogue.

Next in importance to Polus is Callicles, who, however, stands 15 in a different and much freer relation to Gorgias, although he may also in a certain sense be looked upon as his pupil. Of the circumstances of his life we know nothing more than can be gathered from this dialogue. He must have been of noble rank and rich, else Gorgias would hardly have been staying at his house. He seems to be abreast of the culture and spirit of his age, is versed in the poets, and wholly devoted to politics. From 515 a, we judge that he must have entered practical life not long before; and we may accordingly consider him as a man in the early prime of life. He is no theorist, like the other two, but a practical politician; not a teacher, but a statesman, who from his past life has drawn much useful experience, and now prosecutes his designs with definite purpose. For him the art of speech is only that for which it was intended, — namely, the means of acquiring a high position in public life. Since he was already fully in possession of the training of the period, he was well adapted to disclose all the principles on which his view of life was founded, and in accordance with which he was now pursuing his public career. Hence he represents the materialistic tendency, which recognizes profit only in enjoyment, only in the sensual pleasures, and scorns as an antiquated prejudice all acting in conformity with moral principles. But his materialism is by no means either coarse or effeminate; it is joined with a delicate culture and an energetic spirit; at least, he would wish it so. Hence he appears as an aristocrat (*καλὸς κἀγαθός* in its political sense) and despiser of the ignoble crowd, while at the same time he holds himself aloof from philosophy, because it makes men unpractical

and unfits them for great efforts and designs. As a practical orator, he possesses a perfect mastery of form, and knows not only how to utter his sentiments with rhetorical swing and force, but also how to defend them with spirit, wit, and (what Polus could not do) with arguments of logical sequence. Socrates is able to defeat him only by contrasting with the false view the better and true one, and supporting the latter by all the means of positive dialectic at his command. Of course Callicles' point of view does not permit him to acknowledge his defeat by dialectic; for he despises its methods from the outset, believes that he has advanced far beyond it, and professes to find the position occupied by Socrates one which has been long abandoned by thinking men. He is complete in himself, and entirely self-sufficient, and therefore becomes annoyed that Socrates should wish to awaken him out of his security or abase his self-confidence. This is the reason that he continually (482 c, 491 a, 499 b) speaks as if he were vastly beyond Socrates; that he makes really unreasonable objections to Socrates' method of argument (497 a, 511 a); that in his irritation he tries to withdraw from the discussion, or declares that he continues it only out of courtesy (501 c, 505 c, 510 a, 516 b); and that while he finally (513 c) admits the correctness of Socrates' teachings, he refuses to accept it for himself. With this, at the same time, the personal good will which he expresses (486 a) for Socrates agrees. But this is due really to his courteous disposition or to circumstances, rather than to genuine respect and appreciation. How much it is worth, is clearly shown by what Socrates says in 487 c.

- 16 On Socrates' side we find Chaerephon. Xenophon (*Mem.* I. 2. 48) numbers him among those friends of Socrates who in their intercourse with him had none but the purest motives and designs. In his nature there was something enthusiastic, even flighty, and this caused the surname *μανικός* to be applied to him as well as to Apollodorus.²⁸ In *Apol.* 21 a Socrates himself relates the story

²⁸ *Charm.* 153 b Χαίρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὢν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρὸς με. For the application of the name to Apollodorus, cf. *Sym.* 173 d,

where, in a description of his character, we find these words, καὶ ὁπόθεν ποτὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔλαβες τὸ μανικὸς καλεῖσθαι, οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε.

that Chaerephon had the boldness to demand of the oracle at Delphi whether any man were wiser than Socrates. In the same passage, it is mentioned that he was among those banished under the government of the Thirty. Soon after his return he died, not living to see the trial of his master. He is made an object of ridicule by Aristophanes,²⁹ along with Socrates, inasmuch as he was looked upon as his master's model pupil. Hence it is fitting that he should appear here with Socrates. He is, even though he has only an unimportant part to play, the representative of Socrates' followers and friends, and thus far serves to offset Polus. He understands the Socratic method and knows how to employ it skilfully, while Polus was but a clumsy imitator of the external features of his master's style. Hence while Polus places himself if not above his master, at least on an equal plane, Chaerephon shows throughout a heart-felt love and subordination to Socrates.

B. Place.

As regards the place³⁰ where we are to assume that this dialogue took place, Plato does not give us any such definite information as he does in other dialogues, for example, in the *Crito*, *Phaedo*, or *Protagoras*. Only certain expressions in the introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and Chaerephon show clearly the negative fact, that we are not to look upon the house of Callicles as the scene of the *Gorgias*. This follows first of all from the words of Callicles in which he invites Socrates and Chaerephon to come to his house to listen to a lecture similar to the one which Gorgias has just held. Since, however, the preceding words of Socrates and Chaerephon show that they have come to the spot where the festal exhibition has just taken place, and that the lecture promised by Callicles can only be intended for some later time, and is so understood and courteously put aside by Socrates, and since, on the other hand,

²⁹ Ar. Nub. 104, 503 et al.

³⁰ The view advocated here by Cron is discussed at great length in the *Beiträge*, pp. 25-35. The view formerly received is that the dialogue was held in the house of Callicles.

Schleiermacher was the first to oppose this, and he was followed by Woolsey, Cron, and later by Kratz. In addition to the German critics, the house of Callicles is assumed also by Thompson (?) and Cope.

the discussion is immediately opened in the name of Socrates by Chaerephon, without any intimation of a pause or change of place, which would hardly be consistent with the simple setting of the dialogue, therefore it follows of necessity that the whole discussion takes place in the very spot where Gorgias had just held his splendid harangue. But since the house of Callicles, where Gorgias is staying as a guest, cannot be the scene of this harangue, we must lay aside any idea of a private dwelling, such as is the scene of the *Protagoras*, and imagine the scene of the *Gorgias* to be, perhaps, one of the gymnasiums so often mentioned in Plato's writings, which owing to its size and arrangement, was well adapted for such exhibitions before a large number of hearers, with the view of drawing pupils. Other persons, beside those already named, must also have been present at this discussion as silent listeners, as we can assume from several passages;³¹ and the use of *θόρυβος* in 458 c seems to indicate that their number was considerable.

C. Time.

- 18 The time³² at which the dialogue is to be conceived as taking place must be determined by the different allusions which occur in the course of it. These unfortunately refer to events so various that their dates mutually exclude each other; and the author seems to have allowed himself almost a poet's license. We must, therefore, from all these different allusions, try to select that especial circumstance which would be likely to have made the deepest impression upon the minds of contemporaries; and having decided upon this, we have a good basis from which to assume a date for the dialogue. The most important event alluded to is the death of Pericles (503 c), which compels us in any case to assume a time different from that which the mention in the *Protagoras* of Pericles and his sons as living, causes us to assume for

³¹ 447 c, 455 c, 458 c, 473 e, 490 e.
See note on 455 c.

³² A complete discussion of the various views regarding the supposed date of the *Gorgias* is given in Cron's *Beiträge*, pp. 35-47. Since that time

(1870) there has been but little discussion. Hirschig (1873) does not agree with Cron, — nay, does not even mention his view; Thompson (1871) and Schmelzer (1883) do not touch the question.

that dialogue. At first sight the addition of the adverb *νεωστί*, "lately," seems to go far towards fixing the date, but the indefiniteness of *νεωστί* (see the note) and its entirely relative meaning forbid us to trust to it as a backward limit of time. The fact that Gorgias came from Leontini to Athens as ambassador in 427, Ol. 88. 1, also gives us no certain help, for we have no reason to suppose that he was only *once* at Athens—rather the contrary—and in the passage there is no definite allusion to that especial period. Still, the assumption that we have to imagine the period of this apparently first acquaintanceship of the Athenians with Gorgias as the time of our dialogue, would harmonize well enough with the above-mentioned allusion to Pericles's death, and also with the circumstance, that in 472 *a*, Nicias and Aristocrates are referred to as living, of whom we know that the former perished in the expedition against Syracuse, and the latter was one of the condemned³³ after the battle of Arginusae. This allusion prevents us from setting the date of the dialogue later than 413, and at the same time weakens the value of the otherwise especially noteworthy passage in 473 *e*, where Socrates speaks of his unskilfulness in political matters as shown by his conduct in the assembly. The mention of his office as senator and the duty of *ἐπιψηφίζειν* reminds us strikingly of the chronologically exact account of this same occurrence in the *Apology*. But Plato has avoided an express reference to the historical event mentioned there, perhaps designedly, in order not to give any too definite chronological background to his story. Hence we may possibly, if not probably, consider that he is alluding to some other event than the celebrated trial of the impeached generals, and need not be compelled to hold to the year 405 as the supposed time of our dialogue. The citations from the *Antiope* of Euripides, which was brought out in 410, need not cause us any trouble either, since it is just in such matters that Plato allows himself the greatest liberties, as is shown by the celebrated anachronism in the *Protagoras*, the mention of the Ἄγριοι of Pherecrates.³⁴

³³ *Apol.* 32 *b*.

³⁴ This play was brought out in 420, while the supposed time of the

Protagoras is put at 432 or 433 by most editors. See Towle-Sauppe's *Intro.* pp. 6 *f*.

- 19 The important references seem therefore to point to a period of time included between the years 427 and 413.³⁵ Other allusions to circumstances and events also agree with this assumption. Thus in 481 *a*, Alcibiades, who was born in 450, and Demus, son of Pyrilampes, are contrasted, — the former as the sweetheart of Socrates, the latter as that of Callicles. Again, in 519 *a*, there is an allusion to the political activity of Alcibiades. Finally in 470 *d* we find a reference to Archelaus, who seized the kingdom of Macedon in 414, as a ruler who was now at the height of his fortune, the admiration and envy of the world. To fix the date more definitely within this period seems to be a matter of impossibility. If we assume it to be nearer to 413, we do not attach so much weight to the reference to the death of Pericles as it apparently deserves. If from other grounds we desire to keep the year 427 for the visit of Gorgias to Athens which we are now discussing, the reference to Archelaus adds another anachronism to the one already mentioned of the *Antiope* of Euripides. Such an anachronism, it is true, would not be more strange than the well-known one in the *Symposion*, where the violence shown the Mantineans by Sparta, fifteen years after the death of Socrates, is mentioned at a banquet, at which Socrates is represented as being a guest; but the rise of the kingdom of Macedon could not but have a very important bearing on the politics of Greece, and it is likely that the Athenians regarded, even at this early day, the intrusion of a new force into the political arena as more momentous than even the death of Pericles. This reference would then be a clear indication for the time when the star of the Macedonian king was already in the ascendant.
- 20 Certain other references to persons and facts are also found, such as the mention of the painters Polygnotus and Zeuxis in 448 *b*, 453 *c*, and of the dithyrambic poet Cinesias in 501 *e*, but these are not definite enough to be exactly dated, and therefore need not be taken into consideration in the present question.

³⁵ Zeller, in an article *Über die Anachronismen in den Platonischen Gesprächen* (*Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie*, 1873), places the assumed date before 420, and Susemihl seems

now (Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, i. 5) to hold the same view. Cf. his *Kleine Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte in Fleckeisen's J. J.* cxv. pp. 793 ff., and Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, xix. p. 144.

5. PLAN OF THE DIALOGUE.³⁰

The plan of the dialogue would depend of course on the object 21 which the author had in mind. The third section of this Introduction has already shown that that object was to make clear and emphasize the opposition from the moral point of view between Rhetoric, as the generally recognized medium of political activity and ambition, and Philosophy, the true calling and aim of a man's life, as claimed by Socrates. This contrast is, however, not made prominent at once, but is the subject of the discussion with Callicles, which must therefore be considered as the most important part of the dialogue. This is preceded by the conversation of Socrates with Gorgias and Polus, which although it is divided between the two persons, is still shown clearly to be practically a single discussion. For not only are the discussions with these two persons outwardly united by the forwardness of Polus, whose pushing egotism is only equalled by his dialectical incapacity, but they betray also an internal connexion in their subject-matter, inasmuch as they both treat the question as to the nature and value of rhetoric, and both likewise are marked by vagueness of idea and uncertainty of moral feeling in the answers given it. This vagueness and uncertainty is in striking contrast to the reckless decision with which Callicles announces and defends his principles, — a contrast, too, which must be the more mortifying to Gorgias and Polus, since they, as theorists and teachers, are opposed to the mere practical statesman, who, however, of himself more than overbalances both the others together. In like manner, the discussion with Callicles, as its subject is more important, has a much wider compass than both the preceding together. A certain parallelism with the previous double discussion is also very apparent, in the fact that the discussion with Callicles is broken nearly in the middle by the

³⁰ Bonitz (*Platonische Studien*, Wien, 1858, i. p. 33) well says: "It can hardly be doubted any longer that the substance and object of the whole dialogue is given in the question, 'Is

Philosophy in the Platonic sense, or is political Rhetoric, in the condition in which it at that time actually was, a worthy calling for life?'" See Cron, *Beiträge*, 47-65.

interruption caused by Callicles' refusal to take part further in the discussion; owing to which refusal and because no one else is willing to enter the lists,³⁷ Socrates is compelled to answer his own questions in Callicles' place, until he succeeds in drawing him again into the conversation. With this section the dialectical development reaches its highest point; now begins that change (*μετάβασις*) which in the poetical drama is denoted by the term *περιπέτεια*, — the catastrophe; for up to this point the opponents of Socrates' view of life and its duties, in the case both of the individual in private and of the public aggregations of individuals into a state, have been continually increasing their efforts, partly owing to the growing heat of argument, partly also because they have had to call all their resources to their aid; now, however, a relaxation takes place — they have failed in the opposition — and it only remains for Socrates to expound more fully the theory which he has defended so successfully. Very effectively as far as the chief object of the dialogue is concerned, and also with admirable artistic feeling, the author makes Socrates begin this final section with a resumé of the results obtained in the conversation with Callicles. But inasmuch as the latter, in accordance with his deeply rooted manner of thinking and living, even at the last moment obstinately clings to his view of what the true man ought to do, Socrates finds it necessary to show the universal and eternal application of his theory, the inevitable and decisive victory of truth over error, in an independent section. In striking contrast with the dialectical sharpness and accuracy of the previous discussions, this conclusion appears couched in the guise of a mythical story. There is, however, a special fitness in this, for its religious coloring causes the whole exposition to appeal with convincing power to the feelings of the reader, and goes far to prepare him for the earnest and solemn warning with which the dialogue closes. This conclusion, short in compass, in contents and form intensely oratorical, serves also to preserve the due artistic proportions of the work; for it corresponds to the short introductory conversation between Callicles, Socrates, and

³⁷ 505 d ΣΩ. τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; sc. ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

Chaerephon. And just as this introduction, through the medium of the question which Chaerephon propounds to Gorgias, and which Polus presses forward to answer, leads naturally and gradually to the progressively developing scientific discussion,—so this discussion through the medium of this mythologically colored λόγος is led over to the concluding exhortation in which we, whose eyes are opened, can see clearly the power and warmth of deep moral conviction.

Simple as is the setting of the *Gorgias*, it yet belongs among the greatest, from the point of view of artistic perfection, of the dialogues of Plato.⁸⁸ For, aside from the absorbing interest of the question discussed, one can hardly fail to notice as he reads, both in the choice and characterization of persons (ἦθος), and also in the progressive development of the discussion, how completely all the requirements of art are satisfied, thus making the *Gorgias* as a prose work fit to challenge comparison with any of the works of the poetical drama.

6. SUMMARY OF THE DIALOGUE.⁸⁹

Introduction. Preliminary conversation on the scene of Gorgias' 22 just concluded speech. Socrates desires to have some conversation with Gorgias. Callicles invites him to his house for the purpose. Socrates bids Chaerephon ask Gorgias what he professes to be.

⁸⁸ In the *Introd. to Apol.* § 52, Dyer-Cron divides the dialogues of Plato into three classes, according to their setting: (1) the simplest form, which 'has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons.' Then the narrated dialogues: (2) those 'without preface, and with no account of the persons to whom

the narrative or reading is made, or (3) those introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners.' Typical examples are *Gorgias*, *Republic*, and *Phaedo*.

⁸⁹ This summary, which is not found in Cron's edition, is drawn from Deuschle's *Dispositionen der Apologie und des Gorgias von Platon* (2d ed. by Cron, Leipzig, 1867), and adapted to the short skeleton of the dialogue which is given by Cron in his *Beiträge* (Leipzig, 1870), pp. 73 ff.

Discussion. 447 d-527 a.

I. 447 d-481 b. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias and Polus. What is Rhetoric, and what is its power?

Introduction. 447 d-448 d. Chaerephon puts the question to Gorgias. Polus pushes forward and attempts to answer the question, of what art Gorgias is master, by praising the art.

A. 448 d-461 c. Dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias. Attempt to define the nature of Rhetoric and its relation to moral principles, — with self-contradictory results.

Introduction. 448 d-449 d. Socrates shows the error into which Polus has fallen. Definition of his art, Rhetoric, by Gorgias. Socrates insists upon a discussion according to dialectical methods.

1. 449 d-457 c. Attempt to obtain a definition of Rhetoric.

a. 449 d-453 a. Determination of the specific class to which Rhetoric must be assigned.

a. 449 d-451 a. First attempt at definition. But the characteristic is too general and only external.

β. 451 a-453 a. Second attempt at definition. Rhetoric (with its varieties) is classed under the specific idea *πειθώ*.

b. 453 a-457 c. An examination of the definition just obtained.

a. 453 a-455 a. Its meaning.

aa. up to 454 c. Determination of the object to which the *πειθώ* is directed, — right and wrong.

ββ. up to 455 a. Determination of the nature of the *πειθώ*, — pretence, without knowledge.

β. 455 b-457 c. Its compass.

aa. up to 456 c. Indefinite extension of the field of Rhetoric.

ββ. up to 457 c. Admission of the possibility of a misuse of the power Rhetoric gives.

2. 457 c-461 c. Proof of the contradiction between Gorgias' conception and presentation.

Transition. 457 c-458 e. Question as to the continuation of the discussion.

- a. 458 e-460 d. A definite statement of Gorgias' view.
 a. up to 459 c. In general, the orator need have no knowledge of the matters on which he speaks.
 β. up to 460 d. In the special case of right, however, he must be able as well as desirous to know it.
 (This involves an inner contradiction.)
- b. 460 d-461 c. Proof of the (external) contradiction between this definitely stated view and the admission made above of the possibility of a misuse of Rhetoric.
- B. 461 c-481 c. Dialogue between Socrates and Polus. Value of Rhetoric according to the standard of moral principle.
 Transition. 461 c-462 b. Polus objects to Socrates' method. Socrates exacts a condition in regard to the manner of conducting the discussion.
1. 462 b-468 e. Exposition of the real nature, and little value of Rhetoric (in general).
 a. 462 b-466 a. The real nature of Rhetoric.
 a. 462 b-463 d. Vain attempt of Polus to lead the discussion by propounding the questions himself. General characterization of Rhetoric.
 β. 463 e-466 a. Complete presentation and exposition of Socrates' view of the nature of Rhetoric.
- b. 466 a-468 e. From this determination of the nature of Rhetoric is deduced the result that it is of little value.
 a. 466 a-467 c. Polus questions unskillfully. Socrates declares as a consequence of the definition the entire weakness of Rhetoric.
 β. 467 c-468 e. Socrates takes control of the discussion and *proves* this consequence from the difference between *βούλεσθαι* and *δοκεῖν*.
2. 468 e-479 e. Declaration of the moral principles which serve as the standard for this judgment.
 Transition. 468 e-470 c. A discussion in which the meaning of Polus is formulated (by a limitation) in opposition to the principle enumerated by Socrates.
 a. 470 c-474 a. Negative portion. Vain attempt of Polus to combat the moral principles of Socrates.

a. 470 c-472 d. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, 'If any one do wrong, he is not happy.' — Criticism of the argument by Socrates.

β. 472 d-474 a. Vain attempt of Polus to refute the proposition, 'He who suffers punishment for a wrong committed is happier than he who escapes such punishment.' — Criticism of the argument by Socrates.

b. 474 b-479 e. Positive portion. Socrates brings forward his proofs.

a. 474 b-475 e. Proof of the proposition, 'Doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering wrong.'

β. 476 a-479 e. Proof of the proposition, 'To remain without punishment for a wrong committed is the greatest possible evil.'

Conclusion. 480 a-481 b. Results in regard to the employment of Rhetoric

a. For protection of one's self or one's friends.

β. For the injury of one's enemies.

23 II. 481 b-522 e. Dialogue between Socrates and Callicles. What is the true theory in life, — the rhetorical-political or the philosophical-ethical?

Introduction. 481 b-482 c. Callicles recognizes that the ethical theory of life advocated by Socrates and the ordinary practice of men are diametrically opposed. Socrates shows that all human effort should be the outcome of a harmony of the soul in thought and action.

A. 482 c-505 c. Negative portion. Exposition and refutation of the rhetorical-political theory of life (Attack and Defence).

1. 482 c-495 a. Exposition of the rhetorical-political theory of life.

a. 482 c-486 d. General exposition. Commendation of the political, rejection of the philosophical calling.

(Rhetorical part.)

Introduction. 482 c-e. Criticism of the manner of procedure which Socrates has followed towards Polus and Gorgias.

- a. 482 e-484 c. Opposition between natural right and legal right.
 - aa. up to 483 c. Explanation of the nature of both and of the origin of the latter.
 - ββ. up to 484 c. Alleged proofs of the right of the stronger, drawn from history and from
 - Pindar.
- β. 484 c-485 e. Opposition between political and philosophical activity.
 - aa. up to 485 a. Objections to the latter.
 - ββ. up to 485 e. Its usefulness is limited to a preparation for political activity.
- Conclusion. 485 e-486 d. Recommendation of the rhetorical-political activity for Socrates, on the ground of the danger which threatens him.
- Transition. 486 d-488 b. Socrates shows the importance of the question under discussion and the conditions which allow the hope of a satisfactory result.
- b. 488 b-495 a. Exposition of the view of Callicles from the point of view of its leading principle in a dialectical discussion.
 - a. 488 b-491 b. (Preparatory portion.) Test of the proposition as to the right of the stronger.
 - aa. up to 489 b. First limitation of the stronger, to that which is more powerful in bodily strength or greater in mass.
 - ββ. up to 491 b. Second limitation to that which is more clever.
 - β. 491 b-495 a. Disclosure of the fundamental principle of the theory of Callicles.
 - aa. 491 c-492 d. In general. The essence of happiness and the end of human effort is the satisfaction of the desires, however great they may be.
 - ββ. 492 d-495 a. In particular. Passion of itself without limitation, or the pleasant, is the good.
- 2. 495 a-505 c. Refutation of the theory of Callicles as shown in its fundamental principle.

a. 495 a-499 b. Refutation of the theory that pleasure is the chief end of man. Arguments against the identity of the pleasant and the good.

a. 495 a-497 d. Direct proof.

β. 497 d-499 b. Indirect proof.

Transition. Acknowledgment that only a part of man's desires are good, the other part being evil.

b. 499 b-505 c. Deduction of the immediate consequences of that principle.

a. 499 b-501 d. Determination of a general antithesis, to serve

aa. up to 500 d. As a standard of judgment in regard to human actions.

ββ. up to 501 d. As a means of determining the principles which underlie human occupations.

β. 501 d-505 c. Application of it to special occupations.

aa. up to 502 d. To the varieties of music and poetry.

ββ. up to 505 c. To Rhetoric in particular. The standard of judgment for the actions of the statesman.

B. 505 c-522 e. Dialectical exposition of the philosophical-ethical theory of life, as opposed to the rhetorical-political.

1. 505 c-513 c. This theory must determine the life of the individual. Ethics *per se*.

a. 505 c-508 c. Positive arguments to show that this theory must determine the life of the individual.

a. up to 507 c. The teaching of virtue for its own sake.

β. up to 508 c. The teaching of virtue in relation to the attainment of happiness.

b. 508 c-513 c. Negative justification. Refutation of the objection that life according to philosophical principles must make a man incapable of helping himself.

a. up to 511 a. Determination of what true self-help is: Defence against wrong doing, not wrong suffering.

β. up to 513 c. Refutation of the idea which lies at the basis of this objection, viz. that under any circumstances a man should try to live as long as he can.

2. 513 c-521 a. Application of the ethical principle to Politics.

a. 513 c-517 a. Empirical determination of the business of the statesman

a. 513 c-515 c. By establishing the preliminary conditions which must be fulfilled.

β. 515 c-517 a. By a criticism of the most celebrated Athenian statesmen, from the point of view of their skill as displayed in the results of their efforts.

b. 517 a-521 a. Logical confirmation of this judgment

a. 517 a-519 b. By a distinction between the true art of statesmanship and that which is only time-serving (pretended).

β. 519 b-521. By the demonstration of the necessary connexion which exists between the statesman's course of action, and the behavior of the citizens toward him. Analogy between Rhetoric and Sophistic.

Conclusion and transition, 521 a-522 c. Choice between the two kinds of statesmanship. Callicles commends the time-serving or flattering art with regard unto the danger of death which would otherwise threaten. Socrates declares himself as one who under existing circumstances intends, as far as possible, to practise the true statecraft in spite of the danger of death which threatens.

III. 523 a-527 a. Epilogue. Mythical exposition of the object, 24 after death, to which the efforts of a man should be directed in life.

A. 523 a-524 b. Myth of the origin of the judgment of the souls of the dead, and how this is conducted.

B. 524 b-527 a. Results.

a. up to 525 b. The nature of death and the form in which the soul appears after death.

b. up to 527 a. The condition of the soul after death, under a system of rewards and punishments, in accordance with each man's life in this world.

Conclusion. Recapitulation of the leading contents of the dialogue, and exhortation of Callicles.

7. TIME OF COMPOSITION OF THE DIALOGUE.

- 25 This must of course be distinguished from the time assumed for the meeting of Socrates, Gorgias, and Callicles (§§ 18 ff.). Hence to determine it, the very anachronisms which offer so much difficulty in determining the assumed time are often of great value. This is not so much the case, however, in the *Gorgias* as in some other dialogues, since, leaving out of account the anachronisms, no ground exists for assuming the date of composition to be before 405. Nay, rather, the subject and whole tone of the work, as shown in the many passages which must strike every reader as plain allusions to the fate of Socrates as an already accomplished fact, compel the assumption of some time subsequent to this tragic event. But that it was written not very long after Socrates' death is shown by the evident traces of moral indignation in the references to the existing government and the actions of prominent statesmen. This assumption would fix the date as shortly after the composition of the *Apology* and *Crito*.⁴⁰ This is supported, though one could hardly say confirmed, by the statement of Athenaeus, that Gorgias was still living when this dialogue was brought out.⁴¹

⁴⁰ This is the view generally adopted. The majority of the editors are content to give this period, rather than a definite date. Thompson puts it at 395, and Cope in the period between 395-388. The most recent treatment of the question is by S. Sudhaus in *Rhein. Mus.* xlv. pp. 54-63, who thinks that the *Gorgias* is

directed against Isocrates, who is represented by Callicles, and is a kind of reply to the *Πρὸς Νικοκλέα* (377 B.C.). Isocrates, on this view, defends himself against the strictures of the *Gorgias* in the *Νικοκλής* (375 B.C.). Hence the date of the composition of the *Gorgias* must be 376.

⁴¹ Athenaeus xi. 113 (505 d).

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ,
ΠΩΛΟΣ.

Stephanus I. p. 447.

Ι. ΚΑΛΛΙΚΛΗΣ. Πολέμου καὶ μάχης φασὶ χρῆναι, ὃ Σώ-
κρατες, οὕτω μεταλαγχάνειν.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον κατόπιν ἐορτῆς ἤκομεν
καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν;

5 ΚΑΛ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἀστείας ἐορτῆς. πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ
καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπεδείξατο.

447 I. 1. πολέμου καὶ μάχης: Socrates
a and Chaerephon come just after Gor-
gias has finished his lecture. Calli-
cles receives them with a jest, the
point of which lies in the οὕτω. In
the double expression, the more gen-
eral precedes, as is natural, the more
definite. — μεταλαγχάνειν: occurs also
in *Rep.* 429 a with ἐπιστήμης, and *Leg.*
873 c with αἰσχύνης. It is rare.

3. τὸ λεγόμενον: in appos. with
the sentence. See G. 137, 3; H.
626 b. — κατόπιν ἐορτῆς: proverbial,
like post festum. This would call
up to the Greek mind their public ex-
hibitions, and the banquets with which
they closed. Here is probably also
an allusion to the extravagant enthu-
siasm which led the Athenians to
designate as festivals those days on

which Gorgias lectured. See *Introd.* 447
§ 4 *fin.* a

5. καὶ μάλα γ' ἀστείας: Hirschig
remarks the frequency of such an-
swers as these, which avoid the repe-
tition of the last word of the preced-
ing question. *Cf. Theaet.* 168 e ἀλλ'
οὐ τοι σοῦ γε, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον, *Crat.*
391 b. — ἀστείας: properly belonging to
a city. It became an adj. of quality
inasmuch as city festivals and cele-
brations are naturally superior to
those of the country. It is used here
in a good sense, though it may also
mean "citized."

6. ἐπεδείξατο: the aor. is necessi-
tated by the time-limit (ὀλίγον πρό-
τερον). — ὀλίγον πρότερον: the first
word is an acc. of extent; the second
is adverbial.

ΣΩ. Τούτων μέντοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, αἴτιος Χαιρεφῶν ὄδε, ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἀναγκάσας ἡμᾶς διατρήσαι.

ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ. Οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ
10 ἰάσομαι. φίλος γάρ μοι Γοργίας, ὥστ' ἐπιδείξεται ἡμῖν,
εἰ μὲν δοκεῖ, νῦν, ἐὰν δὲ βούληται, εἰσαυθίς.

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν; ἐπιθυμεῖ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαι
Γοργίου;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐπ' αὐτό γέ τοι τοῦτο πάρεσμεν.

15 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν βούλησθε παρ' ἐμὲ ἤκειν οἴκαδε,
παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ Γοργίας καταλύει, καὶ ἐπιδείξεται ὑμῖν.

⁴⁴⁷ 7. **τούτων**: the pl. refers to the fact and its consequences. — **ὄδε**: is deictic. — **ἐν ἀγορᾷ**: the omission of the art. shows that this was a phrase like 'in town,' 'on change.' By this time, *ἀγορά* had come in Athens to mean simply the exchange, or market-place, where people assembled not for public debate (that was in the Pnyx), but for business. It was a favorite resort of Socrates, since there the discourse of people offered him the best opportunity for prosecuting his god-given vocation (cf. *Introd.* to *Apol.* § 25, and *Apol.* 33 a ff.). Cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 10 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε αἰετὶ μὲν ἦν ἐν τῷ φανερώ· πρῶτ' τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ἦεν καὶ πληθούσης ἀγορᾶς ἐκεῖ φανερός ἦν, κτέ. — **ἀναγκάσας**: the literal meaning is not to be pressed. Chaerephon as the constant companion of Socrates took the liveliest interest in all his actions.

b 9. **οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα**: shows the asyndeton of ordinary conversation. — **ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ ἰάσομαι**: prob. contains some allusion to the story of Telephus, who when wounded by Achilles received from the oracle the assurance *ὃ τρώσας (καὶ) ἰάσεται*. The

myth was made the subject of a noted tragedy by Euripides.

^b 10. **ὥστε ἐπιδείξεται**: *ὥστε*, when combined with the ind., can for all practical purposes be treated as if it were compounded of *οὕτως* and *τέ*. Cf. *Lat. itaque*. See on 458 d. — **ἐπιδείξεται**: here used absolutely in the same sense as above. The fut. has two sides, one corresponding to each condition; thus it is equiv. to (1) *ἐθέλει ἐπιδείκνυσθαι εἰ δοκεῖ*, and (2) *ἐπιδείξεται ἐὰν βούληται*. Cf. a different case in 502 b, with note.

12. **τί δέ**: the question shows that Chaerephon had not anticipated any great eagerness on Socrates' part.

14. **ἐπ' αὐτό**: the pronoun is emphatic. See on 458 a. The emphasis is heightened by *γέ*.

15. **ὅταν βούλησθε κτέ.**: contains an invitation, the basis of which is given by the clause with *γάρ*. The original conclusion of the condition was to be *ἐπιδείξεται*, but in the course of the *γάρ* clause the speaker lost sight of this and continued with the co-ordinate construction. — **παρ' ἐμὲ ἤκειν οἴκαδε**: this shows that the speakers are neither in nor before the house of Callicles. On the place of meeting, see *Introd.* § 17.

Σο. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις. ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐβελήσειεν ἂν
 ἡμῶν διαλεχθῆναι; βούλομαι γὰρ πυθέσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ^c
 τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὃ ἐπαγ-
 20 γέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει· τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν εἰσαυθίς,
 ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ποιησάσθω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέν οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ
 γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐν τοῦτ' ἦν τῆς ἐπιδείξεως· ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὴ
 ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα
 25 ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι.

Σο. Ὡ καλῶς λέγεις. Ὡ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

447 17. ἐβελήσειεν ἂν: Socrates uses the
^c opt. with ἂν a great deal, esp. when he
 first meets a person. It is the mood
 of courtesy, but not of argument. In
 this dialogue the opt. preponderates
 at the beginning, but the subjv. over-
 takes it in the argumentative passage
 471, 472; while in the whole dialogue
 the proportion of subjs. to opt. is 3
 to 2.

18. διαλεχθῆναι: emphasized in order
 to contrast Socrates' method with
 the ἐπίδειξις of Gorgias.

19. δύναμις (vis): i.e. the power
 and inner meaning of the art, with
 which the ἐπάγγελμα should corre-
 spond, — the scope or compass. — ἐπα-
 γγέλλεται κτ.ι.: cf. *Apol.* 33 b ὦν
 μήτε ὑπεσχόμεν μᾶθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα.
 ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι is the regular word in
 Greek for 'advertise', 'profess.'

✓ 20. τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἐπίδειξιν: it does
 not follow from this that Socrates
 considered the διαλεχθῆναι as a kind
 of ἐπίδειξις. It is only an example of
 the idiomatic Greek usage of ἄλλος,
 which does not include but excludes
 the word with which it is connected.
Cf. 473 c πολιτῶν καὶ ἄλλων ξένων,
Apol. 36 b. See G. 142, 2, n. 3; H.
 705. We must use a circumlocution,

or another word, in English. In Cal- 447
 licles' answer, however, the attribu- ^c
 tive force is regained.

21. ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις: const. closely
 with εἰσαυθίς, as referring to the in-
 vitation of Callicles to come to his
 home.

22. οὐδέν οἶον τὸ αὐτόν ἐρωτᾶν:
*there is nothing like asking the man
 himself.* The articular infinitive is a
 favorite with Plato. He uses it most
 commonly in the acc. The nom.
 comes next in frequency, with the
 gen. a close third. The dat. is much
 less frequent. The pr. tense occurs
 nine times oftener than the aor., show-
 ing a great advance on Pindar. See
Am. Jour. Phil. III. 193–201.

23. αὐτῷ: on account of its mean-
 ing ("the master," *Kr.* 51. 5, 4; *H.*
 681 c) is placed in this emphatic
 position. On the matter itself see
Introd. § 7, and the passage from
Meno quoted *Introd.* n. 12. Auditors
 are present also at the following dia-
 logue (*cf.* *Introd.* § 17 *fin.*). — ἐκέλευε:
 imperf., because the same bidding or
 invitation was given to the different
 members of the group. *He bade us all.*

26. καλῶς λέγεις: expresses more
 satisfaction than εὖ λέγεις just before.

ΧΑΙ. Τί ἔρωμαι;

ΣΩ. Ὅστις ἐστίν.

ΧΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

- 30 ΣΩ. Ὡςπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ὑποδημάτων δημιουργός, ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν δήπου σοι ὅτι σκυτοτόμος· ἣ οὐ μανθάνεις ὥς λέγω;

II. ΧΑΙ. Μανθάνω καὶ ἐρήσομαι. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Γοργία, ἀληθῆ λέγει Καλλικλῆς ὅδε, ὅτι ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τίς σε ἐρωτᾷ;

ΓΟΡΓΙΑΣ. Ἀληθῆ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν· καὶ γὰρ νυνδὴ αὐτὰ 448 5 ταῦτα ἐπηγγελλόμεν, καὶ λέγω ὅτι οὐδεὶς μέ πω ἠρώτηκε καινὸν οὐδὲν πολλῶν ἑτῶν.

ΧΑΙ. Ἡ που ἄρα ῥαδίως ἀποκρινεῖ, ὦ Γοργία.

ΓΟΡ. Πάρεστι τούτου πείραν, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, λαμβάνειν.

ΠΩΛΟΣ. Νῆ Δία· ἂν δέ γε βούλῃ, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, ἐμοῦ.

- 447 d 27. τί ἔρωμαι: deliberative subjunctive.

28. ὅστις ἐστίν: ὅστις is regularly used to ask the question 'who' after a neg. (cf. 524 e, 526 b); but in all cases it may be used to express the idea of quality. See on 453 b.

30. ὥςπερ ἂν . . . ἀπεκρίνατο ἂν: ὥςπερ ἂν εἰ is phraseological, and the second ἂν comes in unconsciously with the conditional apodosis. The use of the aor. with ἂν in the apodosis, following an imperf. with εἰ in the protasis, where both refer to the present sphere of time, is not common, and according to GMT. 414, occurs chiefly in Plato and in such phrases as εἶπον ἂν, ἀπεκρινάμην ἂν. Similar constructions in the past sphere are found with other verbs in Dem., Aristoph., Soph., Eur., Xen., etc. Cf. Dem. xix. 162, Ar. Eq. 507. — δημιουργός: see on 452 a.

II. 1. μανθάνω: one example suffices 447 to make the idea of Socrates clear to Chaerephon; two are not enough for Polus. This is, however, due to the fact that Chaerephon is familiar with Socrates' methods, while they are new and strange to Polus. d

2. ἀποκρίνεσθαι κτέ.: this is the τί of Socrates' question above in c. The tense shows that it is a general standing announcement.

7. ἣ που ἄρα κτέ.: spoken in a 448 wondering, admiring tone which expects an answer. "Surely, then, you must have but little difficulty in replying, Gorgias." The irony lies in (the inferential) ἄρα as well as in ῥαδίως. On the pushing nature and insolence of Polus, see Introd. § 14. What is said generally in Meno 70 b (see Introd. n. 12) of the pupils of Gorgias applies excellently to him.

9. ἐμοῦ: by a very natural shift,

10 Γοργίας μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι μοι δοκεῖ· πολλὰ γὰρ ἄρτι διελήλυθεν.

ΧΑΙ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; οἶει σὺ κάλλιον ἂν Γοργίου ἀποκρίνασθαι;

ΠΩΛ. Τί δὲ τοῦτο, ἐὰν σοί γε ἱκανῶς;

15 ΧΑΙ. Οὐδέν· ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ σὺ βούλει, ἀποκρίνου.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρώτα.

ΧΑΙ. Ἐρώτῳ δὴ. εἰ ἐτύγχανε Γοργίας ἐπιστήμων ὢν τῆς τέχνης ἥσπερ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ Ἡρόδικος, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὠνομάζομεν δικαίως; οὐχ ὅπερ ἐκείνον;

20 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΧΑΙ. Ἰατρὸν ἄρα φάσκοντες αὐτὸν εἶναι καλῶς ἂν ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΧΑΙ. Εἰ δέ γε ἥσπερ Ἀριστοφῶν ὁ Ἀγλαοφῶντος ἢ ὁ 25 ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἔμπειρος ἦν τέχνης, τίνα ἂν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς ἐκαλοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι ζωγράφον.

ΧΑΙ. Νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ τίνος τέχνης ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, τίνα ἂν καλοῦντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς καλοῦμεν;

30 ΠΩΛ. Ὡ Χαιρεφῶν, πολλαὶ τέχναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν

448 after τοῦτον. — 'Gor. You may try the experiment if you please, Chaerephon. Pol. Yes, 'egad, and upon me too, if you like, Chaerephon.' Cope.

10. καὶ ἀπειρηκέναι: gives the ground of Polus' offer. Possibly he may also wish to intimate that Gorgias may now fairly retire, and yield the field to another.

b 14. τί δὲ τοῦτο: sc. διαφέρει. "What difference does this make?" Cf. 497 e. Polus does not wish to slight his master, but only to win admiration for himself.

18. Ἡρόδικος: this brother of Gorgias (see Introd. § 4) must not be confounded with another physician of the same name who came from Selymbria (*Rep.* iii. 406 a, *Phaedr.* 227 d, *Prot.* 316 d), and was famed as the first to insist upon the value of gymnastics for health.

19. ὅπερ: after τίνα by an easy transfer to the actual idea, — 'name.'

24. Aristophon's brother was the celebrated painter Polygnotus of Thasus.

30. Polus speaks as from a book — c perhaps from his own book (462 b).

ἐκ τῶν ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρῆμέναι· ἐμπειρία μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸν αἰῶνα ἡμῶν πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τέχνην, ἀπειρία δὲ κατὰ τύχην. ἐκάστων δὲ τούτων μεταλαμβάνουσιν ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως, τῶν δὲ ἀρίστων οἱ ἀριστοί· ὧν καὶ Γοργίας
35 ἔστιν ὁδε, καὶ μετέχει τῆς καλλίστης τῶν τεχνῶν.

III. ΣΩ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Γοργία, φαίνεται Πῶλος παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς λόγους· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὁ ὑπέσχετο Χαιρεφῶντι οὐ ποιεῖ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ ἐρωτώμενον οὐ πάνυ μοι φαίνεται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ σύ, εἰ βούλει, ἐροῦ αὐτόν.

✓ ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ αὐτῷ γε σοὶ βουλομένῳ ἔστιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον σέ. δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος

448 He overdoes the use of those figures, with which Gorgias also was accustomed to amuse himself, e.g. 'paronomasia' (κατὰ τέχνην . . . κατὰ τύχην) and other phonetic figures in regard to the names of which theorists themselves were not at one. He uses the poetic αἰῶνα instead of βίον. His statements are indefinite and cloudy, and finally he brings forward a wholly general attribute — as Socrates proves in e by the distinction between ποῖα and τίς — of the matter in question, instead of its name. To speak of rhetoric as καλλίστη τῶν τεχνῶν is furthermore dialectically inappropriate, although it well agrees with the artistic design by drawing attention thus early to this idea. For other examples of similar mannerisms, see the speeches which go under the name of Gorgias (e.g. in the appendix to Blass' edition of Antiphon), and which, whether genuine or not, show

admirably the peculiarities of the Gorgianic school.

III. 1. παρεσκευάσθαι εἰς: equipped for. The phrase is a military one; hence λόγους is almost equiv. to the later λογομαχίαν, 'disputation.' The reference is to the readiness with which Polus begins his harangue.

4. τί μάλιστα: how so, pray? To Gorgias' view the question has been well answered.

8 f. οὐκ . . . ἀλλά: the construction is colloquial. οὐκ is to be translated no! The following clause with γέ serves to give the reason for οὐκ, "that is, if." The negative color of the whole complex causes the speaker to ground his position by ἀλλά where one would more naturally find γάρ. It is not necessary to fill out the ellipsis with ἂν ἥδιον σέ either in Greek or English.

9. δῆλος γάρ μοι: on the personal construction, see on 449 b.

10 καὶ ἐξ ὧν εἶρηκεν, ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον
μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι.

ΠΛΑ. Τί δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐρομένου Χαιρεφῶντος τίνος Γοργίας
ἐπιστήμων τέχνης, ἐγκωμιάζεις μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν τέχνην
15 ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος, ἣτις δέ ἐστιν οὐκ ἀπεκρίνω.

ΠΛΑ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι εἷη ἡ καλλίστη;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε. ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἡρώτα ποία τις εἷη ἡ
Γοργίου τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τίς καὶ ὄντινα δέοι καλεῖν τὸν Γορ-
γίαν· ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετείνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ
20 αὐτῷ καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἰπέ 448
τίς ἡ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. μᾶλλον
δέ, ὦ Γοργία, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν εἰπέ, τίνα σε χρὴ καλεῖν ὡς τίνος
ἐπιστήμονα τέχνης.

ΓΟΡ. Τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

25 ΣΩ. Ῥήτορα ἄρα χρὴ σε καλεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἀγαθόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ δὴ ὁ γε εὐχομαι εἶναι,
ὡς ἔφη Ὅμηρος, βούλει με καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.

448 11. διαλέγεσθαι: the most unassum-
d ing name by which Socrates can char-
acterize his practice, so completely
the reverse of the commonly used
rhetoric. The inf. is an acc. verbal
noun.

e 15. ὥσπερ τινὸς ψέγοντος: equiv.
to ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις ἔψεγε.

19. ὑπετείνατο: cf. the Eng. use of
'lay down a proposition or principle'
to serve as analogy for future guid-
ance. Note the asyndeton which ap-
pears somewhat harsh, but is not
uncommon in clauses with ὥσπερ. Cf.
Alcib. I. 108 d τί οὖν τὸ κατὰ ταύτην
ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον ἐστιν; ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ ἐγώ
401 το κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς,

τὴν γυμναστικὴν, καὶ σὺ δὴ οὖν οὕτως 448
ἐνταῦθα τί φῆς;

21. Socrates accepts tentatively 448
the statement which has been so con-
tinually advanced, that ῥητορικὴ is a
species of art, in order to proceed with
the discussion. The correctness of
this statement is brought under ques-
tion later.

26. ἀγαθόν γε: the self-satisfaction
of Gorgias is so great that he speaks
like a Homeric hero. Note the con-
descension (perhaps unconscious) in
the following κάλει δὴ (you may call
me so, then), of which, however, So-
crates takes no notice. — εἰ δὴ: if...
really.

ΓΟΡ. Κάλει δῆ.

30 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατόν εἶναι ποιεῖν; b

ΓΟΡ. Ἐπαγγέλλομαί γε δὴ ταῦτα οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοθι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐθελήσαις ἄν, ὦ Γοργία, ὥσπερ νῦν δια-
λεγομένα, διατελέσαι τὸ μὲν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος,
35 τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων τοῦτο, οἷον καὶ Πῶλος ἤρξατο, εἰσ-
αὔθις ἀποθέσθαι; . . . ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ, μὴ ψεύσῃ, ἀλλὰ
ἐθέλησον κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΓΟΡ. Εἰσὶν μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔναι τῶν ἀποκρίσεων
ἀναγκαῖαι διὰ μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι⁴⁴⁹· οὐ μὴν c
40 ἀλλὰ πειράσομαί γε ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ
τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημι, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ
αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν.

449 32. ἄλλοθι: on these travels, see
b Introd. § 5. The vagueness of the
adverb stamps the whole statement
as somewhat boastful.

35. τὸ δὲ μῆκος τῶν λόγων: Socrates
does not mean that the answers should
be restricted to a certain length; but he
wishes to exclude those answers which,
instead of keeping strictly to the ques-
tion under discussion, branch off and
lose themselves in different trains of
thought. By using καὶ before Πῶλος,
Socrates gives us to understand that he
fears something similar from Gorgias.

36. εἰσαὔθις ἀποθέσθαι: put off till
another time. — ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ: with
reference to 447 e.

38. εἰσὶν κτέ.: though Gorgias
speaks like a master, with the air of
authority, he would still like to leave
a way of escape open for himself,
— which unfortunately his boastful
ἐπάγγελμα has rendered impossible,
although he had not yet distinctly
promised to speak with brevity.

39. ἀναγκαῖαι . . . ποιεῖσθαι: the 449
personal construction proceeds from c
the 'prolepsis' of the subject of the
inf., — a common occurrence with
δίκαιος and δῆλος. The real subject
of the infinitive is then ἐνίας τῶν ἀπο-
κρίσεων. Of this construction Plato
affords other examples. Cf. *Meno* 79 d
ἀπόκρισιν τὴν διὰ τῶν ἐτι ζητουμένων
. . . ἐπιχειροῦσαν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, *Phaedo*
92 d τοῖς διὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδείξεις
ποιουμένοις λόγοις. In translation the
adj. must be made neuter, or a cir-
cumlocution must be used. "There
are certain answers in which it is nec-
essary for one to deliver himself more
at length." See H. 944 a; Rid. § 230.

40. διὰ βραχυτάτων: simply a cir-
cumlocution for the superlative adv.,
and accordingly const. with ὡς acc. to
the usual rule. Kr. 49, 10, 1; H.
651 a. In the next sent., ἐν seems to
have much the same force as διὰ here.

41. μηδένα ἂν . . . εἰπεῖν: the use of
μή here is not to be considered as due

Σα. Τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὦ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπιδείξιν αὐτοῦ
τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰς-
45 αὐθις.

Γορ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, καὶ οὐδενὸς φήσεις βραχυλογω-
τέρου ἀκοῦσαι.

IV. Σα. Φέρε δὴ· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ φῆς ἐπιστήμων τέχ-
νης εἶναι καὶ ποιῆσαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἄλλον ῥήτορα· ἡ ῥητορικὴ δ
περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει οὕσα; ὥσπερ ἡ ὑφαντικὴ περὶ
τῶν τῶν ἱματίων ἐργασίαν· ἡ γάρ;

5 Γορ. Ναί.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ μουσικὴ περὶ τὴν τῶν μελῶν ποίησιν;

Γορ. Ναί.

Σα. Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Γοργία, ἀγαμαί γε τὰς ἀποκρί-
σεις, ὅτι ἀποκρίνει ὡς οἶόν τε διὰ βραχυτάτων.

10 Γορ. Πάνυ γὰρ οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπεικῶς τοῦτο
ποιεῖν.

Σα. Εὖ λέγεις. ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι οὕτως καὶ περὶ
τῆς ῥητορικῆς, περὶ τί τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη;

Γορ. Περὶ λόγους.

449 to indir. disc. which would require οὐ,

^e but as being in an inf. clause which is in apposition with ἔν.

IV. 1. ῥητορικῆς γὰρ κτέ.: γὰρ introduces the reason for the question which is announced in the challenging phrase, φέρε δὴ. Hence the position of the causal clause.

d 3. περὶ τί: 'περὶ with acc., ordinarily of action; περὶ with gen., ordinarily of thought or speech; but thought or speech may be considered as action, and shifts are not uncommon.' B.L.G. Cf. περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς below (12).

8. νῆ τὴν Ἥραν: Socrates rarely uses the same oath twice in the same dialogue. Cf. νῆ τῶν κύνα 466 c, μὰ

τὸν— 466 e, Δ' 470 e, 516 d, τὸν κύνα 449 τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν 482 b, τὸν Ζῆθον d 489 e. See on 463 d.

9. ὅτι ἀποκρίνει: the explanatory clause freq. borders on the causal, as here.

10. πάνυ ἐπεικῶς: fairly well. In this self-laudation, Gorgias has in view only the form of his answers without reference to their connexion with the subject-matter. He only wants to show that he is a master of brachylogy, and therefore answers in the shortest formulae of affirmation and negation.

13. ἐπιστήμη: not really different from τέχνη, inasmuch as the orator is ἐπιστήμων ῥητορικῆς τέχνης.

- 15 Σα. Ποίους τούτους, ὦ Γοργία; ἄρα οἱ δηλοῦσι τοὺς ἐ
 κάμνοντας, ὡς ἂν διαιτῶμενοι ὑγιαίνουσιν;
 Γορ. Οὐ.
 Σα. Οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας γε τοὺς λόγους ἡ ῥητορική
 ἐστίν.
 20 Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα.
 Σα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν λέγειν γε ποιεῖ δυνατούς.
 Γορ. Ναί.
 Σα. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν;
 Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
 25 Σα. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἣν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἰατρικὴ περὶ τῶν 450
 καμνόντων δυνατούς εἶναι φρονεῖν καὶ λέγειν;
 Γορ. Ἀνάγκη.
 Σα. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, περὶ λόγους ἐστίν.
 Γορ. Ναί.
 30 Σα. Τούς γε περὶ τὰ νοσήματα;
 Γορ. Μάλιστα.
 Σα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ γυμναστικὴ περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τοὺς
 περὶ εὐεξίαν τε τῶν σωμάτων καὶ καχεξίαν;

449 15. ποίους τούτους: the acc. instead
 of the nom. on account of the proxim-
 ity of λόγους. The const. of the previ-
 ous clause is continued. — τοὺς κάμ-
 νοντας: an example of one of the
 most common kinds of anticipation,
 where the subj. of the dependent
 sent. is drawn forward under the
 government of the leading verb.

18. οὐκ ἄρα περὶ πάντας κτέ.: ac-
 cordingly the definition of Gorgias is
 too wide. Cf. Prot. 312 d ἴσως ἂν, ἣν
 δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἱκανῶς
 γε· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἡ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν
 δεῖται περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεῖνόν ποιεῖ
 λέγειν.

23. οὐκοῦν περὶ ὧν περ λέγειν, καὶ

φρονεῖν: sc. ποιεῖ δυνατούς with each
 clause. Apparently Socrates makes
 no immediate use of this point, so that
 it might appear unnecessary. But by
 contrasting thought with speech he
 thus at the beginning of the discus-
 sion emphasizes the importance of the
 contents as opposed to the form, a
 distinction on which he subsequently
 bases his refutation of Gorgias.

26. δυνατούς εἶναι (sc. ποιεῖ from 450
 449 e): on the difference between ἄρα^a
 and ἄρα οὐ, where an affirmative an-
 swer is expected, see on 479 c.

33. εὐεξίαν τε . . . καὶ καχεξίαν:
 opposites are regularly connected by
 τε . . . καί.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΟ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχνηαι, ὦ Γοργία, οὕτως
ἔχουσιν· ἐκάστη αὐτῶν περὶ λόγους ἐστὶν τούτους, οἱ τυγ- b
χάνουσιν ὄντες περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὗ ἐκάστη ἐστὶν ἡ τέχνη.

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΟ. Τί οὖν δὴ ποτε τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὐ ῥητορικὰς
40 καλεῖς, οὕσας περὶ λόγους, εἴπερ ταύτην ῥητορικὴν καλεῖς,
ἡ ἂν ᾗ περὶ λόγους;

ΓΟΡ. Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκратες, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν περὶ
χειρουργίας τε καὶ τοιαύτας πράξεις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πᾶσά
ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδέν ἐστιν τοιοῦτον
45 χειρουργήμα, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λό- c
γων ἐστίν. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ῥητορικὴν τέχνην ἀξιώειναι
περὶ λόγους, ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι.

V. ΣΟ. Ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω οἶαν αὐτὴν βούλει καλεῖν;

450 36. ἐκάστη: when the second clause
b explains the first, the asyndeton is
but little felt.

37. ἡ τέχνη: const., in spite of the
article, not with ἐκάστη, but with οὗ.
This is the pred. while ἐκάστη is sub-
ject. "Of which each (art) is the art."

41. ἡ ἂν ᾗ: the indef. rel. sentence
is necessary, owing to the very gen-
eral character of Gorgias' statements
hitherto. — ταύτην: as referring to ἡ
ἂν ᾗ is also indefinite. "If this you
call rhetoric—any art which has to
do with discourses."

43. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: this phrase oc-
curs in Plato 77 times (GMT. 777, 1).
The ὡς is not to be considered as
final, as in the Eng. 'so to speak,' but
is rather comparative, in the meaning
'in a word,' though it is often con-
venient to translate by 'so to speak.'
It is closely connected with the fol-
lowing πᾶσα, as in 466 a with ἀπάσας,

450 d with οὐδενός, *Phaedo* 78 e with 450
οὐδαμῶς. Cf. Kr. 56, 1, 2. Its force b
is shown by its opposition to ἀκριβεῖ
λόγῳ in *Rep.* i. 341 b ποτέρως λέγεις
τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ τὸν
ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, and its employment here
shows the inability of Gorgias to give
a clear and sharp definition of his art.

45. κύρωσις: accomplishment, con-
sequently effect, power. This unusual
word, which Thucydides vi. 103 uses
in the meaning decision, resolution, de-
termination, is replaced below in e by
the equally unusual κύρος. More com-
mon is the verb κυροῦν confirm and
κυροῦσθαι bring to pass, 451 b, c. Cf.
also ἄκυρος void, inoperative, *Crito* 50 b,
Prot. 356 d.

47. ὀρθῶς λέγων ὡς ἐγὼ φημι: this c
addition is also characteristic of his
self-confidence.

V. 1. ἄρ' οὖν μανθάνω κτέ.: this
question is put without any expecta-

τάχα δὲ εἴσομαι σαφέστερον. ἀλλ' ἀπόκριναι· εἰσὶν ἡμῖν τέχναι. ἦ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

- 5 ΣΩ. Πασῶν δέ, οἶμαι, τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν μὲν ἐργασία τὸ πολὺ ἐστὶν καὶ λόγου βραχέος δέονται, ἔναι δὲ οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς τέχνης περαίνοιτο ἂν καὶ διὰ σιγῆς, οἷον γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. τὰς τοιαύτας μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, περὶ ἧς οὐ φῆς τὴν ῥητορικὴν
10 εἶναι· ἦ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

- ΣΩ. Ἐτεραι δέ γέ εἰσι τῶν τεχνῶν αἱ διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι, καὶ ἔργου ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἢ οὐδενὸς προσδέονται ἢ βραχέος πάνν, οἷον ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ
15 καὶ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ πεπτευτικὴ γε καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τέχναι, ὧν ἔναι σχεδόν τι ἴσους τοὺς λόγους ἔχουσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ πλείους, καὶ τὸ παράπαν πᾶσα ἡ

⁴⁵⁰ tion of an answer. *οἶαν* is used, and
^c not *τίνα*, because there is no inquiry after the name of the art (which for the moment is considered satisfactory), but after its nature or kind, which must now be more clearly defined. In the following methodical discussion Socrates makes clear what was present, but in a confused form, in Gorgias' mind. The question now is as to the *means* of the *κύρωσις*. The ground of distinction is formed by the contrast so familiar to the Greeks between *λόγος* and *ἔργον* (λέγειν and πράττειν). Cf. *Apol.* 32 a.

5. τῶν μὲν: in part. apposition with *πασῶν*. See H. 624 d. The correlative is *ἕτεραι δέ* (12), while *ἐναι δέ* is to be connected with *δέονται* as one division of the τῶν μὲν, and as correlative with the implied subject (αἱ

μὲν) of *δέονται*. Below we find ἡ . . . ⁴⁵⁰
ἢ instead. ^c

7. τὸ τῆς τεχνῆς: the business, function of the art. See H. 730 b.

9. οὐ φῆς: on the adhaerent οὐ d see GMT. 384; H. 1028.

14. ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καὶ λογιστικὴ: arithmetic is the theoretical science of numbers; logistic, the practical art of reckoning. See the following chapter. On the omission of the article, see Kr. 58, 2, 1; H. 660 a; and note on 469 d.

15. πεπτευτικὴ: seems to be a general name for various games which were played on a board with pieces, whether dice or checkers. The addition of γέ indicates that the member of the series is not usually classed with the others; cf. *Crito* 47 b ταύτη ἕρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ ἐδεστέον γε καὶ ποτέον κτέ.

πρᾶξις καὶ τὸ κῦρος αὐταῖς διὰ λόγων ἐστίν. τῶν τοιού-
των τινά μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

20 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΟ. Ἀλλ' οὗτοι τούτων γε οὐδεμίαν οἶμαί σε βούλε-
σθαι ῥητορικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες,
ὅτι "ἡ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν," καὶ
ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις, εἰ βούλοιο δυσχεραίνειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
25 "τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἄρα ῥητορικὴν, ὧ Γοργία, λέγεις;"
ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶμαί σε οὔτε τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν οὔτε τὴν γεωμε-
τρίαν ῥητορικὴν λέγειν.

ΓΟΡ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ δικαίως ὑπο- 451
λαμβάνεις.

VI. ΣΟ. Ἴθι νῦν καὶ σὺ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην
διαπέρανον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ῥητορικὴ τυγχάνει μὲν οὔσα τούτων
τις τῶν τεχνῶν τῶν τὸ πολὺ λόγῳ χρωμένων, τυγχάνουσι
δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τοιαῦται οὔσαι, πειρῶ εἰπεῖν, ἡ περὶ τί ἐν

450 18. αὐταῖς . . . ἐστίν: cf. below in

^c ἢ διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα.

22. οὐχ ὅτι: not but that, although.

—πρὸ ῥήματι: as far as actual words
are concerned; "but you could not
have earnestly meant it."

24. ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις: regular for-
mula for introducing an objection; cf.
Apol. 20 c. The opt. is potential. —
δυσχερής: in the proper sense of
δυσχερής, hard to manage, i.e. to make
difficulties. Cf. 483 a κακουργεῖς ἐν
τοῖς λόγοις. Remark the delicate
irony of the words ἀλλ' οὐκ κτέ.,
which consists in this, that Socrates
apparently passes very gently over
the contradiction which exists be-
tween the words and the actual mean-
ing of the teacher of oratory.

451 28. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἶε: acknowledges

^a and accepts the suggestion made by
Socrates. Note the oratorical swing

in the addition of δικαίως ὑπολαμβά- 451
νεις, which serves also to preserve the
dignity of the master who is ever
ready to encourage good work in the
pupil.

VI. 1. ἴθι: is simply an encourag-
ing interjection like φέρε δὴ 449 c. —
καὶ σύ: acknowledges the courtesy of
Gorgias' preceding words. — τὴν ἀπό-
κρισιν ἣν ἠρόμην: is brachylogic for
τὴν ἀπόκρισιν τοῦ ἐρωτήματος ὃ ἠρόμην.

2. διαπεραίνειν: denotes the situa-
ble conclusion which Gorgias ought
to make to his answer, by establish-
ing some distinction characteristic of
rhetoric. Socrates assumes then a
little ironically that this object has
already been almost attained. Since,
however, he wishes in what follows
to make clear that two or more arts
can belong to the same species and
yet be entirely distinct from one an-

- 5 λόγοις τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα ῥητορική ἐστιν. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
 με ἔροιτο ὦν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον περὶ ἡστινοσοῦν τῶν τεχνῶν.
 “ὦ Σώκратες, τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη;” εἴποιμ’ ἂν
 αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ σὺ ἄρτι, ὅτι τῶν διὰ λόγου τις τὸ κῦρος **b**
 ἔχουσῶν· καὶ εἴ με ἐπανεῖροίτο “τῶν περὶ τί;” εἴποιμ’ ἂν
 10 ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἂν ἐκάτερα
 τυγχάνη ὄντα. εἰ δ’ αὖ ἔροιτο· “τὴν δὲ λογιστικὴν τίνα
 καλεῖς τέχνην;” εἴποιμ’ ἂν ὅτι καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ τῶν λόγῳ τὸ
 πᾶν κυρουμένων· καὶ εἰ ἐπανεῖροίτο· “ἡ περὶ τί;” εἴποιμ’
 ἂν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφόμενοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
 15 καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ **c**
 γάρ ἐστι, τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦ-
 τον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους
 ἐπισκοπεῖ τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον ἢ λογιστικὴ. καὶ εἴ

451 other, it is necessary for him to give
a and compare several examples.

6. ὦν νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον: logically fol-
 lows τεχνῶν.

b 9. τῶν περὶ τί: the sentence would
 be correctly filled out thus: τῶν περὶ
 τί διὰ λόγου τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσῶν. The
 use of τῶν, both here and in the fol-
 lowing answer, shows that the in-
 quiry is directed to the function of a
 class. On the other hand ἡ περὶ τί;
 just below inquires after the function
 of the individual art. As an exam-
 ple of Plato's ποικιλία, notice the va-
 riety in the expressions ἐν λόγοις τὸ
 κῦρος ἔχουσα, διὰ λόγων τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσα
 and λόγῳ κυρουμένων.

10 f. ὅσα ἂν τυγχάνη: however great
 each happen to be, i.e. to any magni-
 tude you please.

14. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν δήμῳ συγγραφόμε-
 νοι. Socrates refers to those who
 bring forward motions in the assem-
 bly of the people or have them re-
 corded by the γραμματεῖς to be then

communicated to the assembly, at 451
 the command of the president, by the **b**
 herald. If there was a previous mo-
 tion either of the senate or an orator
 on the same subject before the body,
 instead of recording and reading the
 common preamble of both motions,
 the words τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ βουλὴ
 (or whatever the name of the pro-
 poser was) were employed, followed
 by the modification or amendment.
 This corresponds in a general way to
 our ‘amend after the words,’ etc.

17. πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα **c**
 κτέ.: ‘the relative as well as the absolute
 properties.’ Cope. The reckoning can
 only be made with odd and even num-
 bers; hence πρὸς αὐτὰ means even to
 even, etc.; πρὸς ἄλληλα, even to odd, etc.
 The definition of λογιστικὴ runs thus
 in *Charmides* 166 **a** ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐστὶ
 που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ ἐπιστήμη,
 πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς
 ἄλληλα. The pl. must be construed
 according to the sense, not the form.

τις τὴν ἀστρονομίαν ἀνέροιτο, ἐμοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι καὶ αὕτη
 20 λόγῳ κυροῦται τὰ πάντα, "οἱ δὲ λόγοι οἱ τῆς ἀστρονο-
 μίας," εἰ φαίη, "περὶ τί εἰσω, ὦ Σώκρατες;" εἵποιμ' ἂν
 ὅτι περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀστρων φοράν καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης,
 πῶς πρὸς ἀλληλα τάχους ἔχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ὁρθῶς γε λέγων σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

25 ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Γοργία. τυγχάνει μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡ
 ῥητορικὴ οὔσα τῶν λόγῳ τὰ πάντα διαπραττομένων τε καὶ
 κυρουμένων τις· ἡ γάρ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τῶν περὶ τί; (τί) ἐστι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων,
 30 περὶ οὗ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι εἰσίν, οἷς ἡ ῥητορικὴ χρῆται;

✓ ΓΟΡ. Τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, καὶ ἀριστα.

VII. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Γοργία, ἀμφισβητήσιμον καὶ τοῦτο
 λέγεις καὶ οὐδέν πω σαφές. οἶμαι γάρ σε ἀκηκοέναι ἐν
 τοῖς συμποσίοις ἀδόντων ἀνθρώπων τοῦτο τὸ σκολιόν, ἐν

451 19. ἀνέροιτο: *sc. τίς ἐστιν*, the sub-
 c ject of which is given in the proleptic
 accusative. *Cf. Prot.* 351 *e* τὴν ἡδονὴν
 αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν.

d 25. Ἴθι σύ: the rest of the sentence
 is to be supplied from the preceding
 words of Gorgias. The clause with
 γάρ gives the basis of the following
 question. *Cf.* 449 *c*, d.

30. περὶ οὗ: according to analogy
 we should expect περὶ δ. But *cf.* a
 similar shift in 453 *b* and *e* with
 πειθῶ. See also 491 *a* and note on
 449 *d*.

31. τὰ μέγιστα. Gorgias, like Po-
 lus, finds it extremely hard to come
 out of the rut into which he has
 fallen, and give a scientific definition
 of his art.

e VII. 3. The scolion was a pecu-

liar kind of drinking-songs, *παροίτια*, 451
 sung at banquets. The one here al-
 e luded to is mentioned by Plato in
Euthyd. 279 *a*, *Phileb.* 48 *d*, *Legg.*
 631 *c*, 661 *a*. It probably was com-
 posed by Simonides, although accord-
 ing to some it was by Epicharmus.
 After Bergk's (*Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii.⁴ 645)
 rhythmical changes the words acc. to
 the Scholiast read as follows:

Ἵγλαινεῖν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ,
 δεῦτερον δὲ φῦαν καλὸν γενέσθαι,
 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως,
 καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων.

The last line of the scolion is omitted
 by Socrates, because, for his argu-
 ment, only those advantages can be
 cited which involve the practice of
 some art.

✓ ὧ καταριθμοῦνται ἄδοντες, ὅτι ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστόν ἐστιν,
5 τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δέ, ὥς φησιν ὁ
ποιητὴς τοῦ σκολιοῦ, τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σοι αὐτίκ' ἂν παρασταῖεν οἱ δημιουργοὶ τού- 452
των ὧν ἐπῆνεσεν ὁ τὸ σκολιδὸν ποιήσας, ἱατρός τε καὶ
10 παιδοτρίβης καὶ χρηματιστής, καὶ εἴποι πρῶτον μὲν ὁ
ἱατρός ὅτι "ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξαπατᾷ σε Γοργίας· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν
ἡ τούτου τέχνη περὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις,
ἀλλ' ἡ ἐμή." εἰ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐροίμην· "σὺ δὲ τίς ὧν
ταῦτα λέγεις;" εἴποι ἂν ἴσως ὅτι "ἱατρός." "τί οὖν λέγεις;
15 ἡ τὸ τῆς σῆς τέχνης ἔργον μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἀγαθόν;" "πῶς
γὰρ οὐ," φαίη ἂν ἴσως, "ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑγίεια; τί δ' ἐστὶν b

451 4. καταριθμοῦνται: the advantages
e are arranged according to their value
in the enumeration. Instead of an
object the clause with *ὅτι* follows,
introducing the dir. discourse.

452 8. δημιουργοί: the word is found as
a early as Homer and denotes all who
carry on a business which is public
and useful to the people; as, physi-
cians, soothsayers, singers, goldsmiths.
Later, the expression was extended
to free manual laborers, without, how-
ever, losing any of its respectability.
Hence it corresponds to our use of
the word 'master' (master-workman,
master-mason). Cf. 455 b. It is
noteworthy that only such things are
enumerated as, like the assumed re-
sult of rhetoric, were reckoned among
external advantages; for rhetoric,
according to the view of Gorgias,
should procure in the state either high
office or honors. Hence the scolion
is very applicable. Socrates brings
forward the physician, the body-
trainer, and the banker, in order to

contrast with the subjective judgment 452
of Gorgias the subjective opinions of
others, and thus to show the subjec-
tivity of the answer. a

10. παιδοτρίβης: the *body-trainer*
for boys taught in the gymnastic
schools (παλαίστραι). He is often con-
founded with the *γυμναστής*, whose
proper office was the scientific treat-
ment of the whole subject of bodily
exercises, and whose field was the
public *γυμνάσια*, where he instructed
grown men in general and also those
who were training for the games
(ἀθληταί). Both the *παιδοτρίβης* and
the *γυμναστής* are often mentioned
alongside of the physician, since the
nurture and care of the body was
their common aim. Cf. *Crito* 47 b.
—εἴποι πρῶτον: the *ἂν* before *παρα-*
σταῖεν is felt as extending over the
whole sentence.

16. ὑγίεια: if the word is sound, b
it must be taken as an absolute addi-
tion to the proper question which
ends with ὦ Σώκρατες. The diffuse-

μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώποις ὑγείας;” εἰ δ’ αὖ μετὰ τοῦτον ὁ
 παιδοτρίβης εἴποι ὅτι “θαυμάζοιμι τὰν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ
 αὐτός, εἴ σοι ἔχοι Γοργίας μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδείξαι τῆς
 20 αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἢ ἐγὼ τῆς ἐμῆς.” εἴποιμ’ ἂν αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦ-
 τον· “σὺ δὲ δὴ τίς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, καὶ τί τὸ σὸν ἔργον;”
 “παιδοτρίβης,” φαίη ἄν, “τὸ δ’ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλοῦς τε
 καὶ ἰσχυροῦς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα.” μετὰ δὲ
 25 καταφρονῶν ἀπάντων· “σκόπει δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴαν σοι ο
 πλούτου φανῇ τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἢ παρὰ Γοργία ἢ παρ’
 ἄλλῳ ὁτωῦν.” φαίμεν ἂν οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν· “τί δὲ δὴ; ἢ
 σὺ τούτου δημιουργός;” φαίη ἄν. “τίς ὢν;” “χρηματισ-
 τῆς.” “τί οὖν; κρίνεις σὺ μέγιστον ἀνθρώποις ἀγαθὸν
 30 εἶναι πλούτον;” φήσομεν. “πῶς γὰρ οὐκ;” ἔρεϊ. “καὶ
 μὴν ἀμφισβητεῖ γε Γοργίας ὅδε τὴν παρ’ αὐτῷ τέχνην
 μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν εἶναι ἢ τὴν σὴν,” φαίμεν ἂν ἡμεῖς.
 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔροιτ’ ἄν· “καὶ τί ἐστιν α
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν; ἀποκρινάσθω Γοργίας.” ἴθι οὖν νομί-
 35 σας, ὦ Γοργία, ἐρωτᾶσθαι καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων καὶ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ,

452
 b ness of the whole passage favors the view that the construction must not be rigidly pressed here.

18. τὰν: for τοι ἄν, as we frequently find μεντάν for μέντοι ἄν. Cf. *Apol.* 29 a δεινὸν τὰν εἶη.

18 f. καὶ αὐτός: like et ipse, “likewise,” while recognizing the claims of the physician, shows also a consciousness of his own importance as compared with Gorgias. This calls forth in the reply the address ὦ ἄνθρωπε, which indicates some degree of contempt and surprise.

c 25. The very mode of speaking declares the pride of wealth. — δῆτα: with the inv. makes the claim for

recognition more urgent than the sim- 452
 ple δῆ. Kr. 69, 20; H. 1037, 6. — c
 εἴαν: whether, introducing the indir. question. But Goodwin (GMT. 493, 680) denies that εἴαν can ever mean ‘whether,’ insisting that every expression like the present is conditional. The side-thrust at Gorgias is very appropriate, as he himself received much money from his teaching and lived magnificently upon it.

31. ἀμφισβητεῖ: affirms (in contradiction of his opponent), “disputes this and says.”

33. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: adverbial acc. d
 H. 600 a; 719 b.

ἀπόκριναι τί ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ σέ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ.

✓ GOR. Ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν καὶ αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
40 ποῖς, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστω.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο λέγεις;

✓ GOR. Τὸ πείθειν ἔγωγ' οἶόν τ' εἶναι τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν
δικαστήριῳ δικαστὰς καὶ ἐν βουλευτηρίῳ βουλευτὰς καὶ
ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἐκκλησιαστὰς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ξυλλόγῳ παντί,
45 ὅστις ἂν πολιτικὸς ξύλλογος γίγνηται. καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ
τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔξεις τὸν ἱατρόν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν

452 37. αὐτοῦ: shift from the rel. to
d the leading clause. G. 156; H. 1005.

39 f. αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: the pronoun emphasizes personal freedom as opposed to power over others. In thus stating the aim and purpose of all the sophists' efforts, Gorgias (acc. to Plato) fails completely to notice the mutual contradiction of the two members.

40. τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν: Heindorf desires τῶν ἄλλων, which would better accord with the ordinary usage. Still the indefiniteness of the expression may not be without object in showing the inexactness of thought which naturally prevailed at a time when the art of speaking was just being brought within the reach of all.

e 42. Construe ἔγωγ' (λέγω) τὸ οἶόν τε εἶναι πείθειν κτέ. — οἶόν τε: expresses 'position,' οἶος 'disposition.' Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 165.

44. καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ξυλλόγῳ (sc. τῶν πολιτῶν): is paraphrased with a limitation in the following clause. In this division of the various kinds of bodies in which the orator would have occasion to display his powers

we see the basis of the three chief 452
varieties of oratory (γένη, genera) e
which are generally recognized by later critics. The first, τὸ δημηγορικόν (συμβουλευτικόν, deliberativum), was employed ἐν τε τοῖς βουλευτηρίοις καὶ ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. The second, τὸ δικανικόν (iudiciale), was employed ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις. The germ of the third, τὸ ἐπιδεικτικόν, which was not distinguished by Anaximenes, can be discerned in the words καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ ξυλλόγῳ κτέ. This last was first defined by Aristotle, who used as the basis of his division the oratorical characteristics of the several varieties, not the place of their delivery, as Gorgias does here.

45. ἐν δυνάμει κτέ.: "the possession of this power will involve the servitude of the physician," etc.

46. δοῦλον. This expression seems to be Gorgias' own, as is to be gathered from the passage in *Philebus* 58 a, cited by Heindorf. Protarchus says there: ἡκουον μὲν ἔγωγ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις, ὥς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν (δύναμις) πολλὰ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῇ

παιδοτρίβην· ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς οὗτος ἄλλω ἀναφανήσεται χρηματιζόμενος καὶ οὐχ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ σοὶ τῷ δυναμένῳ λέγειν καὶ πείθειν τὰ πλήθη.

VIII. ΣΩ. Νῦν μοι δοκεῖς δηλῶσαι, ὦ Γοργία, ἐγγύτατα τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἥντινα τέχνην ἡγεῖ εἶναι, καὶ εἴ τι ⁴⁵³ ἐγὼ συνίημι, λέγεις ὅτι πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική, καὶ ἡ πραγματεία αὐτῆς ἅπανσα καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον εἰς 5 τοῦτο τελευτᾷ· ἡ ἔχεις τι λέγειν ἐπὶ πλεον τὴν ῥητορικὴν δύνασθαι ἢ πειθὼ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖν;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὀρίζεσθαι· ἔστιν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτῆς.

ΣΩ. Ἀκουσον δὴ, ὦ Γοργία. ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι, ὥς

⁴⁵² ^e δοῦλα δι' ἐκόντων ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποι-
οῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν
τεχνῶν.—The Gorgianic balancing
δοῦλον μὲν . . . δοῦλον δέ gives a cer-
tain dignity to the words.

47. οὗτος: is scornful, as in *Crito* ^{45 a}.—The thought is expressed first positively, then negatively, then again (by a kind of apostrophe—since *σοί* cannot be considered as addressed to Socrates) positively. Gorgias cannot refrain from again declaring more distinctly what he has already indicated by ἄλλω. Cf. 464 c ἡ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθημένη, οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, where, however, the same device is of value in giving more clearness to the statement.

49. τὰ πλήθη: sc. in the different assemblies.

VIII. 1. ἐγγύτατα: more definitely.¹ The answer given comes nearer to being an answer indeed.

⁴⁵³ ^a 3. πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἡ ῥητορική: this definition which Socrates has gathered from Gorgias' verbiage, was not invented by Plato, but was apparently well known in Athens at the

time.—πειθοῦς: to be understood in ⁴⁵³ a passive sense, as πειθῶ ποιεῖν below ^a shows.

4 f. εἰς τοῦτο τελευτᾷ: instead of the regular εἰς, occasionally ἐν and πρὸς are used with but little difference of meaning.

5. τι: is not the object of λέγειν, but is probably to be construed with ἔχειν somewhat as follows, *have you any reason to say*. The object of λέγειν is contained in the following ἐπὶ πλεον . . . δύνασθαι ("its power extends further than"), with which indeed Hirschig construes τι.

9. εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι: is occasionally found construed with the inf. like an ordinary verb of perception, even in cases where there is no intervening clause as here to attract a following inf. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 2 Λύσανδρος τοὺς φρουροὺς . . . ἀπέπεμπεν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας . . . εἰδὼς ὅτι ὅσῳ ἂν πλείους συλλεγῶσιν εἰς τὸ ἄστυ, θάττον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔνδειαν ἔσεσθαι. Owing to the shift in the construction, ἐγὼ is left absolute at the beginning of the sentence.

10 ἐμαντὸν πείθω, εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ἄλλω διαλέγεται βουλόμε-
 νος εἰδέναι αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ οὗτου ὃ λόγος ἐστίν, καὶ ἐμὲ
 εἶναι τούτων ἓνα · ἀξιώ δὲ καὶ σέ.

ΓΟΡ. Τί οὖν δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΑ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ νῦν. ἐγὼ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ῥητορικῆς πειθῶ,
 15 ἥ τις ποτ' ἐστὶν ἢν σὺ λέγεις καὶ περὶ ὧντινων πραγμάτων
 ἐστὶν πειθῶ, σαφῶς μὲν εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ μὲν ἄλλ'
 ὑποπτεύω γε ἢν οἶμαί σε λέγειν καὶ περὶ ὧν · οὐδὲν μέντοι
 ἦττον ἐρήσομαί σε, τίνα ποτὲ λέγεις τὴν πειθῶ τὴν ἀπὸ
 τῆς ῥητορικῆς καὶ περὶ τίνων αὐτὴν εἶναι. τοῦ ἔνεκα δὲ
 20 αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σέ ἐρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω ; οὐ
 σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα οὕτω προῖη, ὥς μάλιστ' ἂν
 ἡμῖν καταφάνες ποιῶι περὶ οὗτου λέγεται. σκόπει γὰρ εἴ
 σοι δοκῶ δικαίως ἀνερωτᾶν σε. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐτύχχανόν
 σε ἐρωτῶν τίς ἐστί τῶν ζωγράφων Ζεῦξις, εἴ μοι εἶπες ὅτι

453 10. εἴπερ κτέ. : the leading idea of
 b the pred. lies in the participle.

13. τί οὖν δῆ : inquires what is to
 follow from the admission of the
 statement.

14. τὴν πειθῶ : proleptic.

15. ἥ τις ποτ' ἐστίν : but ἢν οἶμαι is
 used below, according to the rule that
 ὅστις is required after a negative,
 while it may occur — though ὅς is
 regular — with a positive. Cf. 447 d,
 and see Morris on Thuc. i. 136. 4. —
 ἢν σὺ λέγεις : indispensable addition
 to ἥ τις. On περὶ ὧντινων, see on 451 d.

19. τοῦ ἔνεκα δῆ : an example of
 the 'rhetorical question' which De-
 mosthenes uses to great advantage.
 Rid. § 325 cites also from *Gorgias*
 457 e, 458 a, 487 b.

c 20 f. οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα : in this answer
 we have merely an indefinite contrast
 between person and thing ; which is
 much more clearly defined below in

457 d κατὰ φθόγον οἶονται τὸν 453
 ἐαυτῶν λέγειν and e οὐ πρὸς τὸ c
 πρᾶγμα φιλονικούντα λέγειν . . .
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. Socrates guards him-
 self against any suspicion that he may
 be influenced by personal feelings in
 his criticism of Gorgias. Cf. 454 c.

21. ὥς : not to be joined with μά-
 λιστα as a superlative phrase, but
 correlative with οὕτω.

23. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ : introduces fre-
 quently, as an illustration of a gen-
 eral principle, a supposed case sim-
 ilar to it. It is easy to add a second
 hypothetical clause, not coördinated
 with the first, but which, combined
 with the apod., has the first as a com-
 mon protasis. Cf. below, 468 d, and
Apol. 27 d.

24. Zeuxis, the celebrated painter
 and contemporary of Socrates, was a
 native of Heraclea in Lower Italy.
 He was the pupil of Apollodorus,

25 ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δικαίως σε ἡρόμην ὁ τὰ ποῖα τῶν ζώων γράφων καὶ ποῦ;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἄλλοι εἰσὶ ζωγράφοι γρά-
φοντες ἄλλα πολλὰ ζῶα;

30 ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

⁴⁵³ who, by a more delicate appreciation
^c and application of the principles of light and shade in painting, greatly furthered the development of the art, and obtained for himself the surname of 'Sciagraph.' The paintings of Zeuxis, who belonged to the Ionic school, were noted for their delicacy and fine coloring. Besides the Helena which he painted for the Crotoniates (Cic. *de Inv.* ii. i. 1), his most celebrated picture was the Penelope, wherein he depicted with great success pure matronly modesty. The story of his contest with his rival Parrhasius is well known.

25. ζῶα: a general expression for every kind of pictures.

26. καὶ ποῦ: Socrates wishes here to make clear that if we wish to define an object exactly, i.e. so as to make it easily recognizable, it is not sufficient to give the characteristic which it has in common with other objects, but rather it is necessary to mention that characteristic which belongs to it alone and distinguishes it from all other objects. So, for example, it is not sufficient to say that Zeuxis is a painter, i.e. one who either paints or has painted pictures; but in order to distinguish him from other painters, who also paint or have painted pictures, we must state more nearly the kind of pictures which he has painted (ποῖα), as 'he who painted the Helena or the Penelope.' But

even this is not entirely sufficient, for ⁴⁵³
there are still other painters who have
painted these same objects; but when
^c we say, 'he who painted the Helena in Croton (ποῦ),' we have definitely defined Zeuxis. ποῦ could also, and more naturally, refer to the scene of his labors, — where he had his studio. We must note (1) that ὁ τὰ ζῶα γράφων is only the common designation of all painters, by which they are distinguished from the λόγους or νόμους or συγγραμματα γράφοντες, (2) that ὁ γράφων can and must be understood in the same way in which we so often understand ὁ ἀδικῶν, ὁ κρατῶν, etc., i.e. as a generic word, not limited in time (H. 827), (3) that ποῖος is often scarcely to be distinguished from τίς (cf. Xen. *Anab.* iii. i. 14 ἐγὼ οὖν τὸν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατηγὸν προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν; ποίαν δ' ἡλικίαν ἐμαντῶ ἐλθεῖν ἀναμένω;). With these points understood, we see that the present example suffices to show that to define rhetoric as πειθοῦς δημιουργός, i.e. ἡ τὴν πειθὸς ἀπεργαζομένη τέχνη is insufficient, so long as the πειθὸς wrought by it is not more exactly specified in order to distinguish it from that wrought by other arts which come under the same general definition. Cf. moreover the answer of Gorgias, below, 454 b, which corresponds to the example before us exactly, even as far as the ποῦ is concerned.

Σο. Εἰ δέ γε μηδεὶς ἄλλος ἢ Ζεῦξις ἔγραφε, καλῶς ἂν σοι ἀπεκέκριτο ;

Γορ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

Σο. Ἴθι δὴ καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπέ· πότερόν σοι
35 δοκεῖ πειθῶ ποιεῖν ἢ ῥητορικῇ μόνῃ ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τέχναι ;
λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· ὅστις διδάσκει ὅτιοῦν πρᾶγμα, πότε-
ρον ὁ διδάσκει πείθει, ἢ οὐ ;

Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

40 Σο. Πάλιν δὴ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεχνῶν λέγωμεν ὧνπερ ε
νυνδῇ· ἢ ἀριθμητικῇ οὐ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς, ὅσα ἐστὶν τὰ τοῦ
ἀριθμοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἄνθρωπος ;

Γορ. Πάνν γε.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πείθει ;

45 Γορ. Ναί.

Σο. Πειθοῦς ἄρα δημιουργὸς ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ ἀριθμητικῇ.

Γορ. Φαίνεται.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἐάν τις ἐρωτᾷ ἡμᾶς, ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ
περὶ τί, ἀποκρινόμεθά που αὐτῷ ὅτι τῆς διδασκαλικῆς
50 τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ τὸ περιττόν ὅσον ἐστίν. καὶ τὰς 454

453 31. ἔγραφε: were a painter.

32. οὐ δῆτα (sc. οὐ πείθει) ἀλλὰ κτέ.: chiasmic with the question preceding. The affirmative of the first member of the question is made much more emphatic by the previous express denial of the second member, which must therefore itself be emphatically uttered. Usually the answer does not follow so closely the words of the question; cf. below, 501 c, and *Parm.* 128 a οὕτω λέγεις ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ὁρθῶς καταμανθάνω; Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καλῶς συνήκας ὅλον τὸ γράμμα δὲ βούλεται. Different, however, are 454 a, b, and 496 d, below. Cf. *Rid.* § 305.

40. ὧνπερ: on the omission of the prep. see *Kr.* 51, 11, 1; *H.* 1007. Cf. below, 517 c ἐν παντὶ τῷ χρόνῳ ὃν διελγόμεθα, *Apol.* 27 d. So in *Lat.*, e.g. *Nep. Cim.* 3.

41 f. τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ: the properties of number. Cf. τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ τοῦ βίου. See on 450 c.

50. τὸ περιττόν: in such combinations the article is usually omitted with the second member, and only inserted when the two members are to be looked upon as more distinct. Cf. above, 451 b with c, and 454 e, 455 a; see *Kr.* 58, 2, 1. — ὅσον: sing. because each antecedent is of equal value.

ἄλλας ἅς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τέχνας ἀπάσας ἔξομεν ἀποδείξαι
πειθοῦς δημιουργοὺς οὕσας καὶ ἡστινος καὶ περὶ οὗ· ἡ οὐ·

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ῥητορικὴ μόνη πειθοῦς ἐστὶν δημιουργός.

55 ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΙΧ. ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν οὐ μόνη ἀπεργάζεται τοῦτο τὸ
ἔργον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλαι, δικαίως ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου
μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπανερούμεθ' ἂν τὸν λέγοντα, "ποίας δὴ πει-
θοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί πειθοῦς ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶν τέχνη;"

5 ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι ἐπανερέσθαι;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀπόκριναι δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ
οὕτω.

✓ ΓΟΡ. Ταύτης τοῖνυν τῆς πειθοῦς λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῆς
10 ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ
ἄρτι ἔλεγον, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἃ ἐστὶ δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδικα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ τοι ὑπώπτειν ταύτην σε λέγειν τὴν πειθὴν
καὶ περὶ τούτων, ὦ Γοργία· ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζῃς, ἐὰν

453 Neither *ὅσον ἐστίν*, nor *ὅσα ἐστίν*, above,
e conflict with the passage 451 b, c.

454 3 f. *ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ τῆς περὶ τί*:

a cf. above, *ποίας πειθοῦς καὶ περὶ τί*.

4. *τέχνη*: no one need be dis-
turbed by the substitution of *τέχνη*
for *δημιουργός*, as the two words have
kindred ideas. There is also no appre-
ciable difference between *ποίας* here
and *ἡστινος* a few lines above. Cf.
453 e, and see on 453 c.

b 6. *ἔμοιγε*: the form of the ques-
tion shows that an affirmative answer
is expected.

9. *ταύτης*: draws attention to the
earlier explanation in 452 e, from
which is drawn (*τοῖνυν*) the following
definition, which in form follows as
an exegesis to *ταύτης τῆς πειθοῦς*.

The definition answers the *ποῖον* as
454 far as the external matters of persons
b (speakers) and place are concerned,
and is used by Socrates (c) in order
to obtain a definition that character-
izes the nature of the *πειθώ*. Gorgias
does not use *ὄχλοις* with the dispar-
aging feeling which it sometimes has,
but as a general word for assemblies.

11. *περὶ τούτων κτέ.*: answers the
question *περὶ τί* 4, above. On the
change of case, cf. 449 d.

13. *ἀλλ' ἵνα κτέ.*: this sentence is
a good example of those curious ana-
colutha which occur so often in the
conversation of ordinary life, where a
slight emphasis on a single word may
perhaps change the whole construc-
tion, and cause the speaker to lose

ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἀνέρωμαι, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν c
 15 δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ· ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, τοῦ ἐξῆς
 ἔνεκα περαίνεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐρωτῶ, οὐ σοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλ'
 ἵνα μὴ ἐθίζώμεθα ὑπονοοῦντες προαρπάξιν ἀλλήλων τὰ
 λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τὰ σαυτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὅπως ἀν
 βούλη περαίνης.

20 ΓΟΡ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα. καλεῖς τι μεμα-
 θηκέναι.

ΓΟΡ. Καλῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πεπιστευκέναι;

25 ΓΟΡ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ταῦτόν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι μεμαθηκέναι a
 καὶ πεπιστευκέναι, καὶ μάθησις καὶ πίστις, ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Οἶομαι μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς γὰρ οἶε, γνώσει δὲ ἐνθένδε. εἰ γὰρ τίς σε

454 himself in a network of clauses, of
 b which, while the idea is clear enough, the grammatical construction is hopeless. The idea here is this: "I thought you meant that, but still I asked; and you must not be surprised if I again ask something which seems to be evident enough; for it is absolutely essential for our argument that we proceed upon definitely expressed statements, and not upon mere suspicions, which may prove to be misunderstandings." In the construction the speaker proceeds well enough until he is thrown off the track by ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ. The use of this seemingly independent clause (it is really, together with δοκεῖ μὲν, in dependence on δ) causes him to branch off, in the clause ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω, in order to explain the reason

for his repeated questioning, and at 454 the same time to reiterate one of the fundamental principles of dialectic. b

15. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω: refers to 453 b.

17. ὑπονοεῖν: "to form a pre-opinion of what another is likely to think on a subject without his having expressed himself," to impute to him certain views, and thereby to forestall his explaining himself. c

18. ὑπόθεσιν: is a plan or principle which Gorgias has laid down for himself, and which conditions the direction in which (κατὰ) the thesis is to be developed until the end is reached (περαίνης).

21. Ἰθι δὴ κτέ.: see on ταύτης, in b, above.

29. καλῶς γὰρ οἶε: see on 451 a. d Note the difference in tone of Gorgias' answer, as compared with 450 c.

30 ἔροιτο · “ἄρ’ ἔστιν τις, ὦ Γοργία, πίστις ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;” φαίης ἄν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΟ. Τί δ’; ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς;

ΓΟΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

35 ΣΟ. Δῆλον γὰρ αὖ ὅτι οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ τέ γε μεμαθηκότες πεπεισμένοι εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ πεπιστευκότες.

ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

40 ΣΟ. Βούλει οὖν δύο εἶδη θῶμεν πειθοῦς, τὸ μὲν πίστιν παρεχόμενον ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, τὸ δ’ ἐπιστήμην;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΟ. Ποτέραν οὖν ἡ ῥητορικὴ πειθὼ ποιεῖ ἐν δικαστηρίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὄχλοις περὶ τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ 45 ἀδίκων; ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν γίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἡ ἐξ ἧς τὸ εἰδέναι;

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἐξ ἧς τὸ πιστεύειν.

454
d 31. φαίης ἄν: has the force of an affirmative. You would say ‘yes’; so οὐ φημι often means *I say ‘no,’ I deny.* See Kr. 64, 5, 4.

33. ἐπιστήμη: from ἐπίστασθαι to understand, i.e. properly, correct understanding, knowledge. This takes the place of μάθησις, which strictly denotes the process of learning, whose result is ἐπιστήμη, because this idea better suits the above opposition between μεμαθηκέναι and πεπιστευκέναι.

35. δῆλον γὰρ αὖ: confirms the distinctness of the two ideas which Socrates had already affirmed much more e positively than Gorgias.

37. πεπεισμένοι: so far as the inward conviction is concerned, μάθησις

and πίστις agree; objectively, however, they are very different, for μάθησις involves the acquisition of knowledge, while ignorance is the necessary concomitant of πίστις. 454

40. βούλει οὖν κτέ.: Socrates now proceeds to analyze (διαίρεσις, divisio) the general definition in order to obtain that special definition (ὁρισμός, definitio) which, according to the requirements of logic, must include, together with the statement of genus (τὸ γένος, genus proximum) also the addition of the characteristic (διαφορὰ εἰδοποιός, differentia specifica) which separates it from other species of the same genus.

✓ Σο. Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, πειθοῦς δημιουργός 455
ἐστὶν πιστευτικῆς ἀλλ' οὐ διδασκαλικῆς περὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε
50 καὶ ἄδικον.

Γορ. Ναί.

✓ Σο. Οὐδ' ἄρα διδασκαλικὸς ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐστὶν δικαστηρίων
τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων δικάειν τε πέρι καὶ ἀδίκων, ἀλλὰ
πειστικὸς μόνον. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναίτο το-
55 σοῦτον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα.

✓ Γορ. Οὐ δῆτα.

Χ. Σο. Φέρε δῆ, ἴδωμεν τί ποτε καὶ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς· ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ τοι οὐδ' αὐτός πω δύναμαι κατα- b

455 a 48. ἡ ῥητορικὴ κτέ.: the first defini-
a tion which had its origin in the
technic of the rhetorical schools (see
on 453 a) has now acquired a more
exact and complete expression by
the help of this dialectical investiga-
tion. Note the change from περὶ
τῶν δίκαιων to περὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cf.
454 b, e.

54. πειστικός: able to persuade.
Equiv. to ἱκανὸς πείθειν, as διδασκαλι-
κός to διδασκαλίαν παρέχων or ἱκανὸς
διδάσκειν. Neither this nor πιστευτι-
κός used above can properly be con-
strued with the genitive. With διδα-
σκαλικός, however, we find examples,
as *Euthyphr.* 3 c Ἀθηναίους οὐ σφόδρα
μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἶωνται εἶναι μὴ
μέντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας.
See *Kr.* 47, 26, 9; *H.* 754, b. In the
addition of μόνον lies a gentle intima-
tion of some defect, the result of
which for the estimation of rhetoric
appears more plainly later.

55. ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ: draws attention
to a great defect of the Athenian
judicial system. It was often impos-
sible to present before the court a
clear exposition of the points at issue,

as the speeches were limited to a 455
certain length, which was carefully a
measured by the κλέψυδρα, — a prac-
tice which Socrates also complains of
in *Apol.* 19 a ἐπιχειρητέον ὑμῶν ἐξελέ-
σθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ
χρόνῳ ἔσχετε, ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ
χρόνῳ, and 37 a ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω·
ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον διειλέγεσθε.

X. 1. Φέρε δῆ κτέ.: introduces a
new discussion designed to test the
definition just obtained, which, al-
though from the point of view of
form it satisfies excellently the
double requirement made above in
454 a, still leaves some uncertainty
as to the exact meaning of Gorgias.
Hence the question, 'What do we
really mean thereby?' Socrates pro-
fesses to be not yet quite certain
himself (οὐδ' αὐτός), notwithstanding
that he has contributed the most to
the more close definition of the ποῖον.
His doubts are directed especially to
the περὶ τί as it has been just defined
according to the specifications made
by Gorgias. This discussion forms
the transition to the examination of
the true value and ethical tendency

νοῆσαι ὅτι λέγω. ὅταν περὶ ἱατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει
 σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουρ-
 5 γικῶν ἔθνη, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ συμβουλευ-
 σει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον
 δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι. οὐδ' ὅταν τειχῶν περὶ οἰκοδομήσεως ἢ
 λιμένων κατασκευῆς ἢ νεωρίων, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχιτέκτονες· οὐδ'
 αὖ ὅταν στρατηγῶν αἰρέσεως πέρι ἢ τάξεώς τινος πρὸς
 10 πολεμίους ἢ χωρίων καταλήψεως συμβουλὴ ἢ, ἀλλ' οἱ
 στρατηγικοὶ τότε συμβουλευέσονται, οἱ ῥητορικοὶ δὲ οὐ·
 ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Γοργία, τὰ τοιαῦτα; ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αὐτός τε
 φῆς ῥήτωρ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλους ποιεῖν ῥητορικούς, εὖ ἔχει τὰ
 τῆς σῆς τέχνης παρὰ σοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι. καὶ ἐμὲ νῦν νό-
 15 μισον καὶ τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν· ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις
 τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητὴς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὥς
 ἐγὼ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι, οἱ ἴσως αἰσχύ-

455 of rhetoric. On the use of καὶ in
 a questions, cf. Xen. *Hell.* iii. 3. 11 τέλος
 αὐτὸν (τὸν Κινάδωνα) ἤρηντο (οἱ ἔφοροι)
 τί καὶ βουλόμενος ταῦτα πράττει, what
 purpose he actually had in so doing.

b 3. ὅταν περὶ κτέ.: on the whole
 passage, cf. *Prot.* 319 b. — ἱατρῶν
 αἰρέσεως: during the rise of philoso-
 phy in Greece, a science of medi-
 cine also gradually developed, which
 became hereditary among the priests
 of Aesculapius. Among these va-
 rious schools arose; as in Cos,
 Cnidus, Rhodes, and in several cities
 of Magna Graecia. After a while it
 became customary for a state to take
 a noted physician into the public ser-
 vice; as Democedes, who was hired
 one year by the Aeginetans, the sec-
 ond by the Athenians, and the third by
 Polycrates of Samos (*Hdt.* iii. 131).

5. ἔθνη (from the same root as ἔθος,
 εἶωθα): denotes a class of people drawn

into association either for the purposes 455
 of habitation or from force of custom b
 (calling, trade). For δημιουργοὶ see
 on 452 a. In such formulae as ἄλλο
 τι ἢ and οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ the copula is
 frequently omitted. See H. 1015 b.

7. οὐδ' ὅταν: is in close connexion
 with ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς οὐ
 συμβουλευέσει.

12. ἢ πῶς λέγεις κτέ.: intimates
 that possibly Gorgias will not accept
 this limitation of rhetoric.

13. εὖ ἔχει: it is proper, it is in order. c
 Cf. *Phaedo* 107 a εἰ δὴ τι Σιμμία . . .
 ἔχει λέγειν, εὖ ἔχει μὴ κατασιγήσαι.—
 τὰ (not τὸ) τῆς τέχνης: because the
 question is no longer as to the nature
 of the art, but as to its claims and
 effects, one by one.

15. τὸ σὸν σπεύδειν: consult your
 interest.

17. τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς: Cron
 would take this in its entirety as almost

νοιντ' ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι· ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμι- α
 στον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· “τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία,
 20 ἔσται, εἰάν σοι συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβου-
 λεύειν οἰοί τε ἐσόμεθα; πότερον περὶ δικαίου μόνον καὶ
 ἀδίκου ἢ καὶ περὶ ὧν νυνδὴ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν;” πειρῶ
 οὖν αὐτοῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Γορ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σαφῶς
 25 ἀποκαλύψαι τὴν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δύναμιν ἅπασαν· αὐτὸς
 γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. οἶσθα γὰρ δήπου ὅτι τὰ νεώρια
 ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἡ τῶν λιμένων κατα- e
 σκευὴ ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλῆς γέγονεν, τὰ δ' ἐκ
 τῆς Περικλέους, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν.

✓ 30 Σο. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὦ Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους·
 Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτε συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν
 περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους.

✓ Γορ. Καὶ ὅταν γέ τις αἵρεσις ἦ ὧν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, ὦ 456

455 equivalent to “quite a number”; but
 c it seems better to give each word its
 rights, *some, I had almost said many*. In
Phaedo 58a παρήσαν τινες καὶ πολλοί γε,
 we have almost the reverse of the pres-
 ent case; that is, the higher estimate is
 asserted, while in the present passage
 it is denied. The hope of obtaining pu-
 pils is the greatest spur to the Sophist
 to continue a discussion which cannot
 but be unpleasant to him. It serves
 also to draw out his true sentiments.

d 24. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κτέ.: Gorgias allows
 himself to be led on by the exam-
 ples which Socrates has brought for-
 ward, and which seem to him excel-
 lently adapted (hence καλῶς ὑφηγήσω)
 to make clear the efficacy of his art.
 He therefore tries to prove for it as
 great as possible a scope, and thereby
 entirely loses sight of his former
 definition of the περὶ τι.

28. τὰ δέ: without a preceding τὰ 455
 μέν, to complete and correct the state- e
 ment. See Kr. 50, 1, 12.

29. ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν: “in accord-
 ance with the architects,” instead of
 the advice of the architects. Other
 striking examples of such compres-
 sion are *Prot.* 358 c οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο
 ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ δ' οἴεται κακὰ
 εἶναι ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν,
Xen. Cyr. iii. 3: 41 χάραν ἔχετε οὐδὲν
 ἦττον ἐντιμον τῶν πρωτοστατῶν for τῆς
 τῶν πρωτοστατῶν.

30. λέγεται ταῦτα κτέ.: this ad-
 mission of Socrates seems to Gorgias
 to confirm his assumption, and to im-
 ply that Socrates was not in earnest
 in his opposition. At the death of
 Themistocles, Socrates was about
 four years old. See App.

33. ὧν . . . ἔλεγες: sc. at 455 b. So- 456
 crates makes for the moment no ob- a

Σώκρατες, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οἱ ῥήτορές εἰσιν οἱ συμβουλευόντες
35 καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας περὶ τούτων.

Σο. Ταῦτα καὶ θαυμάζων, ὦ Γοργία, πάλαι ἐρωτῶ,
ἥτις ποτὲ ἢ δύναμίς ἐστιν τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δαιμονία γάρ
τις ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται τὸ μέγεθος οὕτω σκοποῦντι.

XI. Γορ. Εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις συλλαβοῦσα ὑφ' αὐτῇ ἔχει.
μέγα δέ σοι τεκμήριον ἐρῶ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἤδη ἔγωγε ἔ
μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἱατρῶν εἰσελθὼν

456 a jection to Gorgias' course, thus stim-
ulating him to the detailed statements
which follow.

35. νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας: the verb
νικᾶν is construed with various ac-
cusatives which belong to the 'cog-
nate' class, as Ὀλυμπιάδα, παγκράτιον,
ψήφισμα, etc. G. 159 B.; H. 716 a.

36. πάλαι ἐρωτῶ: for the pres. with
πάλαι, see H. 826; G. 200, n. 4, and
cf. the similar Lat. use of jam diu
with the present (Gildersleeve, *Gr.*
§ 221). Goodwin. *Gr. Gram.* 1263.

37. δαιμονία: has become by this
time so weakened as to mean simply
wonderful, extraordinary. Cf. the sim-
ilar weakening of strong words in
English; e.g. 'awful.' — τῆς: by add-
ing to the vagueness, enhances the
vastness of the power, like the Lat.
quidam. Cf. Cic. *ad Fam.* x. 12.
I idque contigit meritorum
tuorum in rem publicam ex-
imia quadam magnitudine,
owing to the rather exceptional great-
ness, etc.

XI. 1. εἰ πάντα γε εἰδείης: Socra-
tes' object is finally attained, and
Gorgias, lulled completely by this
ironical expression of admiration,
bursts forth into an eloquent lauda-
tion of his art, and a defence of it

against all censure. The omission of
the apodosis gives to the sentence
the effect of an exclamation. Such
a usage is also common in Eng-
lish.

2. ἀπάσας τὰς δυνάμεις: may be
a compression of ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν
τὰς δυνάμεις. Of course συλλαβοῦσα
is only a figure of speech, though
Gorgias claims his rhetoric to be the
art of all arts. In his exposition he
contents himself with a pair of ex-
amples only. That this view is really
due to Gorgias is shown by the pas-
sage in *Philebus*, quoted on 452 c.

4. τῶν ἄλλων: with whom he was
on like terms of intimacy. The fol-
lowing passage gives the two leading
departments of the physician's pro-
fession — pharmacy, φάρμακον πτείν,
and surgery, τεμεῖν ἢ καῖσαι παρασχεῖν
— which in ancient times, as is also
the case to a large degree at present,
were frequently united by the same
practitioner. The knife and the cau-
tery, as the two leading instruments
of the surgeon's profession, are often
mentioned together. Cf. 480 c, 521 e;
Prot. 354 a; *Aeschyl. Ag.* 848 δ' ὅτ' δὲ
καὶ δεῖ φαρμάκων παιωνίων, | ἥτοι κείαντες
ἢ τέμοντες εὐφρόνως | περασόμεσθα πῆμ'
ἀποστρέψαι νόσου.

- 5 παρά τινα τῶν καμνόντων οὐχὶ ἐθέλοντα ἢ φάρμακον πιεῖν
 ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἱατρῷ, οὐ δυναμένον τοῦ
 ἱατροῦ πείσαι, ἐγὼ ἔπεισα, οὐκ ἄλλη τέχνη ἢ τῇ ῥητορικῇ. —
 φημὶ δὲ καὶ εἰς πόλιν ὅπῃ βούλει ἐλθόντα ῥητορικὸν ἄν-
 δρα καὶ ἱατρόν, εἰ δέοι λόγῳ διαγωνίζεσθαι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ
 10 ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ συλλόγῳ, ὁπότερον δεῖ αἰρεθῆναι ἱατρόν, c
 οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι τὸν ἱατρόν, ἀλλ' αἰρεθῆναι ἂν τὸν
 εἰπεῖν δυνατόν, εἰ βούλοιο. καὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλον γε δη-
 μιουργὸν ὄντιναοῦν ἀγωνίζοιτο, πείσειεν ἂν αὐτὸν ἐλέσθαι
 ὁ ῥητορικὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλος ὅστισοῦν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν
 15 περὶ οὗτου οὐκ ἂν πιθανώτερον εἴποι ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἢ ἄλλος
 ὅστισοῦν τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐν πλήθει. ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις

⁴⁵⁶ 6. παρασχεῖν: cf. *Apol.* 33 b καὶ
 b πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρω-
 τᾶν. As here 475 d, *Prot.* 348 a.
 See *Kr.* 55, 3, 21.

8. ὅπῃ βούλει: more exactly we should expect ὅποι, and some of the inferior Mss. have it here. But the ideas of 'where' and 'whither' are often confounded in Greek, while in Eng. 'where' has become the rule for 'whither' in ordinary conversation. The remark here is very fitting in the mouth of Gorgias, in view of his extensive travels. Cf. *Introd.* §§ 4, 5.

c 11. οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φανῆναι: cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 52 ἀναπείθοντα οὖν τοὺς νέους ὥς αὐτὸς εἴη σοφώτατος, καὶ ἄλλους ἱκανώτατος ποιῆσαι σοφοῦς, οὕτω διατιθέναι τοὺς ἑαυτῷ συνόντας, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Also *Phaedo* 72 c. Similarly in Latin. Cf. *Cic. de Fin.* v. 30. 90 tantam vim esse virtutis ut omnia, si ex altera parte ponantur, ne appareant quidem and ii. 28. 90 Socrates voluptatem nullo

loco numerat. Compare also the ⁴⁵⁶
 exactly similar Eng. colloquialisms, c
 'to be nowhere,' and 'to be left quite out of sight.'

11 f. τὸν εἰπεῖν δυνατόν: λέγειν is more usual; but the same difference which exists between ἔλεγε and ἔλεξε or εἶπε exists also between their infinitives. So here εἰπεῖν means to make or deliver a speech. Cf. *Prot.* 329 a τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν.

16. ἐν πλήθει: though properly much more general in its meaning than ἐκκλησία or συλλόγῳ used above, is probably employed only for the sake of variety. The distinct and definite statement with which Gorgias closes his characterization (ἡ μὲν οὖν κτέ.) brings up to his mind the thought that perhaps some might object to the indiscriminate employment of such an art. He is thus led to a defence of it which is so injudicious that it affords the adversary the very best weapons for attack.

τοσαύτη ἐστὶν καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς τέχνης · δεῖ μέντοι, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀγω-
 νίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα δεῖ πρὸς α
 20 ἅπαντας χρῆσθαι ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι ἔμαθε πυκτεύειν τε καὶ
 παγκρατιάξωεν καὶ ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων
 εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν · οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα τοὺς φίλους
 δεῖ τύπτειν οὐδὲ κεντεῖν τε καὶ ἀποκτείνονται. οὐδέ γε μὰ
 Δία ἐάν τις εἰς παλαιστραν φοιτήσας, εὖ ἔχων τὸ σῶμα
 25 καὶ πυκτικὸς γενόμενος, ἔπειτα τὸν πατέρα τύπτῃ καὶ τὴν
 μητέρα ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἢ τῶν φίλων, οὐ τούτου
 ἕνεκα δεῖ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδά-
 σκοντας μάχεσθαι μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ✓
 ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ παρέδοσαν ἐπὶ τῷ δικαίως χρῆσθαι τού-
 30 τοις πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἀμυνομέ-

456 18. τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀγωνίᾳ: carried away
 d by the excitement of his own thoughts,
 Gorgias forgets the caution which he
 had hitherto exercised in his conver-
 sation with Socrates, as well as the
 definition of rhetoric which the two
 had agreed upon above, and is led to
 set forth his art quite in the manner
 of the Sophists (the Eristics), as a
 means of defence and offence; a
 weapon which, though it required the
 use of the mind instead of the body,
 the lips instead of the arms, was no
 less a department of the science of
 fighting than boxing or the other exer-
 cises of the soldier. Some Sophists
 —e.g. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus
 —were at the same time teachers of
 fencing. Boxing, πυκτεύειν, which, in
 connexion with παλαίειν, or wrestling,
 formed the παγκρατιάξωεν, went be-
 yond the range of ordinary gymnas-
 tics, and belonged to the peculiar art
 of the athletes. Fighting in full ar-

mor (δύλομαχία) was not followed as 456
 a profession until after the Pelopon- d
 nesian War. As in all these exer-
 cises, so in rhetoric the great ob-
 ject was not public, but private, not
 advantage to the community, but ad-
 vancement for the individual.

20. ἔμαθε: the unexpressed sub-
 ject, as of χρῆσθαι, is the indefinite
 'one.'

23. ἀποκτείνονται: if one gets as
 far as the κεντεῖν, it is but a short
 step to the ἀποκτείνονται.

24. φοιτήσας: φοιτᾶν is the regu-
 lar word for attendance at a school;
 hence φοιτητής, a 'scholar.' — εὖ ἔχων
 τὸ σῶμα: not merely by the gift of
 nature, but also, as πυκτικὸς γενόμενος,
 by education.

29. παρέδοσαν: used like tradere
 in the sense 'impart, or transmit by
 teaching.' The object (afterwards
 taken up in τούτοις) is to be supplied
 from the sense of what precedes.

νοὺς, μὴ ὑπάρχοντας · οἱ δὲ μεταστρέψαντες χρώνται τῇ ⁴⁵⁷
 ἰσχύϊ καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. οὐκοῦν οἱ διδάξαντες
 πονηροί, οὐδὲ ἡ τέχνη οὔτε αἰτία οὔτε πονηρὰ τούτου
 ἔνεκα ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι, οἶμαι, ὀρθῶς. ὁ αὐτὸς
 35 δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς. δυνατὸς μὲν γὰρ πρὸς
 ἅπαντάς ἐστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ περὶ παντὸς λέγειν, ὥστε
 πιθανώτερος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἔμβραχυν περὶ οὗτου ἂν
 βούληται · ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἔνεκα δεῖ οὔτε ^b
 τοὺς ἰατροὺς τὴν δόξαν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ὅτι δύναιτο ἂν τοῦτο
 40 ποιῆσαι, οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργοὺς, ἀλλὰ δικαίως καὶ
 τῇ ῥητορικῇ χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ. ἐὰν δέ,

⁴⁵⁷ 31. μὴ ὑπάρχοντας: an integral
^a part of the subst. inf. clause;
 hence the μὴ. ὑπάρχειν has here
 its primitive meaning, to be the first
 cause, to be there to begin with, as
 opposed to ἀμύνεσθαι. Cf. *Leg.* ix.
 879 d μήτε γὰρ ὑπάρχων μήτε ἀμυνό-
 μενος τὸ παράπαν τολμάτων πληγαῖς τὸν
 τοιοῦτον νοουθετεῖν. ἔρχειν is also simi-
 larly used in *Leg.* ix. 869 c ἀμυνόμενος
 ἔρχοντα χειρῶν πρότερον, but with a
 different feeling. The asyndeton of
 two opposites is not unfrequent. —
 μεταστρέψαντες: which is regularly
 transitive (e.g. *Rep.* ii. 367 a μετα-
 στρέφοντες αὐτοῖν τὴν δύναμιν, utrius-
 que vim pervertentes) is used
 here absolutely in the sense revers-
 ing the matter. Cf. *Hom.* β 67 θεῶν δ'
 ὑποδείσατε μῆνιν, | μὴ τι μεταστρέψωσιν
 (cause a reverse) ἀγασσάμενοι κακὰ
 ἔργα.

32. τῇ ἰσχύϊ: corresponds to εὖ
 ἔχων τὸ σῶμα, as τέχνην to πυκτικὸς
 γενόμενος, so that both are considered
 dependent upon training. — οὐκ ὀρθῶς:
 a case of litotes.

34. οἱ μὴ χρώμενοι: equiv. to οἱ ἂν
 μὴ χρώνται ὀρθῶς. Hence the μὴ.

35 f. πρὸς ἅπαντας: as above, ⁴⁵⁷
 456 d. ^a

37. ἔμβραχυν: denotes what is other-
 wise expressed by ὡς ἐν βραχεί (συν-
 ελόντι) εἰπεῖν, and shows that the fol-
 lowing περὶ οὗτου ἂν βούληται is abso-
 lutely without limitation.

38. οὐδέν κτέ.: the dangerousness ^b
 of the art is to be offset by the natu-
 ral feeling of equity which will com-
 pel each of the two aspirants to leave
 uninjured the public position which
 both desire, as well as the δόξα, which
 is the orator's continual and chief
 aim. — οὐδέν τι: strengthens the
 negation. Cf. the Eng. 'none the
 more.' The acc. of this neg. is used,
 but never the dat. with the compara-
 tive.

39. ὅτι: is correlative with τοῦτου
 ἔνεκα. For the following double καί,
 see on 457 e.

41. ἐὰν δέ κτέ.: shows again the
 opposition of practice to theory. Gor-
 gias continually recurs to the same
 thoughts, as if the rolling swell
 (ὄγκος) of words could conceal the
 poverty of ideas. This belongs to
 the mimetic element of the dialogue.

οἶμαι, ῥητορικὸς γενόμενός τις κᾶτα ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδικῇ, οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα δεῖ μισεῖν τε καὶ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ δικαίᾳ χρεῖα 45 παρέδωκεν, ὃ δ' ἐναντίως χρήται. τὸν οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς c χρώμενον μισεῖν δίκαιον καὶ ἐκβάλλειν καὶ ἀποκτείνουσαι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν διδάξαντα.

XII. ΣΩ. Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολ-
λῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ
ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσιν διαλέγεσθαι
διοριστάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες
5 ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, ἀλλ' ἐὰν περὶ a
του ἀμφισβητήσωσιν καὶ μὴ φῇ ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον
ὀρθῶς λέγειν ἢ μὴ σαφῶς, χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ

457 42. κᾶτα : as well as κᾶπειτα, is
b often used after a partic. as if it were
following a finite verb.

c XII. 1. οἶμαι : the asyndeton shows
that Socrates himself is not over-
pleased.—ἔμπειρον : sc. by having
taken part in them either as speaker
or listener.

2. λόγων : employed here as the
general word including both the pub-
lic speech as well as the private con-
versation, which is more properly
διάλογος. Cf. Prot. 335 d ἐὰν σὺ
ἐξέλθῃς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔσονται ἡμῖν οἱ
διάλογοι with 337 a χρῆ τοὺς ἐν
τοιιοῖσδε λόγοις παραγιγνομένους
κοινούς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγόμε-
νοι ἀκροατάς. The word συνουσία is
similarly used in 461 b.—καθεωρακέ-
ναι : the compound verb, as compared
with the simple, shows that the opin-
ion has been gained by a considera-
tion of a number of cases. Cf. 465 d.

3. δύνανται : sc. οἱ λέγοντες or οἱ
διαλεγόμενοι, from the preceding λό-
γων.—διαλέγεσθαι : belongs to ἐπι-

χειρήσωσιν. The οὕτω sums up and 457
re-emphasizes the preceding partici-
ples, on which lies the chief weight. c

4. διοριστάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους :
“after having, by mutually giving
and receiving information, defined to
each other's satisfaction the nature
of the question under discussion.”—
μαθόντες and διδάξαντες : stand to each
other as active and passive ; they de-
note the means by which the dispu-
tants have been enabled to define the
question at issue (διοριστάμενοι), and
are hence subordinate to the preced-
ing participle. Plato rather likes
such collocations of active and pas-
sive ideas. Cf. d below, εἰπόντες καὶ
ἀκούσαντες, and 462 a.

7. ἢ μὴ σαφῶς : an afterthought. d
Had it been present originally in
Socrates' mind, he would have said
μὴ ὀρθῶς ἢ κτέ. ; but not being pres-
ent, the negative was attracted to the
verb of saying, by the regular Greek
rule. Looking at it in this light, it is
not necessary (with Cron) to supply a

- V φθόνον οἶονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικούντας ἀλλ' οὐ
 ζητοῦντας τὸ προκείμενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ· καὶ ἐνιοί γε τελευ-
 10 τῶντες αἰσχιστα ἀπαλλάττονται, λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ
 εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα, οἷα καὶ
 τοὺς παρόντας ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τοιούτων
 ἀνθρώπων ἡξίωσαν ἀκροαταὶ γενέσθαι. τοῦ δὲ ἕνεκα
 λέγω ταῦτα; ὅτι νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς σὺ οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα
 15 λέγειν οὐδὲ σύμφωνα οἷς τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγες περὶ τῆς

457 second φῆ from the preceding μὴ φῆ, which would hardly come under the head of the simple following the compound. — χαλεπαίνουσι: the pl. occurs here as it did with ἀμφισβητήσω-
 d sin above, because from ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον we naturally draw the idea "both." Cf. in Latin, Cic. de Fin. iii. 2. 8 quod cum accidisset, ut alter alterum necopinato videremus, etc., and the expression for 'both' in the Romance languages. — The use of the pronouns throughout this long sentence is both interesting and instructive; ἀλλήλους, ἑαυτοὺς, ἕτερος, ἕτερον, ἑαυτῶν, σφῶν αὐτῶν (bis). The distinction between reciprocal and reflexive is sometimes very narrow.

8. φιλονικούντας κτέ.: when both reproach each other thus, they place themselves on the same level as participants in a disputatious contest, where each seeks his own honor, not the truth, as Socrates shows in *Phaedo* 91 a, where he contrasts the φιλοσόφως and φιλονίκως ἔχοντες, and says of the latter, ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητήσω, ὅπῃ μὲν ἔχει περὶ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παροῦσιν τοῦτο προθυμοῦνται. Cf. e, below, on πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα. They bear it hardly, and think

that out of envy, envy of themselves, the
 opponent said it, actuated by a factious
 spirit, and not by a desire to search into
 the matter before them in the discussion.

10. λοιδορηθέντες κτέ.: the two following participles, though logically co-ordinate with λοιδορηθέντες, really give its two sides.

11 f. οἷα . . . ἄχθεσθαι ὑπὲρ: the use of the acc. with the infin. after forms of οἶος is very rare, and seems to be an extension of the use of the simple infin. with οἶος. See GMT. 759; Madv. 166 c, and note on 452 e. Cf. *Apol.* 23 e Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν κτέ. We soon feel anger and indignation for one whom we consider abused.

14. οὐ πάνυ ἀκόλουθα: 'not quite e consistent.' Cope.—ἀκόλουθα: denotes the naturally following result; σύμφωνα, the inner agreement of two statements standing in juxtaposition. Cf. *Xen. Anab.* ii. 4. 19 νεάνισκος δέ τις . . . εἶπεν, ὥς οὐκ ἀκόλουθα εἶη τὸ ἐπιθήσασθαι καὶ λύσειν τὴν γέφυραν, *Lach.* 193 e τὰ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ τοῖς λόγοις. Plato delights in applying musical terms to logical conditions; hence the frequency of συμφωνεῖν and διαφωνεῖν, as also of συναδεῖν, συμφῶδες. Cf. 461 a, 482 b.

ῥητορικῆς. φοβοῦμαι οὖν διελέγχειν σε, μή με ὑπολάβῃς
οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα φιλονικοῦντα λέγειν τοῦ καταφανὲς
γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς σέ. ἐγὼ οὖν, εἰ μὲν καὶ σὺ εἰ τῶν
ἀνθρώπων ὥνπερ καὶ ἐγώ, ἡδέως ἂν σε διερωτῶην· εἰ δὲ 458
20 μὴ, ἐώην ἄν. ἐγὼ δὲ τίνων εἰμί; τῶν ἡδέως μὲν ἂν ἐλεγ-
χθέντων, εἴ τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐλεγχάντων, εἴ
τίς τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγοι, οὐκ ἀηδέστερον μεντὰν ἐλεγχθέν-
των ἢ ἐλεγχάντων· μείζον γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡγοῦμαι,
ὅσῳπερ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀπαλλαγῆναι κακοῦ
25 τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ ἄλλον ἀπαλλάξαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ οἶμαι το-

457 16. φοβοῦμαι: has here a double
e reference, (1) to an action to be per-
formed (inf.); (2) to an effect to be
avoided (μὴ with subjv.). Cf. Xen.
An. i. 3. 17 ἐγὼ γὰρ ὀκνοῖν μὲν ἂν εἰς
τὰ πλοῖα ἐμβαλεῖν ἃ ἡμῖν δοίη, μὴ ἡμᾶς
ταῖς τριήρεσι καταδύσῃ, φοβοίμην δ' ἂν
τῷ ἡγεμόνι ᾧ δοίη ἐπεισθαι, μὴ ἡμᾶς
ἀγᾶρ ὅθεν οὐκ ἔσται ἐξελθεῖν. In the
first we have the will-side of the
fear; in the second, the apprehen-
sion.

17. οὐ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα: the neg.
οὐ is regular with the inf. of the in-
dir. discourse.—πρὸς: denotes the
end which the subject has in view. In
the present case this is paralleled by
τοῦ with the infin.,—one of the many
Greek modes of expressing finality
(H. 960; G.M.T. 798). With πρὸς σέ
also the main idea of the πρὸς is that
of hostile purpose; the hostility, how-
ever, does not lie in the πρὸς, but in
the general tone. In a certain sense
φιλονικεῖν might also be applied to
Socrates, as his search for truth was
a continual struggle throughout his
whole life.

18 f. καὶ σὺ . . . καὶ ἐγώ: when the
second member of a comparison is
contained in a relative clause with

ὅσῳπερ or ὥσπερ, the Greek idiom re- 457
quires καὶ in both members. e

21. ἡδέως ἂν ἐλεγχάντων . . . λέγοι: 458
a of these two conditional clauses the
first is logical, the second ideal. The
present conversation is a practical
example of Socrates' view; hence the
logical conditional form is used for
the practical present case. The rest of
the sentence follows naturally in the
opt. as being rather theoretical, and
applicable to some other time than
the present. The participles repre-
sent the same tenses of the optatives.

22. οὐκ ἀηδέστερον κτέ.: cf. 506 c
καὶ με ἐὰν ἐξελέγχεσθαι, οὐκ ἀχθεσθήσομαι
σοι, ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐερ-
γέτης παρ' ἐμοί ἀναγεγραμμένος.

23. μείζον γὰρ αὐτό: the correla-
tive to ὅσῳπερ is wanting, as is often
the case. αὐτὸ is always emphatic;
the unemphatic pronoun is τοῦτο.

25. οὐδὲν κτέ.: Socrates was con-
vinced that correct views determine
the will and actions, and that sin and
error are due to lack of knowledge.
Hence instruction, if it carry convic-
tion with regard to what is good and
true, must also bring about moral
improvement. Cf. what he says in
Apol. 26 a δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύ-

σοῦτον κακὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς περὶ ὧν ὁ
 τυγχάνει νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ὢν. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ φῆς
 τοιοῦτος εἶναι, διαλεγώμεθα. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἔαν,
 ἐῶμεν ἤδη χαίρειν καὶ διαλύωμεν τὸν λόγον.

- 30 ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ φημί μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς
 τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἶον σὺ ὑφηγεί. ἴσως μέντοι χρῆν ἐννοεῖν
 καὶ τὸ τῶν παρόντων. πάλαι γάρ τοι, πρὶν καὶ ὑμᾶς
 ἐλθεῖν, ἐγὼ τοῖς παροῦσι πολλὰ ἐπεδειξάμην, καὶ νῦν
 ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν, ἣν διαλεγώμεθα. σκοπεῖν οὖν ^c
 35 χρὴ καὶ τὸ τούτων, μή τις αὐτῶν κατέχομεν βουλομέ-
 νους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν.

XIII. ΧΑΙ. Τοῦ μὲν θορύβου, ὦ Γοργία τε καὶ Σώ-
 κρατες, αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, βουλομένων

⁴⁵⁸ σομαὶ ὃ γε ἄκων ποιῶ, and the cele-
^a brated phrase ascribed to him, οὐδεὶς
 ἔκων ἁμαρτάνει.

26. δόξα ψευδῆς: the force of οἶμαι
 extends over the whole sentence, and
 we should therefore logically expect
 δόξαν ψευδῆ. But by the use of the
 nom. Socrates holds the object up
 to view like an image.

^b 28. εἰ δὲ καί: the contrast would
 rather be given by the harsh εἰ δὲ
 μή, but Socrates modifies it with his
 usual courtesy.

29. τὸν λόγον: in the same sense
 as in 457 d, above.

31. ὑφηγεί: indicate, sc. by your
 words and example. Gorgias reconsi-
 ders his assent by the expression
 χρῆν ἐννοεῖν. With χρῆν and ἔδει the
 opposition is to the inf., not to the
 obligation. By giving his reason,
 Gorgias stimulates himself to change
 from 'we ought to have' to 'we
 must' (σκοπεῖν οὖν χρή).

32. καὶ ὑμᾶς: as contrasted with
 the others, who had come earlier.

34. ἀποτενοῦμεν: to be completed ⁴⁵⁸
 according to 465 e συχρὸν λόγον ἀπο-
 τέτακα and 466 a. So frequently, e.g.
 Prot. 335 c, 336 c, 361 a. ^c

35. μή τις: is connected, in a
 loose kind of exegesis, with τὸ τού-
 των, and hence also depends on σκο-
 πεῖν. For the ind., cf. Lach. 196 c,
 ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἶεται τι λέγειν, Ly-
 sis 216 c ἔτι δὲ καὶ τότε σκεψώμεθα μὴ
 ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν
 τούτων ἔν.

XIII. 1. τοῦ μὲν θορύβου: here we
 recognize the importance of the silent
 listeners, whose presence we infer
 from such remarks as this, and who
 serve at this juncture to keep the
 discussion going. Next to them is
 Chaerephon, who here acts as their
 spokesman, and answers the βουλομέ-
 νους τι καὶ ἄλλο πράττειν. The θόρυβος
 simply denotes a rather loud expres-
 sion of protest against the apparent
 purpose of Gorgias, and of pleasure
 in the continuation of the dia-
 logue.

ἀκούειν, εἴαν τι λέγητε· ἐμοὶ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ γένοιτο
τοσαύτη ἀσχολία, ὥστε τριούτων λόγων καὶ οὕτω λεγο-
5 μένων ἀφεμένῳ προὔργιαίτερόν τι γενέσθαι ἄλλο πρᾶτ-
τειν.

ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ α
αὐτὸς πολλοῖς ἤδη λόγοις παραγενόμενος οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ πώ-
ποτε ἦσθην οὕτως ὥσπερ νυνί· ὥστ' ἐμοιγε, κἂν τὴν
10 ἡμέραν ὅλην ἐθέλητε διαλέγεσθαι, χαριεῖσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει,
εἴπερ ἐθέλει Γοργίας.

ΓΟΡ. Αἰσχροὺν δὴ τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται ἐμέ
γε μὴ ἐθέλειν, αὐτὸν ἐπαγγεिलाμένον ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βού-

458 3. μὴ γένοιτο κτέ.: a most em-
c phatic denial in the form of a wish.
The sentiment is similar to that of
Pindar (*Isth.* i. 1 f.), alluded to in
Phaedr. 227 b οὐκ ἂν οἶε με κατὰ Πίν-
δαρον καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον πρᾶγμα
ποιήσασθαι τὸ σὴν τε καὶ Δυσίου διατρι-
βὴν ἀκοῦσαι.

d 7. Callicles is very eager to get
the conversation directed to his own
more especial field—politics. Hence
his support of Chaerephon's protest,
which he emphasizes by the addi-
tion of the expression καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ
αὐτός, where the καὶ μὲν approximates
closely in force to καὶ μὴν.

8. οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ: commonly equiv.
to *haud scio an*, sometimes, as
here, to *haud scio an non*. On
εἰ in this double meaning, see Kr. 65,
1, 8.

9 f. ὥστε . . . χαριεῖσθε: compare
with ὥστε . . . πρᾶττειν, a few lines
above.

11. τό γ' ἐμόν: has almost the
same force as ἐγώ, only less personal.
Like the phrases with *περί* and *ἀμφί*,
it became very common in later

Greek. Cf. *Rep.* vii. 533 a ἐπεὶ τό γ' 458
ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι with d
Symp. 210 a ἐρῶ μὲν οὖν ἐγώ, καὶ
προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω. Kr. 43, 4,
26.

13. αἰσχροὺν: note that Gorgias is
impelled to a continuation of the dia-
logue only by regard for his own
honor. This motive was especially
strong with the Sophists; cf. *Prot.*
352 d αἰσχροὺν ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ σοφίαν μὴ
οὐχὶ πάντων κράτιστον φάναι. With
αἰσχροὺν and similar words which im-
ply a negation, it is more usual to
find μὴ οὐ. GMT. 817. It is also
more common to employ the dat. of
reference, instead of the acc. with the
infinitive. *Rid.* § 183.—τὸ λοιπόν:
not 'furthermore,' with Kr. 46, 3, 2,
but "finally," "in conclusion," after
those present have expressed their
desires.

14. ἐπαγγεिलाμένον: for the mean-
ing, see on 447 c. Here it acquires
almost the force of "challenge," since
the subject of the inf. must be sup-
plied out of the following ὅτι τις βού-
λεται.

15 λεται. ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ τουτοισί, διαλέγου τε καὶ ἐρώτα ὅτι οὐ
βούλει.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ἃ θαναμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
ὑπὸ σοῦ· ἴσως γάρ τοι σοῦ ὀρθῶς λέγοντος ἐγὼ οὐκ
ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνω. ῥητορικὸν φῆς ποιεῖν οἷός τ' εἶναι,
20 εἰάν τις βούληται παρὰ σοῦ μαρθάνειν.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ πάντων ὥστ' ἐν ὄχλῳ πιθανὸν εἶναι
οὐ διδάσκοντα ἀλλὰ πείθοντα;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

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25 ΣΩ. Ἐλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ
ιατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

ΓΟΡ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἐν γε ὄχλῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν;
οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος
30 ἔσται.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται, τοῦ
εἰδότος πιθανώτερος γίγνεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνν γε.

35 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἱατρός γε ὢν. ἦ γάρ;

458 23. οὐ διδάσκοντα: the regular
neg. with ὥστε is μή. The οὐ here
may be due to the φῆς above, which
throws an indir. disc. coloring over
the whole. See Gildersleeve, *Am.*
Jour. Phil. vii. 174.

459 27. ἐν γε ὄχλῳ: Gorgias wishes
to protect himself by a restriction
which, while it defers, for a brief in-
terval, his defeat, shows plainly the
weakness of his professions. See
the criticism of Socrates which fol-
lows.

28. ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι: the reason

for a change of neg. such as occurs 459
in this and the following clauses is
often hard to perceive. Here it
seems to be the oscillation from gen-
eric to particular, which is going on
continually in Socrates' mind. Hav-
ing made his general point with μή,
he recurs to the case under discus-
sion with οὐ. So ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός . . .
ἀνεπιστήμων (cf. before, ἐν τοῖς μὴ
εἰδόσι), but ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς, ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι.
It would be possible, but not so good,
to take the latter cases as examples
of adhaerent οὐ.

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἱατρός γε δήπου ἀεπιστήμων ὢν ὁ ἱατρὸς ἐπιστήμων.

ΓΟΡ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

40 ΣΩ. Ὁ οὐκ εἰδὼς ἄρα τοῦ εἰδότος ἐν οὐκ εἰδόσι πιθανώτερος ἔσται, ὅταν ὁ ῥήτωρ τοῦ ἱατροῦ πιθανώτερος ᾖ. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι;

ΓΟΡ. Τοῦτο ἐνταῦθά γε συμβαίνει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύ-
45 τως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορική; αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἰδέναι ὅπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δέ τινα πει-
θοῦς ἡύρηκεναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόσι μᾶλλον
εἰδέναι τῶν εἰδόντων;

XIV. ΓΟΡ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὴ ῥαστώνη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γίγνεται, μὴ μαθόντα τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, ἀλλὰ μίαν ταύτην, μηδὲν ἐλαττοῦσθαι τῶν δημιουργῶν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἐλαττοῦται ἢ μὴ ἐλαττοῦται ὁ ῥήτωρ τῶν
5 ἄλλων διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴαν τι

459 42. τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἢ ἄλλο τι: ac-
b cording to the position of ἄλλο τι be-
fore or after the ἢ is the latter to be
translated "than" or "or."

43. ἐνταῦθά γε: Gorgias notices the danger of such a concession, but still thinks he can limit the force of the argument to the single case. Perceiving this, Socrates immediately extends his statement to make it apply καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας.

45 f. πράγματα . . . μηχανὴν πειθοῦς: Socrates never lets slip an occasion to emphasize the essential opposition of the aim of rhetoric to the truth of facts, an opposition admitted, indeed, by the Sophists themselves. Cf. the statement of Tisias in *Phaedr.* 272 d

ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δεοί . . . τὸν
μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν εἶναι.

XIV. 1. πολλὴ ῥαστώνη: Gor-
gias is continually wandering away c
from the discussion of the nature of rhetoric to the praise of it, and being set right again by Socrates, who, while he brings back the discussion to the subjects which Gorgias had declared to be the proper province of rhetoric, is at the same time paving the way for an examination of its moral value.

5. διὰ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν: sc. μὴ μα-
θόντα κτλ. — αὐτίκα ἐπισκεψόμεθα: a
formula for getting rid of a side issue
like εἰσαυθὶς σκεψόμεθα *Prot.* 357 b. —
τι: is adverbial. l

ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἤ· νῦν δὲ τόδε πρότερον σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα d
 τυγχάνει περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν
 καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν οὕτως ἔχων ὁ ῥητορι-
 κὸς ὡς περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι
 10 τέχναι, αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ εἰδώς, τί ἀγαθὸν ἢ τί κακὸν ἐστὶν ἢ
 τί καλὸν ἢ τί αἰσχροὺν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, πειθῶ δὲ περὶ
 αὐτῶν μεμνηχανημένος, ὥστε δοκεῖν εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς ἐν
 οὐκ-εἰδόσι μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰδότος· ἢ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖ e
 προεπιστάμενον ταῦτα ἀφικέσθαι παρὰ σὲ τὸν μέλλοντα
 15 μαθήσεσθαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν; εἰ δὲ μή, σὺ ὁ τῆς ῥητορικῆς
 διδάσκαλος τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν διδάξεις τὸν ἀφικνούμενον
 — οὐ γὰρ σὸν ἔργον — ποιήσεις δ' ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖν
 εἰδέναι αὐτὸν τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ εἰδότα καὶ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐχ οἷός τε ἔσει αὐτὸν
 20 διδάξαι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἐὰν μὴ προειδῇ περὶ τούτων τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν; ἢ πῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει, ὦ Γοργία; καὶ πρὸς 460
 Διός, ὥσπερ ἄρτι εἶπες, ἀποκαλύψας τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἰπεῖ
 τίς ποθ' ἢ δύναμίς ἐστιν;

Γορ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὰν τύχη μὴ
 25 εἰδώς, καὶ ταῦτα παρ' ἐμοῦ μαθήσεται.

Σο. Ἐχε δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ λέγεις. Ἐάνπερ ῥητορικὸν σύ

459 d 6. πρὸς λόγον: to the advantage of
 our discourse. But little different
 from πρὸς λόγον. Cf. Prot. 351 e ἐὰν
 πρὸς λόγον δοκῇ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα.—
 τόδε: draws the attention in advance
 to the series of closely interconnected
 questions, introduced by ἄρα, which,
 by their very intimate relation one to
 another, oppose, with a certain impor-
 tance, Gorgias' continual wandering
 and vagueness, and also, by their
 delicate allusion to the somewhat
 extravagant expression used above
 (455 d), have a decidedly ironical

tinge, which is rendered more appar- 459
 ent by the doubtful οἶμαι of Gorgias' d
 answer.—ἄρα: see on 476 a.

14. προεπιστάμενον: the partic. is e
 again the most important part of the
 statement, as in 457 c, 453 b.

22. τῆς ῥητορικῆς: this passage
 differs from 455 d only in arrange-
 ment.

26. ἔχε δὴ: a request to pause, 460
 whereby the point reached is de-
 clared to be an important one, which
 merits further consideration. Cf.
 Prot. 349 d ἔχε δὴ . . . ἕξιον γάρ τοι a

St. I. p. 460.

τινα ποιήσης, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸν εἰδέναι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
 ἄδिका ἥτοι πρότερόν γε ἢ ὕστερον μαθόντα παρὰ σοῦ.

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

30 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὰ τεκτονικὰ μεμαθηκὼς τεκτονικός, ἢ οὐ; **b**

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ τὰ μουσικὰ μουσικός;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τὰ ἱατρικὰ ἱατρικός, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω κατὰ
 35 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὁ μεμαθηκὼς ἕκαστα τοιούτός ἐστιν οἷον
 ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεται;

ΓΟΡ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ τὰ δίκαια
 μεμαθηκὼς δίκαιος;

40 ΓΟΡ. Πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος δίκαιά πον πράττει;

ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη τὸν [ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι, τὸν **c**
 δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι <ἀεὶ> δίκαια πράττειν;

460 ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. When thus
^a used, ἔχειν is of course intransitive.
 H. 810.

28. ἥτοι . . . ἥ: or at least. In
 English we should naturally use γὰρ
 with the second member. Cf. *Apol.*
 27 *ἃ τοὺς δαίμονας ἥτοι θεοὺς γε ἡγού-*
μεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας.—παρὰ σοῦ: const.
 with ὕστερον μαθόντα alone; πρότερον
 with εἰδέναι.

b 30. τὰ τεκτονικά: "the principles
 of building."

34 f. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον: accord-
 ing to the same principle (analogy).
 'The argument which follows is to
 our notions sophistical enough. Not
 so, however, from the Socratic point
 of view, according to which every
 virtue is a form of knowledge, and

every vice the result of ignorance.' 460
 Thompson. See on 458 a.

43. οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη κτέ.: a few lines **c**
 below is found a repetition of the first
 clause of this sentence, in almost the
 same language, where, too, the state-
 ment is natural, and is used as a basis
 for a further deduction; here, on the
 contrary, it is out of place, and besides,
 is not followed up at all in the next
 sentence. These reasons have led to
 the omission of the bracketed words,
 by which we get a clearly logical argu-
 ment, as follows: "The just man
 performs just actions." "Yes." "Must
 he not therefore wish always to per-
 form just actions?" "Apparently."
 "The just man will never, then, wish
 to perform unjust actions," etc.

45 ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται γέ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ γέ δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τὸν δὲ ῥητορικὸν ἀνάγκη ἐκ τοῦ λόγου δίκαιον εἶναι.

50 ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέποτε ἄρα βουλήσεται ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἀδικεῖν.

ΓΟΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται γέ.

XV. ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν λέγων ὀλίγω πρότερον, ὅτι οὐ α
δεῖ τοῖς παιδοτρίβαις ἐγκαλεῖν οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν
πόλεων, ἐὰν ὁ πύκτης τῇ πυκτικῇ χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῇ;
ὡσαύτως δὲ οὕτως καὶ ἐὰν ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ ἀδίκως
5 χρῆται, μὴ τῷ διδάξαντι ἐγκαλεῖν μηδὲ ἐξελαύνειν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς χρωμένῳ τῇ
ῥητορικῇ; ἐρρήθη ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γε ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος φαίνεται, ὁ ῥητορικός, οὐκ ε
10 ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας. ἢ οὐ;

ΓΟΡ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις γε, ὦ Γοργία, λόγοις ἐλέγετο,
ὅτι ἡ ῥητορικὴ περὶ λόγους εἴη οὐ τοὺς τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ
περιπτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοὺς τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου· ἢ γάρ;

460 XV. 1. λέγων: equiv. to ὅτι ἔλε-
d γες, that you were saying.

2. οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν: when two verbs which govern different cases are construed with but one object, it is customary to construe this object with the nearer verb. Cf. below (5).

3. χρῆται τε καὶ ἀδικῇ: the co-ordination of the two ideas by τε . . . καὶ brings into greater prominence the impropriety of thus misapplying otherwise useful skill, than the more usual ἀδίκως χρῆται of the following clause.

6. ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι: the μηδὲ 460
ἐξελαύνειν is a result which may or d
may not follow the ἐγκαλεῖν, according to circumstances. The real opposition is between τῷ διδάξαντι and τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, hence the second is put in the same case as the first, although the acc. would be required by ἐξελαύνειν. Cf. Prot. 327 a πᾶς πάντα ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα.

10. ἂν ποτε ἀδικήσας: represents e
the same tense of the optative,

15 ΓΟΡ. Ναί.

Σα. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν σοῦ τότε ταῦτα λέγοντος ὑπέλαβον, ὡς οὐδέποτ' ἂν εἶη ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἀδικον πρᾶγμα, ὃ γ' αἰεὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἔλεγες, ὅτι ὁ ῥήτωρ τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἀδίκως
 20 χρῶτο, οὕτω θαυμάσας καὶ ἡγησάμενος οὐ συνάδειν τὰ 461 λεγόμενα ἐκείνους εἶπον τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι, εἰ μὲν κέρδος ἡγοῖο εἶναι τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι ὥσπερ ἐγώ, ἄξιον εἶη διαλέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν χαίρειν· ὕστερον δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπισκοπομένων ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι αὐτὸ ὁμολογεῖται τὸν ῥητορικὸν
 25 ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἀδίκως χρῆσθαι τῇ ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐθέλειν ἀδικεῖν. ταῦτα οὖν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἔχει, μὰ τὸν κύνα, ὦ Γοργία, οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας ἐστὶν ὥστε ἱκανῶς διασκέψασθαι.

XVI. ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὕτω καὶ σὺ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς δοξάζεις ὥσπερ νῦν λέγεις; ἡ οἶε, ὅτι Γοργίας

400 17. **δ γα**: gives the basis of the statement. The neuter may be due to the πρᾶγμα immediately preceding (H. 631 a), or it may simply be used ad sensum. Cf. 465 d.

461 20. **οὕτω**: under these circumstances.

^a See on 503 d. — **συνάδειν**: a musical term. See on 457 e.

24. **ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ αὐτός**: properly the following clause should be independent, stating the conclusions reached in the investigation; but by bringing it under the government of the inserted **ὁρᾷς κτέ.** an appeal is again made to the fairness of the opponent. Cf. *Apol.* 24 d **ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε**, *ὅτι σιγᾷ*, *ib.* 31 b **νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί**, *ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροὶ κτέ.*

^b 26. **μὰ τὸν κύνα**: cf. 466 c, 482 b, *Apol.* 22 a. Socrates is rather fond of this formula of asseveration, possibly out of aversion to any light

handling, even of the Greek divini- 461 ties. See on 463 d. ^b

27. **οὐκ ὀλίγης συνουσίας**: a delicate allusion to 458 c, which shows Socrates' fine feeling in not insisting on a discussion which must be unpleasant and also humiliating to Gorgias. The word *συνουσία* is elsewhere employed so as to include the discourses (*διάλογοι*), e.g. *Prot.* 310 a **τί οὖν οὐ διηγήσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν**; i.e. in the sense of the Eng. "meeting."

XVI. 1. On Polus, who here again thrusts himself into the discussion, see note to 448 a, and *Introd.* § 14. — **καί**: belongs, according to the sense, with *δοξάζεις*. *Is what you say also really your opinion?* We should expect a second *καί* with *ὥσπερ*, according to usage. See on 457 e. Others construe *καί* with *σὺ*.

2. **ἡ οἶε**: or do you think. The

ῥσχύνθη σοι μὴ προσομολογήσαι τὸν ῥητορικὸν ἄνδρα
 μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ δίκαια εἰδέναι καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ,
 5 καὶ ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς παρ' αὐτόν, αὐτὸς διδάξῃν,
 ἔπειτα ἐκ ταύτης ἴσως τῆς ὁμολογίας ἐναντίον τι συνέβῃ ἐν
 τοῖς λόγοις, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, αὐτὸς ἀγαγὼν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα
 ἐρωτήματα — ἐπεὶ τίνα οἶει ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ
 αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἄλλους διδάξῃν; ἀλλ'
 10 εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄγειν πολλὴ ἀγροικία ἐστὶ τοὺς λόγους.

Σπ. ὦ κάλλιστε Πῶλε, ἀλλὰ τοι ἐξεπίτηδες κτώμεθα
 ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς, ἵνα, ἐπειδὰν αὐτοὶ πρεσβύτεροι γιγνό-
 μενοι σφαλλώμεθα, παρόντες ὑμεῖς οἱ νεώτεροι ἐπανορ-
 θῶτε ἡμῶν τὸν βίον καὶ ἐν ἔργοις καὶ ἐν λόγοις. καὶ α

461 second question repeats the first in a
 b varied form. Both questions are
 'rhetorical,' expecting no answer, and
 express a protest against the idea
 that the art of rhetoric has anything
 to do with a knowledge of what is
 right.

4. μὴ οὐχὶ . . . εἰδέναι κτέ.: two
 negs. after ῥσχύνθη μὴ προσομολογήσαι,
 on account of the negative force of
 the expression. Cf. Prot. 352 c, d.
 See H. 1034 b, and on 458 d. The
 construction is the same as that after
 ἀπαρνήσεσθαι below, which is followed
 by a double neg. because the question
 τίνα οἶει veils the assertion οὐδεὶς.
 οὐχὶ is merely more emphatic than
 οὐ.

5. ἐὰν μὴ ἔλθῃ ταῦτα εἰδὼς: more
 logically, ἐὰν ἔλθῃ ταῦτα μὴ εἰδὼς. —
 διδάξῃν: depends upon some verb of
 saying to be supplied from προσομολο-
 γήσαι. The asyndeton with ἔπειτα
 instead of καί (cf. Apol. 23 c) is
 not uncommon, and the clause is to
 be construed in dependence on ὅτι
 (because). By this time, however,
 Polus' flow of words has run away

with him; he has only energy enough 461
 left to hurl at Socrates the words b
 τοῦθ' ὃ δὴ ἀγαπᾷς, before he abandons
 his struggling sentence altogether and
 starts afresh. Such passages as this
 show Plato to have been no mean
 dramatist.

6. ἴσως: gives expression in pass-
 ing to the hint that perhaps the con-
 tradiction was not so clearly deduced
 from Gorgias' words as Socrates sup-
 posed. The whole sentence, however,
 shows Polus' complete inability to
 grasp the real point at issue.

10. ἀγροικία: is the reverse of ποι- c
 δεία. By this very criticism, Polus
 betrays that he is himself just as
 lacking in the polish of a gentleman,
 which he denies to Socrates, as in sci-
 entific knowledge.

11. ὦ κάλλιστε: the epithet suits
 the pompous rhetor excellently.

12. υἱεῖς: the addition of the word
 "sons," though not strictly necessary,
 is quite natural, especially among
 people where the support of the par-
 ent by the son was so strictly enjoined
 as among the Greeks.

15 νῦν εἴ τι ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σφαλλόμεθα, σὺ παρὼν ἐπανόρθου· δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ ἐγὼ ἐθέλω τῶν ὁμολογημένων εἶ τί σοι δοκεῖ μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογήσθαι, ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι ἂν σὺ βούλῃ, ἕαν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης.

20 ΠΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν μακρολογίαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἣν καθέρξης, ἥ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχείρησας χρῆσθαι.

ΠΛ. Τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

25 ΣΩ. Δεινὰ μεντὰν πάθοις, ὦ βέλτιστε, εἰ Ἀθήναζε ὀφεικόμενος, οὗ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐνταῦθα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχήσῃς. ἀλλὰ ἀντίθες τοι· σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος καὶ μὴ ἐθέλοντος

461 15. ἐγὼ καὶ Γοργίας: besides being
d the Greek idiom, the initial position of ἐγὼ softens the supposition for Gorgias. The Latin has the same position.

16. δίκαιος δ' εἶ: the sense is to be supplied from what precedes. Cf. *Lach.* 180 d εἴ τι ἔχεις τῷδε τῷσαντοῦ δημότη ἀγαθὸν συμβουλευῆσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν· δίκαιος δ' εἶ. The regular neg. of the inf. after δοκεῖ would be οὐ. μὴ is here due to the conditional color. For the personal const. see on 449 c.

18. ἀναθέσθαι: the figure is drawn from the draughts-board; it is the regular word for 'taking back' a move. Similarly, *Prot.* 354 e ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι ἔξεστιν, εἰ πρὶν ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι.

20. τί τοῦτο λέγεις: equiv. to τί ἐστι τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις. *Kr.* 57, 3, 6; *H.* 1012 a.

21. ἕαν καθέρξης: as it were, by a dam or a fence.

22. χρῆσθαι: because in μακρολογία the orator has at his disposal all the devices of his art.

25. Ἀθήναζε: Athens was noted as a πόλις φιλόλογος (*Leg.* I. 641 e), and freedom of speech (παρρησία) was held to be the fundamental principle of a democratically governed state. Cf. *Dem. Phil.* iii. 3 ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν οἴεσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεδώκατε.

26. τῆς Ἑλλάδος: is the part. gen. dependent upon οὗ. The Eng. would find ἐν with the dat. more natural. — ἔπειτα: after all. *GMT.* 856.

28. ἀντίθες: equiv. to but consider on the other hand; lit. put in opposition. — σοῦ μακρὰ λέγοντος κτ.: Socrates makes a similar remark in *Prot.* 335 c, when he really prepares to leave the gathering rather than waste his time in words.

τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὐ δεινὰ ἂν αὖ ἐγὼ πάθοιμι,
 30 εἰ μὴ ἐξέσται μοι ἀπιέναι καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν σου; ἀλλ' εἴ τι 462
 κῆδει τοῦ λόγου τοῦ εἰρημένου καὶ ἐπανορθώσασθαι αὐτὸν
 βούλει, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἀναθέμενος ὅτι σοι δοκεῖ, ἐν
 τῷ μέρει ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενος, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ
 Γοργίας, ἔλεγχέ τε καὶ ἐλέγχου. φῆς γὰρ δήπου καὶ σὺ
 35 ἐπίστασθαι ἅπερ Γοργίας· ἢ οὐ;

Πολ. Ἐγωγε.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ κελεύεις σπαντὸν ἐρωτᾶν ἐκάστοτε
 ὅτι ἂν τις βούληται, ὥς ἐπιστάμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι;

Πολ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

40 Σο. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτων ὁπότερον βούλει ποίει, ἐρώτα ἢ β
 ἀποκρίνου.

XVII. Πολ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι,
 ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς
 ῥητορικῆς, σὺ αὐτὴν τίνα φῆς εἶναι;

Σο. Ἄρα ἐρωτᾷς ἥντινα τέχνην φημὶ εἶναι;

5 Πολ. Ἐγωγε.

Σο. Οὐδεμίαν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ὥς γε πρὸς σέ
 τάληθῃ εἰρήσθαι.

462 31. κῆδεσθαι: implies personal in-
 a terest in the matter.

32. ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον: is to be taken with the following clause, ἀναθέμενος.

34. φῆς γὰρ δήπου: by quoting his own vaunting words against him, Socrates compels Polus also to adopt the dialectic form.—δήπου: throws a tinge of irony into the question.

5 XVII. 1. ταῦτα: is simply the proposition which Socrates makes, and the words ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα is a formula of acceptance.—ἀλλά: well then, is often thus used in answers. After an imv., as here in Soph. El.

376 ff., ΗΛ. Φέρ' εἰπέ δὴ τὸ δεινόν... 462
 XP. ἀλλ' ἐξερωῶ τοι πᾶν ὅσον κάτοιδ' ἐγώ. b

3. τίνα φῆς εἶναι: though assuming it as self-evident that rhetoric is a τέχνη, Polus is compelled, in commencing, to put his question quite generally. Socrates, in his answer, confines himself simply to deducing the consequences of Gorgias' admissions. The substitution of ἥντινα for τίνα is according to the strict rule, which, however, is not rigorously adhered to.

6 f. ὥς . . . εἰρήσθαι: cf. Rep. x. 595 b ὥς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθαι. The active εἰπεῖν is more common. See Madv. 151; H. 956; GMT. 777. 2.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Πράγμα ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην ἐν τῷ συγγράμ-
10 ματι ὃ ἐγὼ ἐναγχος ἀνέγνων.

ΠΩΛ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐμπειρία ἄρα σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ἐμοιγε, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

15 ΠΩΛ. Τίνος ἐμπειρία;

ΣΩ. Χάριτός τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν καλὸν σοι δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι, —
χαρίζεσθαι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἀνθρώποις;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Πῶλε; ἤδη πέπυσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ, ὅτι φημί
20 αὐτὴν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ οὐ καλὴ μοι α
δοκεῖ εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ γὰρ πέπυσμαι ὅτι ἐμπειρίαν τινὰ αὐτὴν φῆς
εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμᾷς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, σμικρὸν
25 τί μοι χαρίσασθαι;

462 9. ὃ φῆς σὺ ποιῆσαι τέχνην: is to
b be explained according to 448 c πολ-
λὰ τέχνη ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰσὶν ἐκ τῶν
ἐμπειριῶν ἐμπείρως ἡρμημένοι, accord-
ing to which an art arises from expe-
rience. Polus, however, has by this
time forgotten his own words.—ἐν
τῷ συγγράμματι: see on 448 c and
Introd. § 14.

c 13. ἐμπειρία: here not an empirical
science, but merely a dexterity ac-
quired by much practice. Cf. 463 b.
The following question is no advance
on his first one, and seems to show
that Polus has no definite plan.

16. χάρις: is the grace which
causes pleasure, and depends princi-
pally on the person of the orator;
ἡδονή, the pleasure with which the

hearer is inspired by his speech. 462
Quintilian (*Inst. or.* ii. 15. 24) trans-
lates the expression by the words
peritia gratiae ac voluptatis. Polus
has not yet heard the specific
difference which distinguishes rhetoric
from other ἐμπειρίαι of the same class.
Hence he again falls into the same
error in his question as he did in his
answer above, 448 c. In this way,
however, the conversation is again
turned to the consideration of the
value of rhetoric.

20. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: see on 452 c. d
—εἰ οὐ κτέ.: οὐ because Polus ex-
pects an affirmative answer.—εἰ:
whether.

24. τιμᾷς: equiv. to καλὸν φῆς εἶναι
or περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, as in *Crito* 47 a.

1 ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐροῦ νῦν με, ὀψοποιία ἥ τις μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, τίς τέχνη ὀψοποιία;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία, ὦ Πῶλε.

30 ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ τί; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ, ἐμπειρία τις.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος; φάθι.

ΣΩ. Φημὶ δὴ, χάριτος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας, ὦ Πῶλε. e

ΠΩΛ. Ταῦτόν δ' ἐστὶν ὀψοποιία καὶ ῥητορική;

35 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς μὲν ἐπιτηδεύσεως μόριον.

ΠΩΛ. Τίνος λέγεις ταύτης;

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν· ὁκνῶ Γοργίου ἐνεκα λέγειν, μὴ οἴηταί με διακωμῶδεῖν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
40 ἐπιτήδευμα· ἐγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική ἣν 463
Γοργίας ἐπιτηδεύει, οὐκ οἶδα· καὶ γὰρ ἄρτι ἐκ τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἡμῖν καταφανὲς ἐγένετο, τί ποτε οὗτος ἡγέται· ὁ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.

45 ΓΟΡ. Τίνος, ὦ Σώκρατες; εἰπέ, μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς.

462 — τὸ χαρίζεσθαι: pres. for the habit.

d — χαρίσασθαι: aor. for the single example.

e 34. ταῦτόν δ' ἐστίν: with surprise and disgust. Polus overlooks the fact that there can be two orders belonging to the same species.

37. τίνος . . . ταύτης: in close connexion with what precedes. See on 461 d and 449 e.

38. μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἢ: it is not necessary to supply a verb of apprehension, though that is the idea suggested by μὴ with the subjv. GMT. 309; H. 867. The employment of the

form here is an attempt to conciliate. In 486 c, 509 a καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστί, Socrates has laid aside all idea of conciliation, and speaks the truth with boldness. ἀγροικος is opposed to ἀστεῖος, and means rude (see on 447 a). It is to be taken in connexion with the reproof administered by Polus in 461 c. Truth often incurs the reproach of ἀγροικία. Note that Socrates still preserves towards Gorgias his courtesy and respect.

44. οὐδενός: explanatory of τινός. 463

45. μηδὲν ἐμὲ αἰσχυνθείς: cf. Hom. a γ 96 μηδέ τί μ' αἰδόμενος μειλίσσεο.

XVIII. Σο. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Γοργία, εἶναι τι ἐπι-
 τήδευμα τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀν-
 δρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακεῖαν. ταύτης μοι **b**
 5 δοκεῖ τῆς ἐπιτηδεύσεως πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα μόρια εἶναι,
 ἐν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιική· ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ
 ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.
 ταύτης μόριον καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐγὼ καλῶ καὶ τὴν γε
 κομμωτικὴν καὶ τὴν σοφιστικὴν, τέτταρα ταῦτα μόρια ἐπὶ **c**
 10 τέτταρσιν πράγμασιν. εἰ οὖν βούλεται Πῶλος πυνθάνε-
 σθαι, πυνθανέσθω. οὐ γάρ πω πέπυσται, ὁποῖόν φημι
 ἐγὼ τῆς κολακείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν
 λέληθα οὐπω ἀποκεκριμένος, ὃ δὲ ἐπανερωτᾷ, εἰ οὐ καλὸν
 ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρότερον,

463 XVIII. 2. ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς
a κτέ.: in this characterization, Socrates includes all the good that can be said of the art of rhetoric. It requires cleverness in perceiving and distinguishing between various relations, hardihood to work before the eyes of the world, and skill in dealing with men. — στοχαστικῆς: is originally connected with shooting and throwing, but is often metaphorically used. With this definition, cf. Isoc. c. Soph. 294 d ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι. In regard to courage in speaking, cf. Cic. de Or. i. 26. 121.

b 4. κολακεῖαν: the Greek word means more than the English "flattery." Under it is included everything whose aim is the agreeable rather than the good.

5. ἐπιτηδεύσεως: notice the variety in the use of the words ἐπιτήδευσις and ἐπιτήδευμα, which are to be

distinguished as πράξις and πρᾶγμα, ⁴⁶³ the one being a concrete manifestation of the other. **b**

7. ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή: these words are but little distinguished. The first denotes, as has already been said (on 462 c), the result obtained by practice; the latter is more especially that which is derived from work without any definite object or clear consciousness. So rhetoric is called in *Phaedrus* 260 e ἀτεχνος τριβή, and in 270 b τριβὴ καὶ ἐμπειρία. See on 462 c.

9. κομμωτική: is not only finery **c** in dress, but also hair-curling, ointments, cosmetics, etc. Cf. Quint. ii. 15. 25 manganum artificium, qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani sagina mentiuntur. The addition of γέ emphasizes the examples newly thought of.

13. εἰ οὐ: see on 462 d.

14 ff. ἀποκρινοῦμαι... πρὶν ἂν ἀποκρίνωμαι: after the model of the anticipatory conditional. πρὶν, "before,"

15 εἶτε καλὸν εἶτε αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν, πρὶν ἂν πρῶτον ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅτι ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ὦ Πῶλε· ἀλλ' εἴπερ βούλει πυθέσθαι, ἐρώτα, ὅποιον μόριον τῆς κολακείας φημί εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐρωτῶ δὴ, καὶ ἀπόκριναι, ὅποιον μόριον.

20 ΣΑ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν μάθοις ἀποκριναμένου; ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ α ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδῶλον.

ΠΩΛ. Τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Αἰσχρὸν ἔγωγε· τὰ γὰρ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ καλῶ· ἐπειδὴ δεῖ σοι ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς ἤδη εἰδότες ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

25 ΓΟΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲ αὐτὸς συνίημι ὅτι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰκότως γε, ὦ Γοργία· οὐδὲν γάρ πω σαφὲς λέγω, ο Πῶλος δὲ ὅδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς.

463 takes the inf.; "until," the indic.
c subjv. or opt., according to the sphere of time. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* ii. 465 ff.

d 20. ἄρ' οὖν κτέ.: the question implies doubt, and is intended to stimulate Polus' attention; but for some cause, probably dulness, he merely renews his previous question.—The meaning of εἰδῶλον is made clear by *Theaet.* 150 e ψευδῇ καὶ εἰδῶλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

23. τὰ γὰρ κακὰ κτέ.: that which according to its nature can be characterized as ἀγαθόν, must be esteemed καλόν. If, however, it is κακόν, then it must be esteemed αἰσχρόν.

24. ὡς ἤδη εἰδότες: is a stinging rebuke to Polus.

25. μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔλλ' ἐγὼ κτέ.: Socrates' words implied that Polus was either too dull or too careless to understand him. Gorgias, while tacitly admitting Polus' incompetency, tries to smooth over his de-

feat by confessing to his own inability to catch Socrates' meaning as it is at present stated. If the master, αὐτός, cannot understand, the pupil may be pardoned for the same fault. Polus, though defeated in his attempt to rout Socrates (461 b ff.), only retires to recover breath before making a final effort (466 a).—μὰ τὸν Δία: is a real asseveration, used designedly by Gorgias, who is too much of a gentleman to indulge in oaths,—this being the only instance in this dialogue. It is significant that Polus, in spite of his heat, is likewise only once (473 a) betrayed into the common ναὶ μὰ Δία. Callicles uses oaths roundly enough, but restricts himself to νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ναὶ μὰ Δία, and μὰ Δία. On Socrates' habit, see on 449 d, 461 b.

28. Πῶλος δὲ . . . ὀξύς: in this remark Socrates both apologizes for and explains the reason of the obscurity of his statements; but it is, at the same time, an excellent char-

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν ἔα, ἐμοὶ δ' εἰπέ, πῶς λέγεις
30 πολιτικῆς μορίου ἔδωλον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικὴν.

ΣΟ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι, ὃ γέ μοι φαίνεται
εἶναι ἡ ῥητορικὴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦτο, Πῶλος ὃδε
ἐλέγξει. σῶμά που καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχὴν;

ΓΟΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

464

35 ΣΟ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τούτων οἶει τινὰ εἶναι ἑκατέρου εὐεξίαν;

ΓΟΡ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΟ. Τί δέ; δοκοῦσαν μὲν εὐεξίαν, οὔσαν δ' οὐ; οἷον
τοιόνδε λέγω· πολλοὶ δοκοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα, οὓς
οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως αἰσθοιτό τις ὅτι οὐκ εὖ ἔχουσιν ἄλλος ἢ
40 ἱατρός τε καὶ τῶν γυμναστικῶν τις.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΟ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγω καὶ ἐν σώματι εἶναι καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ,
ὅτι ποιεῖ μὲν δοκεῖν εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔχει
δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.

463 acterization of the impetuosity and
e heat of Polus, whether he be the
questioner or the respondent. It also
contains an allusion to the name it-
self (*πῶλος* a colt, filly).

464 35. The division of *κολακεία* given
a above was made without specifying
the standard of division, and only
enumerates the different varieties.
Socrates now, at Gorgias' instance,
reduces the whole subject to a regu-
lar system, by referring *κολακεία* back
to a higher species, *θεραπεία*, on the
basis of a distinction according to
reality and appearance. Now, since
θεραπεία has for its object the *εὐεξία*
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, we get two more points
of view: (1) that of the *object* (*ἀνθρώ-
που*), as composed of *body* and *soul*;
and (2) that of the *treatment*, as being
either *positive* or *negative*.

37. *οἷον τοιόνδε λέγω*: is a formula 464
for introducing an example or a spe- a
cial case in illustration of a general
statement.

38. *εὖ ἔχειν τὰ σώματα*: τὰ σώματα
here, as well as *τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν*
below, is acc. of specification. H.
718 a.

42. *τὸ τοιοῦτον*: the article is used
on account of its reference to what
has just been described. This is
more definitely given in the *ὅτι* (rela-
tive) clause which follows.

43. *ἔχει δὲ κτέ.*: in this change of
subject lies no ambiguity either to
the Greek mind or to us. It was, be-
sides, a regular way in Greek of ex-
pressing "although." The subject is
the same indefinite one which must
be supplied as the object of the pre-
ceding *ποιεῖ*. See on 456 d.

45 ΓΟΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

b

XIX. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ σοι, εἰν δύνωμαι, σαφέστερον ἐπι-
δείξω ὃ λέγω. δυοῖν ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων δύο λέγω
τέχνας· τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ πολιτικὴν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ
σώματι μίαν μὲν οὕτως ὀνομάσαι οὐκ ἔχω σοι, μιᾶς δὲ
5 οὕσης τῆς τοῦ σώματος θεραπείας δύο μόρια λέγω, τὴν
μὲν γυμναστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἱατρικὴν· τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντί-
στροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον
δὲ τῇ ἱατρικῇ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ c
ἀλλήλαις, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι, ἐκάτεραι τούτων, ἣ τε
10 ἱατρικὴ τῇ γυμναστικῇ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῇ νομοθετικῇ,
ὅμως δὲ διαφέρουσιν τι ἀλλήλων. τεττάρων δὲ τούτων
οὐσῶν, καὶ αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπευουσῶν τῶν μὲν

464 XIX. 2. δυοῖν κτέ.: the dual in
b Plato's time is fast fading out, and
he uses it as an artistic feature. It
disappears entirely before the close
of the fourth century B.C. Notice the
asyndeton.

4. μίαν ὀνομάσαι: like ἐνὶ ὀνόματι
καλεῖν, προσαγορεύειν.—οὕτως: is idio-
matically used, "thus briefly" or
"thus at the moment." See on 503 d.
—οὐκ ἔχω: I am not in position, regu-
larly takes the aor. infinitive.

6 f. ἀντίστροφον μὲν . . . ἀντίστρο-
φον δέ: an example of 'anaphora.'
—ἀντίστροφον: denotes a part corre-
sponding to a similar part on the op-
posite side of the symmetrical whole.
The function of gymnastic and no-
mothetic is to lay down, each in its
own department, certain positive direc-
tions whereby the constitution of the
subject under treatment is preserved
and improved. The arts of healing
and the administration of justice seek
in practice to put a stop to the dis-
regard of these directions, and to

restore the normal condition. Ac- 464
cording to their object, therefore, b
medicine and gymnastic, as well as
the making and administration of
law, all belong to the same class,
ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν δὴ ἀλλήλαις.

8. δικαιοσύνη: is used here in the c
same sense as δικαστική 520 b below; b
why, it is hard to understand. It
may have been chosen in view of
the earlier definition of the object of
rhetoric in 454 b, 455 a. The ἱατρικὴ
is beyond cavil good; on the con-
trary, δικαστική is susceptible of a bad
construction, whereas here there was
need of no doubtful word. Though
not customary, there is no reason
why δικαιοσύνη should not be un-
derstood as the practical exercise of
that character of the δίκαιος, which
for an Athenian was naturally to be
found in the δικαστική. The word,
then, means here "administration of
justice." That the word is genuine
is shown by Quintilian's translation
iustitia in ii. 15. 28.

τὸ σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ κολακευτικὴ αἰσθομένη, οὐ
 γνοῦσα λέγω, ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη, τέτραχα ἑαυτὴν διανεί-
 15 μασα, ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων, προσποιεῖται
 εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστου οὐδὲν α
 φροντίζει, τῷ δὲ αἰεὶ ἡδίστῳ θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν καὶ
 ἐξαπατᾷ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστου ἀξία εἶναι. ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν
 τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἢ ὀψοποικὴν ὑποδέδυκεν καὶ προσποιεῖται τὰ
 20 βέλτιστα σιτία τῷ σώματι εἰδέναι, ὥστ' εἰ δέοι ἐν παισὶ
 διαγωνίζεσθαι ὀψοποιόν τε καὶ ἱατρὸν ἢ ἐν ἀνδράσιν
 οὕτως ἀνοήτοις ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, πότερος ἐπαίει περὶ τῶν
 χρηστῶν σιτίων καὶ πονηρῶν, ὁ ἱατρὸς ἢ ὁ ὀψοποιός, λιμῷ e
 ἂν ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ἱατρὸν. κολακείαν μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ καλῶ,
 25 καὶ αἰσχρόν φημι εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ Πῶλε — τοῦτο γὰρ 465
 πρὸς σέ λέγω — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στοχάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελ-
 τίστου· τέχνην δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ φημι εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρίαν,

464 13 f. αἰσθομένη and γνοῦσα: are
 c distinguished both as regards the ob-
 ject and the manner of their activity.
 γνῶσις is directed to the nature, which
 is only comprehended by thought;
 αἴσθησις is merely the visual percep-
 tion of the outward form or effects,
 the cause of which, lying in the na-
 ture of the object, is not compre-
 hended. By ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη the
 idea of αἰσθομένη is not merely re-
 peated, but also more exactly defined.
 Similarly, 452 e, and in a different or-
 der 521 d, e. On the heaping up of
 participles and their subordination,
 see Kr. 56, 15 with notes.

15. ὑποδύσα: as it were under a
 cloak or mask by which its real na-
 ture is concealed. The usage is bor-
 rowed from the stage; cf. Luc. Pisc.
 33. The simple acc. with this verb
 is not uncommon.

d 17. θηρεύεται τὴν ἄνοιαν: the ap-

plication of the figure of the hunt to 464
 those arts which seek only the appear- d
 ance, is frequent in Plato, and most
 developed in the *Sophistes*. With
 the same employment of abstract for
 concrete Demosthenes expresses him-
 self, *Ol.* ii. 7 τὴν γὰρ ἐκάστων ἄνοιαν
 αἰεὶ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτὸν ἐξαπατῶν καὶ
 προσλαμβάνων οὕτω ηὔξῃθη.

22. ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες (sc. εἰσιν): in
 such comparisons the nom. is as com-
 mon as the attracted case. Madv.
Syn. 20, 3. — ἐπαίει περὶ κτέ.: this
 otherwise poetic verb is used several
 times by Plato. Cf. 518 c; *Apol.*
 19 c; *Crit.* 47 b, 48 a; *Lach.* 186 e.
 It also takes the acc. Kr. 68, 31, 2.

25 f. τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς σέ λέγω: 465
 brings up again Polus' persistent ef- a
 forts to make Socrates say that rheto-
 ric was καλόν (462 c, 463 d, e).

26. στοχάζεται: here equiv. to aim
 at; above 464 c in the derived mean-

ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον οὐδένα ὧν προσφέρει, ὅσοι ἅττα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐκάστου μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν.
 30 ἐγὼ δὲ τέχνην οὐ καλῶ, ὃ ἂν ᾗ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα· τούτων δὲ πέρι εἰ ἀμφισβητεῖς, ἐθέλω ὑποσχεῖν λόγον.

XX. Τῇ μὲν οὖν ἰατρικῇ, ὥσπερ λέγω, ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ^b κολακεία ὑπόκειται· τῇ δὲ γυμναστικῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἡ κομμωτική, κακοῦργός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀπατηλὴ καὶ ἀγεννὴς καὶ ἀνελεύθερος, σχήμασιν καὶ χρώ-
 5 μασιν καὶ λειότητι καὶ ἐσθήσει ἁπατῶσα, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἄλλότριον κάλλος ἐφελκομένους τοῦ οἰκείου τοῦ διὰ τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἀμελεῖν. ἵν' οὖν μὴ μακρολογῶ, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι — ἥδη γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἀκολουθή-

⁴⁶⁵ ing guess at. — ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου: is
^a brachylogic. Without regard to what is best.

28. ὧν προσφέρει: denotes the means which each employs, and whereby it works upon others.

29. ὥστε . . . μὴ ἔχειν: the μὴ could very well be omitted, but Greek usage sanctions the redundancy.

31. ὑποσχεῖν λόγον: to render account. Cf. Prot. 338 d πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχετόω.

^b XX. 1. ὀψοποιική: is not attributive to κολακεία, but the latter is predicate with ὑπόκειται, as flattery. Hence the point of the following κατὰ λόγον.

2. ὑπόκειται (equiv. to ὑποτίθεται): is not used in the sense which we elsewhere find, *lie at the foundation* of, as in Prot. 349 b ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία, but like ἐποθέδουκεν above, 464 d.

3. κακοῦργος κτέ.: these four adjectives go in pairs. The two first describing the nature of κολακεία *per se*, contain the κακόν of it; the first is more general, the second adds the special (Kr. 69, 32, 2), at the same

time emphasizing the result for the world at large. The second pair contains the αἰσχρόν, the verdict on the value of such skill. The following participle, with its datives, defines more narrowly ἀπατηλή. ^b

8. οἱ γεωμέτραι: the word denotes "mathematicians" in general. So e.g. Theodorus of Cyrene is continually called γεωμέτρης in the Theaetetus. Higher arithmetic also is included under geometry, because the Greeks employed geometrical methods to represent the higher relations of numbers. In the following proportion, we are reminded at once of an arithmetical formula; while the Greeks were reminded of the due proportion of lines and figures, in accordance with the development of mathematical science among them. The relations of the ideas can, by means of this threefold division into pairs, be brought into a simple but complete scheme. See on 464 a above. — ἥδη γὰρ κτέ.: mathematics was looked upon by Plato as a preparation for 'dialectic.'

σαις — ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο ὁψο-
 10 ποικὴ πρὸς ἱατρικὴν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε, ὅτι ὁ κομμωτικὴ ^c
 πρὸς γυμναστικὴν, τοῦτο σοφιστικὴ πρὸς νομοθετικὴν,
 καὶ ὅτι ὁ ὁψοποικὴ πρὸς ἱατρικὴν, τοῦτο ῥητορικὴ πρὸς
 δικαιοσύνην. ὅπερ μέντοι λέγω, διέστηκεν οὕτω φύσει·
 ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄντων φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα
 15 σοφισταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅτι χρήσονται
 οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τούτοις. καὶ

⁴⁶⁵ 9. ὁ κομμωτικὴ πρὸς γυμναστικὴν:
 b in this formula *ἐστὶ* is always want-
 ing.

c 10. μᾶλλον δέ: introduces a com-
 parison equally true, but more to the
 point of the argument (cf. 449 a), by
 the completion of the proportions al-
 ready worked out, and by their ex-
 tension to the whole system of ideas
 thus far developed. — It might seem
 strange that sophistic is paired with
 nomothetic, and not with philosophy.
 Philosophy, however, is the science of
principles in general, while in this dia-
 logue only *ethical* and *political* princi-
 ples are discussed. These latter, how-
 ever, the law-giver must make use of,
 — i.e. must be a philosopher, as is
 proved in the much more comprehen-
 sive and thorough discussion in the
Republic.

13. ὅπερ λέγω: refers, as it always
 does, to a previous statement; here
 to 464 c, where the close relationship
 of the *τέχναι*, which have to do with
 the same object (*body* and *soul*) was
 spoken of. This idea is here ex-
 pressed by the words ἅτε δ' ἐγγὺς ὄν-
 των, which recall at once the expres-
 sion above, ἅτε περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ οὔσαι.
 The subject of διέστηκεν is not ex-
 pressed, but is a general one, to be
 taken out of the preceding propor-
 tions, which embrace all *τέχναι* and

ἐμπειρίαι, and the same subject must ⁴⁶⁵
 be thought of with ὄντων. On account
 of the position of ἅτε ἐγγὺς ὄντων ^c
 the δέ is drawn away from the sec-
 ond member of the contrast, φύρον-
 ται. — φύσει: means the essential pe-
 culiarity, actual nature, of the ideas.
 Instead of these, however, with φύ-
 ρονται we have the persons introduced
 who employ and practise the *τέχναι*
 and ἐμπειρίαι, and who from ignorance
 of their true nature bring them into
 activity at the same time, and thus
 mix together matters which, properly
 considered, are quite distinct.

14. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ: probably denotes
 the soul as the place of action, and
 περὶ ταῦτά the moral questions treated,
 both of which are reckoned together
 above (464 c) in the expression περὶ
 τὸ αὐτό. Socrates restricts himself to
 the two ἐμπειρίαι to which ῥητορικὴ
 belongs, inasmuch as the object of
 the whole investigation is only an
 exact understanding of the nature of
 rhetoric. This passage is referred to
 below, in 520 a. — Plato can explain
 more accurately the relation of so-
 phistic and rhetoric to each other,
 because he was the first to explain
 the difference scientifically, whereas
 Gorgias, though he was unwilling
 to be reckoned among the sophists,
 could give no reason therefor.

- γάρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι ἐπεστάται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ α
αὐτῷ, καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ ταύτης κατεθεωρεῖτο καὶ διεκρίνετο ἢ τε
ὀψοποικὴ καὶ ἡ ἱατρικὴ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα ἔκρινε σταθ-
20 μόμενον ταῖς χάρισι ταῖς πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου
ἂν πολὺ ἦν, ὃ φίλε Πῶλε — σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἔμπειρος, —
ὁμοῦ ἂν πάντα χρήματα ἐφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἀκρίτων ὄν-
των τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν καὶ ὀψοποικῶν. ὁ μὲν
οὖν ἐγὼ φημι τὴν ῥητορικὴν εἶναι, ἀκρίκας· ἀντίστροφον
25 ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἐκείνο ἐν σώματι. ἴσως μὲν οὖν
ἄτοπον πεποίηκα, ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔων μακροὺς λόγους λέγειν
αὐτὸς συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. ἄξιον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγ-

465
d 17. ἐπεστάται: we have to imagine such ἐπιστάται as, like the κυβερνήτης, παιδοτρίβης, ποιμήν, are at the same time ἐπιστήμονες. Cf. Prot. 312 d, where the sophist is defined as ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεῖνόν λέγειν, i.e. ἐπιστάμενος ποιῆσαι κτέ., a definition which furnishes, at the same time, an example for the φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφιστὴς καὶ ῥήτωρ above.

18. κατεθεωρεῖτο: cf. 457 c. Here is meant a thorough critical examination from a higher point of view.

20. τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου: see on 450 c, 453 e, and Kr. 47, 5, 10. Anaxagoras, the friend of Pericles, agreed with the Atomic school and Empedocles, in holding that, in their original condition, the elements or atoms (according to him, unlimited in number, but of a certain definite quality) were mixed all together, without any definite arrangement. Into this confusion order was introduced by νοῦς, or the thinking spirit; or at least, this spirit gave the impulse towards it. His thesis describing the primitive condition of matter was this: ὁμοῦ

πάντα χρήματα ἦν. Cf. Dyer-Cron,⁴⁶⁵ Introd. to *Apol.* § 10.

21. τούτων: perhaps with an intentional ambiguity. — Gorgias himself — was not entirely without philosophical culture. See Introd. § 6. But as to Polus, we have no information.

23. τῶν τε ἱατρικῶν καὶ ὑγιεινῶν: both expressions are frequently connected to denote the same idea, both subjectively and objectively. Now, since ὑγιεινόν is that which ὑγίειαν ἐμποιεῖ (*Rep.* iv. 444 e) and ἱατρικὴ is ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὑγίεινοῦ, the latter must perforce be the art whose object is to restore the body to a healthy condition.

23 f. ὁ μὲν οὖν κτέ.: with this the discussion returns to the point which had given occasion to the above digressions (ὅπερ μέντοι).

25. ἐκείνο: refers to ὀψοποιία. The employment of a neuter demonstrative or relative referring to an antecedent in the masculine or feminine adds to the generalness of the conception. Cf. 463 b, 460 e. But ἐν σώματι may have had some influence.

27. μὲν οὖν: here, as also in ἴσως

γνώμην ἔχειν ἐστίν. λέγοντος γάρ μου βραχέα οὐκ ἐμάν-
θανες, οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι τῇ ἀποκρίσει, ἣν σοι ἀπεκρινάμην,
30 οὐδὲν οἴός τ' ἦσθα, ἀλλ' ἐδέου διηγήσεως. ἔαν μὲν οὖν καὶ
ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου μὴ ἔχω ὅτι χρήσωμαι, ἀπότεινε
καὶ σὺ λόγον, ἔαν δὲ ἔχω, ἔα με χρῆσθαι. δίκαιον γάρ. 466
καὶ νῦν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀποκρίσει εἴ τι ἔχεις χρῆσθαι, χρῶ.

XXI. ΠΩ. Τί οὖν φῆς; κολακεία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἡ
ῥητορικὴ;

ΣΩ. Κολακείας μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε εἶπον μόριον. ἀλλ' οὐ
μνημονεύεις τηλικούτος ὢν, ὦ Πῶλε; τί τάχα δράσεις;

5 ΠΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες;

ΣΩ. Ἐρώτημα τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς ἢ λόγου τινὸς ἀρχὴν λέ- 6
γεις;

ΠΩ. Ἐρωτῶ ἔγωγε.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

465 μὲν οὖν and ὁ μὲν οὖν just preceding,
a οὖν does not denote sequence, but adds
force to the statement about to be
made in view of what has already
been said. — ἐμοί: hints a contrast.

466 XXI. 1. τί οὖν φῆς: Polus braces
a himself, and assumes again the office
of questioner; but shows, by the
vagueness (cf. above, 462 c with note)
and inappropriateness of his question,
that he is either singularly inatten-
tive or stupid. Hence he receives a
sharp rap over the knuckles with the
admonition that his question had been
some time settled (465 d).

4. τί τάχα δράσεις: is taken by
Cron to mean "what can you possi-
bly (τάχα) bring forward?" i.e. in
the course of the discussion. The
scholiast understood it as meaning
"what will you do presently," when
you get old, as we see by the addition

πρεσβύτης γενόμενος. Probably it is 466
but an exclamation of wonder and
surprise; our colloquial "What'll you
do next?"

5. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι: is to be con-
nected with φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι. In spite
of his qualification, Polus proceeds to
put as bad a color on his assumed view
of Socrates as possible, by adding ἀγα-
θοί (cf. 449 a) to ῥήτορες. Cf. 469 a.
He does not aim at a refutation of
Socrates; with him the question is
still not the true nature of Rhetoric,
but its value and power in the state.

7. ἐρώτημα κτέ.: probably Socrates
only wishes to show that, from the
point of view of dialectic, the preced-
ing question is so inappropriate that he
is obliged to look upon it as a merely
rhetorical one, by which Polus only
states his own sentiments. Cf. below c.

10. οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι: much more b

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύνανται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ δύνασθαί γε λέγεις ἀγαθόν· τι εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

15 ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ λέγω γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλάχιστον τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦσιν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύνασθαι οἱ ῥήτορες.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεινύασιν τε οὖν ἂν βούλωνται, καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα^ο καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι^ο ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὖν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

ΣΩ. Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἀμφιγνοῶ μέντοι, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐφ' ἐκάστου ὧν λέγεις, πότερον αὐτὸς ταῦτα λέγεις καὶ γνώμῃσαντοῦ ἀποφαίνει, ἢ ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾷς.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλ' ἔγωγε σὲ ἐρωτῶ.

25 ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ φίλε· ἔπειτα δύο ἅμα με ἐρωτᾷς;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς δύο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἔλεγες, ὅτι ἀποκτεινύασιν οἱ ῥήτορες οὓς ἂν βούλωνται, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὖν ἂν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς.

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

⁴⁶⁶ crushing than φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι.

^b "They are not considered at all," "they have no value whatever." On νομίζεσθαι, cf. Ar. Nub. 962 ὅτ' ἐγὼ (ὁ δίκαιος λόγος) τὰ δίκαια λέγων ἤνθουν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἐνένομιστο ("was in high repute").

15. μὲν: almost equiv. to μήν, indeed.—δή: equiv. to just. "But that is indeed just what I do (γε) say."

^c 18. ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι: by this comparison Polus endeavors to emphasize the importance of his art, careless of

the fact that he thereby detracts ⁴⁶⁶ from its moral value. He employs his strongest expression of power actually used (ἀποκτεινύασιν), not even using the circumlocution οἱοί τ' εἰσίν. In spite of his following reassertion, however, the question is really only a rhetorical one, in which he voices his own statements. See on a above.

21. νῆ τὸν κύνα: see on 461 b.—ἀμφιγνοῶ . . . λέγεις: 'I am in doubt at every word you say.' Cope.

25. εἶεν: "very well," accepts the issue.

XXII. ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν σοι, ὅτι δύο ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἔρω-
τήματα, καὶ ἀποκρινοῦμαι γέ σοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα. φημί
γάρ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐγὼ καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς τυράννους
δύνασθαι μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν σμικρότατον, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ
5 ἔλεγον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν·
ποιεῖν μὲντοι ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξη βέλτιστον εἶναι.

ΠΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ, ὥς γέ φησιν Πῶλος.

ΠΩ. Ἐγὼ οὐ φημι; φημί μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε.

10 ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν — οὐ σύ γε, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι φῆς
ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τῷ δυναμένῳ.

ΠΩ. Φημί γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν οὖν οἶε εἶναι, εἰάν τις ποιῇ ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν
δοκῇ αὐτῷ βέλτιστα εἶναι, νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς
15 μέγα δύνασθαι;

ΠΩ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις τοὺς ῥήτορας νοῦν ἔχοντας καὶ

466 XXII. 4. δύνασθαι μὲν: the cor-
d relative has μέντοι, which is much
stronger than δέ.

e 5. ὧν βούλονται: is a circumlocution
for the part. gen.; hence the indica-
tive. — ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b.

7. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: Polus is surprised
that Socrates should see any differ-
ence in the two phrases.

9. οὐ φημι (nego): repeats οὐχ,
ὡς φησι. Polus does not understand
Socrates, who has in mind the results
of the admission that the possession
of power is a good. The question is
merely rhetorical, with an accent of
astonishment.

10. μὰ τόν: the omission of the
divinity occurs not infrequently. Cf.
Ar. Ran. 1374 μὰ τόν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδ' ἄν,
εἴ τις ἔλεγέ μοι τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων, ἐπιθό-

μην κτέ. H., 723 a, says that the deity 466
is omitted with humorous effect; but
it is much more likely here that So-
crates is a little vexed, but stops at
once any exhibition of it. The Scho-
liast's note, εὐλαβείας χάριν, may be
interpreted as indicating this motive,
or the motive assigned to Socrates on
461 b. — φῆς: with a clear reference
to Polus' previous statements in b,
which he is thus led to reiterate.

12. γὰρ οὖν: is frequently found
thus in phrases of acquiescence.

17. οὐκοῦν ἀποδείξεις κτέ.: the fut.
in neg. questions forms a lively ex-
pression for urgent demand. Kr. 53,
7, 4; H. 844 a. — The pred. noun with
the supplementary partic. follows the
same rule of agreement, as with the
supplementary infinitive.

τέχνην τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἀλλὰ μὴ κολακείαν, ἐμὲ ἐξελέγξας; 467
 εἰ δέ με ἑάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, οἱ ῥήτορες οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐν ταῖς
 20 πόλεσιν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς καὶ οἱ τύραννοί οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν
 τοῦτο κεκτημένοι. ἡ δὲ δύναμις ἐστίν, ὥς σὺ φῆς, ἀγα-
 θόν, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν ἄνευ νοῦ ἃ δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ ὁμολογεῖς κακὸν
 εἶναι· ἡ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

25 ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ῥήτορες μέγα δύναιτο ἢ οἱ τύραν-
 νοὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης ἐξελεγχθῇ ὑπὸ Πώ-
 λου ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΠΩΛ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ —

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς ἃ βούλονται· ἀλλὰ μ' ἔλεγε.

30 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ὠμολόγεις ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς βέλ-
 τιστα εἶναι, τούτου πρόσθεν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ νῦν ὁμολογῶ.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκοῦν ποιοῦσιν ἃ βούλονται;

ΣΩ. Οὐ φημι.

467 18. ἐξελέγξας: the refutation con-
 a sists in the proof, and the proof is
 at the same time a refutation. We
 must not insist on the priority of the
 aorist participle (H. 856 b); but the
 complex is to be considered, and from
 that point of view it would make no
 difference whether we had ἀποδείξεις
 ἐξελέγξας or ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξεις.

21. ἡ δὲ δύναμις κτέ.: contains one
 of the propositions on which Socra-
 tes bases the statement made above
 (466 e) and afterwards repeated, πῶς
 ἂν . . . μέγα δύναιτο. The other pro-
 position is that the possession by the
 orators of the power of doing what
 they please is not a good possession.

26. ἐξελεγχθῇ: in the pregnant
 sense. "If by a refutation of the
 position taken he be not convinced."
 Cf. 482 b.

28. οὗτος ἀνὴρ —: 'aposiopesis.' 467
 Polus is so astonished that he does
 not know what to say. The com-
 plete exclamation (always without
 the article) occurs 489 b. Cf. 505 c.
 Polus' astonishment, as well as stupid-
 ity, are still more evident in the words
 which follow, σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερ-
 φυᾷ. σχέτλιος is taken from Homer,
 where, however, it is only used of
 persons (except rarely in the *Odyssey*);
 ὑπερφυῖς is not unknown in
 Attic, but occurs in Plato (except
 here and 477 d) only in the adverbial
 form.

31. τούτου πρόσθεν: can, of course,
 be considered as a gloss on ἄρτι, but
 it heightens the effect, from a mimetic
 point of view, as well by its meaning,
 "a moment ago," as by its position
 at the end of the sentence.

35 Πηλ. Ποιοῦντες δὲ ἂ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς;

Σπ. Φημί.

Πηλ. Σχέτλια λέγεις καὶ ὑπερφυᾶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. O

Σπ. Μὴ κατηγορεῖς, ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσείπω σε κατὰ σέ· ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐμὲ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐπιδείξον ὅτι α
40 ψεύδομαι, εἰ δὲ μή, αὐτὸς ἀποκρίνου.

Πηλ. Ἀλλ' ἐθέλω ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ ὅτι λέγεις.

XXIII. Σπ. Πότερον οὖν σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἐκάστοτε, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττουσιν τοῦθ' ὃ πράττουσιν; οἷον οἱ τὰ φάρμακα πίνοντες παρὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν b
5 τοῦτο βούλεσθαι, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν, πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον καὶ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὗ ἔνεκα πίνουσιν; d

Πηλ. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν.

Σπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ πλείοντές τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον χρηματισμὸν χρηματιζόμενοι οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ βούλονται, ὃ ποι-
10 οῦσιν ἐκάστοτε· τίς γὰρ βούλεται πλεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ πράγματ' ἔχειν; ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οἶμαι, οὗ ἔνεκα πλείουσιν, πλουτεῖν· πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλείουσιν.

467 35. δέ: almost equiv. to "although."

b It is often used in the second of clauses thus connected to emphasize the opposition.

38. ὦ λῶστε Πῶλε: 'paronomasia' in Polus' style. See on 448 c.

c 41. ἵνα καὶ εἰδῶ: expresses curiosity, rather than a desire for information. Socrates, as leader of the discussion, makes at once an advance, by fixing a very important distinction.

XXIII. 2 f. ὃ ἂν πράττωσιν, ὃ πράττουσιν: the former is generic, the latter is a circumlocution. A few lines below ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν is

the special case, explanatory of 467 c
τοῦτο.

4. πίνοντες παρὰ κτέ.: the preposition is personal; "from the hands of."

8. οἱ πλείοντες: the merchants (ἐμ- d
ποροί) who engage in transmarine trade. Notice the confusion of the order, in which we can see the natural freedom of conversation. The subject of ἐστίν is οὐ τοῦτο ὃ ποιοῦσιν, the predicate ὃ βούλονται. The subject of οἱ πλείοντες floats until the plural verb appears. The neg. in οὐκοῦν is not felt here. H. 1048 a (β).

11. πράγματ' ἔχειν: is passive to πράγματα παρέχειν.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὕτω καὶ περὶ πάντων, εἴαν τις τι
15 πράττη ἔνεκά του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται, ὃ πράττει, ἀλλ'
ἐκείνο, οὗ ἔνεκα πράττει;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔστιν τι τῶν ὄντων, ὃ οὐχὶ ἦτοι ἀγαθόν γ'
ἔστιν ἢ κακὸν ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν;

20 ΠΩΛ. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν τε καὶ
ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τάναν-
τία τούτων;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

25 ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ μῆτε ἀγαθὰ μῆτε κακὰ ἄρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ
ἐνίστε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίστε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίστε 468
δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ
πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα;
οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλ' ἅττα καλεῖς τὰ μῆτε ἀγαθὰ μῆτε
30 κακὰ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἔνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν
πράττουσιν, ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τὰγαθὰ τῶν μεταξὺ;

ΠΩΛ. Τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

467 14. ἄλλο τι: 'ἄλλο τι ἢ challenges'
d an affirmation with respect to some
special portion of the sentence; ἄλλο
τι challenges an affirmation with
respect to the whole sentence which
follows it.' Riddell, § 22.

e 18. ὅρ' οὖν ἔστιν κτέ.: see a more
detailed investigation of this theory
in *Lysis*. Cf. 216 d δοκεῖ μοι ὡσπερὶ
τρί' ἅττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν,
τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
κακόν.

20. πολλὴ ἀνάγκη: the answer is 467
not according to the form of the pre-
ceding question, but according to the
sense, as if οὐδὲν ἔστι τῶν ὄντων had
preceded.

21 f. σοφίαν, ὑγίειαν, πλοῦτον: types
of the three great classes of property,
— mental, physical, and material.

25. ἄρα: for position, see on 472 d.

28. αὖ: on the other hand. To 468
actions are opposed things, which, how-
ever, belong to a similar category.

35 ΣΩ. Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν, ὅταν βα-
 δίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσταμεν,
 ὅταν ἐστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἦ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνουμεν, εἴ τινα ἀποκτείνουμεν, καὶ
 40 ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον
 εἶναι ἡμῶν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ
 ποιοῦντες.

45 ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

XXIV. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἔνεκά του ποιοῦ-
 μεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, οὗ ἔνεκα ταῦτα
 ποιοῦμεν;

ΠΩΛ. Μάλιστα.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδ' ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ
 τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλ'
 ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλα-
 βερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα,
 ὡς φῆς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα,
 10 οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε,
 ἦ οὐ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

468 36. βέλτιον: sc. than its opposite.

^b When the comparison is self-evident, the Greek, like the English, frequently omits the second member.

^c XXIV. 2. ἐκεῖνα, ἐκεῖνο: the immediate repetition of the same pronoun with different reference is remarkable.—ταῦτα: refers back to ἀ.

5. σφάττειν: is purposely substituted as a harsher word for ἀποκτείνονται. It implies that the person killed is defenseless; "to slaughter

like an ox."—ἀπλῶς οὕτως. thus sim- 468
 ply, "without limitation," as one would
 have to assume if the view of Polus
 is to stand. Cf. Prot. 351 c οὐκ οἶδα
 ἀπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀπο-
 κριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθὰ
 ἐστίν κτέ. Cf. 464 b.

11. τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις: a challenge in the form of a question, because Polus hesitates to answer. He is beginning to feel concerned for his fondly cherished view and bold state-

Πολ. Ἀληθῆ.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει
τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύ-
15 ραννος ὦν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχά-
νει δὲ ὦν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ γάρ;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ
ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνεις;

20 Πολ. Ἄλλ' οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Σο. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ
πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ
τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν;

Πολ. Οὐκ ἔστιν.

25 Σο. Ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον
ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ
ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται.

Πολ. Ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο ἐξεῖναι σοι

468 ments. The same form recurs a few
c lines below, where Polus is just clearly
recognizing his defeat. These arti-
fices belong to the dramatic side of
the dialogue, and take the place of
the tedious repetitions which weary
us in the narrative form; e.g., in
Prot. 360 c, d *συνέφη* — ἐπένευσεν —
καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν — πάνυ μόγῃς
ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν — οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὐτ'
ἐπινεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε.

d 13. *εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν*: is
the general premiss, while what fol-
lows up to *οὐ κάκιον* is the special ap-
plication of this to tyrants and ora-
tors. For the structure, see on the
similar case in 453 c.

15. *αὐτῷ*: is said from the stand-
point of the critic, although referring
to the subject of *οἰόμενος*. The Greek

does not cling to the reflexive. Kr. 468
51, 2, 5; H. 684 a.

15 f. *τυγχάνει δὲ κτέ.*: is connected
with the participle as an independ-
ent clause, — a usage common after
relatives. Kr. 59, 2, 6. 9; H. 1005.
The Eng. idiom requires 'although'
or 'whereas.'

21 f. *ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ*: in this
undefined city of which they were
speaking, the abode of the tyrant or
orator under criticism (*ὁ τοιοῦτος*).

25. *ὅτι ἔστιν*: that it is possible.
There need not be in all cases a
conflict between what one wishes and
what seems best, but the possibility
of a single case is enough for Socra-
tes' argument.

28. *ὥς δὴ σύ κτέ.*: is quite ironic;
as if you would not! It is really a com-

ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῦς
30 ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμε-
νον χρήματα ἢ δῆσαντα.

Σα. Δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;

Παλ. Ὅποτερ' ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; 469

Σα. Εὐφήμει, ὦ Πῶλε.

35 Παλ. Τί δῃ;

Σα. Ὅτι οὐ χρή οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς
ἀθλίους, ἀλλ' ἐλεεῖν.

Παλ. Τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω
τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

40 Σα. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Παλ. Ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνουσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως
ἀποκτεινύς, ἀθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεεινός;

Σα. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός.

Παλ. Οὐκ ἄρτι ἀθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι;

45 Σα. Τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεεινόν ἢ
γε πρὸς· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.

Παλ. Ἡ που ὁ γε ἀποθνήσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεεινός τε καὶ
ἀθλιός ἐστιν.

Σα. Ἥττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἥττον ἢ ὁ

50 δικαίως ἀποθνήσκων.

Παλ. Πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

468 parison, "it is just as true as the fact
e that," etc. By this fling Polus seeks
to evade confession of his defeat.

31. δῆσαντα: equiv. to εἰς τὸ δεσ-
μωτήριον ἀγαγόντα.

33. ζηλωτόν: *enviable*. By an easy
469 shift, the personal idea is transferred
a to the action itself.

34. εὐφήμει (*faue lingua*): says
Socrates, because the denial of all

moral principles implied in the words 469
of Polus seems to him like a sin a
against divinity. Cf. *Prot.* 330 d.

39. τῶν: the art. with incorporated
antec. is Platonic. Kr. 51, 12, x.

41. δικαίως: is slipped in unfairly
by Polus. Cf. 466 a.

46. πρὸς: is the only preposition b
that occurs at all frequently in Attic
prose as an adverb.

ΣΩ. Οὕτως, ὥς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὃν τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

ΠΩΛ. Ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μείζον;

55 ΣΩ. Ἡκιστά γε.

ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν;

ΣΩ. Βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἐλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

60 ΠΩΛ. Σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ.

ΠΩΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτείνυντι καὶ ἐκβάλλονται καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν.

XXV. ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ α

469 52. οὕτως κτέ.: 'Life is not the
b highest good, but guilt is certainly the greatest evil.' This was one of the life principles of Socrates. Cf. the beautiful exposition in *Apol.* 28 b ff., especially 29 b and 30 d, *Crito* 48 b.

57. βουλοίμην ἂν οὐδέτερα: I would
c wish neither; because also to suffer wrong is not a good thing. With Polus wish and preference coincide. — This quibble of Socrates is interesting, as showing the difficulties by which early thinkers were beset. For an accurate statement of principles, an accurate use of synonyms was indispensable; and this was not yet possible, even with the cultured.

60. σὺ ἄρα κτέ.: Polus cannot tear himself away from his fast-rooted ideas. Hence all teaching is vain.

XXV. 1. ὦ μακάριε: has somewhat of an ironical coloring. The

nearest English equivalent is the half
serious "Oh, you awful fellow!" —
c ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος: as an offset to Polus' words ἀλλ' ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω. "Let us have, then, argument for argument." The gen. may depend on ἐπιλαβοῦ, as in 506 b, but it is more likely gen. abs. See on ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, 506 a, and *Symp.* 214 e ἐάν τι μὴ ἀληθὲς λέγω, μεταξὺ ἐπιλαβοῦ, ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ εἰπὲ ὅτι τοῦτο ψεύδομαι. The original meaning is made clear by *Prot.* 329 a τὰ χαλκεία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιλάβηται τις (unless one takes hold of it). — τῷ λόγῳ: instrumental dat., "with your argument."

2. ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ: is not temporal, as in *Xen. An.* i. 8. 1 ἥδη δὲ ἦν ἀμφὶ ἀγορὰν πλῆθουσιν, i.e. towards noon. It simply indicates the presence of a multitude.

μάλῃς ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σέ ὅτι “ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύνα-
 μίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν
 5 γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ
 ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν
 δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεαγέ-
 ναι, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἄν θοϊμάτιον διεσχί-
 σθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται· οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν
 10 τῇδε τῇ πόλει”· εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχει-
 ρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι “ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν
 πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναυτο, ἐπεὶ κἄν ἐμπρησθεῖη οἰκία τούτῳ
 τῷ τρόπῳ ἦντιν’ ἂν σοι δοκῇ, καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια
 καὶ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ
 15 ἴδια”· ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ
 ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἣ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΠΛΑ. Οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.

ΣΟ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν δι’ ὅτι μέμφει τὴν τοιαύτην δύ- 470
 ναμιν;

469
 d 3. ἐγχειρίδιον: is not a “dagger,”
 but a short sword for striking and
 thrusting; the former is shown by
 κατεαγέαι τῆς κεφαλῆς. Cf. Xen. Hell.
 ii. 3. 23 παραγγέιλαντες νεανίσκοις . . .
 ξιφίδια ὑπὸ μάλῃς ἐχοντας παραγενέσθαι.

6. τεθνήξει: one of the two Greek
 verbs with fut. perf. active. See H.
 467. The fut. perfect expresses the
 certainty as well as the immediate-
 ness of the result; cf. κατεαγὼς ἔσται
 αὐτίκα μάλα, and see GMT. 79.

7. τῆς κεφαλῆς: is a gen. of the part
 affected. H. 738 b. Cf. Ar. Ach. 1180
 τῆς κεφαλῆς κατέαγε περὶ λίθον πεσών.
 The acc. could have been used; cf.
 515 e τὰ ὅτα. — αὐτῶν: follows τινά,
 —a case of ‘hyperbaton.’

e 14. The art. is omitted before τριή-
 ρεις, although it has a different gender

from that of the preceding substan- 469
 tive. Cf. Phaedo 111 c καὶ τὸν γε e
 ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι
 ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὅλα τυγχάνει ὄντα. Omission
 of the art. where both substantives
 are of the same gender is not un-
 common. The two kindred ideas are
 thereby brought together into one
 conception. In the present passage,
 by this means we have the objects
 enumerated divided into classes: (1)
 the navy-yard, with the war-vessels
 therein contained; (2) the remain-
 ing vessels, whether they be public
 or private property. Similarly, Dem.
 Ol. ii. 9 τῶ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι.

17. οὕτω γε: limits the answer, as
 if Polus still wished to save something
 from his earlier statement.

20 ΠΩΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὴ; λέγε.

ΠΩΛ. Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιῶσθαι ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ζημιῶσθαι οὐ κακόν;

25 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἔπεται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι· σκεψόμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίστε
30 μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτείνουσι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίστε δὲ οὐ;

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται.

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότε οὖν σὺ φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὀρίζεις.

470 26. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: the sentence is
a merely a statement in the form of an interrogation, and assumes an assent by the opponent, provided no express demurrer is raised. Socrates gives opportunity for this after δύνασθαι (29), but as none is made, he proceeds again with σκεψόμεθα κτέ.—πάλιν αὖ: because in this new conception is contained a correction of the former view held by Polus.

27. φαίνεται: has its subject in τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, and its predicate in ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι. "Does not then this great power of yours (πάλιν αὖ) appear to you (only provided the one

who does what seems good to him 470 proves to be doing what is profitable) to be both a good thing, — and that, as it seems, is the real (τό) great power; otherwise it is an evil thing and small power." The sentence begins with a question which is lost in an affirmation.

29. εἰ δὲ μή: is phraseological, "otherwise." The contrast is with τοῦτο, and through this with ἐὰν μὲν κτέ. The subject of κακόν (ἔστι) καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι is, of course, the phrase τὸ πράττειν ἃ δοκεῖ, to be supplied from the context. H. 904, 906 a, b.

30. ἄλλο τι: see on 467 d.

40 ΠΩΛ. Σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρ' ἐμοῦ ἢ ἰδιὸν ἔστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον.

XXVI. ΠΩΛ. Χαλεπὸν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἔξω, ἴσῃν δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξης καὶ ἀπαλλάξης φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ
5 κάμης φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε.

ΠΩΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθές καὶ πρόῃν γεγονότα
ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἔστιν καὶ ἀποδείξαι, ὥς πολλοὶ
ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονες εἰσιν.

10 ΣΩ. Τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκον ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας;

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b 40. σὺ μὲν οὖν κτέ.: Polus evades the answer and forces it upon Socrates, partly because he is not able to give it, for the distinction demanded lies equally remote from the circle of his thoughts and his feelings; partly because he does not wish it, for he has a suspicion that it will contradict all the views which he has thus far expressed. The less, however, he is in position to confute Socrates by arguments, the greater is his confidence in his ability to do so by facts.

c XXVI. 1. χαλεπόν: is ironic; but in ἀλλ' οὐχὶ the irony turns to sober earnest. Not so with the irony of Socrates.

5. μὴ κάμης, ἀλλ' ἔλεγχε: note the difference between positive and neg. imperative. — εὐεργετῶν: is to be explained according to 458 a. On the supplementary partic., see G. 279, 1; H. 983.

7. τὰ γὰρ ἐχθές καὶ πρόῃν: means 470
d "recent events." Homer also uses the phrase *χθιζά τε καὶ πρώϊα*, B 303. The Greek idiom requires καὶ where the Eng. uses "or."

8 f. πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι: in most cases when the participle is used as an attribute, we can still feel the participial plus as compared with the adjective. Here, however, that has almost completely disappeared, and the participle is as much an adj. as *προσθήκων*, *πρέπων*, etc.

10. τὰ ποῖα: it is a matter of individual preference whether the art. be used or not; cf. 449 e. When used, the article limits the attention to what has been already alluded to; here, τὰ ἐχθές . . . ταῦτα. In Eng. one also occasionally hears the art. with the interrogative.

11. Ἀρχέλαον: Archelaus, an ille-

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἀκούω γε.

ΠΩΛ. Εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος;

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτό-
θεν οὐ γινώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ;

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί', οὐ δῆτα.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βα-
20 σιλέα γινώσκεις φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γάρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως
ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.

ΠΩΛ. Τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἢ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν
25 κάγαθον ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ
ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

470
d gitimate son of Perdiccas, seized the throne in B.C. 414, after his father's death, and reigned until 399, when he was murdered by Craterus or Crateuas (name and motive are alike uncertain). The facts brought forward by Polus in their darkest colors are probably correct; but Archelaus laid the foundation for the later importance of Macedonia by introducing Greek culture. He invited famous artists, among others Euripides, to his court. There is also a tradition that he invited Socrates, but that is hardly credible. — ὄραs: well expresses the lively interest which Polus, as well as many other Greeks, took in that admired ruler, whose apparent success was doubtless envied by many an aspiring and ambitious man. The answer of Socrates sounds somewhat pedantic, but it is probably jesting, and designed to cool the extravagant ardor of Polus, while at the same

time it prepares the way for οὐπω 470
συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί below.

13. ἀλλὰ... γε: nevertheless, at least.
H. 1046, 2, a.

15-26. This passage is translated by Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 12.

16. αὐτόθεν: "instinctively," "of e
yourself." This is not translated by Cicero, but it forms a good contrast to συγγενόμενος. Polus thinks the very fact of Archelaus being a ruler implies that he is fortunate. That the Persian king was generally esteemed the personification of happiness is shown by *Apol.* 40 e.

21 f. παιδεία and δικαιοσύνη: together denote moral cultivation. — ὅπως ἔχει: construed with the part. gen. See G. 168, n. 3; H. 757 a.

25. ἄνδρα καὶ γυναικα: virtue, and hence also the foundation of εὐδαιμονία, is, according to Socrates, one and the same for all, while the pupils of Gorgias recognized different varie-

Πολ. Ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν
σὸν λόγον;

Σο. Εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος.

- 30 Πολ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσήκε μὲν
τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἦν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη
Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον
δούλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν,
ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λό-
35 γον· νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέ-
γιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν **b**
δεσπότην καὶ θείον μεταπεμφάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἦν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ κατα-
μεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν
40 αὐτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἄμαξαν, νύκτωρ
ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους· καὶ
ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος καὶ

470 ties for different classes. Cf. *Meno*

^e 71 *e* πρῶτον μὲν εἰ βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν κτέ. On the omission of the art. with *γυναικα*, see on 469 *e*.

471 27. οὗτος . . . ὁ Ἀρχέλαος: the po-
^a sition emphasizes the name; 'this man — Archelaus!'

30. πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος: *sc. ἐστίν*. This admission, coupled with the opinion that Archelaus is an enviable and happy man, which is very evident from the ironical narrative which follows, shows most plainly the utter opposition between Polus' view and the moral principle which Socrates champions.—*ᾧ γε*: introduces the authority of indisputable facts. See on 460 *e*.

32 ff. καί, καί, καί: is in sense almost equiv. to "and therefore." The

construction begun in the clause *ᾧ γε* 471
... ἀδελφοῦ is naturally varied in καὶ ^a
... Ἀλκέτου by being made personal.

33. εἰ ἐβούλετο, ἦν εὐδαίμων: is an unreal conditional sentence, with opposition to the present. The close proximity of the two clauses in the apodosis explains the omission of the second *ἂν*.

37. δεσπότην καὶ θείον: denotes **b**
two kinds of moral obligation to which Archelaus paid no attention; *ξενίσας* adds a third, the violation of which was considered among Greeks the worst of crimes, a sin against *Zeus xenios*. Cf. Hom. *N* 624, Xen. *An.* iii. 2. 4. The heaping up of the words *καταμεθύσας, ἐμβαλὼν* (like a thing), *ἐξαγαγὼν, ἀπέσφαξεν, ἠφάνισεν* makes the impression of the repeated acts of violence very vivid.

οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν,
τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου υἱόν, παῖδα ὡς ἐπτέτη, οὗ ἡ c
45 ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων
γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ,
ἀλλ' εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα
αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀπο-
θανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἡδικηκῶς τῶν ἐν
50 Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιωτάτος ἐστὶν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλ'
οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἐστὶν ὅστις Ἀθηναῖον
ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτ' ἂν ἄλλος ὅστισιν Μακεδόνων
γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος. d

XXVII. Ση. Καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε,
ἐγωγέ σε ἐπῆνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν
πεπαιδευσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν
ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ὦ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε,
5 καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἶε, ἐξελέλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ
λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν,
ᾧγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὢν σὺ φῆς.

471 43. τὸν ἀδελφόν: is emphasized by
b its position in advance of its govern-
ing verb (partic.).

c 44. Περδίκκου: Perdiccas II. reigned
from B.C. 454 (?) until 414 or 413,
after having dispossessed his brother
Alcetas. During the Peloponnesian
war he pursued a very prudent but
faithless policy. — The extraordinary
number of participles employed by
Polus has an artistic value in showing
the tumultuousness of his feelings.

45. οὐκ ἐβουλήθη (he did not choose)
εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι: is very sarcastic.
The conclusion introduced by τοιγάρτοι
is equally emphatic. Polus admires in
Archelaus the strength of will which
hesitates at nothing to accomplish its
aim; regret with him is weakness.

51. καὶ ἴσως ἐστὶν ὅστις κτέ.: in 471
these words, in spite of their sarcastic
form, lies the only attempt at proof
c which Polus makes, i.e. an appeal to
the opinion of others; he of course
thinks that no one will own himself
to be such a man.

XXVII. 1. καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς: leads d
us to expect in the following καὶ νῦν
a confirmation and climax of praise,
— which, however, is changed instead
to blame by τοῦ . . . ἡμεληκέναι. Note
the zeugma in combining τοῦ . . . ἡμε-
ληκέναι with ἐπῆνεσα. See on 520 b
ἡ τῷ αὐτῷ. The praise was bestowed
in 448 d.

6. πόθεν: is a question with a
negative force, to which the affirma-
tive καὶ μὴν corresponds.

ΠΛ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω. e

ΣΑ. ὦ μακάριε, ῥητορικῶς γὰρ με ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν,
 10 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἡγούμενοι ἐλέγχειν. καὶ
 γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ ἕτεροι τοὺς ἐτέρους δοκοῦσιν ἐλέγχειν, ἐπειδὰν
 τῶν λόγων ὧν ἂν λέγωσι μάρτυρας πολλοὺς παρέχωνται
 καὶ εὐδοκίμους, ὁ δὲ τάναντία λέγων ἓνα τινὰ παρέχεται
 ἢ μηδένα. οὗτος δὲ ὁ ἑλεγχος οὐδενὸς ἀξίος ἐστὶν πρὸς 472
 15 τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἐνίοτε γὰρ ἂν καὶ καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖ
 τις ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ δοκούντων εἶναι τί. καὶ νῦν περὶ ὧν
 σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσιν ταῦτα Ἀθη-
 ναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, εἰάν βούλη κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρα-
 σχέσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, εἰάν

471 e 8. ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ: in such phrases the
 ἐπεὶ has the force of "although,"
 "whereas." Cf. *Prot.* 335 c σοφὸς γὰρ
 εἰ· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος
 ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός τ' εἶναι. *Apol.*
 19 e. The conj. merely indicates a
 relation between the two ideas. If
 these two ideas harmonize, the rela-
 tion becomes causal; if not, it be-
 comes adversative.

9. ὦ μακάριε (cf. 469 c): implies
 the reproof which follows.

10. ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις: the man-
 ner of argument practised there fre-
 quently incurs Plato's disapproval.
 Cf. *Apol.* 34 b ff. The emphasis is
 laid on ἡγούμενοι and δοκοῦσιν.

13. ἓνα τινά: the indef. pron. em-
 phasizes the number, "a paltry one."

472 a 15 f. καταψευδομαρτυρηθεῖ τις: the
 Greek idiom does not require intr.
 verbs to be used impersonally in the
 passive. Cf. *Xen. Apol.* 24 καταψευ-
 δομαρτυρεῖν ἐμοῦ with Dem. in *Meid.*
 136 καταψευδομαρτυροῦμαι.

16. δοκούντων εἶναι τί: equal to
 εὐδοκίμων. Cf. the English colloquial-
 ism 'he pretends to be something.'

17. ὀλίγου: almost; the remnant 472
 of the phrase ὀλίγου δεῖν. H. 743 b. a

19. μαρτυρήσουσι κτέ.: Nicias, the
 celebrated general in the Pelopon-
 nesian war, who met his death in the
 Sicilian expedition (B.C. 413), was
 leader of the moderate wing of the
 aristocratic party. Aristocrates, the
 son of Scellias or Scellius, belonged,
 as we can judge from *Ar. Av.* 125 and
Thuc. viii. 89, to the extreme or oli-
 garchical order. He was one of the
 generals condemned to death for neg-
 ligence at the battle of Arginusae.
Xen. Hell. i. 7. Socrates here speaks
 of both as if they were still living.
 (See *Introd.* § 18.) Next to them,
 Socrates mentions the house of Peri-
 cles; he could not name the states-
 man himself because he was already
 dead when Gorgias visited Athens for
 the first time; but he, with his house,
 was a champion of the Athenian dem-
 ocracy. So we have here representa-
 tives of the chief political parties as
 witnesses for Polus. They agreed
 with each other in that they esteemed
 power in the state,—even tyranny,

20 μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ,
 ὧν οἱ τρίποδες οἱ ἐφεξῆς ἐστῶτές εἰσιν ἐν τῷ Διουνυσίῳ,
 ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου, οὗ αὖ ἐστὶν ἐν
 Πυθίου τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ἀνάθημα, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περι- b
 κλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια ἦντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν
 25 ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἰς ὧν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ·
 οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις, ἀλλὰ ψευδομάρτυρας πολλοὺς
 κατ' ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς
 οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἓνα ὄντα
 μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν
 30 οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ c

472 — though purchased at the price of
 a wrong-doing, to be the highest good.

20 ff. ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ: are not pleonastic after ἐὰν βούλῃ, but are due partly to courtesy (cf. *Prot.* 353 b εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον), and serve also by specifying to emphasize the possibility of a free choice among all parties.

21. ὧν οἱ τρίποδες: in this way these men show that they were δοκοῦντες εἶναι τί. They also, by the magnificence of their offerings, proved their piety, and their 'testimony' would be therefore the more weighty. Nicias was, according to all accounts, an honorable man. Thucydides says (vii. 86) of him, in referring to his mournful death: ἥκιστα δὲ ἄξιος ὧν τῶν γε ἐπ' ἐμοῦ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοῦτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν γενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν. By Dionysion is to be understood not a temple, but a spot sacred to Dionysus, — a sacred precinct. Nicias built there a kind of shrine, which possessed, among other treasures, some very costly tripods which he had dedicated to Dionysus after he had discharged the office of Choregus — a very costly liturgy in

itself. The tripods were arranged 472
 apparently ἐφεξῆς with a kind of ostentation. a

22 f. ἐν Πυθίου: sc. ἱερῷ. The offering of Aristocrates must have been, according to the words of Socrates, also costly and well-known.

26. ἀναγκάζεις: sc. to agreement b by convincing reasons; often followed by ὁμολογεῖν, but without it in *Theaet.* 196 b τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῇ δόξαν.

27 f. ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς: this is ambiguous, for οὐσία can denote property, material possessions as well as physical existence. Accordingly Polus appears here in the investigation as a tyrant, who drives others from house and home. But it is this same power which the orator wishes to obtain (before a court) by his speech.

28 f. σὲ αὐτὸν . . . μάρτυρα: the dialectical proof is a course of logic, a process of reasoning, which Socrates carries through, with the help of his adversary, by question and answer. Hence by his enforced agreement a man becomes a witness against himself.

λόγος ἤ· οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἐὰν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἶς
 ὢν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τούτους χαίρειν ἑᾶς.
 ἔστιν μὲν οὖν οὗτός τις τρόπος ἐλέγχου, ὥς σύ τε οἶε καὶ
 ἄλλοι πολλοί· ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἄλλος, ὃν ἐγὼ αὖ οἶμαι.
 35 παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἴ τι διοί-
 σουσιν ἀλλήλων. καὶ γὰρ τυγχάνει περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβη-
 τοῦμεν οὐ πᾶν σμικρὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, περὶ
 ὧν εἰδέναι τε κάλλιστον μὴ εἰδέναι τε αἰσχιστον· τὸ γὰρ
 κεφάλαιον αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἡ γιγνώσκειν ἡ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅστις τε
 40 εὐδαίμων ἔστιν καὶ ὅστις μὴ. αὐτίκα πρῶτον, περὶ οὗ α
 νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, σὺ ἡγεῖ οἷόν τε εἶναι μακάριον ἄνδρα
 ἀδικοῦντά τε καὶ ἄδικον ὄντα, εἴπερ Ἀρχέλαον ἄδικον μὲν
 ἡγεῖ εἶναι, εὐδαίμονα δέ· ἄλλο τι ὥς οὕτω σου νομίζοντος
 διανοώμεθα;

45 Πῶλ. Πάνυ γε.

XXVIII. Σο. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι ἀδύνατον. ἐν μὲν τουτὶ
 ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. εἰεν· ἀδικῶν δὲ δὴ εὐδαίμων ἔσται ἂρ'
 ἂν τυγχάνῃ δίκης τε καὶ τιμωρίας;

472 33. ἔστιν κτέ.: Socrates does not
 c hereby recognize this adducing of 'tes-
 timony' to be a correct τρόπος ἐλέγ-
 χου, but rather implies by the words
 ὥς σύ τε οἶε κτέ. (cf. 471 d, 473 b)
 that it is only a pretended one, which
 cannot stand against the true one.

37. σχεδόν τι: does not weaken the
 idea, but merely softens the expres-
 sion. The question under discussion
 is really the cardinal one of life,
 'How can I be happy?'

d 40. αὐτίκα: is one of the ways of
 introducing an example in Greek. Cf.
Prot. 359 e πᾶν τοῦναντίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ᾧ
 οἱ τε δειλοὶ ἔρχονται καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ.
 αὐτίκα εἰς τὸν πόλεμον οἱ μὲν ἐθέλουσιν
 ἵεναι, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν. The addi-
 tion of πρῶτον shows that there are

still other conflicts between their 472
 views; e.g. in reference to the nature d
 and value of punishment.

41. εἶναι: is thrown forward for
 the sake of emphasis, as ἔστι above.
 After ἡγοῦμαι, νομίζω, and similar
 verbs the pred. is often found without
 a copula. Cf. 473 a.

XXVIII. 1. ἐν: with this are con-
 nected other points of difference.

2. εἰεν: see on 466 c.—ἀρα: the
 position here is still more remarkable
 than in 467 e and 476 a.—The whole
 weight of the question falls on ἂν
 τυγχάνῃ δίκης καὶ τιμωρίας. The for-
 mer, δίκη, usually denotes simply the
 carrying out of the law, the infliction
 of justice; the latter, τιμωρία,
 the fine or penalty which falls to the

Πολ. Ἡκιστά γε, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γ' ἂν ἀθλιώτατος εἴη.

- 5 Σολ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ἄρα μὴ τυγχάνη δίκης ὁ ἀδικῶν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον εὐδαιμόνων ἔσται;

Πολ. Φημί.

- Σολ. Κατὰ δέ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἀδικῶν τε καὶ ὁ ἀδικος πάντως μὲν ἄθλιος, ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι, εἰς
10 μὴ διδῶ δίκην μηδὲ τυγχάνη τιμωρίας ἀδικῶν, ἥττον δὲ ἄθλιος, εἰς διδῶ δίκην καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

Πολ. Ἀτοπά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιχειρεῖς λέγειν.

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- Σολ. Πειράσομαι δέ γε καὶ σὲ ποιῆσαι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ταῦτα
15 ἐμοὶ λέγειν· φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἂ διαφερόμεθα ταῦτ' ἐστίν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ· εἶπον ἐγὼ πού ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι.

⁴⁷² injured person or the state. These
^d are both external demands on the criminal, called forth by his crime, and by which an expiation of it is to be effected. On the other hand, κόλασις is the discipline which the guilty party himself undergoes, designed to prevent further transgression; while ζημία (470 a) is only the injury or damage which he sustains in expiating his crime. From the outset Socrates shows that, even according to the view of his opponent, wrongdoing does not give happiness under all conditions. This point is not made superfluous by the discussion of 469 c-470 c; for there the question concerns δύναμις, not εὐδαιμονία.

e 11. καὶ τυγχάνη δίκης: seems a strange addition after διδῶ δίκην, with which it appears to be almost synonymous. But the two phrases are probably intended to be but the subjective and objective, the active and passive

expression of the same idea; as the
ὑπό with the gen. would indicate.

15. φίλον γάρ σε ἡγοῦμαι: there-
fore Socrates does not allow himself
to be deterred by the trouble it will
involve to bring Polus to the same
opinion. ταῦτα λέγειν (καὶ φρονεῖν) is
held as a sign of friendship, just as
διαφέρεσθαι of enmity. See on 510 c
and Sall. Cat. 20 nam idem velle
atque idem nolle, ea demum
firma amicitia est. At the same
time the words contain a delicate
reply to Polus' discourteous exclamation.
Socrates will soon bring him
to say what is in his own view ἀτο-
πον.

16 f. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν: cf. 469 b.

17. τὸ ἀδικεῖν . . . εἶναι: is cited
as an example of rather uncommon
use of the indir. disc. inf. after εἶπον
(GMT. 753, 3), but the clause is to
be looked at rather as the object of
εἶπον in the sense of "declare."

Πολ. Πάνν γε.

Σο. Σὺ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι.

20 Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Καὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἀθλίους ἔφην εἶναι ἐγώ, καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ.

Πολ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

Σο. Ὡς σὺ οἶε, ὦ Πῶλε.

25 Πολ. Ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως.

Σο. Σὺ δέ γε εὐδαίμονας αὖ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας, ἐὰν μὴ διδῶσι δίκην.

Πολ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Σο. Ἐγὼ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἀθλιωτάτους φημί, τοὺς δὲ διδόν-
30 τας δίκην ἦττον. βούλει καὶ τοῦτο ἐλέγχειν;

Πολ. Ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτ' ἐκείνου χαλεπώτερόν ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐξελέγξαι.

Σο. Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Πῶλε, ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

35 Πολ. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐὰν ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος ληφθῇ τυραν-
νίδι ἐπιβουλεύων, καὶ ληφθεὶς στρεβλῶται καὶ ἐκτέμνηται

473 22. καὶ ἐξηλέγχθην ὑπὸ σοῦ: of
a course the addition of Socrates after
Polus' reply throws a quite different
coloring over this sentence. Polus'
self-assurance is apparent in *ναὶ μὰ*
Δία, his positiveness in *ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμε-*
νος. *ἴσως* shows no uncertainty, but
is only the conscious under-statement
which is common in English. See on
480 a.

b 31. ἀλλ' ἔτι τοῦτο κτέ.: refers to
470 c and is just as ironical. In
sharp contrast with the false assur-
ance which trusts its own cleverness
is Socrates' faith in the immutability
of truth, τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγ-
χεται.

35. ληφθῇ: pictures vividly the
actual scene. In compound verbs
c the metaphorical meaning often pre-
dominates, and leaves the actual in
the background (cf. ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ κα-
ταλαμβάνεσθαι). In what follows, no-
tice the rhetorical heaping up of the
most frightful punishments; which
reminds us of Aesch. *Eum.* 186 ff. κα-
ρανιστῆρες ὀφθαλμωρύχοι | δίκαι σφαγαί
τε σπέρματός τ' ἀποφοραὶ | παίδων, κα-
κοῦ τε χλοῦνις ἡδ' ἀκρωνία, | λευσμός τε
καὶ μύζουσιν οἰκτισμὸν πολλὸν | ὑπὸ βράχιν
παγέντες. Cf. *Rep.* ii. 361 e μαστι-
γώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεθήσεται, ἐκ-
καυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα
κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυνευθήσεται.

καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐκκᾶται, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ παντοδαπὰς λώβας αὐτός τε λωβηθεὶς καὶ τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐπιδὼν παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκα τὸ ἔσχατον ἀνα-
 40 σταυρωθῇ ἢ καταπιττωθῇ, οὗτος εὐδαιμονέστερος ἔσται, ἢ ἐὰν διαφυγὼν τύραννος καταστῇ καὶ ἄρχων ἐν τῇ πόλει διαβιῶ ποιῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται, ζηλωτὸς ὢν καὶ εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων; ταῦτα δὲ λέγεις ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἐξελέγχειν;

XXIX. ΣΩ. Μορμολύττει αὖ, ὦ γενναῖε Πῶλε, καὶ οὐκ ἐλέγχεις· ἄρτι δὲ ἐμαρτύρου. ὅμως δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με σμικρόν· “ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι,” εἶπες;

5 ΠΩ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστερος μὲν τοίνυν οὐδέποτε ἔσται οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὁ κατειργασμένος τὴν τυραννίδα ἀδίκως οὔτε ὁ διδοὺς δίκην· δυοῖν γὰρ ἀθλίωιν εὐδαιμονέστερος

473 37. καὶ ἄλλας κτέ.: notice the ὁμοι-
 C τέλευτα.

39. ἐπιδὼν: sc. λωβηθέντας.

40. καταπιττωθῇ: an especially severe manner of punishment. The criminal was put into a sack smeared with pitch,—the so-called tunica molesta,—which was then set on fire.

41. διαφυγὼν: “if he succeed”; opposed to ληφθῇ.

42. ὅτι ἂν βούληται: Polus has again forgotten the explanation of the difference between δοκεῖν and βούλεσθαι.—εὐδαιμονιζόμενος: to be thought εὐδαίμων by the multitude is to be so, in Polus’ estimation.

43. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων: cf. Hom. B 191 ἀλλ’ αὐτός τε κᾶθησο καὶ ἄλλους ἔδρνε λαούς, 480 d, *Phaedo* 110 e λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰσχύοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς. The same idiom is found in

Latin, as equites et aliud vul- 473
 gus. See on 447 c. C

43 f. ταῦτα λέγεις: Polus is triumphant, as if Socrates’ position (ταῦτα) were now overthrown. d

XXIX. 1. μορμολύττει: the expression for terrifying with ghost stories. The ‘mormo’ was the ‘bad man’ with which children were frightened. Cf. *Crito* 46 c.—ὦ γενναῖε: is probably designedly used because the means employed are unfair, being only a pretended, not a real proof. Cf. 471 e.

2. ὅμως δέ: although in reality no point has been made, yet Socrates is ready to assume one and proceed upon that.

3. ἐὰν ἀδίκως ἐπιβουλεύων: can be completed from c. The change in the expression is due to the collocation of the two words.

μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἀθλιώτερος μέντοι ὁ διαφεύγων καὶ τυ-
 10 ραννέυσας. τί τοῦτο, ὦ Πῶλε; γελᾷς; ἄλλο αὖ τοῦτο
 εἶδος ἐλέγχου ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴν τίς τι εἴπῃ, καταγελᾷν, ἐλέγ-
 χειν δὲ μῆ;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ οἶει ἐξεληλέγχθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν τοιαῦτα
 λέγῃς, ἃ οὐδεὶς ἂν φήσειεν ἀνθρώπων; ἐπεὶ ἐροῦ τινα
 15 τούτωνί.

ΣΩ. ὦ Πῶλε, οὐκ εἰμὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, καὶ πέρυσι βου-
 λεύειν λαχόν, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φυλὴ ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἔδει με
 ἐπιψηφίζειν, γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψη- 474
 φίζειν. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ νῦν με κέλευε ἐπιψηφίζειν τοὺς

473 9. ὁ διαφεύγων: "whoever remains
 6 unpunished."—τυραννέυσας: "he who
 attains to the tyranny." The more
 important idea precedes.

10. τί τοῦτο: *what can this mean?*
 The inappropriate laughter of Polus
 is probably in accordance with the pre-
 cept of Gorgias that in serious things
 one must draw the audience to his
 own side by laughing. Arist. *Rhet.* iii.
 18 (*Rhet. Gr.* ed. Sp. i. 160): δεῖν ἔφη
 Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθεῖρειν τῶν
 ἐναντίων γέλωτι, τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ.

11. καταγελᾷν: *to laugh it down.*
 Socrates' opinion of the ἄλλο εἶδος
 ἐλέγχου is shown by the addition,
 ἐλέγχειν δὲ μῆ.

14 f. ἐροῦ τινα τούτωνί: by again
 having recourse unto the opinion of
 others, Polus again reverts, though in
 a different manner, to his 'witnesses'
 (469 e), and shows that the rhetorical
 method of proof is alone comprehen-
 sible to him. By inviting Socrates
 to put the question to those present,
 he reminds him of the analogous
 practice of ἐπιψηφίζειν (*rogare po-*
pulum), and gives him a chance to
 plead his own inaptitude as an excuse

for not employing rhetorical methods. 473
 Socrates in his reply also shows that
 to accept the opinion of the majority
 — the method which the state had
 settled upon as the best way of estab-
 lishing the truth — was as unsatisfac-
 tory, when employed by the individ-
 ual, as the rhetorical methods. The
 fact to which Socrates alludes is the
 well-known trial of the generals who
 had won the battle of Arginusae and
 afterwards fell victims to political
 intrigue. The full proceedings are
 detailed by Xen. *Hell.* i. 6. 33 ff. and
 7. Socrates was senator this year
 (Ol. 93. 3, 406 B.C.), and in the mem-
 orable assembly ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυ-
 τάνεων. As such, he opposed the
 unlawful proceeding with an intrepid
 courage which he here humorously
 calls inaptitude in ἐπιψηφίζειν. So-
 crates mentions the circumstance also
 in *Apol.* 32 b, but in a different man-
 ner. On the chronological difficulty,
 see *Introd.* § 18.

17. ἡ φυλὴ: of course that to which
 Socrates belonged, ἡ Ἀντιοχίς.

18. γέλωτα παρείχον καὶ κτέ.: a 474
 'hysteron proteron.' See *Rid.* § 308. a

20 παρόντας, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ἔχεις τούτων βελτίῳ ἔλεγχον, ὅπερ
 νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἐμοὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει παράδος, καὶ πείρα-
 σαι τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἷον ἐγὼ οἶμαι δεῖν εἶναι. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὦν
 ἂν λέγω ἓνα μὲν παρασχέσθαι μάρτυρα ἐπίσταμαι, αὐτόν,
 πρὸς ὃν ἂν μοι ὁ λόγος ᾗ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἐὼ χαίρειν, καὶ
 25 ἓνα ἐπιψηφίζειν ἐπίσταμαι, τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγο-
 μαι. ὅρα οὖν, εἰ ἐθελήσεις ἐν τῷ μέρει διδόναι ἔλεγχον
 ἀποκρινόμενος τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οἶμαι καὶ ἐμὲ
 καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδι-
 κέσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ
 30 διδόναι.

Πολ. Ἐγὼ δέ γε οὐτ' ἐμὲ οὐτ' ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα.
 ἐπεὶ σὺ δέξαι' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.

Σο. Καὶ σύ γ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

Πολ. Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἐγὼ οὐτε σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος
 35 οὐδεὶς.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινεῖ;

Πολ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι ὅτι ποτ'
 ἐρεῖς.

Σο. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ὣν εἰδῆς, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς σε
 40 ἡρώτων· πότερον δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Πῶλε, κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ
 ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

474 20. τούτων: i.e. the various means
 a with which Polus had hitherto at-
 tempted to confute Socrates.—ὅπερ
 νυνδὴ: 472 c.

21. παράδος: viz. τὸν ἔλεγχον. Cf.
 below, διδόναι ἔλεγχον: "to give a
 chance for refutation."

25. οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι: because sci-
 entific investigation by means of con-
 versation is naturally confined to
 individuals.

b 32. ἐπεὶ . . . ἀδικεῖν: this is not
 meant in earnest, but is a reductio

ad absurdum of the preceding 47-
 b words of Socrates, which are so op-
 posed to Polus' view. On ἐπεὶ cf.
 471 e, and see GMT. 718, where this
 clause is cited as interrogative.

37. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶ: implies a c
 doubt whether Socrates can really
 advance anything in support of his
 view. On the following answers of
 Polus, see Introd. § 14.

39. ὥσπερ κτέ.: as an actual fact,
 the discussion has been concerning
 the question whether ἀδικεῖν or ἀδικεῖ-

ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; αἷσχιον πότερον τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνον.

45 ΠΩΛ. Τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

XXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ κάκιον, ἔπερ αἷσχιον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἦκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω· οὐ ταυτὸν ἡγεῖ σύ, ὥς ἔοικας, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἷσχρόν. d

5 ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δὴτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα, οἶον καὶ σώματα καὶ χρώματα καὶ σχήματα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα, εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλά; οἶον πρῶτον τὰ σώματα τὰ καλὰ οὐχὶ ἦτοι κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν λέγεις καλὰ d
10 εἶναι, πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἕκαστον χρήσιμον ᾖ, πρὸς τοῦτο, ἢ κατὰ ἡδονὴν τινα, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς

474 σθαι were the greater evil, since the middle of ch. XXIV.

43. τί δὲ δὴ; *how so, then?* — The predicate is thrown forward in the following clause, because the chief weight of the contrast falls upon it.

XXX. 1. οὐκοῦν κτέ.: the καλόν is here the species under which the ἀγαθόν and the ἡδὴ are subordinated.

3. ὥς ἔοικας: logically, in such cases as this, an inf. is to be supplied; but it is doubtful if any such ellipses were felt by the Greeks. — καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, — κακὸν καὶ αἷσχρόν: 'chiasmus.'

d 6. τόδε: is probably an acc. with λέγεις understood. Cf. *Phaedo* 65 d τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα and *Xen. Mem.* iii. 1. 10 τί δὲ τοὺς κινδυνεύειν μέλλοντας. On the other hand, *Phil.* 27 e τί δὲ δὸς βίος and *Soph. Aj.* 101 τί γὰρ δὴ παῖς ὁ τοῦ Λαερτίου make for the nom. The context must be the guide.

8. εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων: *with regard unto nothing*, that is, without searching for some characteristic common to all these things, in accordance with which you would be justified in calling them καλά. The word ἀποβλέπω is used also when reference is made to an idea or principle, which conditions a person's action or the manner of appearance of any phenomenon.

9. κατὰ: is used of the scale according to which a thing is to be measured.

10. πρὸς τοῦτο: points emphatically back to πρὸς ὃ κτέ., in a way more remarkable here than in 469 c. The relative clause itself is an extension of κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν, laying especial stress on the relativity of the καλόν.

11. ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖσθαι: notice the use of the passive to denote the point of view from which σῶμα is καλόν.

θεωροῦντας; ἔχεις τι ἐκτὸς τούτων λέγειν περὶ σώματος καὶ κάλλους;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω.

- 15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω καὶ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα ἢ διὰ ἡδονὴν τινα ἢ διὰ ὠφελίαν ἢ δι' ἀμφοτέρα καλὰ προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

- ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν μουσικὴν
20 πάντα ὡσαύτως;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δήπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἐστίν, τὰ καλὰ, ἢ ὠφέλιμα εἶναι ἢ ἡδέα ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

- 25 ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως; 475

ΠΩΛ. Πάνν γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὀρίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὀριζόμενος τὸ καλόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχροὺς τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπη τε καὶ κακῷ;

474 12. ἐκτὸς τούτων: *i.e.* the points of view mentioned in § . . . §.

17. προσαγορεύειν: *i.e.* to designate by the addition of a characteristic, as if one were addressing a person by name.

22. καὶ μὴν: introduces us to a new variety of the beautiful, *i.e.* the results of mental activity. The νόμοι, ἐπιτηδεύματα, and μαθήματα are, with reference to the subject of investigation, fittingly introduced as representatives of this class.—τά γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους κτέ.: it must be confessed that we could do very well without τὰ καλὰ. If kept, it must be considered as a repetition and restriction of τὰ γε κατὰ κτέ., and τούτων must be

explained by ἢ ὠφέλιμα κτέ. in apposition. See H. 950. But Rid. § 271 b seems to have a different view of the sentence, which he holds to be a case of inversion of government, and with this Cope seems to agree in his translation: "And moreover, in all that belongs to laws and habits of life, their beauty, I presume, is to be found nowhere beyond these limits; that is to say, either the utility or the pleasure that is in them, or both."

27. καὶ καλῶς κτέ.: this lively as- sent of Polus shows that he thinks that Socrates is at last veering round to his position. The manner in which he is gradually undeceived is interesting.

30 ΠΩΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὄταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾗ, ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτων ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιον ἔστιν, ἥτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις.

ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾗ, ἥτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
40 ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐλεγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἥτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν
45 εἶναι ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

XXXI. ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἄρα λύπῃ ἢ
ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι
μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι; ^{subt + pass}

ΠΩΛ. Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει. ^{sup pass}

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι
ὑπερβάλλοι.

ΠΩΛ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

475 36. ἥτοι κτέ.: if the text is sound,
b Socrates here speaks with less exactness than above, omitting what can be easily supplied.

39. φέρε δῆ: the result obtained is applied to the case under discussion.

XXXI. 1. λύπῃ: here denotes, as 475 the following ἀλγοῦσι explains, only c physical pain. No reference can be meant to the gnawings of conscience.

2. ὑπερβάλλει: here construed with gen. like ὑπερέχει (5). Cf. Leg. v. 734a.

10 Σο. Οὐκοῦν τῷ ἐτέρῳ ^{γὰρ καὶ ἡ}λείπεται;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Τῷ κακῷ;

Πολ. Ὑποεικέν.

Σο. Οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη
15 τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

Πολ. Δηλὸν δὴ ὅτι.

Σο. Ὑποεικέν τι οὖν ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ
ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἰσχρὸν
εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι;

20 Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη.

Πολ. Ὑποεικέν.

Σο. Δέξαιτο ἂν οὖν σὺ μάλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν
ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡττον; μὴ ὅκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν
25 γὰρ βλαβήσκει· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἱατρῷ
παρέχων ἀποκρίνον, καὶ ἢ φάθῃ ἢ μὴ ἂ ἐρωτῶ.

Πολ. Ὑποεικέν οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὥ Σώκρατες.

Σο. Ὑποεικέν τις ἀνθρώπων;

Πολ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

475 17. ἄλλο τι: see on 467 d. Polus
d had several times given as an authority the opinion of the masses, and had even, in 474 b, by the words οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς spoken in their name. He thus appears, like Protagoras in *Prot.* 353 a, as their representative. ὁμολογεῖτο properly applies to ὑπὸ σοῦ, and the present is to be supplied to ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

23. δέξαιτο ἂν: pays back for Polus' remark in 474 b. The construction is varied by the substitution of ἀντὶ with gen. instead of ἢ after μάλλον.

24. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡττον: sc. κακοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ. 475 d

25. γενναίως: bravely; scorning the pain. The comparison is the same as in 480 c παρέχων . . . ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κτείνει ἱατρῷ, and seems to be a Socratic one. Cf. *Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 54. For the construction, see on 456 b.

26. φάθῃ ἢ μὴ (sc. φάθῃ): affirm or deny. See on 454 d.

29. κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον: a conditional admission, implying that with a different treatment possibly a different result might be obtained.

- 30 Σο. Ἀληθῇ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐτ' ἂν ἐγὼ οὐτ' ἂν σὺ οὐτ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν.

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

- Σο. Ὅρᾳς οὖν, ὦ Πῶλε, ὁ ἔλεγχος παρὰ τὸν ἔλεγχον
 35 παραβαλλόμενος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ σοὶ μὲν οἱ
 ἄλλοι πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἐξαρκεῖς
 εἰς ὧν μόνος καὶ ὁμολογῶν καὶ μαρτυρῶν, καὶ ἐγὼ σέ
 μόνον ἐπιψηφίζων τοὺς ἄλλους ἐὼ χαίρειν. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν
 40 ἡμῖν οὕτως ἐχέτω· μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ περὶ οὗ τὸ δεύτερον
 ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν σκεψώμεθα, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην
 ἄρα μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν, ὡς σὺ ᾤου, ἢ μείζον τὸ
 μὴ διδόναι, ὡς αὖ ἐγὼ ᾤμην. σκοπώμεθα δὲ τῇδε· τὸ
 διδόναι δίκην καὶ τὸ κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα ἄρα
 τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς;

- 45 Πολ. Ἐγώ γε.

Σο. Ἐχεις οὖν λέγειν, ὡς οὐχὶ τά γε δίκαια πάντα καλὰ ἢ
 ἐστὶ, καθ' ὅσον δίκαια; καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ.

Πολ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

- 475 30 f. οὐτ' ἂν κτέ.: ἂν draws attention
 e to the emphatic words. On the position and repetition, see H. 802, 804; GMT. 223, 226.

34. ὁρᾳς οὖν, ὁ ἔλεγχος κτέ.: we might also have had ὁρᾳς οὖν τὸν ἔλεγχον ὅτι παρὰ κτέ. But the form chosen by Plato greatly heightens the contrast. Socrates, moreover, is referring to his own words in 472 c παραβαλόντες οὖν παρ' ἀλλήλους σκεψώμεθα, εἰ τι διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων. Hence also the addition of the expressions μαρτυρῶν καὶ ἐπιψηφίζων to the more general ὁμολογῶν.

- 476 41. ἄρα μέγιστον: the more usual
 a particle for "whether" is εἰ, but cf.

Phaedo 70 d ἴδωμεν ἄρ' οὕτως γίνεται 476
 ἅπαντα. H. 1016. In the sentence following, we have ἄρα introducing a direct question previously announced by τῇδε as in 459 d.

43. κολάζεσθαι δικαίως ἀδικοῦντα: the adverb is necessary, because upon it rests the main point in the proof.

43 f. ἄρα τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖς: the position makes the question more pointed.

47. καὶ διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ: the exhortation to Polus to think well before he speaks is at the same time an intimation to the reader that the principle touched on in the question is of the greatest importance, as indicative of a man's moral views, and

XXXII. Σ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε· ἄρα εἴ τις τι ποιεῖ, ^{is affected}
ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι καὶ πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιούντος;

Π. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Σ. Ἄρα τοῦτο πάσχον, ὃ τὸ ποιοῦν ποιεῖ, καὶ τοιούτον,
5 οἷον ποιεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις τύπτει,
ἀνάγκη τι τύπτεσθαι;

Π. Ἀνάγκη.

Σ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα τύπτει ἢ ταχὺ ὁ τύπτων, οὕτω καὶ
τὸ τυπτόμενον τύπτεσθαι;

10 Π. Ναί.

Σ. Τοιούτον ἄρα πάθος τῷ τυπτομένῳ ἐστίν, οἷον ἂν
τὸ τύπτον ποιῇ;

Π. Πάνυ γε.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ κάει τις, ἀνάγκη τι κάεσθαι;

15 Π. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Σ. Καὶ εἰ σφόδρα γε κάει ἢ ἀλγεινῶς, οὕτως κάεσθαι
τὸ καόμενον ὥς ἂν τὸ κᾶον κάη;

Π. Πάνυ γε.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τέμνει τις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; τέμνεται
20 γάρ τι.

Π. Ναί.

Σ. Καὶ εἰ μέγα γε ἢ ^{deep}βαθὺ τὸ ^{cut}τμήμα ἢ ἀλγεινόν,
τοιούτον τμήμα τέμνεται τὸ τεμνόμενον, οἷον τὸ τέμνον α
τέμνει;

25 Π. Φαίνεται.

⁴⁷⁶ hence is not to be accepted without
^b earnest investigation. How neces-
sary this exhortation is, can be per-
ceived from a question of Polus in
477 c.

^c XXXII. 14. *κάει*: the examples
are chosen from cauterizing and sur-
gery, because the healing art is in

general for the body what the puni- ⁴⁷⁶
tive administration of justice is for ^c
the soul. See on 456 b. The second
example is an advance on the first, in
so far as the result of the treatment
— corresponding to the general idea
πάθος — can be expressed in the sub-
stantival form *τμήμα*.

In 509m

St. I. p. 476.

Σα. Συλλήβδην δὴ ὅρα εἰ ὁμολογεῖς, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, περὶ πάντων, οἷον ἂν ποιῇ τὸ ποιοῦν, τοιοῦτον τὸ πάσχον πάσχειν.

Παλ. Ἀλλ' ὁμολογῶ.

30 Σα. Τούτων δὴ ὁμολογουμένων, τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποιεῖν;

Παλ. Ἀνάγκη, ὃ Σώκρατες, πάσχειν.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ τινος ποιούντος;

Παλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; ὑπὸ γε τοῦ κολάζοντος.

35 Σα. Ὁ δὲ ὀρθῶς κολάζων δικαίως κολάζει;

Παλ. Ναί.

Σα. Δίκαια ποιῶν ἢ οὐ;

Παλ. Δίκαια.

Σα. Οὐκοῦν ὁ κολαζόμενος δίκην διδούς δίκαια πά-

40 σχει;

Παλ. Φαίνεται.

Σα. Τὰ δὲ δίκαιά που καλὰ ὁμολόγηται;

Παλ. Πάνυ γε.

Σα. Τούτων ἄρα ὁ μὲν ποιεῖ καλά, ὁ δὲ πάσχει, ὁ κολα-

45 ζόμενος.

Παλ. Ναί.

XXXIII. Σα. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθὰ; ἢ γὰρ 477 ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα.

Παλ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σα. Ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς;

476 d 26. συλλήβδην: turns from the particular to the generic, and extends to all cases the law which has been noticed in special cases. It belongs, of course, to the last clause οἷον κτέ.

30. τὸ δίκην διδόναι: the article determines the subject. GMT. 790.

e 35. ὀρθῶς: denotes in general the

proper or appropriate exercise of any 476 function, and thus leads up to δίκαιως, e which is specially ethical.

XXXIII. 1. εἴπερ καλά κτέ.: the 477 argument, made according to the a modus tollendo ponens with natural abbreviations, rests on the exposition made in 474 d f.

5 ΠΩΛ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ὡφελεῖται ἄρα;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν; βελ-
τίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται;

10 ΠΩΛ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε
δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ὅ

15 ἄλλην τιὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πένιαν;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ πένιαν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαιοι
ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἰσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

ΠΩΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγεί τινα εἶναι;

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ
δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;

477 8. τὴν ὠφελίαν: cognate accusa-
a tive. After ὑπολαμβάνω we must sup-
ply ὠφελεῖσθαι. The asyndeton which
follows is of the very common ex-
planatory class.

13. ἄρα οὖν: introduces a new sec-
tion of the argument, regarding the
statement advanced by Socrates in
469 b.

b 14. κατασκευῇ: is distinguished
from παρασκευῇ in that it denotes a
preparation designed to endure; παρα-
σκευῇ is for the emergency. Conse-
quently the constitution of the body,
so far as it is the result of physical
culture, is naturally a κατασκευῇ.

20. πονηρίαν: not κακίαν. The lat-

ter word, according to the prevailing 477
usage, denotes, as applied to the soul, b
moral depravity only, as above (a).
The former denotes a bad condition
in general, which may or may not be
due to moral depravity. But as the
bad condition usually involves bad
constitution, πονηρία comes to mean
much the same as κακία. The use of
the words depends upon κατασκευῇ.

23. καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα: shows that the
enumeration is not complete. The
omitted member is given below in d
(ἀκόλαστον) and ε ἀκολασία, and thereby
the number of πονηρίαι (i.e. varieties of
πονηρία) is made to correspond with the
number of cardinal virtues (ἀρεταί).

Πολ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

- 25 Σο. Οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν; c

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία;

- 30 Πολ. Πολύ γε.

Σο. Εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη;

Πολ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις;

- Σο. Ὡς· ἀεὶ τὸ αἰσχιστον ἦτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρ-
έχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφοτέρα αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὁμο-
35 λογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν.

Πολ. Μάλιστα.

Σο. Αἰσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν; d

Πολ. Ὁμολόγηται γάρ.

- 40 Σο. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀνιάρωτατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνία ὑπερβάλλον αἰσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβη ἢ ἀμφοτέρα;

Πολ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμ-
νειν τὸ ἀδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;

- 45 Πολ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε.

477 32. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; Polus shows
c by the question that he has not yet completely grasped the relationship of the ideas, good and beautiful, bad and ugly (cf. 477 a), although it has been twice expounded by Socrates.

d 40. ἀνιάρως and ἀνία: like ἀλγεινός and ἀλγηδών, characterize the λύπη from its physical side, i.e. the pain caused by the punishment. Cf. also *Prot.* 355 e and *Gorg.* 499 a, where ἀνιάσθαι is opposed to χαίρειν. With βλάβη sc. ὑπερβάλλον, and also with

ἀμφοτέρα, which is the adverbial acc. 477 like τούναντίον and the like. See G. 180, 2; H. 719 b. The words ἀνιάρω-
τόν ἐστι do not indeed harmonize with the rest of the sentence and may without injury be cut out, but still they are not unnatural in this careless form of conversational speaking and do fit the following question ἄρ' ἀλγεινότερον.

41. τούτων: is of course to be understood in the partitive sense.

45. ἀπὸ τούτων γε: 'ex his quidem quae disputata sunt.' Stallbaum.

Σο. Ὑπερφυεῖ τι ^{εἰς τὴν} ἄρα ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακῶ ^{εἰς τὴν} θανά- St. I. p. 477.
μασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα τὰλλα ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχι-
στόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. e

Πολ. Φαίνεται.

50 Σο. Ἀλλὰ μὴν που τό γε μεγίστη βλάβη ὑπερβάλλον
μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων.

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς
πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν;

55 Πολ. Φαίνεται.

XXXIV. Σο. Τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ
χρηματιστική;

Πολ. Ναί.

Σο. Τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;

5 Πολ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σο. Τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπο- 478
ρεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμ-
νοντας τὰ σώματα;

Πολ. Παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 Σο. Ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας.

⁴⁷⁷ Polus has a suspicion of what is coming and so expresses himself guardedly, as if he wished to leave a door open behind him. On the contrary, Socrates speaks with great decision, and probably has in mind Polus' words in 471 *a* *θαυμάσιος ὡς ἄθλιος γέγονεν*.

46. *ὑπερφυεῖ ὡς μεγάλη βλάβη*: a case of what was originally attraction, but which by long usage has become phraseological. See H. 1003 b; Rid. § 197.

^e XXXIV. 2. *χρηματιστική*: this and the *ιατρική* appear already in 452 *a* ff., where they are associated ⁴⁷⁸ with *γυμναστική*.

a 6 f. *εὐπορεῖς*: is used in a trans-

ferred sense, as is more frequently ⁴⁷⁸ the case with *ἀπορεῖν*. "If you are ^a not at once (*οὕτως*) prepared with an answer." We must imagine a short pause as occurring before *εἰ*. Such halts and explanations by means of examples, analogies, suggestive questions, and the like, are of course in accordance with the artistic design of the dialogue, but also serve to keep the attention of the reader. Note the interrogative form of one of Polus' answers. On *οὕτως* see on 503 *d*.

10. *ἀκολασταίνοντας*: appears again in *Rep.* 555 *d*, but otherwise seems to be restricted to comedy.

ΠΩΛ. Παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας;

ΠΩΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνην τινὲ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν
15 οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες;

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἱατρικὴ
δὲ νόσον, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

20 ΣΩ. Τί τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

ΠΩΛ. Τίνων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Χρηματιστικῆς, ἱατρικῆς, δίκης.

ΠΩΛ. Πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν
25 ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ ἱατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν
οἱ ἱατρευόμενοι;

ΠΩΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

30 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ
υπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι.

ΠΩΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

35 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος
ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἱατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν;

478
b 23. πολὺ διαφέρει: this utterance comes from Polus' heart because he still continues to regard the practice of law as the proper field for the exercise of the art which he teaches.

c 32. ἀπαλλάττεται: the subj. is to be supplied from the previous question of

Socrates (ἀρ' οὖν ... ἱατρευόμενοι). The trans. use of ἱατρεύειν is not common.

33. ὑγιῇ: on the form, see H. 231 b.

35. ἀρ' οὖν κτέ.: Socrates proceeds now to fulfil the promise made in 473 a. — οὕτως: is explained by the partic. which follows.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον ὅτι μὴδὲ κάμνων.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλ-^{depression}
λαγῇ, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴδὲ κτήσις.^{getting}

40 ΠΩΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν α
εἴτ' ἐν σώματι εἴτ' ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλατ-
τόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος.

45 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγῇ
ἦν, πονηρίας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιότερους ποιεῖ καὶ
ιατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη.

50 ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν e
ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη.

ΠΩΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερος δῆπου ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος.

55 ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος δ' ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενός
καὶ δίκην διδούς.^{warned} ^{perceived}

478 38. τοῦτ' ἦν κτέ.: on the gender,
C see H. 617; G. 138, n. 2 c. The impf.
of 'awakening' is often employed
with ἄρα or its equivalents (ὡς ἔοικε);
See H. 833.

39. τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴδὲ κτήσις: is the
substantival, hence the general ex-
pression for the previous particular
partic. clause. τὴν ἀρχὴν is construed
with κτήσις, which thus far retains
its verbal nature.

d 49. ἱατρικὴ γίγνεται: carries out
the analogy already so far developed.
σωφρονίζειν in the soul corresponds

to ἰατρεῦειν (κάειν καὶ τέμνειν) in the 478
body. d

52. τοῦτο: i.e. τὸ ἔχειν κακίαν ἐν e
σώματι, to be supplied from the pre-
ceding clause.

54. δεύτερος: cf. the Eng. colloquial
'second best.'

56. ὁ νουθετούμενος: contains an
intimation that the improving punish-
ment need not necessarily be the in-
fliction of physical pain, but may be
perceptible only by its effect on the
soul. Cf. Apol. 26 a τῶν ἀκουσίων ἀμαρ-
τημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν,

ΠΩΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων ἀδικίαν καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλατ-
60 τόμενος.

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὗτος τυγχάνει ὦν ὃς ἂν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδι-
κῶν καὶ χρώμενος μεγίστη ἀδικία διαπράξεται ὥστε μήτε
νουθετεῖσθαι μήτε κολάζεσθαι μήτε δίκην διδόναι, ὥσπερ
65 σὺ φῆς Ἀρχέλαον παρεσκευάσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τυράν-
νους καὶ ῥήτορας καὶ δυνάστας;

ΠΩΛ. Ἔοικε.

XXXV. ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν γάρ που οὗτοι, ὧ ἄριστε, τὸ αὐτὸ
διαπεπραγμένοι εἰσίν, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοῖς μεγίστοις
νοσήμασιν συνισχόμενος διαπράξαιτο μὴ διδόναι δίκην
τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμαρτημάτων τοῖς ἰατροῖς μηδὲ ἰατροῦ-
5 εσθαι, φοβούμενος ὥσπερανεὶ παῖς τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ
τέμνεσθαι, ὅτι ἀλγεινόν. ἥ οὐ δοκεῖ καὶ σοὶ οὕτω; b

478 ἄλλ' ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νοουθε-
6 τεῖν. The following expressions can be
conceived as denoting progressively
severer modes of punishment without
going into details.—ἐπιπληττόμενος:
the act. usually governs the dative.
See on 472 a.

59. ἀδικίαν: in accordance with
the general purpose of the discussion
this word is used as a general repre-
sentative of the various varieties of
κακία of the soul.

62. οὗτος: is pred. and is explained
by the preceding clause. The subject
is the following rel. clause.

63. διαπράξεται: cf. 473 c.—The
three expressions for the idea of pun-
ishment correspond to those above
used, since κολάζειν ἀνέλδυσιν (*Leg.* viii.
847 a) is but little different from

479 ἐπιπληττεῖν.

a XXXV. 2. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις: a

case of very natural ellipsis. Cf. the 479
analogous Lat. use of *tanquam si*,
ut si. When used by itself this
expression becomes a relative phrase,
equivalent to the Lat. *tanquam*
sicut. In this sense it is written as
one word. GMT. 227, 868. The com-
parison to a child occurs in Homer,
and is found also elsewhere in Plato,
e.g. *Phaedo* 77 d *δεδιέμαι τὸ τῶν παίδων*
and *εἴσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς ὅστις*
τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. Cf. above, 470 c.

3. μὴ διδόναι δίκην: cf. 478 e just
above, where the same verb is used
with ὥστε μή, and below, b, c, where
πάν ποιῶσι is used like *διαπράξαιτο* in
this passage without ὥστε.

5 f. τὸ κάεσθαι καὶ τὸ τέμνεσθαι: the
repetition of the art. is unusual, and
serves to keep the two ideas separate.

6. ὅτι ἀλγεινόν: on the causal ὅτι
after verbs of fearing, see GMT. 377. b

Παλ. *Εμοιγε.

- Σο. Ἀγνοῶν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἶόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρετὴ σώματος. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ὡμο-
 10 λογημένων τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν καὶ οἱ τὴν δίκην φεύγοντες, ὃ Πῶλε, τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυφλῶς ἔχειν καὶ ἀγνοεῖν, ὅσῳ ἀθλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὑγιоῦς σώματος μὴ ὑγιεῖ ψυχῇ συνοικεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαθρὰ καὶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ἀνοσίῳ. ὅθεν καὶ πᾶν ποιοῦσιν ὥστε δίκην μὴ διδό-
 15 ναι μῆδ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι καὶ φίλους καὶ ὅπως ἂν ᾧσιν ὡς πιθανώτατοι λέγειν. εἰ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀληθῆ ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὃ Πῶλε, ἂρ' αἰσθάνει τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου; ἡ βούλει συλλογισάμεθα αὐτά;
 20 Παλ. Εἰ μὴ σοί γε ἄλλως δοκεῖ.

479 8. ἀγνοῶν γε: Plato frequently
 b employs participial clauses as a kind of addendum to sentences which are either interrupted by the answer of the respondent or already complete in themselves. — οἶον: *what sort of a thing*.

11 f. καθορᾶν . . . ἀγνοεῖν: is epexegetical to τοιοῦτόν τι, and corresponds to συνοισχόμενος . . . φοβούμενος and ἀγνοῶν in the comparison above.

12 f. μὴ ὑγιоῦς σώματος: a harsh use of the comparative gen. equiv. to ἡ μὴ ὑγιεῖ σώματι. See *Madv. Syn.* § 90.

13. συνοικεῖν: divorces the human personality from the soul and body, by a union of which it exists. With καθορᾶν κτέ., Plato thinks especially of the νοῦς to which he opposes that part which, in its subserviency to the lusts and appetites, willingly withdraws from the control of reason. — σαθρῇ: is used of injuries and defects of all kinds, whether of material things, as

jars (493 e), or of the body (*Dem. Ol.* 479 ii. 21 κἂν ρήγμα (*fracture*) κἂν στρέμμα (*dislocation*) κἂν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σαθρὸν ᾗ). From this meaning comes its transferred use in application to the soul or the state. Notice that the unhealthy soul is designated as σαθρά from a physical point of view, ἄδικος in its dealings with its neighbors, and ἀνόσιος in its attitude towards the divine.

15 f. καὶ χρήματα παρασκευαζόμενοι: epexegetic partic. to πᾶν ποιοῦσιν.

16. ὅπως ἂν ᾧσιν κτέ.: is a circumlocution for a third substantive.

18. τὰ συμβαίνοντα: "the results" obtained.

19. συλλογισάσθαι: "to sum up what has been proved." See on 478 a above, in regard to the answers of Polus.

20. εἰ μὴ κτέ.: affirms and admits; but because nothing else can be done.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἢ ἀδικία καὶ
τὸ ἀδικεῖν;

ΠΩ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπαλλαγὴ γε ἐφάνη τούτου τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ α
25 δίκην δίδοναι;

ΠΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε μὴ δίδοναι ἐμμονὴ τοῦ κακοῦ;

ΠΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν κακῶν μεγέθει τὸ ἀδικεῖν.
30 τὸ δὲ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ δίδοναι δίκην πάντων μέγιστόν τε καὶ
πρῶτον κακῶν πέφυκεν.

ΠΩ. Ἐοῖκεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν περὶ τούτου, ὦ φίλε, ἡμφεσβητήσαμεν, σὺ
μὲν τὸν Ἀρχέλαον εὐδαιμονίζων τὸν τὰ μέγιστα ἀδι-
35 κοῦντα δίκην οὐδεμίαν δίδοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦναντίον οἶόμε-
νος, εἴτ' Ἀρχέλαος εἴτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων ὅστισοῦν μὴ
δίδωσι δίκην ἀδικῶν, τούτῳ προσήκειν ἀθλίῳ εἶναι διαφε-
ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αἰετὸν τὸν ἀδικοῦντα τοῦ
ἀδικουμένου ἀθλιώτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὴ δίδοντα δίκην
40 τοῦ διδόντος; οὐ ταῦτ' ἦν τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λεγόμενα;

ΠΩ. Ναί.

479 21. ἄρ' οὖν: regularly introduces
c a conjecture, which is expected to be confirmed by the other party; ἄρα alone is also often so used; ἄρα οὐ expects distinctly an affirmative answer. Often ἄρ' οὖν approximates to ἄρ' οὐ. Cf. 450 a. — μέγιστον κακόν: συμβαίνειν has (in addition to the inf.) the constr. of τυγχάνω. Hence the omission of the partic. is allowable. GMT. 890.

29. δεύτερον κτέ.: cf. the similar 479 usage above in 478 e. If the reading is d sound, we must infer from the following clause that τὸ ἀδικεῖν has the same force as τὸ ἀδικοῦντα δίδοναι δίκην.

34. τὸν Ἀρχέλαον . . . τὸν κτέ.: the main force of the example lies in the predicate, τὸν . . . δίδοντα, as the art. shows. Constr. τὸν with δίδοντα, to which ἀδικοῦντα is subordinate.

37 f. διαφερόντως: is construed like e the corresponding verb. Cf. Apol. 29 b ἐγὼ τοῦτ' ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

d 24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.: in this and in the following utterance of Socrates, the question is denoted merely by the tone.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἔλέγετο;

ΠΩΛ. Φαίνεται.

XXXVI. ΣΩ. Εἴεν· εἰ οὖν δὴ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ Πῶλε, 480
τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶν τῆς ῥητορικῆς; δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δὴ
ἐκ τῶν νῦν ὁμολογημένων αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα φυλάτ-
τειν ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσῃ, ὡς ἱκανὸν κακὸν ἔξοντα. οὐ γάρ;

5 ΠΩΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν δέ γε ἀδικήσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὢν ἂν
κῆδεται, αὐτὸν ἐκόντα ἵεναι ἐκέισε, ὅπου ὡς τάχιστα δώ-
σει δίκην, παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ὥσπερ παρὰ τὸν ἱατρὸν,
σπεύδοντα ὅπως μὴ ἐγχρομισθὲν τὸ νόσημα τῆς ἀδικίας b
10 ὑπουλον τὴν ψυχὴν ποιήσῃ καὶ ἀνίατον· ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν,
ὦ Πῶλε, εἴπερ τὰ πρότερον μένει ἡμῖν ὁμολογήματα;
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταῦτα ἐκείνοις οὕτω μὲν συμφωνεῖν, ἄλλως
δὲ μῆ;

ΠΩΛ. Τί γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

15 ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ μὲν ἄρα τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀδικίας
τῆς αὐτοῦ ἢ γονέων ἢ ἐταίρων ἢ παίδων ἢ πατρίδος ἀδι-

480 XXXVI. 2. ἡ μεγάλη κτέ.: the
a use of the adj. is a slightly sarcastic
allusion to Polus' extravagant encomi-
ums on rhetoric. The rhetorical
question has the force of a neg.
Hence the following causal clause.

3. αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κτέ.: the prefixing
of αὐτὸν emphasizes the reflexive. H.
688. The subj. of φυλάττειν is indefi-
nite; cf. 456 d.

4. ἱκανόν: the use of this word is
an example of μείωσις, or understatement,
the peculiar characteristic of
American humor. A similar case is
Ant. Tetral. A. β 2 ἐμοὶ δὲ ζῶν τε
ἄνθρωπος ἀνατροπεὺς τοῦ οἴκου ἐγένετο
ἀποθανών τε . . . ἱκανὰς λύπας . . . προσ-
βέβληκεν.

10. ὑπουλον: is stronger than σα- 480
θρόν. The disease leaves the sur- b
face, and fastens on the innermost
kernel of the soul. We are re-
minded of the Ovidian *Princi-
piis obsta. sero medicina pa-
ratur, | cum mala per longas
convalescere moras (Rem. Am.
91 f.)*.

14. τί γὰρ δὴ κτέ.: the rhetorical
question has the force of an emphatic
affirmation, τί being almost equiv. to
τί ἄλλο.

16 f. πατρίδος ἀδικουσύνης: the
speeches in the assembly are hereby
put in the same category with the
judicial. — ἀδικουσύνης: is a colloquial
repetition of ἀδικίας.

κούσης οὐ χρήσιμος οὐδὲν ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Πῶλε, εἰ
 μὴ εἴ τις ὑπολάβοι τοῦναντίον, κατηγορεῖν δεῖν μάλιστα ^c
 μὲν ἑαυτοῦ, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὃς
 20 ἂν αἰετῶν φίλων τυγχάνῃ ἀδικῶν, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι, ^{had}
 ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ φανερόν ἄγειν τὸ ἀδίκημα, ἵνα δῶ δίκην καὶ
 ὑγιῆς γένηται, ἀναγκάζειν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 μὴ ἀποδειλιάειν, ἀλλὰ παρέχειν ^{with closed eyes} μύσαντα καὶ ἀνδρείως
 ὥσπερ τέμνειν καὶ κᾶειν ἱατρῷ, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν
 25 διώκοντα μὴ ὑπολογιζόμενον τὸ ἀλγεινόν, ἐὰν μὲν γε πλη- ^{διόου}
 γῶν ἄξια ἡδίκηκός ᾖ, τύπτειν παρέχοντα, ἐὰν δὲ δεσμοῦ, ^{strikes} ^{imprisonment} ^d
 δεῖν, ἐὰν δὲ ζημίας, ἀποτινόντα, ἐὰν δὲ φυγῆς, φεύγοντα,
 ἐὰν δὲ θανάτου, ἀποθνήσκοντα, αὐτὸν πρῶτον ὄντα κατή- ^{accuser}
 γορον καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρώ-
 30 μενον τῇ ῥητορικῇ, ὅπως ἂν καταδῆλων τῶν ἀδικημάτων
 γιγνομένων ἀπαλλάττωνται τοῦ μεγίστου κακοῦ, ἀδικίας.
 φῶμεν οὕτως ἢ μὴ φῶμεν, ὦ Πῶλε;

Πηλ. Ἄτοπα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, τοῖς μὲν- ^c
 τοι ἔμπροσθεν ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται. ^{agrees}

480 17 f. εἰ μὴ εἰ: cf. Lach. 196 a οὔτε
^b γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἱατρὸν . . . λέγει τὸν
 ἀνδρείον εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν
 εἶναι. Cf. Lat. nisi si; e.g. Cic. ad
 Fam. xiv. 2. 1 noli putare me ad
 quemquam scribere, nisi si
 quis ad me scripsit.

^c 18. εἰ ὑπολάβοι τοῦναντίον: except
 in case one should assume, on the con-
 trary, that, etc.

19 f. ὃς ἂν κτέ.: follows a pl. on
 account of its generic signification,
 and governs τῶν φίλων as a part. gen.
 Examples in Kr. 58, 4, 5.

23. μύσαντα: to go into danger
 blindly, i.e. with closed eyes,—to be
 blind to the existence of danger, as
 such, was apparently thought to be a

mark of great courage and determi- 480
 nation; hence μύσαντα is paired here ^c
 with ἀνδρείως. Why one should act
 so, is explained by τὸ . . . διώκοντα.
 One of the functions of the partici-
 ple is to express manner; hence it is
 quite natural to find it side by side
 with an adverb.

29. τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων κτέ.: see on ^d
 473 c.

30. ὅπως ἂν κτέ.: is correlative
 with ἐπὶ τοῦτο. Notice that here the
 ὅπως is a purely final particle, as it
 was not in a, b above.

34. ἴσως σοι ὁμολογεῖται: the per- ^e
 sonal dat. σοι seems strange, since it
 can neither be understood as 482 b
 below, οὐ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς,

35 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ κακέϊνα ^{καρτερία} λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν;

ΠΩΛ. Ναί, τοῦτό γε οὕτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Τοῦναντίον δέ γε αὖ μεταβαλόντα, εἴ ἄρα δεῖ τινα κακῶς ποιεῖν, εἴτ' ἐχθρὸν εἴτε ὄντιν οὖν, ἐὰν μόνον μὴ
40 αὐτὸς ἀδικῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦ· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ εὐλαβητέον· ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικῇ ὁ ἐχθρός, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δῶ δίκην 481

480 nor as 477 d above, αἰσχιστον ἀδικία
e . . . ἐμολόγηται ἡμῖν, for ὁμολογεῖται (convenient, consentanea sunt) has its dat. in τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν. But it is not superfluous; its force seems to be this: "but perhaps you can make it agree with what precedes." Thus the dat., as well as ἴσως, would serve the author's purpose in delineating Polus' character, who by such shallow artifices seeks to weaken his admissions, and, as far as possible, relieve himself from any responsibility in the results,—a design which Socrates balks by his following question. See on 477 d, 478 a, and H. 770, 771.

35. κακέϊνα: καί assumes εἰ τάδε ἄτοπα δοκεῖ, thus noticing Polus' observation.—λυτέον: a metaphor drawn from such usage as λύνει γέφυραν. Cf. Prot. 332 e, Xen. An. ii. 4. 19. A different meaning appears in διαλύειν τὸν λόγον, 458 b, after διαλύειν τὴν συνουσίαν in 457 c.

38. τοῦναντίον: the heaping up of such kindred ideas as αἰ, αἰθῖς, πάλιν is not uncommon (see examples in Kr. 69, 12); τοῦναντίον means "on the contrary"; αἰ, "on the other hand"; μεταβαλόντα (intransitive), "vice versa."—εἰ ἄρα: if, assuming the ordinary view to be the correct one (ἔρα).—τινὰ: is object, and with it εἴτε . . .

ὄντιν οὖν is in apposition. ἐχθρός is 480 a personal enemy, as distinguished from πολέμιος, a national enemy.

39. ἐὰν μόνον μὴ αὐτὸς κτέ.: because experiencing injury might be held as a kind of substitute for the punishment due for inflicting it.

40. αὐτός: refers to the subject of κακῶς ποιεῖν, which is indefinite.—τοῦτο κτέ.: the insertion of this clause, which is due to the preceding ἐὰν μόνον κτέ., defers the completion of the sentence to παντὶ τρόπῳ κτέ.

42. πράττοντα καὶ λέγοντα: the 481 two species of activity do not exclude each other, for the effect of πράττειν may be more thoroughly completed by λέγειν, and vice versa.—The acc. case is in agreement with the unexpressed indefinite agent of παρασκευαστέον. On the case of the agent with verbal adjs., see G. 281, 2; H. 991 a.—ὅπως μὴ δῶ κτέ.: this sentence is remarkable on account of the variety of the constructions found after ὅπως,—three out of the perhaps eight varieties being found, viz. subjv., ἄν with subjv., fut. indic. We should not attempt to make any sharp distinctions here, for Plato is capable of changing the construction for the sake of variety. We may, however, say this much. ὅπως μὴ δῶ is purely final, the conjunction not

μηδὲ ἔλθῃ παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν· ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ, ^{St. I. p. 481.} ^{Concl. p. 72.} μηχανήτεον, ὅπως ἂν διαφύγῃ καὶ μὴ δῶ δίκην ὁ ἐχθρός, ἀλλ' ἐὰν τε
 45 χρυσίον ^{σρενω} (ᾗ) ἥρπακώς πολὺ, μὴ ἀποδιδῶ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἔχων ἀναλίσκῃ καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως, ἐάν τε θανάτου ἄξια ἡδίκηκώς ᾗ, ὅπως μὴ ἀποθάνειται, ^{wickstr} μάλιστα μὲν ^{wickstr} μηδέποτε, ἀλλ' ἀθάνατος ἔσται ποινη-
 ρὸς ὧν· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅπως ὡς πλείστον χρόνον βιώσεται τοι-
 50 οὔτος ὧν. ἐπὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Πῶλε, ἡ ῥητο-
 ρικὴ χρήσιμος εἶναι, ἐπεὶ τῷ γε μὴ μέλλοντι ἀδικεῖν οὐ
 μεγάλη τίς μοι δοκεῖ ἡ χρεία αὐτῆς εἶναι, εἰ δὴ καὶ ἔστιν
 τις χρεία, ὡς ἔν γε τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδαμῇ ἐφάνη οὔσα.

XXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Χαιρεφῶν, σπουδάξει
 ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;

ΧΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ^{wickstr} ὑπερφυνῶς σπουδά-
 ζειν· “οὐδὲν” μέντοι “οἶον τὸ αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν.”

481 ^a differing from *ἴνα*. When the delin-
 quent is brought before the judge,
 there is some doubt as to his escape,
 and ὅπως ἂν (equiv. to ἐάν πως) gives
 expression to this doubt. In the long
 sentence following the ἂν gradually
 fades away, and the most common
 relative construction with the fut.
 indic. closes the series. On εἰ δὲ μή
 after ἐάν, see on 502 b.

43. ἐὰν δὲ ἔλθῃ: in thus stating
 the opposite alternative, Socrates
 takes for the moment the standpoint
 of the orators. That it is only for
 the moment is seen from *Crito* 49 c
 οὔτε ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν
 οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν πάσχη
 ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

46. ἀναλίσκῃ: to make the state-
 ment of the wrong complete, the way
 in which the money is wasted is added.

b XXXVII. 1. On the role assigned
 to Callicles here, see *Introd.* § 15.

After Polus has shown himself in-
 capable of maintaining his views of
 rhetoric against the superior dialecti-
 cal skill of Socrates, Callicles enters
 the discussion with a thought quite
 similar to the one with which Polus
 had entered it in 461 b. The view
 of life on which all of Socrates' de-
 ductions rest is so abhorrent to his
 innermost nature and all his hitherto
 cherished ideas that he cannot be
 brought to look upon the principles
 here advocated as the earnest convic-
 tions of a reasonable man. He does
 not, however, rush into the lists so
 roughly as Polus, but, being a more
 polished man of the world, turns first
 to Chaerephon, who is thoroughly
 acquainted with Socrates' views. He,
 however, wittily refers him to the
 master, in the same words with which
 Callicles himself had in 447 c re-
 ferred Socrates to Gorgias.

5 ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρα- c
τες, πότερόν σε φῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα;
εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα
ἀ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη
τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὥς ἔοικεν,
10 ἢ ἂ δεῖ;

ΣΩ. ὦ Καλλίκεις, εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος,
τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν
ἰδίον τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδεί- d
ξασθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. λέγω δ' ἐννοήσας,
15 ὅτι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν τυγχάνομεν ταῦτόν τι πεπονθότες,

481 5. νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμῶ:

c ἀλλά is used after an expression of asseveration, as in 463 d. The words of Chaerephon contain the challenge, "Why don't you rather turn to Socrates himself?" to which Callicles replies, "But that is just what I do desire." In Callicles' manner of expression we discern his excitable nature as well as his strong faith in his own views, which he is the more surprised to find opposed, not only by Socrates, but also by Chaerephon. Artistically also his words form the text for the discussion which follows.

6. φῶμεν . . . παίζοντα: this is a very unusual construction for φημί. G. 280, 2, n. 1.

8. ἀνατετραμμένος: cf. ἀνατρέπειν τὰ πράγματα, πόλιν, οἰκίαν. For if you be both in earnest, and the thing which you say prove to be (τυγχάνει) true, would not the only (ἄλλο τι ἢ) conclusion be that the manner of life of us men has been entirely upside down? — τῶν ἀνθρώπων: is emphatically added because Callicles does not intend that under ἡμῶν only a limited circle shall be understood. Cf. Ar. *Plut.* 500 ὥς

μὲν γὰρ νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ βίος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 481
διάκειται. c

9. πάντα τὰ ἐναντία: like πᾶν τοῦναντίον, quite the contrary.

11. εἰ μὴ τι κτέ.: Socrates recognizes indeed the opposition in their views of life, but refers it to the different exercise of a common feeling, — love, — which varies according to the difference in the objects to which it is directed. The comparison of love of wisdom with other varieties of human love is often found in Plato, e.g. *Phaedo* 68 a. — πάθος: denotes a state of mind brought about by external influences. According to cause and circumstances it may be love, hate, admiration, or scorn. But no variety is peculiar to any single man; this is made clear by the explanatory clause inserted between πάθος and τὸ αὐτό.

13. ἴδιον: contains in itself an idea d of comparison, like ἄλλο ἕτερον, and hence takes ἦ.

15. ταῦτόν τι: the πάθος experienced by each one, is first roughly characterized as "about the same thing," and later clearly defined by

ἐρῶντε δύο ὄντε δυοῖν ἐκάτερος, ἐγὼ μὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου τε τοῦ Κλεινίου καὶ φιλοσοφίας, σὺ δὲ τοῦ τε Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους. αἰσθάνομαι οὖν σου ἐκάστοτε, καίπερ ὄντος δεινοῦ, ὅτι ἂν φῇ σου τὰ παιδικὰ καὶ 20 ὅπως ἂν φῇ ἔχειν, οὐ δυναμένου ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω καὶ οὐ κατὰ μεταβάλλομένου· ἐν τε τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, εἴαν τι σοῦ λέγοντος ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων μὴ φῇ οὕτως ἔχειν, μεταβαλλόμενος λέγεις ἅ ἐκείνος βούλεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν Πυριλάμπους νεανίαν τὸν καλὸν τοῦτον τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πέπον- 25 θας· τοῖς γὰρ τῶν παιδικῶν βουλευμασί τε καὶ λόγοις

⁴⁸¹ the explanatory ἐρῶντε κτέ. The ^d variation from the pl. to the dual is interesting. The lack of a first person dual compels the first pl., with its accompanying partic. πεπονθότες, while the following dual emphasizes the exact similarity of the two experiences.

16. Ἀλκιβιάδου: the mental and moral training of the rising youth was largely directed by prominent older men with whom they associated, usually according to individual preference. One of these prominent teachers, and one who made it the business of his life, was Socrates, and among the young men who clustered around him and followed his conversations was Alcibiades, whom Socrates greatly loved for his mental gifts. Owing to his great beauty he was jestingly called Socrates' sweetheart (τὰ παιδικά). Cf. Prot. init. Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ἔραν. This is the point of the allusion here. *νέη, αἰγλή.*

18. δήμου: has two allusions. The son of Pyrilampes, a rich Athenian and friend of Pericles, was called Demus. Like his father, he is re-

ported to have been especially beau- ⁴⁸¹ tiful, and is also mentioned by Ar. ^d Vesp. 97 ff. as a much admired sweetheart. This fact Socrates skilfully uses to characterize Callicles' relation to the Athenian demus. This people needed, like a boy, a leader and guide; but the orators, instead of governing it, regulated their actions according to its whims. — τοῦ Πυριλάμπους: is of course to be understood in the usual way, like τοῦ Κλεινίου. Cf. τὸν Πυριλάμπους below, and 513 b.

18 f. αἰσθάνομαι . . . οὐ δυναμένου: on the gen. partic. construction see GMT. 884-6; H. 742, 982. — δεινοῦ: is often joined with λέγειν, in order to describe a skilful orator, but can also be used without this addition, in the sense of "skilful," "clever."

20 f. ἄνω καὶ κάτω: like Lat. sur- ^e sum deorsum, with μεταστρέφειν, στρέφειν (511 a), μεταβάλλειν, μεταπίπτειν (493 a) denotes a changeable and uncertain course of action. Variations of the phrase are ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω, and more often ἄνω κάτω.

25. βουλευμασί: i.e. the fanciful plans and designs of boys.

οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ὥστε, εἴ τίς σου λέγοντος ἐκά-
 στοτε, ἃ διὰ τούτους λέγεις, θαυμάζοι ὡς ἄτοπὰ ἐστίν,
 ἴσως εἴποις ἂν αὐτῷ, εἰ βούλοιο τάληθ' ἔλεγε, ὅτι, εἰ μὴ
 τις παύσει τὰ σὰ παιδικὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων, οὐδὲ σὺ 482
 30 παύσει ποτὲ ταῦτα λέγων. νόμιζε τοῖνυν καὶ παρ' ἐμοῦ
 χρῆναι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούειν, καὶ μὴ θαύμαζε ὅτι ἐγὼ
 ταῦτα λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικὰ, παύ-
 σον ταῦτα λέγουσαν. λέγει γάρ, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ἃ νῦν
 ἐμοῦ ἀκούεις, καὶ μοί ἐστιν τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν πολὺ
 35 ἦττον ἐμπληκτός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κλεινίειος οὗτος ἄλλοτε
 ἄλλων ἐστὶ λόγων, ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία (ἀεὶ) τῶν αὐτῶν· λέγει
 δὲ ἃ σὺ νῦν θαυμάζεις, παρήσθα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς λεγομένοις. b
 ἡ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγχον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἀδι-
 κεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχα-
 40 τον κακῶν· ἡ εἰ τοῦτο ἑάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα
 τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, οὗ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ

481 28. εἰ βούλοιο: which probably was
 e hardly to be expected.

482 31. ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: cf. above (24),
 a τοιαῦτα ἕτερα.

34. τῶν ἐτέρων παιδικῶν: in the
 above-cited passage from *Phaedo*
 (68 a) we find the word ἀνθρωπίνων
 in the same connexion.

35. ἐμπληκτός: unstable. Cf. *Soph.*
Ai. 1358 τοιοῖδε μέντοι φῶτες ἐμπλη-
 κτοι βροτῶν.

36. ἄλλων . . . τῶν αὐτῶν: gen.
 of characteristic is not common in
 Greek, and is always predicate. Cf.
Thuc. i. 113 ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης
 ἦσαν. See H. 732 d.

b 37. παρήσθα δέ: change from the
 rel. to the independent construction.
 See on 452 d. Here, however, we
 must supply the pronoun (αὐτοῖς) to
 which λεγομένοις is a subordinate tem-

poral partic. equiv. to ὅτε ἐλέγετο. 482
 We might translate δέ "although." b

38. ἐξέλεγχον ὡς κτέ.: see on 467 a.
 Here, to "prove by confuting her."
 — ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον: refers to 480 e
 οὐκοῦν ἢ κακείνα λυτέον ἢ τάδε ἀνάγκη
 συμβαίνειν. The transition from the
 personal to the material object is
 made much easier by the meaning of
 the verb ἐξέλεγχον.

40. μὰ τὸν κύνα: the addition of
 τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν is a humorous al-
 lusion to the animal worship of the
 Egyptians. See *Apol.* 21 e. The
 omission of the art. with Αἰγυπτίων is
 regular.

41. Καλλικλῆς: the use of the
 proper name in contrast with the
 pronoun σοί, and its close connection
 with the address ὦ Καλλίκευς, is in-
 tended to emphasize as sharply as

Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσῃ ἐν ᾧ παντὶ τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὃ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμωστῆν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοῖν, 45 καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ' ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν.

XXXVIII. ΚΑΛ. ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖς νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν· καὶ νῦν ταῦτα δημηγορεῖς ταῦτόν παθόντος Πώλου πάθος, ὅπερ Γοργίου κατηγορεῖ πρὸς σέ παθεῖν. ἔφη γάρ που Γοργίαν ἐρωτώ-

482 possible the inner conflict which
b must continue to rage in Callicles' soul, so long as one opinion has not decisively vanquished the other.

44. ἀναρμωστῆν: applies especially to imperfection in the general harmony, while διαφωνεῖν is used of the discord between single tones. Two different principles exert their effects upon the soul.—χορηγοῖν: this liturgy, which has been already mentioned in note on 472 a, was of course not possible for Socrates, and could be only for the rich. But in proportion as a victory in this kind of musical competition was looked upon as a great honor, so a failure was a great humiliation. The opt. is ideal, and to be translated "which I might conduct."

c 46. μᾶλλον: frequently follows a comp. to reiterate the idea with a slight modification (rather than). Cf. below, 487 b, *Phaedo* 79 e, and see for other examples, *Rid.* § 166.

XXXVIII. 1. νεανιεύεσθαι: "to act like a wild young man." Callicles has in mind especially the insolent, bold, and reckless conduct of the rich and proud Athenian youth. This is usually the meaning of the adject-

tive νεανικός (so in our dialogue, 508 d, 482 509 a), which, however, is sometimes used only of the freshness and the vigor of youth, as below, 485 e. The verb applies especially to the training of the youth by the Sophists, which leads them to light and idle speeches and to a defense of the most conflicting principles without having regard unto the higher and earnest problems of life. Cf. *Phaedrus* 235 a καὶ ἐφαίνετο δὴ μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὡς οἷός τε ὢν ταῦτα ἐτέρως τε καὶ ἐτέ- 485 ρως λέγων ἀμφοτέρως εἰπεῖν ἄριστα.

2 f. δημηγόρος, δημηγορεῖν: indicate dissatisfaction, sometimes with the length of the speeches, as opposed to διαλέγεσθαι, e.g. 519 d, e, *Prot.* 329 a, 336 b; sometimes, as here and in 494 d, with the means employed by those who, unconcerned for the truth, seek only the approbation of the multitude. In the mouth of Callicles, who is the real δημηγόρος, this reproach sounds very strange, especially with the addition ὡς ἀληθῶς. It is a kind of unconscious self-criticism.

4. πρὸς σέ: cf. 485 b below, and *Apol.* 21 c πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, "at whose hands I had some such experience."

- 5 μενον ὑπὸ σοῦ, ἐὰν ἀφίκηται παρ' αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπιστάμενος
τὰ δίκαια ὁ τὴν ῥητορικὴν βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, εἰ διδάξοι α
αὐτὸν ὁ Γοργίας, αἰσχυρῆναι αὐτὸν καὶ φάναι διδάξειν
διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἀγανακτοῖεν ἂν εἴ τις μὴ
φαίη· διὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἑναν-
10 τία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν, σὲ δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾶν. καὶ σου
κατεγέλα, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν, ὁρθῶς τότε· νῦν δὲ πάλιν
αὐτὸς ταύτῳ τοῦτο ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἔγωγε κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐκ
ἄγαμαι Πῶλον, ὅτι σοι συνεχώρησε τὸ ἀδικεῖν αἰσχίον
εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας e
15 αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη,
αἰσχυρθεὶς ἅ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν. σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες,
εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικά καὶ δημηγορικά, φάσκων τὴν

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d 6. διδάξοι: the fut. opt. is only found in indir. disc. as a representative of the fut. indicative. It is post-Homeric, the first example occurring in Pindar.

7. αὐτόν: repeats with emphasis the subject Γοργίαν, which is already expressed. Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 15 πειράσομαι τῷ πάππῳ ἀγαθῶν ἵππεων κράτιστος ὧν ἵππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ. The clause with ὅτι is causal, and is explanatory of διὰ τὸ ἔθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, which is to be connected with φάναι, not with διδάξειν.

10. ἀγαπᾶν: cf. 461 c δὲ δὴ ἀγαπᾶς.

11. ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖν: as it seemed to me. The phrase is found sometimes with ὥς as here and Hdt. ii. 124; sometimes without, as Meno 81 a; ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν Soph. El. 410.

e 15. συμποδισθεὶς ἐπεστομίσθη: a combination of two metaphors, both of which refer to a horse which has been caught by a noose, and then guided according to a strange will by a bridle which has been forced into

its mouth. In the same way Polus, 482 by that unlucky admission, allowed himself to be noosed, and was thus compelled to follow the lead of Socrates, wherever that might take him.

16. τῷ ὄντι: affirms the justice of the accusation made against Socrates by Polus.

17. φορτικά: a word not uncommon in Plato, is used in *Euthyd.* 287 a of insidious catch-questions. See on *Apol.* 32 a, where combined with δικάνικα it is used of the tediousness of those detailed discussions from which Socrates, after the manner of an orator before a court, seeks to draw his proofs. Here Callicles probably wants to indicate the vulgarity of such illustrations and talks, as being fit only for the uncultured multitude. The rel. sentence ἃ φέσει κτέ. is connected epexegetically with τοιαῦτα, and thereby the conclusion from the special case is made of general application. It was indeed from the idea of the καλόν that Socrates drew the

ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, ἃ φύσει μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν καλὰ, νόμῳ δέ.
 ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντί' ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἧ τε φύσις
 20 καὶ ὁ νόμος. εἰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν 483
 ἅπερ νῦν, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο
 τὸ σοφὸν κατανενοηκῶς κακουργεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, εἰν
 μὲν τις κατὰ νόμον λέγει, κατὰ φύσιν ὑπερωτῶν, εἰν δὲ τὰ
 τῆς φύσεως, τὰ τοῦ νόμου. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα ἐν τούτοις, τῷ
 25 ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι, Πώλου τὸ κατὰ νόμον
 αἰσχιον λέγοντος, σὺ τὸν νόμον ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν.
 φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αἰσχιὸν ἔστιν ὅπερ καὶ κάκιον, τὸ

482 whole argument with which he re-
 e futed Polus.

18. φύσει μὲν, νόμῳ δέ: the oppo-
 sition of natural right to conventional
 right (law) was first definitely main-
 tained by Hippias of Elis. Cf. *Prot.*
 337 c d, Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 14. After
 him this principle was accepted and
 made a commonplace by all the
 Sophists. It is probable that Gorgias
 himself did not defend it, but his
 teaching can be traced back to it.
 This principle Callicles now proceeds
 to unfold. Of kindred import is also
 the discussion between Alcibiades
 and Pericles, related by Xen. *Mem.* i.
 2. 40 ff.

483 21 f. ὁ δὲ καὶ σὺ τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν
 a κτέ.: τὸ σοφόν (*artifice, trick*) is used
 somewhat scornfully in the sense in
 which the sophistical Eristics em-
 ployed it, with whom Callicles puts
 Socrates on a level. Hence he also
 employs towards him the word κα-
 κουργεῖν, which was used among the
 Eristics to denote crafty tripping in
 discussion. Cf. *Rep.* i. 341 a οὐτε γὰρ
 ἄν με λάθοις κακουργῶν, by which Thra-
 symachus declares his ability to de-
 fend himself against such unfair treat-

ment; so *ib.* 338 d. The same feel- 483
 ing determines the choice of the com-
 pound ὑπερωτᾶν "to slip artfully into
 the question," "ask slyly". — τοῦτο
 τὸ σοφόν: is epexegetic to ὧ.

23. εἰν δὲ κτέ.: supply the same
 verbs as are found in the first mem-
 ber of the sentence.

24. ὥσπερ αὐτίκα: *as, for example.*
 See on 472 d.

26. ἐδιώκαθες κατὰ φύσιν: 'you
 followed up what he meant "conven-
 tionally" by arguing upon it in the
 "natural" sense.' Cope. *I.e.* Socrates
 had treated the concession of Polus,
 and drawn his results from it, as if
 Polus had therein conceded that to
 do wrong was by nature, *i.e.* of itself,
 more ugly than to suffer wrong. "For
 — so runs the argument of Callicles
 — that which is by nature ugly coin-
 cides with what is evil, which latter,
 however, is the suffering of wrong.
 But we must not conclude from this
 that what is by law the more ugly is
 also the greater evil."

27 f. τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι: as the passage
 stands, must be considered as explan-
 atory of the preceding, without close
 construction.

ἀδικεῖσθαι, νόμῳ δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τοῦτό **b**
 γ' ἐστὶν τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνδραπόδου τινός,
 30 ᾧ κρείττον' ἐστὶν τεθνάναι ἢ ζῆν, ὅστις ἀδικούμενος καὶ
 προπηλακιζόμενος μὴ οἷός τέ ἐστὶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν
 μηδὲ ἄλλῳ οὐ ^{οὐκ} ἀν κήδηται. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς
 νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρωποὶ εἰσιν καὶ οἱ πολλοί. πρὸς
 αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθεν-
 35 ται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγου- **c**
 σιν. ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχω-
 σιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἀδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ
 τοῦτό ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων ζῆτειν ἔχειν.

483 **b** 28. οὐδὲ γὰρ: leads over to a criti-
 cism of Socrates' view per se, the
 question thus far having been his man-
 ner of procedure in the case of Polus.

30. ᾧ κρείττον' κτέ.: in the opinion
 of the masses, the same is true of all
 who are without the enjoyments of
 life. Cf. *Phaedo* 65 a. The regular
 relative after an indefinite (τινός) is
 ὅστις, which frequently has a condi-
 tional idea, and then takes the cond.
 neg. μή. H. 699 a.

31 f. αὐτὸς . . . κήδηται: the same
 ideas were presented in 480 a. Here
 every man is expressly thrown upon
 his own resources and the state abol-
 ished.

32. ἀλλ', οἶμαι κτέ.: this exposition
 of the origin of conventional right is
 designed by Callicles to show the su-
 perior authority of the natural right
 which he advocates. — οἱ τιθέμενοι:
 "the law-makers." The active is used
 of the law-giver. On the force of
 the article with the predicate, see H.
 669 a; G. 141, n. 8.

33. καὶ οἱ πολλοί: it is just this
 addition which contains the most im-

portant point, according to Callicles' 483
 real view, though he keeps it in the **b**
 background, because for him the con-
 trast between stronger and weaker is
 of more value for his argument. It
 is this begging of the question to
 which Socrates first turns his atten-
 tion in 488 c ff. — πρὸς αὐτούς: usu-
 ally we find βλέποντες, but the prepo-
 sition itself is sufficient. Kr. 68, 39, 5.

35. ἐπαίνους, ψόγους: the people **c**
 not only makes laws, — i.e. commands
 and prohibitions, the transgression of
 which is punished by penalties, — but
 also expresses in manifold ways, by
 offices, honors, etc., its judgment on
 the value of men and actions.

36. Another case of explanatory
 asyndeton. — ἐρρωμενεστέρους: how
 completely this word has become an
 adjective is shown by the fact that
 it is the only partic. which admits
 comparison.

38. πλεονεκτεῖν: is an expression
 for every effort of self-aggrandize-
 ment, and was often used as a politi-
 cal watchword in opposition to ἰσονο-
 μία. Cf. τὸ ἴσον, two lines below.

^{καρρη}
40 ἀγαπῶσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσιν φανυλότεροι
όντες.

XXXIX. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ νόμῳ μὲν τοῦτο ἄδικον καὶ
αἰσχυρὸν λέγεται, τὸ πλεόν ζητεῖν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ
ἀδικεῖν αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν· ἡ δέ γε, οἶμαι, φύσις αὐτῇ ἀπο- d
φαίνει αὐτό, ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστιν τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος
5 πλεόν ἔχειν καὶ τὸν δυνατώτερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου. δηλοῖ
δὲ ταῦτα πολλαχοῦ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώ-
οις καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς γένε-
σιν, ὅτι οὕτω τὸ δίκαιον κέκριται, τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος
ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος

483
c 40. ἀγαπῶσι: in mockery, because
satisfaction is a sign of weakness.
Cf. what Adimantus says in *Rep.* ii.
386 c οἶδεν ὅτι πλὴν εἴ τις θεία φύσει
δυσχεραίνων τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἐπιστήμην λα-
βὼν ἀπέχεται αὐτοῦ, τῶν γε ἄλλων
οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν δίκαιος, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἀνανδρίας
ἢ γήρως ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀσθενείας ψέγει
τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἀδυνατῶν αὐτὸ δρᾶν.— τὸ
ἴσον: Callicles is thinking of the
fundamental principle of democratic
states, the *ισονομία* and *ισότης* of all.

d XXXIX. 4. αὐτό: draws especial
attention to the following clause,
which it introduces. By its proxim-
ity to αὐτή this emphasis is still more
increased.—ἀμείνω: is here probably
used purposely instead of κρείττω,
as Callicles had in mind also the
mental superiority of the rhetorically
educated over the great multitude.
Hence, too, *δυνατώτερον*.

5. δηλοῖ: can be taken in construc-
tion with φύσις, or, which is better,
as an impersonal verb equiv. to *δηλόν*
(δηλὰ) ἐστιν. The subj. is the fol-
lowing ὅτι clause, whose own subj.,
ταῦτα, has been attracted to the gov-
ernment of the leading verb.

6. πολλαχοῦ: introduces facts in 483
support of the general statement.— d
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις: the law of
nature is the principle which is at the
basis of national law. Here is, more-
over, an indication of the moral char-
acter of those who hold this view, in
that they put the *ἄνθρωπος* on the
plane of the ζῷον.

7. ὅλαις ταῖς πόλεσι: in inter-
national relations this natural law
(‘might makes right’) has preserved
its force longer than in the inter-
course of individual men; hence γέ-
νος is equiv. to gens. The clause
following, ὅτι . . . ἔχειν, is explana-
tory of ταῦτα ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

8. κέκριται: in 520 c ἐννόμισται is
the word.

9. ἄρχειν: is the legal, πλεόν ἔχειν
the natural expression of the same
idea.—ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ κτέ.: is not
purely neg., but has somewhat the
sense: “What other right had Xerxes
than that of nature?” The choice of
examples shows that with this self-
ish, immoral view of life is connected
also a lack of national feeling. Cal-
licles himself feels the impropriety

10 *Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ ἑ*
Σκύθας ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἂν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν· ἀλλ’
οἶμαι, οὔτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν,
καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι
ἴσως, κατὰ τοῦτον, ὃν ἡμεῖς [τιθέμεθα] πλάττοντες τοὺς
 15 *βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων*
λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντες τε καὶ γοητεύ-
οντες καταδουλοῦμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ 484
τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε, οἶμαι,

483 of declaring Xerxes to be *ἀμείνων* and *δυνατώτερος* τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and therefore hastily seeks another example which will not arouse personal feeling.

e 11. *ἄλλα μυρία*: is simply rhetorical exaggeration. The concluding summarizing clause deviates from the regular construction of the sentence, as also in a similar passage in *Apol.* 41 c *ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ’ ἂν τις δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον, ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἂν τις εἴποι κτέ.*

12. *οἶμαι*: as well as *ἴσως*, a couple of lines below, merely softens the expression, without diminishing its positiveness. Cf. 473 a.—*τὴν τοῦ δικαίου*: if these words, which we would rather miss, are genuine, we have a case of word-play, which may be justified on the ground of the proposition above, *ἢ δέ γε . . . ἀδυνατωτέρων*. The same force must be assigned to *τοῦ δικαίου φύσει* below (484 c), though the form is different.

13. *ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ κτέ.*: a clever play upon the word *νόμος*. "Nature, too, has its law, — right and custom."

14. *ἡμεῖς*: contains, by the implied contrast, a rebuke. Notice the heaping up of the participles, which, though connected with one verb, are subordinated one to another, quite after the Greek habit. See Kr. 56,

15, with notes. — *πλάττοντες*: the side-idea of artificiality and amateurishness easily attaches itself to this verb. Cf. *Apol.* 17 c *μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους*. It is applied to laws, as here, also *Leg.* iv. 712 b *πειρώμεθα καθάπερ παῖδες πρεσβύται πλάττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς νόμους*.

15 f. *ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες*: cf. *Apol.* 18 b *ἐκ παίδων παραλαβόντες*. The usual word for 'receiving into school' is the compound. Cf. 516 b. The use of the simple verb here implies a forcible compulsory manner of treatment.

16. *ὥσπερ λέοντας κατεπάδοντες*: the comparison describes with bitterness the suppression of the so-called natural freedom, in that it compares education to the taming of wild beasts (*καταδουλοῦμεθα*). *κατεπάδειν* applies to soothing by certain formulae, or charms; *γοητεύειν* to the employment of forms of magic and witchcraft. Meno uses the same expression regarding the dialectic proof of Socrates, 80 a *καὶ νῦν, ὡς γ’ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, γοητεύεις με καὶ φαρμάτεις καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατεπάδεις*. In a jesting way, without feeling, *ἐπάδειν* is used in *Phaedo* 77 e, *ἐπφῶν ἐν Charm.* 155 e.

18 f. *ἐὰν . . . γένηται*: Callicles 484 does not doubt that this future absolute ruler will come.

φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισά-
 20 μενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγών, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέ-
 τερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους
 τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης
 ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως
 δίκαιον. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ Πίνδαρος ἄπερ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐνδείκ- b
 25 νυσθαι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι ἐν ᾧ λέγει ὅτι

νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς
 θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων·

484 19. φύσιν ἱκανήν: "a nature which
 a is equal to all difficulties." There is
 no understatement, as in 480 a. — All
 the following expressions are chosen
 so as to be appropriate to the much-
 loved comparison with wild beasts.
 ἀποσειεσθαι can apply both to the
 shaking off of any bond or yoke and
 to the throwing of his rider by a
 horse; διαρρήξας is used more of break-
 ing a hedge or an enclosure than a
 halter, etc. ἀπορρήξας would be more
 natural for the latter; cf. Hom. Z 507
 δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας, which passage quite
 suits the view of Callicles.

20. διαφυγών: calls to mind what
 has been previously said by Polus
 (473 c). — καταπατήσας: depicts the
 insolence of the victor to the van-
 quished. In Δ 157 Homer makes
 Agamemnon say of the perjured
 Trojans κατὰ δ' ὄρκια πιστὰ πάτησαν.

21. γράμματα κτέ.: the γράμματα
 denote, in contradistinction to the
 unwritten laws implanted in man by
 nature, the "written laws" which limit
 and regulate the exercise of the will;
 μαγγανεύματα "works of deceit and
 witchcraft," which fetter the reason;
 ἐπωδαὶ "incantations" which palsy the
 feelings. These ideas correspond in
 the reverse order to the preceding

participles, κατεπφδοντες, γοητεύοντες, 484
 λέγοντες, and the participles just in
 advance ἀποσεισάμενος . . . διαφυγών
 are probably chosen with reference to
 them. All three ideas serve, more-
 over, to show from the various sides
 what objections can be made to the
 laws which are opposed to nature,
 and are hence crowded together for
 greater emphasis.

22. ἐπαναστὰς: is used of one who
 has lain prostrate for a time and now
 unexpectedly shows his strength. —
 ἀνεφάνη: is 'gnomic aorist.' The
 single past example (aor.) serves as
 a norm for the general statement
 (pres.). H. 840; GMT. 155.

23. ὁ δοῦλος: as a result of κατα-
 δουλούμεθα above, 483 e, "the one
 whom we brought up as a slave." —
 ἐξέλαμψε: shone forth in splendor, a
 poetical word also employed in Rep.
 iv. 435 a.

24. δοκεῖ δέ μοι: introduces a new b
 element, — the authority of Pindar.
 Knowledge of the poets was a require-
 ment of the culture of the period.
 Cf. Prot. 338 e. The last words of
 the fragment are restored by Bergk
 (Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 344, ed. 3) from
 the citation of the Scholiast as fol-
 lows: —

οὗτος δὲ δῆ, φησίν,

30 ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον
ὑπερτάτῃ χειρί· τεκμαίρομαι
ἐργοισιν Ἡρακλέος, ἐπεὶ ἀπριάτας —

λέγει οὕτω πως· τὸ γὰρ ᾄσμα οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι· λέγει δ' ὅτι
οὔτε πριάμενος οὔτε δόντος τοῦ Γηρυόνου ἠλάσατο τὰς
βοῦς, ὡς τούτου ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου φύσει, καὶ βοῦς καὶ
35 τᾶλλα κτήματα εἶναι πάντα τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ κρεί-
ττονος τὰ τῶν χειρόνων τε καὶ ἡττόνων.

XL. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς οὕτως ἔχει, γνώσει δέ, ἂν ἐπὶ
τὰ μεῖζω ἔλθῃς ἑάσας ἥδη φιλοσοφίαν. φιλοσοφία γάρ

484
b ἐργοισιν Ἡρακλέος ἐπεὶ Γηρυόνα βόας
Κυκλαπίων ἐπὶ προθύρων Εὐρυσθέος
ἀναιτήτας τε καὶ ἀπριάτας ἤλασεν.

Since we do not know the context in which these verses stand, Pindar's views cannot be determined from them with certainty; but they were probably based on the principles of religious belief. In this νόμος δὲ πάντων βασιλεὺς Pindar may be thinking of the power of that *fate* which is superior even to the gods themselves. — Geryones, son of Chrysaor ("lightning") and the Oceanid Callirhoe ("beautiful stream"), was a giant with three bodies and three heads. He lived with his dog Orthros, or Orthos, on the fertile island Erytheia, and possessed great herds of cattle. These were stolen from him by Hercules in the expedition celebrated in the story. Cf. Preller, *Mythol.*² ii. 202-216. — ἐνδεικνύναι: is used of all kinds of practical proof; ἀποδεικνύναι, of demonstration.

32. οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι: says Callicles, because the exact words of the poem

are not at his command. The verb 484 has the same meaning in *Prot.* 339 b, *Phaedo* 61 b. After ἀπριάτας Callicles breaks off, intending to give the sense of what follows, and resumes the idea with οὔτε πριάμενος.

33. ἠλάσατο: the use of the middle instead of the active is normal, but is well suited to Callicles' conception.

34. ὡς τούτου ὄντος: the use of ὡς c ascribes this view to Hercules, as his basis of action. τούτου is explained by the clause καὶ βοῦς κτέ.

36. τὰ τῶν χειρόνων κτέ.: notice the rhetorical position.

XL. 1. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθές: introduces a new topic, that of the value of philosophy. Its connexion with the preceding lies in the fact that Callicles looks upon philosophy as the hindrance which prevents Socrates from recognizing the truth of what he says. — ἐπὶ τὰ μεῖζω: is indefinite, and is employed only to depreciate philosophy and relegate it to a lower plane, as is evident from Callicles' further exposition.

τοί ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ᾄψη-
 ται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ· ἐὰν δὲ περαιτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδια-
 5 τρήσῃ, διαφθορὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ πάνν
 εὐφυνὴς ᾗ καὶ πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας φιλοσοφῇ, ἀνάγκη πάν- a
 των ἄπειρον γεγονέναι ἐστίν, ὧν χρὴ ἔμπειρον εἶναι τὸν
 μέλλοντα καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐδόκιμον ἔσσεσθαι ἄνδρα.
 καὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων ἄπειροι γίνονται τῶν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν,
 10 καὶ τῶν λόγων, οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς συμβο-
 λαίοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, καὶ τῶν
 ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην
 τῶν ἡθῶν παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίνονται. ἐπειδὰν οὖν
 ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν, καταγέλαστοι

484 3. χαρίεν: with a pleasing conde-
 cension, recognizing its merit, — but
 what a poor merit! Cf. 485 b.

4. ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ: "in the time of life
 suitable for it." What period this
 is can be gathered from the expres-
 sions πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας and περαιτέρω
 τοῦ δέοντος. The words μετρίως and
 ᾄψηται are also designedly chosen.

5. διαφθορά: Callicles assumes al-
 most the tone of an oracle.

d 7. ἄπειρον γεγονέναι: "a man can-
 not practise philosophy and at the
 same time fulfil the requirements of
 his civil position."

8. The καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, according to
 the idea of Callicles, is shown by the
 addition of εὐδόκιμος, to be the man
 who, through practical activity, ob-
 tains reputation and honor. With
 μέλλω we find the pres. and fut.
 almost equally common, the aor. ex-
 ceptional.

9. τῶν νόμων: that Callicles is
 laying great stress on the knowledge
 of the laws in this passage, seems at
 first sight inconsistent with the view
 which he has already expressed; but

in reality he has shifted his point of
 view but little, since he advocates the
 study of the laws, not for the pur-
 pose of following them, but as being
 necessary for the work of the practi-
 cal statesman, whether he be in the
 senate or assembly, or hold any pub-
 lic position. The force, therefore, of
 νόμοι is much that of our "constitu-
 tion." The λόγοι οἷς δεῖ χρώμενον κτέ.
 belong to the department of jurispru-
 dence in both its divisions, individual
 and national. ξυμβόλαια is character-
 ized in *Rep.* i. 333 a, as the variety
 of κοινωνήματα (i.e. mutual intercourse,
 trade, and commerce) in which δικαιο-
 σύνη is of especial value. It de-
 notes, accordingly, treaties and the
 law-business connected with them.

11 f. τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ.: the enjoy-
 ment of life consists, according to
 Callicles, in satisfying the appetites.

12. τῶν ἡθῶν: can be considered
 as a general comprehensive term, in
 so far as we understand by it the
 peculiar traits of mind and charac-
 ter which impart individuality to a
 man.

15 γίγνονται, ὥσπερ γε, οἶμαι, οἱ πολιτικοί, ἐπειδὰν αὖ εἰς ε
τὰς ὑμετέρας διατριβὰς ἔλθωσιν καὶ τοὺς λόγους, κατα-
γέλαστοί εἰσιν. συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου· λαμ-
πρὸς τ' ἐστὶν ἕκαστος ἐν τούτῳ, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτ' ἐπείγεται,

20 νέμων τὸ πλείστον ἡμέρας τούτῳ μέρος,
ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὢν.

ὅπου δ' ἂν φαῦλος ᾖ, ἐντεῦθεν φεύγει καὶ λοιδορεῖ τοῦτο, 485
τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἐπαινεῖ, εὐνοία τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡγούμενος οὕτως
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὸ ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν
ἀμφοτέρων μετασχεῖν· φιλοσοφίας μὲν ὅσον παιδείας
25 χάριν καλὸν μετέχειν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν μειρακίῳ ὄντι
φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἤδη πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἄνθρωπος
ἔτι φιλοσοφῇ, καταγέλαστον, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ χρῆμα

484 15. ὥσπερ γε: makes a concession,
e in order to anticipate the retort which
could easily be made here.

16. διατριβὰς: is used especially of
philosophical discussions. Cf. *Apol.*
37 c οὐχ οἱοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς
ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, *Charm.*
153 a ἦα ἐπὶ τὰς ξυνήθεις διατριβὰς.

17. συμβαίνει: is in point.—τὸ τοῦ
Εὐριπίδου: inasmuch as his works
abounded in gnomes and sententious
sayings, and he himself was not far
removed from the sophistic way of
looking at things, Euripides was fre-
quently quoted by sophists and orators,
and also by Socrates (Plato). The
present passage is from the
lost tragedy *Antiope*. See below,
485 e.

18. ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κτέ.: the
demonstratives are antecedent to the
adverbial rel. clause with ἵνα, "in
which each one is most successful."
The words λαμπρὸς . . . ἐπείγεται, by
omitting what would not be missed,

and reading *καπὶ* for *καὶ ἐπὶ*, form a 484
trimeter. Cf. *Ar. Vesp.* 1431 ἔρδοι τις e
ἦν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην.

20. ἵνα τυγχάνει: is to be com-
pared with *ἔπου ἂν ᾖ* to show the dif-
ference between definite and indefinite
antecedent.—αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βέλτιστος:
the gen. with sups. may be an exten-
sion of the gen. with comparatives.
See H. 644 a.

24. ἀμφοτέρων: i.e. philosophy and 485
politics.—ὅσον παιδείας χάριν: as far
as it serves the purpose of education.
Cf. *Rep.* iii. 403 e ὅσον τοὺς τύπους,
Euthyd. 273 a τὴν φύσιν ὅσον. See
H. 719 b; G. 160, 1. The opposite is
ἐπὶ τέχνῃ, or something similar, as
seen from *Prot.* 312 b τούτων σὺ ἐκά-
στην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὥς δημιουρ-
γὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὥς
τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.
Culture was the watchword of the
time.

25. καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν: change from
the καλὸν to the καταγέλαστον.

γίγνεται, καὶ ἔγωγε ὁμοιότατον πάσχω πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσο- **b**
 φούντας ὥσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ψελλιζομένους καὶ παίζοντας.
 30 ὅταν μὲν γὰρ παιδίον ἴδω, ᾧ ἔτι προσήκει διαλέγεσθαι
 οὕτω, ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παῖζον, χαίρω τε καὶ χαρίεν μοι
 φαίνεται καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ πρέπον τῇ τοῦ παιδίου ἡλικίᾳ,
 ὅταν δὲ σαφῶς διαλεγόμενον παιδαρίου ἀκούσω, πικρόν
 τί μοι δοκεῖ χρῆμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνιᾶ μου τὰ ὅτα καί μοι
 35 δοκεῖ δουλοπρεπές τι εἶναι· ὅταν δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἀκούσῃ τις
 ψελλιζόμενον ἢ παίζοντα ὄρᾳ, καταγέλαστον φαίνεται καὶ **c**
 ἄνανδρον καὶ πληγῶν ἄξιον. ταῦτόν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτο
 πάσχω καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας. παρὰ νέῳ μὲν γὰρ
 μειρακίῳ ὁρῶν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ,
 40 καὶ ἡγοῦμαι ἐλευθέρόν τινα εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον,
 τὸν δὲ μὴ φιλοσοφούντα ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδενὸς
 ἀξιῶσόντα ἑαυτὸν οὔτε καλοῦ οὔτε γενναίου πράγματος·
 ὅταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἔτι φιλοσοφούντα καὶ μὴ **d**

485 **b** 28. *πάσχω πρὸς*: as 482 **c**. The comparison, however sensible the thought therein expressed may be, still is not in place here. For it describes only the subjective impression which philosophizing at different periods of life makes on Callicles. It is therefore only a rhetorical reaffirmation of the statement that philosophy is not appropriate for a mature man. In his mind, however, Callicles has still a *tertium comparationis* which he does not express, viz. the objects of philosophical research afford no real interest, hence resemble *παιδιά*. Further, so much trouble about single ideas is like *ψελλίζεσθαι* (*stammering*). On the contrary, *σαφῶς διαλέγεσθαι* (*λέγειν*) is the business of orators.

32. *ἐλευθέριον*: Callicles speaks of

stammering thus, as contrasted with 485 **b** the restraint which the child must exercise in order to learn to speak clearly, which latter seems to him to be *δουλοπρεπές*. Note also the contrast in *χαρίεν* and *πικρόν*.

38. *παρὰ νέῳ κτέ.*: the companion of **c** (*παρά*) a youth. The duplication* of the idea is also found in *Prot.* 315 **d** *νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον*.

40. *ἐλευθέρον*: is amplified and illustrated by the following clause, *οὐδενὸς ἀξιῶσόντα κτέ.* Philosophy gives the youth an opportunity for the practice in mental gymnastics, which is as yet denied him in public life, and thus prepares him for his future career as a speaker in the assembly.

43. *δή*: deictic. This is just the case about which Callicles raises the question.

ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἤδη δεῖσθαι, ὦ Σώ-
 45 κρατες, οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὁ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει
 τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ πάντῃ εὐφυνῆς ἦ, ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι
 φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη
 ὁ ποιητῆς τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι, καταδεδυ-
 κότῳ δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μεираκίων ἐν γωνία
 50 τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ
 νεανικὸν μηδέποτε φθέγγασθαι.

XLI. Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σέ ἐπιεικῶς ἔχω φιλι-
 κῶς· κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς

485 44. δεῖσθαι: is still stronger than
 d ἄξιον, and declares that it is to the
 man's own interest to be so dealt
 with.

47. τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως: is empha-
 sized together with the ἀγορά, in op-
 position with the following ἐν γωνίᾳ.
Cf. Cic. *de Or.* i. 13. 57 quibus
 (philosophis) ego ut de his
 rebus in angulis consumendi
 otii causa disserant cum con-
 cessero, illud tamen oratori
 tribuam, etc.

48. ὁ ποιητής: the poet, of course,
 is Homer. He says, I 440, νήπιον,
 οὔπω εἰδόθ' ὁμοίῳ πολέμοιο | οὐδ' ἀγο-
 ρῶν, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθου-
 σιν. — καταδεδυκότι: "in retirement,"
 as contrasted with the brilliant life
 of the public man. The word is
 used somewhat differently in *Rep.* ix.
 579 b, where it is said of a tyrant
 εἴτ' ἀποδημησάτι ἐξεστίν (αὐτῷ) οὐδαμῶς
 οὔτε θεωρῆσαι ὄσων δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι
 ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταί εἰσι, καταδεδυκῶς
 δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὥς γυνὴ ζῇ.

49. μετὰ μεираκίων: as contrasted
 with association with men and with
 the whole people. It is evident that,
 in spite of Callicles' exaggeration,
 he is striking continually at Socra-

tes' (and Plato's) occupation. Quite 485
 naturally and conversationally ψιθυ- d
 ρίζοντα suggests again its opposite,
 which is added in ἐλεύθερον φθέγγ-
 εσθαι.

51. νεανικόν: for the meaning, see e
 on 482 c above. *Cf.* Dem. *Ol.* iii. 32
 ἔστι δ' οὐδέποτε, οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν
 φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράτ-
 τοντας.

XLI. 1. After this general pre-
 sentation of his views of philosophy,
 Callicles now proceeds to make a
 special application to Socrates' case,
 with apparent personal good-will, it
 is true, but still with the condescending
 mien of the superior man of the
 world.

2 f. ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφί-
 φίονα: the omission of πρὸς σέ is
 hardly felt. Callicles cleverly illus-
 trates his exposition of the opposition
 between the principles of practical
 life and this theoretical philosophiz-
 ing by reference again to the already
 cited *Antiope* of Euripides. *Antiope*
 had borne to Zeus twin sons, *Amphion*
 and *Zethus*, but was afterwards taken
 by her uncle *Lycus* to *Thebes*, where
 she suffered for a long time the most
 cruel treatment at the hands of *Ly-*

τὸν Ἀμφίωνα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὐπερ ἐμνήσθην. καὶ γὰρ
 ἔμοι τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἐπέρχεται πρὸς σέ λέγειν, οἵαπερ ἐκείνος
 5 πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, οἷ "ἀμελείς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὦν δεῖ σε
 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς (ἔχων) ὧδε γενναίαν μει-
 ρακιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι, καὶ οὐτ' ἂν δίκης⁴⁸⁶
 βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὐτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ
 πιθανὸν λάκοις οὐθ' ὑπὲρ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βου-
 10 λεύσαιο." καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθε-
 σθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐκ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι

⁴⁸⁵ ^e *cus' wife, Dirce. Meanwhile, her sons*
 were being brought up by a herdsman
 in the forest. Amphion devoted him-
 self entirely to music, while the active
 and restless Zethus spent his time in
 hunting and the care of his herds.
 Finally Antiope escapes from her
 prison, and hurries to her sons. Dirce
 pursues, overtakes her, and is just in
 the act of having her bound to a wild
 steer, when the sons, who had been
 informed of their parentage by the
 herdsman, appear on the scene, rescue
 their mother from the hands of Dirce,
 and bind her to the steer instead.
 Dirce was then changed into a foun-
 tain. Amphion and Zethus attain
 the sovereignty in Thebes, and fortify
 it with walls. In this work Zethus
 contributed his great bodily strength,
 while Amphion's lyre drew after him
 the stones. This difference in charac-
 ter as related in the myth (Apollod.
 iii. 5. 5 *Ζῆθος μὲν οὖν ἐπεμελεῖτο βου-
 φορβίων, Ἀμφίων δὲ κιθαρωδίαν ἥσκει*)
 suggested to Euripides a dialogue
 between the brothers, wherein each
 praises his own calling to the dispar-
 agement of the other's. Callicles
 applies Euripides' words to the op-
 position between political and philo-
 sophical activity.

5 f. The words of Euripides are ⁴⁸⁵
 given by Nauck. *Eur. frag.*² 185, as ^e
 follows:—

. . . ἀμελείς, ὦν σε φροντίζειν ἐχρῆν·
 ψυχῆς ἔχων γὰρ ὧδε γενναίαν φύσιν
 γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι·
 . . . κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
 ὀρθῶς ὁμιλήσεις οὐτ' ἔλλων ὑπερ
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιό τι.

Yet these lines do not contain all that
 seems poetical in this passage. In
 place of *γυναικομίμῳ* Callicles natur-
 ally, from his point of view, uses
μειρακιώδει, which is quite different
 from *νεανικός* in its meaning (*boyish*).

7 f. *δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν* ⁴⁸⁶
λόγον: would give an opinion in coun- ^a
 sels of justice.

9. *ὑπὲρ ἄλλου:* is in the mouth
 of Callicles a very natural change of
 the word of the poet. The sing. of
ἄλλος, *ἕτερος*, and of *τις* is easily used
 in a generic sense.

10. *καίτοι:* would naturally lead us
 to expect some qualification of his se-
 vere criticism; instead of this he glides
 over to the rhetorical question, which,
 while reaffirming his opinion, sum-
 mons Socrates to decide. Cf. b below.

11. *σῇ:* equiv. to *σοῦ*. Cf. ⁴⁸⁵ a
εὐνοία τῇ ἐαυτοῦ, *Apol.* 20 e *ἐπὶ διαβολῇ*

εἶναι οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥς ἐγὼ σὲ οἶμαι ἔχειν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας; νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις
 σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁπουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων* εἰς τὸ δε-
 15 σμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἷσθ'
 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' εἰλιγγιῶς ἂν **b**
 καὶ ἡχασμῷ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον
 ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦν τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ,
 ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. καίτοι
 20 πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα

⁴⁸⁶ τῇ ἐμῇ, Hom. T 321 σὴ ποθῇ, Soph.
^a O. C. 332 σὴ προμηθία. See H. 694;
 G. 147, n. 1.

13. τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας: has a poetic coloring, but also occurs in Xen. and in *Crat.* 410 **e** πόρρω ἤδη φαίνομαι σοφίας ἐλαύνειν. *Euthyp.* 4 **b**. The gen. is partitive. See H. 757; G. 168. — ἀεὶ: when used with the art. and partic. has a distributive sense. In the present case its position between πόρρω and φιλοσοφίας is also to be noted.

15. ἀπάγοι: this was the summary process called ἀπαγωγή, in which the guilty person, when caught in the act, was immediately arrested and brought before the Eleven. Cf. *Apol.* 32 **b**. The expression here is simply a rhetorical hyperbola, but it sounds prophetic in view of Socrates' trial later on, and was probably written designedly by the author. See *Introd.* § 10. — ἀδικεῖν: the pres. is the customary tense in accusations. *Apol.* 19 **b**, 24 **b**. — οἷσθ' ὅτι: parenthetical, with no effect on the construction, much in the same way as the English phraseological 'you know.' The Greek expression is, however, not so colorless as the English, but assumes

a recognition of the truth of the ⁴⁸⁶ observation. ^a

16 **f**. εἰλιγγιῶς, ἡχασμῷ: vividly **b** portray the confusion and terror of the prisoner.

17. ὅτι εἴποις: this opt. and the preceding χρήσαιο both represent deliberative subjvs. GMT. 186.

18. ἀναβάς: the regular expression for appearing before a court. Its origin may have been from the location of the court; cf. Lat. descendere in forum and *Apol.* 17 **d**, 33 **d**. — κατηγοροῦν τυχών: "if chance so willed it." The words πάνυ φαύλου καὶ μοχθηροῦ are again designedly given to Callicles by Plato. Socrates' accuser would of necessity be such a man.

19. θανατοῦ τιμᾶσθαι: if the crime had no definite punishment fixed by law (ἀγὼν ἀτίμητος), the accuser proposed some special punishment, for which the accused was at liberty to offer a substitute, and the court had to accept one or the other. Cf. *Apol.* 36 **b** ff. and for the gen. see H. 746 **b**.
 20. According to Nauck, Fr. 186, the following citation from the *Antiope* runs thus: —

πῶς γὰρ σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστιν, εἴ τις εὐφυᾶ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χεῖρονα.

τέχνη φῶτα ἔθηκε χείρονα, μήτε αὐτὸν αὐτῷ δυνάμενον
βοηθεῖν μηδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων μήτε
ἑαυτὸν μήτε ἄλλον μηδένα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶ- c
σθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ
25 πόλει; τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι,
ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρη τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην. ἀλλ',
ὠγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ, παῦσαι δ' ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ'
εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις
τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε

486 23. **περισυλᾶσθαι**: implies that the
c one robbed is vanquished or defence-
less, and contains the side-idea of in-
sult added. This inf. as well as ζῆν
is used freely after ἔθηκε to define in
what respects the man who follows
philosophy becomes χείρων.

24. **ἄτιμον**: 'atimia' in various de-
grees of completeness was a punish-
ment attached to transgressions
against the state. Complete 'atimia'
involved deprivation of all civil
rights. See Busolt, *Gr. Alter.* § 158,
and cf. Andoc. i. 73-76. According to
Callicles, Socrates will bring himself
virtually into this condition by his
continual philosophizing.

25. **εἰ . . . ἀγροικότερον**: see on
462 c. Cf. Lys. in *Andoc.* 24 *προσε-*
ψηφίασθε ὑμεῖς αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν ἄτιμον)
εἰργεσθαι τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν
ὥστε μὴ ἀδικούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
δύνασθαι δίκην λαβεῖν.

26. **ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα**: a blow
on the head was considered especially
dishonorable.—*κόρρη* (old Attic *κόρ-*
ρη), *κόρη*, *δέρη*, and *ἀδάρη* are the sole
exceptions to the rule which requires
α after ρ in Attic.

27. Callicles closes with a further
citation from the *Antlope*, which
Nauck, Fr. 188, gives thus:—

ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ 486
c παῦσαι μελῶδων, πολεμίων δ' εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει· τοιαῦτ' ἔειδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάπτων, ἄρων γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα,
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικῆσεις δόμοις.

—**ἐλέγχων**: is probably, like the cor-
responding word in the quotation,
to be considered as a verb, since the
contrast lies not in a single word, but
in the whole following clause. Simi-
larly Thrasyarchus says, *Rep.* i.
336 c, *μηδὲ φιλοτιμοῦ ἐλέγχων*. The
verb, used absolutely, designates the
kind of philosophical activity which
Socrates has just practised against
Polus. Cf. 472 b.

28. **εὐμουσίαν**: was appropriate in
Zethus' speech, as he wished to show
his brother wherein the *εὐμουσία*,
which he sought in *κιθαρωδία*, was
really to be found; less so in Callic-
cles', who probably is thinking rather
of *εὐβουλία*. The contrast to *φρονεῖν*
would be *ληρεῖν* or *φλυαρεῖν*. Hence
Callicles substitutes *ληρήματα* and
φλυαρίας (*trifling* and *prattling*) for
σοφίσματα.

29. **κομψά**: witty, subtle, often used
with an unfavorable connotation,
both of persons and things; but it

30 φλναρίας, ἐξ ὧν κenoίσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις, ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ α βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθά.

XLII. ΣΩ. Εἰ χρυσὴν ἔχων ἐτύγχανον τὴν ψυχὴν, ὦ Καλλίκεις, οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμενον εὐρεῖν τούτων τινὰ τῶν λίθων, ἣ βασανίζουσιν τὸν χρυσόν, τὴν ἀρίστην, πρὸς ἣντινα ἔμελλον προσαγαγὼν αὐτήν, εἴ μοι ὁμολογήσειεν 5 ἐκείνη καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, εὖ εἴσεσθαι ὅτι ἱκανῶς ἔχω καὶ οὐδέν μοι δεῖ ἄλλης βασάνου;

ΚΑΛ. Πρὸς τί δὴ τοῦτ' ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκратες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ · νῦν οἶμαι ἐγὼ σοὶ ἐντετυχηκῶς τοι- οὗτω ἐρμαίω ἐντετυχηκέαι.

10 ΚΑΛ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης περὶ ὧν ἡ ἐμὴ

⁴⁸⁶ is applied especially to the quibbles of the Sophists and Eristics. Cf. κομψεύεσθαι in *Lach.* 197 d.

d 31. τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα: i.e. those subtle distinctions of words and ideas which in Callicles' view yield no advantage; while political activity and its results — these are τὰ μέγιστα (484 c above).

32. βίος: as opposed to κenoίσι δόμοις means "means of livelihood," an abundance of the good things of life. — δόξα: contrasted with ἀτιμον ζῆν.

XLII. 1. The delicate irony which characterizes the reply of Socrates is in striking contrast with the rudeness with which Callicles began, in 482 c above, the exposition of his view of life. — χρυσήν: is pred. of τὴν ψυχὴν. "If the soul which I have were of gold."

2. οὐκ ἂν οἶμι με ἄσμενον: the main idea lies in ἄσμενον.

2 f. τινὰ τῶν λίθων: equiv. to the more common βάσανος alone.

3. ἦ: after λίθων instead of αἷς. Cf. ⁴⁸⁶ 521 d.

4. ἔμελλον κτέ.: 'The relative fut. after an unreal conditional is ἔμελλον with the infinitive.' Gildersleeve. Cf. Isae. ii. 25. — ὁμολογήσειεν: the choice of this expression in the comparison is due to the nature of the discussion. The testing which Socrates is undergoing at the hands of Callicles must end in ὁμολογεῖν (cf. e ἂν μοι σὺ ὁμολογήσης).

5. καλῶς τεθεραπεῦσθαι: leads back to the idea of θεραπεία τῆς ψυχῆς already discussed in 464 b above, and thus immediately prepares the way for making progress in the investigation. Cf. 487 a. — The subject of τεθεραπεῦσθαι must be supplied from μοί.

9. ἐρμαίω: all unexpected gains (κέρδος ἀπροσδόκητον) were supposed to come from Hermes, who had among other surnames that of κερδαῖος.

11. ἂν μοι κτέ.: we miss the less

ψυχὴ δοξάζει, ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τὰληθῆ. ἐννοῶ γάρ,
 ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανεῖν ἱκανῶς ψυχῆς περί ὀρθῶς τε 487
 ζώσης καὶ μὴ τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν, ἃ σὺ πάντα ἔχεις, ἐπι-
 15 στήμην τε καὶ εὐνοίαν καὶ παρρησίαν. ἐγὼ γὰρ πολλοῖς
 ἐντυγχάνω, οἳ ἐμὲ οὐχ οἷοί τέ εἰσιν βασανίζειν, διὰ τὸ μὴ
 σοφοὶ εἶναι ὥσπερ σύ· ἕτεροι δὲ σοφοὶ μὲν εἰσιν, οὐκ
 ἐθέλουσιν δέ μοι λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, διὰ τὸ μὴ κήδεσθαί
 μου ὥσπερ σύ· τὼ δὲ ξένω τῷδε, Γοργίας τε καὶ Πῶλος,
 20 σοφῶ μὲν καὶ φίλῳ ἐστὸν ἐμῷ, ἐνδεεστέρῳ δὲ παρρησίας b
 καὶ αἰσχυνηροτέρῳ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
 ὦ γε εἰς τοσοῦτον αἰσχύνῃς ἐληλύθατον, ὥστε διὰ τὸ
 αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ ἑκάτερος αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἐναντία
 λέγειν ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν
 25 μεγίστων. σὺ δὲ ταῦτα πάντα ἔχεις, ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι οὐκ ἔχου-
 σιν· πεπαιδευσαί τε γὰρ ἱκανῶς, ὥς πολλοὶ ἂν φήσαιεν

486 an object to *δομολόγησις* since the idea
 e is made especially prominent by the
 following ταῦτα. Cf. 487 e ἐάν τι σὺ
 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι.

12. *δοξάζει*: is a *vox media*.
 The same activity of the soul may,
 according to circumstances, lead to
 error or to truth. Cf. also *δόξα ἀλη-*
θείας and *ψευδούς*. — *ἤδη*: at once (jam),
 without need of further discussion.

487 14. *τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἔχειν*: must of
 a necessity possess three qualities. The
 particle *ἄρα* shows that this lies in the
 nature of the matter.

15 f. *πολλοῖς ἐντυγχάνω κτέ.*: So-
 crates gives examples in *Apol.* 21 b ff.

19. *τῷ δὲ ξένῳ κτέ.*: Socrates says
 what follows with an irony which
 applies especially to Polus; but at
 the same time it is a significant
 criticism of the *παρρησία* of Callicles.

b 21. *μᾶλλον*: see on 482 c.

22. *ὦ γε*: the *γέ* emphasizes the

pronoun. The irony from here on is
 quite distinct, and no longer veiled. b

— *διὰ τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι τολμᾷ*: an ex-
 ample of 'oxymoron.' Timidity and
 shame are not usually the basis of
 boldness. The opposite of *τολμᾷ* is
 implied. The reference to 483 a is
 unmistakable: *ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται*
καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκά-
ζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.

23. *αὐτῶν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ*: the posi-
 tion makes the contradiction beat
 heavily upon the ear.

24 f. *περὶ τῶν μεγίστων*: in con-
 trast with 486 d τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα. Cf.
 484 c τὰ μέγιστα.

26. *πεπαιδευσαί*: see on *παιδείας*,
 485 a. The addition of *ὥς πολλοὶ ἂν*
φήσαιεν 'Αθηναίων implies, of course,
 the usual opposition of the many
 ignorant to the few capable, and this
 makes the tone of *ἱκανῶς* almost
 bitter.

Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμοὶ εἶ εὖνους. τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῶμαι;
 ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ. οἶδα ὑμᾶς ἐγώ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τέτταρας c
 ὄντας κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας, σέ τε καὶ Τείσανδρον
 30 τὸν Ἀφιδναῖον καὶ Ἄνδρωνα τὸν Ἀνδροτίωνος καὶ Ναυσικύδην
 τὸν Χολαργέα· καὶ ποτε ὑμῶν ἐγὼ ἐπήκουσα βουλευομένων,
 μέχρι ὅποι τὴν σοφίαν ἀσκητέον εἶη, καὶ οἶδα
 ὅτι ἐνίκα ἐν ὑμῖν τοιάδε τις δόξα, μὴ προθυμείσθαι εἰς
 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι παρεκελεύ- d
 35 εσθε ἀλλήλους, ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γενόμε-
 νοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες. ἐπειδὴ οὖν σου ἀκούω ταῦτα
 ἐμοὶ συμβουλευόντος, ἅπερ τοῖς σεαυτοῦ ἐταιροτάτοις,
 ἱκανόν μοι τεκμηρίον ἐστίν, ὅτι ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι εὖνους εἶ.
 καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι,

487 29 f. Of the three companions of c
 Callicles we know but little. Tisander is mentioned only here. Andron appears in *Prot.* 315 c as a defender of Hippias. Nausicydes had, according to Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7. 6, acquired wealth from his business of ἀλφιτοποιία. The deme Cholargus belonged to the tribe Acamantis, Aphidnae to Aiantis.

32. μέχρι ὅποι: the use of μέχρι with an adverb is unusual. Cf. *Crat.* 412 e, *Symp.* 217 e, and *Kr.* 66, 1, n. 4.

33. ἐνίκα: has a somewhat comic effect, inasmuch as it brings before the mind the image of an earnest and thorough deliberation engaged in by some public body (e.g. the senate), followed by the putting of the question. These young men, however, judge philosophy without understanding it.—προθυμείσθαι: expegetical inf. to τοιάδε τις δόξα.

33 f. εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν: recalls the τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα above. This cautious decision contrasts remarkably

with the ἐλεύθερον and νεανικόν which 487 c
 Callicles defends in 485 c, d.

35 f. ὅπως μὴ . . . διαφθαρέντες: the d
 same state of mind is shown in the accusation brought later against Socrates, the second part of which ran thus: ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖρων. That this was Callicles' judgment is shown by his words in 484 c ff. above.

37. ἐταιροτάτοις: is found also in *Phaedo* 89 d.

39 f. ὅτι . . . αὐτός τε φῆς κτέ.: this must not be considered as a valid example of ὅτι after φημί, which regularly takes the infinitive. The ὅτι clause precedes, and may have escaped the speaker's mind when he was about to make the collocation of αὐτός and λόγος. The occurrence of two forms of λέγω in the same clause would likewise have been awkward.—οἷος παρρησιάζεσθαι: you are disposed to free speech. See on 452 e. The omission of the first and second persons of the copula is rare. When εἶ is omitted, σὺ is generally found. On the inf. see on 457 d.

40 αὐτός τε φῆς καὶ ὁ λόγος ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες ὁμο-
 λογεῖ σοι. ἔχει δὴ οὕτως δῆλον ὅτι τούτων πέρι νυν·
 εἴαν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον ο
 τοῦτ' ἤδη ἔσται ἱκανῶς ὑπ' ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, καὶ οὐκέτι
 αὐτὸ δεήσει ἐπ' ἄλλην βάσανον ἀναφέρειν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν
 45 ποτε αὐτὸ συνεχώρησας σὺ οὔτε σοφίας ἐνδεία οὐτ'
 αἰσχύνης παρουσία, οὐδ' αὖ ἀπατῶν ἐμὲ συγχωρήσῃς
 ἂν· φίλος γάρ μοι εἶ, ὥς καὶ αὐτὸς φῆς. τῷ ὄντι οὖν ἡ
 ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ σὴ ὁμολογία τέλος ἤδη ἔξει τῆς ἀληθείας.
 πάντων δὲ καλλίστη ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, περὶ
 50 τούτων ὢν σὺ δὴ μοι ἐπετίμησας, ποῖόν τινα χρή εἶναι τὸν
 ἄνδρα καὶ τί ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μέχρι τοῦ, καὶ πρεσβύτερον 488
 καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα. ἐγὼ γὰρ εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττω κατὰ
 τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ, εἴ ἴσθι τοῦτο ὅτι οὐχ ἑκὼν ἐξαμαρ-
 τάνω ἀλλ' ἀμαθία τῇ ἐμῇ· σὺ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἤρξω νουθετεῖν

487 41. ἔχει δὴ κτέ.: with this Socrates
 d recurs to what was said in 486 e.

e 44 ff. ἂν συνεχώρησας, συγχωρή-
 σαις ἂν: the time is pushed into the
 fut. pf. by the previous βεβασανισ-
 μένον ἔσται, and standing on this as-
 sumed plane, Socrates uses naturally
 the unreal past. The second clause
 is, as the αὖ shows, a second thought,
 and being of general application, is
 put into the ideal (potential) opta-
 tive. The whole sentence shows the
 narrow line that separates between
 unreality and ideality.

48. τέλος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔξει: the
 gen., as in the Homeric phrases τέλος
 γάμοιο, θανάτοιο. Every effort must
 be directed to a terminus or comple-
 tion. Here the end is perfect truth.

49. καλλίστη: refers to its value.
 It yields a rich return.

488 51. τί χρή ἐπιτηδεύειν: is the ques-
 a tion about which the following dis-

cussion revolves. Cf. 492 d, 500 c, 488
 512 e, 515 a, 521 a, 527 b, e.

52 f. κατὰ τὸν βίον: refers, not to
 the period of life, but to the manner
 of living.

53. τοῦτο: Heindorf, followed by
 Cron, construes this word with the
 following verb. But it is more nat-
 ural to look upon it as antecedent to
 the following sentence, *know well this*
fact, etc. — οὐχ ἑκὼν: sc. according to
 the Socratic view as to the cause of
 wrong doing.

54. νουθετεῖν: according to the rule,
 when ἔρχεσθαι is used with the inf.
 the inf. is emphasized; when with the
 partic. the 'beginning' is emphasized.
 So *Theaet.* 187 a ἡρχόμεθα διαλεγόμε-
 νοι, "we commenced the discussion on
 which we are still engaged." — Here,
 as in 458 a, Socrates looks upon the
 correction of any erroneous views as
 a favor.

55 με, μὴ ἀποστῆς, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς μοι ἔνδειξαι, τί ἔστιν τοῦτο
 ὃ ἐπιτηδευτέον μοι, καὶ τίνα τρόπον κτησαίμην ἂν αὐτό,
 καὶ ἐάν με λάβῃς νῦν μὲν σοι ὁμολογήσαντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ
 ὑστέρω χρόνῳ μὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα ἅπερ ὡμολόγησα,
 πάννυ με ἡγοῦ βλάκα εἶναι καὶ μηκέτι ποτέ με νοουθετήσης **b**
 60 ὕστερον, ὥς μηδεὶν ὄντα. ἐξ ἀρχῆς δέ μοι ἐπανά-
 λαβε, πῶς φῆς τὸ δίκαιον ἔχειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος τὸ
 κατὰ φύσιν; ἄγειν βίαν τὸν κρείττω τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων καὶ
 ἄρχειν τὸν βελτίω τῶν χειρόνων καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν
 ἀμείνω τοῦ φαυλοτέρου; μὴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις τὸ δίκαιον
 65 εἶναι, ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι;

XLIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα [ἔλεγον] καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν
 λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν βελτίω καλεῖς σὺ καὶ κρείττω;
 οὐδὲ γάρ τοι τότε οἶός τ' ἢ μαθεῖν σου τί ποτε λέ- **c**
 5 γεις. πότερον τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς καὶ δεῖ
 ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου τοὺς ἀσθενεστερούς, οἷόν μοι
 δοκεῖς καὶ τότε ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὥς αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τὰς
 σμικρὰς κατὰ τὸ φύσει δίκαιον ἔρχονται, ὅτι κρείττους
 εἰσὶν καὶ ἰσχυρότεραι, ὥς τὸ κρείττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον
 10 καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτόν ὄν, ἢ ἔστι βελτίω μὲν εἶναι, ἥττω δὲ
 καὶ ἀσθενέστερον, καὶ κρείττω μὲν εἶναι, μοχθηρότερον

⁵⁸ 59. βλάκα: 'implies feebleness
^b both of mind and character, a dolt.'
 Thompson.

60 f. ἐπανάλαβε: we find ἀναλα-
 βεῖν in this sense in 506 c and *Apol.*
 19 b.

61. σὺ καὶ Πίνδαρος: see on 484 b.

62. ἄγειν βίαν: is a freer expression
 of the sense of Pindar's words.

64. μὴ λέγεις: in spite of the ad-
 dition of ἢ ὀρθῶς μέμνημαι, the ten-
 dency of the question is towards a

negative answer, as is also to be ⁴⁸⁸
 gathered from the ἀλλὰ of Callicles' ^b
 answer.

XLIII. 4. τότε: refers to what was **c**
 said in 483 d, e, and ἐνδείκνυσθαι is
 accordingly imperfect infinitive.—ἢ:
 appears to be the old Attic form.

9 f. ὥς ταῦτόν ὄν: on the assump-
 tion that, etc. See on 491 a.

10. ἢ ἔστι: begins the second
 member of the double question intro-
 duced by πότερον.

δέ· ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ κρείτ- d
 τονος; τοῦτό μοι αὐτὸ σαφῶς διόρισον, ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερόν
 ἐστὶν τὸ κρείττον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ ἰσχυρότερον;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφῶς λέγω, ὅτι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς κρείττους εἰσὶν κατὰ
 φύσιν; οἳ δὴ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί, ὥσπερ
 καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

20 ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἄρα νόμιμα τὰ τῶν κρείττωνων ἐστίν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τῶν βελτιόνων; οἳ γὰρ κρείττους βελ- e
 τίους που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

25 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ τούτων νόμιμα κατὰ φύσιν καλά, κρείτ-
 τόνων γε ὄντων;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὥς ἄρτι αὖ
 σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ
 30 ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἢ οὐ; καὶ ὅπως 489
 μὴ ἀλώσει ἐνταῦθα σὺ αἰσχυνόμενος· νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὐ,
 οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι,
 καὶ αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνοι μοι

488 12. ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος: cf. 470 b. The
 d question is, whether the range of
 each idea is the same. A clear dis-
 tinction (σαφῶς διόρισον) would obvi-
 ate any false application.

14. τὸ κρείττον κτέ.: the position
 of the three terms is arbitrary; but
 Socrates seems to put first the two on
 which he lays most stress.

17 f. ὥσπερ . . . ἔλεγες: this appeal
 to the statement of Callicles reveals a
 contradiction between his statements,

inasmuch as he had said above, 483 b, 488
 that the πολλοί were the ἀσθενεῖς. d

28 f. ὥς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες: the αὖ e
 draws attention again to the above
 ὥσπερ καὶ σὺ ἄρτι ἔλεγες. See 483 a-d.

30 f. ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει: an ironical 489
 allusion to Callicles' reproaches of a
 Gorgias and Polus in 482 e.

33. μὴ φθόνοι: a formula for en-
 treaty and urging, still more frequent
 in the form μὴ φθονήσης. Regularly
 μὴ with pres. impv. prescribes a neg.

ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵν', εἴαν μοι ὁμολογή-
 35 σης, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς
 διαγνῶναι ὁμολογηκόςτος.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλ' οἷ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἰσχίον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει.
 40 ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ b
 ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων, ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος
 καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις,
 εἴαν μὲν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, εἴαν δέ
 τις κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν.

XLIV. ΚΑΛ. Οὐτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ
 μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνει, τηλικούτος ὢν, ὀνόματα
 θηρεύων, καὶ εἴαν τις ῥήματι ἀμάρτη, ἐρμαῖον τοῦτο ποι- c
 ούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἶε ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι

489 course of action, with an aor. subjv.

a negatives a course of action. Socrates wishes at the outset to obviate any tendency to a refusal to answer, or hesitancy.

34. Καλλίκλεις: the omission of the & is unusual.

35. βεβαιουῖσθαι: to become strengthened in one's opinion. It is used with παρὶ to designate the quarter from which the influence comes; direct agency would require ὑπό.—ἱκανοῦ διαγνῶναι: competent to decide, with reference to 487 e.

b 40 f. λέγειν, κατηγορεῖν: indir. disc. for impf. indicative. The κατηγορία proper begins with & δῆ. The use of δῆ implies a fact beyond controversy.

XLIV. 1. οὐτοσὶ ἀνὴρ: Callicles with this turns to the surrounding listeners to give vent to his indignation. Cf. 467 b, 505 c.—οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν: Callicles, who looks upon

all philosophical activity as φλυαρία, 489
 objects to having dialectical treat- b
 ment applied to him.—εἰπέ μοι: the asyndeton renders the question especially incisive, and hence is a measure of excitement. The question οὐκ αἰσχύνει is a rhetorical imperative.

2 f. ὀνόματα θηρεύων: the same image is employed in *Theæt.* 166 c, with the substantive ὀνομάτων θήρεν-σιν to denote logomachy, where the matter at issue has been quite forgotten.

3. ῥήματι: in an expression. See c on 450 e.

4. Callicles takes his stand on the identity, which he had maintained, of βελτίων and κρείττων, but reverses the relation of these words to each other; for while above he considered βελτίων to be synonymous with κρείττων, now he wishes κρείττων to be understood in the sense of βέλτιων.

5 ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαί σοι λέγω, ὅτι ταυτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἶε με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδεὶνδὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα;

10 ΣΩ. Εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

d

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαί τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο
15 βελτίους ἡγεί τοῦ ενός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπέ, τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυρότερους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρῶτόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ.

489 5. οὐ πάλαί σοι λέγω: he adds, in
c order to cover this change of conception. See on 456 a.

6. ἢ οἶε κτέ.: Callicles allows himself to be clearly recognized as a member of that political party which applied to itself by preference the name οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοί, and which both during the latter part and after the conclusion of the Peloponnēsiān war obtained for a brief period the ascendancy in Athens.—σύρφετος: from σῦρω, sweep. Cf. the English colloquial words 'off-scourings' and 'scum.'

8. ἀξίων πλὴν: without a following gen., instead of which we find τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι by means of their bodily strength. Others construe τῷ with σώματι, making the inf. depend upon some word of ability to be taken from ἀξίων, but this is harsh.

9. αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα: construe with λέγειν as an indignant dis-

claimer in the shape of a question. 489
"Or think you I mean that if a
c rabble be got together, of slaves and all sorts of wretches, good for nothing unless perhaps for feats of physical strength, and these people say this or that, that these their mere dicta are to have the force of law?" Thompson.

12. αὐτὸς πάλαί τοπάζω: why So- d
crates does not express his conjecture, he has already explained in 453 b, c.

14. σύ γε: you, at least, for your part. Cf. what has just preceded in c.

16. ἀλλὰ πάλιν: in what precedes Callicles has really succeeded merely in eluding the expression of any positive view.

18. προδίδασκε: the πρό in composition indicates the progress or going forward, which ought to attend teaching.

19. ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ: run away from your school. Cf. 456 d.

20 ΚΑΛ. Εἰρωνεύει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος, πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρὸς με· ἀλλ' ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε.

25 ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς ἄρα, ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἄρα εἰς φρονῶν μυρίων μὴ φρονούντων
30 κρείττων ἐστὶν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ τοῦτον ἄρχειν δεῖ, τοὺς δ' ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τὸν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἀρχομένων — τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖς βούλεσθαι λέγειν — καὶ οὐ ῥήματα θηρεύειν — εἰ ὁ εἰς τῶν μυρίων κρείττων.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτ' ἔστιν ἃ λέγω. τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι ἐγὼ
35 τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι φύσει, τὸ βελτίῳ ὄντα καὶ φρονιμώτερον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ πλεόν ἔχειν τῶν φανλοτέρων.

XLV. ΣΩ. Ἔχε δὴ αὐτοῦ. τί ποτε αὖ νῦν λέγεις; ἐὰν ἂν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄθροοι ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἢ ἐν κοινῷ πολλὰ σιτία καὶ ποτά, ὦμεν δὲ παντοδαποί, οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί, οἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν ἢ

489 21. μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον: with μὰ we
e always infer the negative. The allusion to Zethus, whom Callicles had brought forward as an authority, has a very comic effect.

22. ἀλλ' ἴθι: see on 451 a.

25. ὁρᾷς κτέ.: alludes to 489 c, where βέλτιον and κρείττον were said by Callicles to be identical. Here he characterizes the βελτίους as ἀμείνους, showing, as Socrates declares in δηλοῖς οὐδέν, that at this time there was no distinction of consequence between these two words,

26. οὐκ ἐρεῖς: again asyndetic, as 489 above in b. e

27. φρονιμωτέρους: excludes the ambiguity which was still possible with ἰσχυρότερος.

29. μὴ φρονούντων: the neg. is conditional. a

33. ῥήματα: a clear reference to 489 b, c. ῥῆμα has rather the force of "phrase."

XLV. 1. ἔχε δὴ: see on 460 a. b
3. ἐν κοινῷ: i.e. so that, as being public property, it must be distributed.

4. οἱ μὲν ἰσχυροί κτέ.: added be-

St. I. p. 490.

5 φρονιμώτερος περὶ ταῦτα, ἱατρὸς ὢν, ἣ δέ, οἷον εἰκός, τῶν
μὲν ἰσχυρότερος, τῶν δὲ ἀσθενέστερος, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὗτος,
φρονιμώτερος ἡμῶν ὢν, βελτίων καὶ κρείττων ἔσται εἰς
ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν τούτων τῶν σιτίων πλεόν ἡμῶν ἐκτέον αὐτῷ, ^c
ὅτι βελτίων ἔστιν, ἣ τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν πάντα ἐκεῖνον δεῖ νέ-
μειν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀναλίσκειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ καταχρησθαι εἰς τὸ
ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα οὐ πλεονεκτεῖν, εἰ μὴ μέλλει ζημιοῦσθαι,
ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν πλεόν, τῶν δ' ἔλαττον ἐκτέον· ἐὰν δὲ τύχη
15 πάντων ἀσθενέστατος ὢν, πάντων ἐλάχιστον τῷ βελτίστῳ,
ὦ Καλλίκλεις; οὐχ οὕτως, ὦγαθέ;

ΚΑΛ. Περὶ σιτία λέγεις καὶ ποτὰ καὶ ἱατροὺς καὶ φλυα-
ρίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ ταῦτα λέγω. d

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τὸν φρονιμώτερον βελτίῳ λέγεις; φάθι
20 ἢ μή.

⁴⁹⁰ cause it is just in the distribution of
^b food that one would expect bodily
strength to form the standard.

5. *περὶ ταῦτα*: the acc. implies
some mental activity.

^c 10. *ἐκτέον*: the verbal of *ἐχω*,
which is quite rare, shows two forms,
this and the more normal one *σχετός*,
also used by Plato. (in composition).

11. *τῷ μὲν ἄρχειν*: this comes to
him according to 490 a, because he is
φρονιμώτερος. The dat. is one of cause.
νέμειν is an action for which are neces-
sary wisdom, justice, and self-control.

12. *καταχρησθαι*: not *misuse*, but
use up. *κατά* frequently has the force
of "completely" in composition. Kr.
68, 46, 10.

13. *ζημιοῦσθαι*: used metaphori-
cally, of the natural result which
follows the over-engorgement of the
stomach with food.

14. *τῶν μὲν . . . τῶν δέ*: with refer.⁴⁹⁰
ence to b. c

15. *τῷ βελτίστῳ*: used instead of
the pron. for the sake of the contrast
with *ἐλάχιστον*.

17. *περὶ σιτία*: this is a very un-
usual construction. The gen. is the
rule with *περὶ* after *λέγω*. Cron
thinks it is calculated to define the
region in which the speeches of Socra-
tes move. The word *φλυαρίας* serves
also to characterize all that precedes.
Cf. 519 a *λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τει-
χῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαρίων*,
the companion passage to this one.
Cf. also Dem. *Ol.* iii. 29 *τὰς ὁδοὺς ὡς
ἐπισκευάζομεν, καὶ κρήνας, καὶ λήρους*.

19. *πότερον*: the second member ^d
is to be supplied from the following
question.

20. *ἢ μή* (*sc. φάθι*): to be under-
stood like *ὅς φημι* (nego).

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν βελτίω πλέον δεῖν ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σιτίων γε οὐδὲ ποτῶν.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνω, ἀλλ' ἴσως ἱματίων, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ὑφαντικῶ-
25 τατον μέγιστον ἱμάτιον ἔχειν καὶ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα
ἀμπεχόμενον περιέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ποίων ἱματίων;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰς ὑποδήματα δῆλον ὅτι δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τὸν
φρονιμώτατον εἰς ταῦτα καὶ βέλτιστον. τὸν σκυτοτόμον ^e
30 ἴσως μέγιστα δεῖ ὑποδήματα καὶ πλείστα ὑποδεδεμένων
περιπατεῖν.

ΚΑΛ. Ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεις, ἴσως τὰ τοιάδε· οἷον
γεωργικὸν ἄνδρα περὶ γῆν φρόνιμόν τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ
35 ἀγαθόν, τοῦτον δὴ ἴσως δεῖ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν σπερμάτων
καὶ ὡς πλείστῳ σπέρματι χρῆσθαι εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν.

• ΚΑΛ. Ὡς αἰεὶ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν.

490 24. **μανθάνω**: ironic; as if Socra-
d tes could by any means judge what
Callicles did mean from a general
statement of what he did not mean.
— **ὑφαντικώτατον**: a sup. coined for
the occasion.

26. **περιέναι**: sc. in order to show off
in them; still stronger is the follow-
ing (31) **περιπατεῖν** ("strut about").

27. **ποίων ἱματίων**: expresses in-
dignant contempt. Cf. *Charm.* 174 b
ἀρά γε (οἷδε) τὸ πεττευτικόν; ποῖον πετ-
τευτικόν;

32. **φλυαρεῖς ἔχων**: a manner of
speech taken from the common life,
and hence especially frequent in the
comic poets. Cf. *τί ἔχων ληρεῖς*; (497 a),

τί δῆτα ἔχων στρέφει; (*Phaedr.* 236 e), 490
τί δῆτα διατρίβεις ἔχων; (*Ar. Eccles.* e
1151). *ἔχων* seems to imply a kind
of continual persistence. You still
persist in talking nonsense.

33. **τοιαῦτα, τοιάδε**: correspond in
usage to *οὗτος* and *ὅδε*. The article
divides the examples into classes.

37. **ὡς αἰεὶ κτέ.**: an exclamation im-
plying a taunt, which was so often
directed against Socrates e.g. (ac-
cording to Xen. *Mem.* iv. 4. 6) by the
sophist Hippias, who receives about
the same answer that Callicles does
here, with the ironical addition: *σὺ δ'*
ἴσως διὰ τὸ πολυμαθὲς εἶναι περὶ τῶν αὐ-
τῶν οὐδέποτε τὰ αὐτὰ λέγεις. Cf. 482 a.

40 ΚΑΛ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε αἰὲ σκυτέας τε καὶ 491
κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, ὡς
περὶ τούτων ἡμῖν ὄντα τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἐρεῖς περὶ τίνων ὁ κρείττων τε καὶ φρο-
νιμώτερος πλεον ἔχων δικαίως πλεονεκτεῖ; ἢ οὔτε ἐμοῦ
45 ὑποβάλλοντος ἀνέξει οὗτ' αὐτὸς ἐρεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάσαι λέγω. πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς
κρείττους οἳ εἰσιν οὐ σκυτοτόμους λέγω οὐδὲ μαγείρους,
ἀλλ' οἳ ἂν εἰς τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα φρόνιμοι ᾖσιν, b
ὄντινα ἂν τρόπον εὖ οἰκοῖτο, καὶ μὴ μόνον φρόνιμοι, ἀλλὰ
50 καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, ἱκανοὶ ὄντες ἂ ἂν νοήσωσιν ἐπιτελεῖν, καὶ μὴ
ἀποκάμνωσι διὰ μαλακίαν τῆς ψυχῆς.

XLVI. ΣΩ. Ὁρᾷς, ὦ βέλτιστε Καλλίκλεις, ὡς οὐ ταῦτα
σύ τ' ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖς καὶ ἐγὼ σοῦ; σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐμὲ φῆς
αἰὲ ταῦτα λέγειν, καὶ μέμφει μοι· ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντίον,

491 40. αἰὲ σκυτέας κτέ.: Charicles, one
a of the thirty, irritated by some keen
remark of Socrates, expresses himself
similarly in Xen. Mem. i. 2. 37 οὐκοῦν,
ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων τού-
τοις τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ δόσιον καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ
Χαρίκλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε.

41 f. ὡς ὄντα τὸν λόγον: the acc.
abs. is rare, except with impers. verbs.
GMT. 853; G. 278, 2; H. 974. The infer-
ence here is that the assumption intro-
duced by the ὡς is untenable; in which
case we more commonly have ὥσπερ.

43. περὶ τίνων: due to assimilation
after περὶ τούτων, for, acc. to the
usage, we should expect περὶ τίνα
after πλεονεκτεῖ. Cf. Lach. 182 e οἷς
οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν, ὅτι ἂν
μαθόντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ
τὸν πόλεμον. The ἐρεῖς may also have
had some effect. See on 449 d. For
οὐκοῦν ἐρεῖς, see on 489 e.

46. ἀλλ' ἔγωγε καὶ πάσαι λέγω: 491
see on 456 a and 489 c. Callicles' a
irritation shows itself again in the
side-thrust, οὐ σκυτοτόμους κτέ.

46 f. τοὺς κρείττους οἳ εἰσιν: equiv.
to τούτους οἳ κρείττους εἰσίν. See Kr.
61, 6, 2; H. 878. Such prolepsis usu-
ally occurs after verbs which express
recognition or make declarations.
Here the relative clause is almost
pleonastic, but this is the more in
harmony with the excited feelings of
Callicles.

48. εἰς . . . πράγματα: denotes the b
object, as περὶ ταῦτα (above 490 b)
denotes the field, to which the φρό-
νησις is directed; and from it we
must take the subject of οἰκοῖτο.

50. ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κτέ.: is to be con-
sidered as explanatory of ἀνδρεῖοι and
φρόνιμοι ᾖσιν.

XLVI. 3. ἐγὼ δὲ σοῦ τούναντίον:
this use of σοῦ, with which we must

ὅτι οὐδέποτε ταῦτὰ λέγεις περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τοτὲ μὲν
 5 τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους ὠρίζου, ^c
 αὐθις δὲ τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους, νῦν δ' αὖ ἕτερόν τι ἦκεις
 ἔχων· ἀνδρειότεροί τινες ὑπὸ σοῦ λέγονται οἱ κρείττους
 καὶ οἱ βελτίους. ἀλλ', ὠγαθέ, εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι, τίνας
 ποτὲ λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους τε καὶ κρείττους καὶ εἰς ὅτι.

10 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' εἰρηκά γε ἔγωγε τοὺς φρονίμους εἰς τὰ τῆς
 πόλεως πράγματα καὶ ἀνδρείους. τούτους γὰρ προσήκει
 τῶν πόλεων ἄρχειν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, πλέον ἔχειν ^d
 τούτους τῶν ἄλλων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῶν, ὦ ἐταῖρε;

15 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐνα ἕκαστον λέγω αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα· ἡ τοῦτο
 μὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων;

⁴⁹¹ supply κατηγορῶ, is somewhat harsh
^b after ἐμέ, with which it contrasts,
 and leads Cron to prefer to consider
 σοῦ as dependent upon τούναντίον, in
 the sense "the opposite of you,"—i.e.
 of what you say,—and the clause
 with ὅτι as exegetical to τούναντίον,
 —a harsh and doubtful construction.

^c 5. τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους: the art. is
 employed, because ἰσχυροτέρους is not
 merely a pred. to τοὺς βελτίους κτέ.,
 but both ideas are considered as iden-
 tical.

6 f. ἦκεις ἔχων: as 518 a. In Eng-
 lish also we often say, 'here you
 are with,' etc.

7. τινές: τίς may express indefi-
 niteness of nature: "a sort of." H.
 702.

8. εἰπὼν ἀπαλλάγηθι: relieve your
 mind by saying, tell and be done with
 it. Cf. below, ^e ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν παρη-
 σιαζόμενος λέγω. The use of the aor-
 ist tense of the partic. may be simply

a case of attraction; it certainly loses ⁴⁹¹
 its connotation of past time, being ^c
 practically identical with the time of
 the leading verb, as in *Phaedo* 60 c
 εἰ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. See GMT.
 150, 845; H. 856 b.

12. τοῦτ' ἐστίν: does not refer to ^d
 ἄρχειν, but simply, as often, intro-
 duces the following clause.

14. τί δὲ αὐτῶν: the indefiniteness
 of the question shows that it is only
 designed to draw Callicles' attention
 to the necessity of some rule govern-
 ing the actions of the κρείττους to one
 another. According to the connex-
 ion we may supply either ἄρχειν or
 πλέον ἔχειν to govern the gen., or we
 may consider it as a free genitive.
 The idea of a man's governing him-
 self is so entirely new to Callicles
 that he is unable to catch Socrates'
 meaning at first.

16. ἓνα ἕκαστον: the single con-
 crete case to explain the principle.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχοντα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ποικίλον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σῶφρονα
20 ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῇ αὐτὸν ἐαυτοῦ; τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἐαυτῷ.

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἡδὺς εἶ. τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις, τοὺς σῶφρο-
νας.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίῃ, ὅτι οὕτω
25 λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν
εὐδαίμων γένοιτο ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων ὀτρωῶν; ἀλλὰ τοῦτ'
ἐστὶν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, ὃ ἐγὼ σοι νῦν
παρρησιαζόμενος λέγω, ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὀρθῶς βιωσόμενον τὰς

491
d 19. οὐδὲν ποικίλον: means that the question is about a simple matter, whereas the person addressed imagines something else behind the words. — ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί: with this, Socrates calls in the authority of common usage to determine the meaning of ἐαυτοῦ ἄρχειν, which he defines by σῶφρων and ἐγκρατὴς ἐαυτοῦ, with τῶν ἡδονῶν κτέ. explanatory.

e 22. ὥς ἡδὺς εἶ: is often used ironically. — ἡδὺς: corresponds best to our *naive*. Callicles means that Socrates still keeps the point of view of a naive—hence interesting (but cf. 485 b, c)—child, inasmuch as he has not yet laid aside his childish prejudice in favor of *σωφροσύνη*. Hence the words τοὺς ἡλιθίους κτέ. are a criticism of Socrates' view: "you mean those simple-minded fellows,—the temperate." This passage shows that Callicles erases *σωφροσύνη*, as he did *δικαιοσύνη*, from the list of the virtues.

24. οὕτω: we should naturally expect τοῦτους. Of course there is a

tinge of irony in the allusion to Callicles' words.

26. πάνυ γε σφόδρα: sc. οὕτω λέγεις. Callicles, of course, means τοὺς ἡλιθίους, and makes an effort in what follows to defend his words. For this purpose he unfolds his view of life more completely, and shows especially wherein he finds happiness. The beginning of his discourse bears a rhetorical stamp.

27. δουλεύων: not to be conceived literally of human servitude, but rather equiv. τὸ ἀρχόμενος and that too αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἐαυτοῦ, which Callicles considers just as bad as if the slavery were to some one else, ὀτρωῶν. The lot of thralldom is considered so unhappy that Callicles conceives δουλεύων, even in the sense which it has here, as the exact opposite to εὐδαίμων. That self-control is not consistent with the generally held idea of freedom is spoken plainly in *Meno* 86 d ἐπειδὴ δὲ σὺ σαυτοῦ μὲν οὐδ' ἐπιχειρεῖς ἄρχειν ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ᾖς, and is at the present day a principle of the opponents of the temperance movement.

30 μὲν ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἔαν ὡς μεγίστας εἶναι καὶ μὴ
 κολάζειν, ταύταις δὲ ὡς μεγίσταις οὖσαις ἱκανὸν εἶναι 492
 ὑπηρετεῖν δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ φρόνησιν, καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι
 ὦν ἂν αἰεὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία γίγνηται. ἀλλὰ τοῦτ', οἶμαι, τοῖς
 πολλοῖς οὐ δυνατόν· ὅθεν ψέγουσιν τοὺς τοιοῦτους δι'
 35 αἰσχύνην, ἀποκρυπτόμενοι τὴν αὐτῶν ἀδυναμίαν, καὶ
 αἰσχρὸν δὴ φασιν εἶναι τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρό-
 σθεν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, δουλούμενοι τοὺς βελτίους τὴν φύσιν
 ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐκπορίζεσθαι ταῖς
 ἡδοναῖς πλήρωσιν ἐπαινοῦσιν τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν b
 40 δικαιοσύνην διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν. ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἡ βασιλέων ἑσίν εἶναι ἡ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύ-
 σει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ
 δυναστείαν, (τί) τῇ ἀληθείᾳ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον (ἂν) εἴη
 σωφροσύνης τοῦτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· οἷς ἐξὸν ἀπολαύειν

492 31. **κολάζειν**: in the sense of "discipline" is quite in place here. At the same time its use forms a link between this and the earlier discussion between Polus and Socrates. **ἀκολασία** is the proper opposite to *σωφροσύνη*, and as such is praised by Callicles.

32. **ὑπηρετεῖν**: Callicles says this, without noticing that thereby the servitude (*δουλεία*) in which man stands to his appetites is recognized.

34. **τοὺς τοιοῦτους**: viz. τοὺς δυνατοὺς ἀποπιμπλάναι κτέ.

36. **αἰσχρὸν δὴ**: with ironical reference to *αἰσχύνην*. — **ὅπερ**: introduces what follows. The reference is to 483 c ff.

b 41. **οἷς ὑπῆρξεν**: whose fortune it was. The original meaning of *ὑπάρχειν*, "to be as a foundation," "to begin with," becomes gradually weaker as time goes on. The dat. in the pred. here passes over into the acc. as subj. of the

inf. (*ἱκανοὺς* and *εἶναι*) as is frequently the case, especially in long periods. Kr. 55, 2, 5, 7. The cause here lies in the necessary addition of *αὐτοῦς*. b

42. **ἀρχὴν τινα** κτέ.: the word *ἀρχή* can be applied to any position of power, whether in a democracy or not. Thuc. ii. 65. 9 says of Athens *ἐγένετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς* (i.e. Pericles) *ἀρχή*. The idea of *τυραννίς* is well known; cf. Nepos, *Milt.* 8. 3. *δυναστεία* combined with *τυραννίς* is not infrequently (479 a, Thuc. iii. 62. 3) used of oligarchs, but it is also a designation of princes, both smaller and greater (524 e, 525 d).

43. **αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον**: declare as strongly as possible the inappropriateness of the practice of virtue for such men; it becomes for them really a shame and an evil.

44. **τούτοις τοῖς ἀνθρώποις**: pur-

45 τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδῶν ὄντος, αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς
 δεσπότην ἐπαγάγοιντο τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων νόμον
 τε καὶ λόγον καὶ ψόγον; ἢ πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἄθλιοι γεγονότες
 εἶεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς σωφρο- ο
 σύνης, μηδὲν πλέον νέμουντες τοῖς φίλοις τοῖς αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς
 50 ἐχθροῖς, καὶ ταῦτα ἄρχοντες ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν πόλει; ἀλλὰ
 τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἣν φῆς σὺ διώκειν, ᾧδ' ἔχει·
 τρυφή καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ ἐλευθερία, ἐὰν ἐπικουρίαν ἔχῃ,
 τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ'
 ἐστὶν τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν συνθήματα ἀν-
 55 θρώπων, φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

XLVII. Σο. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, ἐπεξέρχει α

⁴⁹² posely placed at the end of the clause
^b (as above διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν ἀνανδρίαν),
 and to emphasize the contrast, ἀνθρώ-
 πων, which is usually wanting, is
 added in the next clause after τῶν
 πολλῶν.—οἷς ἐξόν κτέ.: such connex-
 ion of the subordinate to the princi-
 pal clause is idiomatic in Greek and
 Latin. Cf. *Symp.* 174 e οἱ μὲν γὰρ εὐθὺς
 παῖδά τινα τῶν ἔνδον ἀπαντήσαντα ἄγειν
 οὐ κατέκειντο οἱ ἄλλοι. *Nep. Thras.*
 4. 1 huic . . . corona a populo
 data est; quam quod . . . non
 vis expresserat nullam ha-
 buit invidiam. Notice the neces-
 sary shift in ἐξόν and μηδενὸς . . . ὄντος
 due to the change from impersonal
 to personal. The participles are both
 practically concessive, the neg. μή
 being due to the conditional coloring.

46. τῶν πολλῶν κτέ.: notice the
 assonance (παρίσσωσις) in νόμον, λόγον,
 ψόγον.

^c 48. τοῦ καλοῦ: is said with bitter
 irony. Callicles shows here, as well
 as in 486 b above, the code of morals
 prevalent at that time and which Xen.
 expresses in the praise awarded to

Cyrus, *Anab.* i. 9. 11 φάνερως ἦν εἰ τίς ⁴⁹²
 τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ποιήσειεν αὐτὸν, ^c
 νικᾶν πειρώμενος.

51. ἣν φῆς σὺ διώκειν: as above
 482 e φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν.

52. ἐπικουρίαν: capacity to help
 (one's self); i.e. to provide means
 for pleasure and to ward off hind-
 rances. So also ἐπικουρεῖν and ἐπί-
 κουρος. Cf. below, the recapitulation
 of Socrates.

53. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κτέ.: the subject,
 which at first is only inferred as the
 opposite of the three qualities speci-
 fied, is nearer specified first by the
 characteristic addition τὰ καλλωπίσ-
 ματα (affectations) and then by a
 definite expression which at the same
 time shows Callicles' opinion.

53. φλυαρία κτέ.: is predicate.

XLVII. 1. οὐκ ἀγεννῶς: like γεν- d
 ναίως 475 d, 521 a, transferred from
 its original application to the free
 independent conduct proper for a
 man of noble birth; hence equiv. to
 "spirited," "brave."—ἐπεξέρχει: an
 image from war. Cf. ἐπιχειρῶμεν
 495 c.

τῷ λόγῳ παρρησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις,
 ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν.
 δέομαι οὖν ἐγὼ σου μηδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀνείναι, ἵνα τῷ ὄντι
 5 κατὰδηλον γένηται πῶς βιωτέον. καί μοι λέγε· τὰς μὲν
 ἐπιθυμίας φῆς οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἶον δεῖ εἶναι,
 ἐῶντα δὲ αὐτὰς ὡς μεγίστας πλήρωσιν αὐταῖς ἀμόθεν γέ
 ποθεν ἐτοιμάζω, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν;

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ ταῦτα ἐγώ.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς λέγονται οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι
 εὐδαιμονες εἶναι.

ΚΑΛ. Οἱ λίθοι γὰρ δὴ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ εὐδαιμονέ-
 στατοί εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὥς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς ὁ βίος.

492 2. τῷ λόγῳ: refers to the view
 d just stated, the position defended.
Cf. Prot. 345 d, where Socrates says
 of Simonides δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπ-
 εξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι. We
 may, however, consider ἐπεξέρχει as
 used absolutely and τῷ λόγῳ as dat.
 of accompaniment.

6. εἰ μέλλει τις (*sc. τοιοῦτος εἶναι*)
 οἶον δεῖ (*αὐτὸν sc. τὸν ἀνθρώπον*) εἶναι:
 the absence of the inf. after ἐῶντα is
 strange; *cf.* 491 e above.

7 f. ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν: Socrates
 wishes to settle beyond all cavil that
 Callicles sanctions the employment
 of all means, without limitation and
 in the broadest sense, to satisfy his
 desires. As ἐτοιμάζειν is in the same
 construction with κολαστέον, we must
 conceive an idea of obligation con-
 nected with it. *Cf. Crito* 51 c ποιη-
 τέον . . . ἢ πείθειν.

e 8. τὴν ἀρετὴν: the sole true vir-
 tue (*manliness*), which is recognized
 also by Callicles.

10. ἄρα: "it appears," "according

to your view." — οἱ μηδενὸς δεόμενοι 492
 κτέ.: the fundamental principle of the
 Cynic school (of Antisthenes), which
 also derived its origin from Socrates.
Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 6. 10, where to the
 sophist Antiphon, who maintains sim-
 ilar principles to those of Callicles
 here, Socrates says ἔοικας τὴν εὐδαι-
 μονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφῇ καὶ πολυτέλειαν
 εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς
 δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλάχιστον
 ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ.

12. οἱ νεκροὶ κτέ.: Socrates men-
 tions the prevalence of this view in
Phaedo 65 a καὶ δοκεῖ γέ σου τοῖς πολ-
 λοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ
 τεθνάναι ὁ μὴδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν
 αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. Sophocles,
 however, makes the sorely afflicted
 Ajax say (*Ai.* 554 f.) ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν
 γὰρ μὴδὲν ἡδιστος βλος, | ἔως τὸ χαλεπὸν
 καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μαθῆς.

14. Now that Callicles has stated
 exactly the manner in which he looks
 at life, Socrates proceeds to contrast
 that view with his own, not directly

15 οὐ γάρ τοι θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, εἰ Εὐριπίδης ἀληθῆ ἐν τοῖσδε λέγει, λέγων

τίς δ' οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστὶ κατθανεῖν,
τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν;

καὶ ἡμεῖς τῷ ὄντι ἴσως τέθναμεν· ἤδη τοῦ ἔγωγε καὶ 493
20 ἤκουσα τῶν σοφῶν, ὥς νῦν ἡμεῖς τέθναμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν
σῶμά ἐστιν ἡμῖν σῆμα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυ-
μῖαι εἰσὶ, τυγχάνει ὃν οἶον ἀναπείθεσθαι καὶ μεταπίπτειν

492 indeed, but by a series of compari-
sons and similes, which serve the
double purpose of calming the feel-
ings of the listeners and readers after
the impassioned speech of Callicles
and, by presenting these pictures to
the fancy, of preparing their minds
for the following dialectical argu-
ment.

15. Εὐριπίδης: the same poet to
whom Callicles has several times ap-
pealed. Socrates also can quote for
his own purpose. The passage is
from the *Polydus*, and has the sec-
ond line completed by the words *κάτω*
νομίζεται. Quite similar is a passage
which has come down to us from an-
other lost tragedy, the *Phrixus*, *τίς*
οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦδ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν, | *τὸ*
ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί. See Nauck, *Fr.*
639, 830.

493 19 f. ἔγωγε καὶ ἤκουσά του: the
a following comparisons are probably
taken from the book of Philolaus,
a Pythagorean who, after having
been driven from Italy, wandered to
Thebes, and there engaged in teaching
and writing. Socrates was acquainted
with the Pythagorean teaching prob-
ably only orally, from association
with his Theban friends Simmias and
Cebes. For this reason Plato implies

by the manner of expression that this 493
knowledge, which Socrates himself in
nowise valued, was as general as pos-
sible. See Thompson.

20 f. τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι σῆμα: this
comparison, though ascribed to the
Pythagoreans, is connected also with
the Orphic saying that the body is
the custodian of the soul. Plato
combines both in the same manner in
Crat. 400 b καὶ γὰρ σῆμά τινες φασιν
αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ σῶμα) εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. Cf.
Phaedo 62 b.

21. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο: in order
to continue the discussion, a distinc-
tion between the separate parts of
the soul is necessary. This could not
be given here scientifically; but as
much as is needful is stated by the
comparison. Elsewhere Plato distin-
guishes three parts of the soul,—τὸ
λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές (θυμός), and
τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν. For his present pur-
pose two are sufficient,—the really
spiritual, the reason, and that part
which clings greedily to the body;
for the question to be decided is:
Shall life be directed according to the
nature of the soul or of the body?

22. μεταπίπτειν: the active is found
in 481 d, e. Cf. 517 b μεταβιβάζειν
τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

ἄνω κάτω. καὶ τοῦτο ἄρα τις μυθολογῶν κομψὸς ἀνὴρ,
 ἴσως Σικελός τις ἢ Ἰταλικός, παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι διὰ τὸ
 25 πιθανόν τε καὶ πειστικὸν ὠνόμασε πίθον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοήτους
 ἀμυήτους· τῶν δ' ἀμυήτων τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς, οὗ αἱ ἐπιθυ-
 μίαι εἰσὶ, τὸ ἀκόλαστον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐ στεγανόν, ὥς τετρη- b

493 23. μυθολογῶν: "speaking in mythi-
 a cal (here allegorical) form," in con-
 tradistinction with the dialectical
 method. Cf. *Phaedo* 61 e διασκοπεῖν
 τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν. — κομψός: of deli-
 cate perceptions. Often with irony,
 but not here. See on 486 c. Σικε-
 λός refers to Empedocles, Ἰταλικός to
 Philolaus. Neither was able, in the
 infancy of the science, to clothe his
 profound thoughts in philosophical
 form. Cf. Cron-Dyer *Introd. to Apol.*
 §§ 3 and 8. Σικελός, and not Σικελι-
 κός, may be due to the old love song
 of Timocreon Rhodius, which began:
 Σικελὸς κομψὸς ἀνὴρ | ποτὶ τὰν ματέρ'
 ἔφα.

24. παράγων τῷ ὀνόματι: by a slight
 variation of the word. παράγειν is other-
 wise used of etymologies which are
 effected by small variations in the
 sound. — διὰ τὸ πιθανόν τε καὶ πει-
 στικόν: Philolaus was very fond of
 such tricks of derivation (cf. Boeckh,
Philolaos, p. 188). Both words are
 obviously, as was shown above by
 ἀναπείθεσθαι and μεταπίπτειν, to be
 considered as passive, and applying
 to something that can be easily per-
 suaded. In form πιθανόν approaches
 closest to πίθον, and hence stands first.
 It is usually active, yet it occurs also
 as a passive, e.g. Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 2. 10
 πιθανοὶ δ' οὕτως εἰσὶ τινες, ὥστε, πρὶν
 εἰδέναι τὸ προσταττόμενον, πρότερον πεί-
 θονται. — πειστικός: adapted and in-
 clined to belief, presupposes also some
 persuasion.

25. ἀνοήτους: is chosen here as the

opposite of σώφρονες, on account of 493
 its assonance with ἀμυήτους, and de- a
 notes those who are under the control,
 not of the νοῦς, but of the ἐπιθυμία.
 ἀμύητοι, according to the regular us-
 age, denotes those who are not initi-
 ated into the mysteries. Hence Plato
 applies it also, in *Phaedo* 69 c and
Theaet. 155 e, to those who have not
 been initiated into wisdom, or Philo-
 sophy, which causes — as the mys-
 teries were also designed to do — an
 actual inner purification of the soul.
 But here is also probably, at the
 same time, an allusion to the actual
 untransferred meaning of μύειν, close,
 — i.e. the "unconfined." With this
 agrees the following explanation, οὐ
 στεγανόν and τετρημένος πίθος. The
 ἀμύητοι stand open to all the charms
 of sense and the outer world.

27. τὸ ἀκόλαστον: an allusion to b
 the expression of Callicles. — οὐ στε-
 γανόν: which does not cover and pre-
 serve its contents, gives cause and in-
 troduction for the image of the jar.
 It is noteworthy that this greedy part
 of the soul is designated entirely by
 neg. expressions.

27 f. ὥς τετρημένος εἴη πίθος: de-
 pends on an ἔλεγε, which is implied in
 ὠνόμασε. It is true, however, that
 after a verb of naming we find occa-
 sionally a relative clause, as Soph.
O. R. 780 καλεῖ (με) πλαστὸς ὧς εἴη
 πατρί. The comparison reminds one
 of the myth of the Danaidae. With
 the image of the πίθος and κόσκινον
 Thompson compares Shaks. *Cym.* i. 7

μένος εἴη πίθος, διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν ἀπεικάσας. τούναν-
 τιον δὴ οὗτος σοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνδείκνυται ὡς τῶν ἐν
 30 ᾿Αιδου — τὸ ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων — οὗτοι ἀθλιώτατοι ἂν εἶεν
 οἱ ἀμύητοι, καὶ φοροῖεν εἰς τὸν τετρημένον πίθον ὕδωρ
 ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ τετρημένῳ κοσκίνῳ. τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἄρα
 λέγει, ὡς ἔφη ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων, τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι. τὴν δὲ
 ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπῆκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρημέ-
 35 νην, ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην.
 ταύτ' ἐπεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα, δηλοῖ μὴν ὁ ἐγὼ
 βούλομαί σοι ἐνδειξάμενος, εἰάν πως οἶός τε ὦ, πείσαι

493
 b 'The cloyed will, That satiate yet
 unsatisfied desire, That tub both filled
 and running,' and *All's Well* i. 3. 193
 'Yet in this captious and untenable
 sieve, I still pour in the waters of my
 love, And lack not to lose still.'

28. ἀπεικάσας: the necessary ob-
 jects in the acc. and dat. are to be
 supplied from the context. — τούναν-
 τιον: construe with σοί.

29 f. ἐν ᾿Αιδου: the following ety-
 mological explanation is found also
 elsewhere. It draws attention to a
 consideration of the beyond and the
 life after death, which plays an im-
 portant part in the close of the dia-
 logue. Cf. *Phaedo* 80 d, 81 c, d.

30. οὗτοι: points back, but is at
 the same time fixed by the addition
 οἱ ἀμύητοι.

32. ἐτέρῳ τοιούτῳ: "likewise." The
 objects are different, but their defects
 are similar.

c 33. ὁ πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγων: Socrates
 again refers to his authority, because
 he is still engaged with the details of
 the simile.

34. τὴν τῶν ἀμύητων: emphati-
 cally added, because what follows ap-
 plies only to οἱ ἀμύητοι. The soul is
 here, as a whole, compared to a per-

forated sieve, whereas, just before, 493
 only a part of it was compared with
 the jar, because thereby was meant
 only the part attached to the body.
 But the other part, the soul proper,
 is brought into service to this bodily
 part, so that it affords material for
 it, and even assumes its nature. Cf.
Phaedo 66 d δουλεύοντες τῇ τοῦ σώμα-
 τος θεραπείᾳ.

35. ἀπιστίαν: no contradiction to
 the above πειστικόν, which was said
 only of the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the soul.
 By yielding to the sensual, the soul
 loses its power of reception and re-
 tention, of belief and knowledge.

36. ἐπεικῶς: reasonably, fairly, and
 then very likely, indeed. — ὑπὸ τι:
 somewhat, like ὑπό in ὑπομόνουσος *Rep.*
 viii. 548 c, belongs to ἄτοπον. *Rid.*
 § 131 cites *Phaedr.* 242 d ὑπό τι
 ἄσεβῃ (λόγον). Cf. in Lat. subab-
 surdus, subrusticus, etc. — μὴν:
 yet, moreover, like the more usual μὲν-
 τοι.

37. σοί: in Greek, when a pron.
 has been expressed once with one of
 the verbs of a series, it is not neces-
 sary to express it a second time, even
 though the second verb would require
 a different case, as here.

μεταθέσθαι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντος
βίον τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς αἰεὶ παροῦσιν ἱκανῶς καὶ ἔξαρ-
40 κούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πότερον πείθω τί σε
καὶ μετατίθεσαι εὐδαιμονεστέρους εἶναι τοὺς κοσμίους α
τῶν ἀκολάστων, ἢ οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μυθολογῶ,
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον μεταθήσει;

ΚΑΛ. Τοῦτ' ἀληθέστερον εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XLVIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, ἄλλην σοι εἰκόνα λέγω ἐκ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ γυμνασίου τῇ νῦν. σκόπει γὰρ εἰ τοιόνδε λέγεις
περὶ τοῦ βίου ἐκατέρου, τοῦ τε σώφρονος καὶ τοῦ ἀκολά-
· στου, οἷον εἰ δυοῖν ἀνδρῶν ἐκατέρῳ πίθοι πολλοὶ εἶεν, καὶ
5 τῷ μὲν ἐτέρῳ ὑγιεῖς καὶ πλήρεις, ὁ μὲν οἶνου, ὁ δὲ μέλι- e
τος, ὁ δὲ γάλακτος, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πολλῶν, νάματα δὲ

493 38. μεταθέσθαι: denotes the change
c of an opinion or statement. Cf. *Rep.*
i. 334 e ἀλλὰ μεταβάμεθα· κινδυνεύομεν
γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς . . . θέσθαι.

38 f. ἀντὶ . . . ἐλέσθαι: expegetie,
instead of ὥστε ἐλέσθαι.

39. κοσμίως: chiasmatically contrasted
with ἀκολάστως.

40. πότερον πείθω: the question
shows that Socrates himself attaches
no especial cogency to the compari-
son. Cf. below, μυθολογῶ.

d 41. μετατίθεσαι: here equiv. to με-
ταθέμενος ἡγεῖ. Mutasne ita sen-
tentiam ut statuas feliciores
esse modestos libidinosos?
Heindorf.

44. τοῦτο: refers to the second
part of the double question.

XLVIII. 1. φέρε δὴ: the employ-
ment of another simile after the pre-
ceding one is strange; but possibly
the second contains an advance on
the first, inasmuch as it extends the
consideration from the nature to the
life. It may, however, be only an-

other version of the first one, as the 493
scholiast suggests: ἦν δὲ ἐκεῖνο μὲν d
τῶν Πυθαγορείων οἰκεῖον, τοῦτο δὲ Σω-
κράτους, ὡς σαφέστερόν τε καὶ πληκτι-
κώτερον.

2. γυμνασίον: it is not necessary to
refer this strictly to the philosophi-
cal school already mentioned. It
rather has the meaning of "place of im-
agination and fancy from which So-
crates (Plato) draws his new image.
On the 'brachylogy' in τῇ νῦν ("where
we obtained the one just given"), see
Kr. 48, 13, 9.

4. πίθοι πολλοί: by these are to
be understood only the separate de-
sires. Pleasures are the materials
with which the jars are filled.

5. ὑγιεῖς: in the physical sense, e
"undamaged," but with a pre-under-
standing of the moral judgment in
regard to them; hence the contrast
is formed by σαθρά, as in 479 b.

6. πολλῶν: viz. τοιοῦτων χρημάτων
or ναιμάτων. The common manner of

σπάνια καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐκάστου τούτων εἴη καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν
 πόνων καὶ χαλεπῶν ἐκποριζόμενα · ὁ μὲν οὖν ἕτερος πλη-
 ρωσάμενος μήτ' ἐποχετεύοι μήτε τι φροντίζοι, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα
 10 τούτων ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι · τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ τὰ μὲν νάματα, ὥσπερ
 καὶ ἐκείνῳ, δυνατὰ μὲν πορίζεσθαι, χαλεπὰ δέ, τὰ δ' ἀγ-
 γεία τετρημένα καὶ σαθρά, ἀναγκάζοιτο δ' αἰεὶ καὶ νύκτα
 καὶ ἡμέραν πιμπλάναι αὐτά, ἥ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύ- 494
 πας · ἄρα τοιούτου ἐκατέρου ὄντος τοῦ βίου, λέγεις τὸν τοῦ
 15 ἀκολάστου εὐδαιμονέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὸν τοῦ κοσμίου ;
 πείθω τί σε ταῦτα λέγων συγχωρῆσαι τὸν κόσμιον βίον
 τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀμείνω εἶναι, ἢ οὐ πείθω ;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ πείθεις, ὦ Σώκρατες · τῷ μὲν γὰρ πληρωσα-
 μένῳ ἐκείνῳ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἡδονὴ οὐδεμία, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν,
 20 ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν, ἐπειδὴν πλη-
 ρώσῃ, μήτε χαίροντα ἔτι μήτε λυπούμενον. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ ὅ
 ἔστιν τὸ ἡδέως ζῆν, ἐν τῷ ὡς πλείστον ἐπιρρεῖν.

493 expression would be ἄλλοι ἄλλων πολ-
 ὅ λῶν or ἄλλοι ἄλλων πολλοὶ πολλῶν.

7. χαλεπά: used absolutely and explained by the addition of καὶ . . . ἐκποριζόμενα. Cf. below (11), where the supplement is self-evident.

8. ὁ μὲν ἕτερος: i.e. ὁ σώφρων.

9 f. ἔνεκα τούτων: "so far as it depends upon the filling of the casks or desires." Cf. *Theaet.* 148 d προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκα φανέεται.

11. πορίζεσθαι: probably middle. Kr. 55, 3, 8; H. 813.

494 13. ἢ: i.e. εἰ δὲ μὴ (πιμπλαῖη).

14. ἄρα τοιούτου κτέ.: comprehensive resumption of the protasis beginning with εἰ δυοῖν.

16. πείθω τι: the adverbial acc. of the indef. neut. pron. is frequent. See H. 719 b; G. 160, 2. The repetition of πείθω shows that Socrates attaches no value to the comparison as a proof,

for one simile can be offset by another, but it helps to clarify the idea. a

20. τὸ ὥσπερ λίθον ζῆν: expegetical to τοῦτο . . . ὃ κτέ., in order to draw attention again to the earlier remark. — We must supply naturally the same subject to πληρώσῃ as to ζῆν.

22. ἐπιρρεῖν: Callicles takes up b the simile of Socrates; but at the same time, in this treatment of it there may be some traces of the teaching of Gorgias, if, as is supposed, he accepted Empedocles' ideas of efflux and afflux in his views of physics. Cf. *Meno* 76 c βούλει οὖν σοι κατὰ Γοργίαν ἀποκρίνωμαι; — Οὐκοῦν λέγετε ἀπορροὰς τινος τῶν ὄντων κατ' Ἐμπεδοκλείαν; καὶ πόρους εἰς οὓς καὶ δι' ὧν αἱ ἀπορροαὶ πορεύονται. In this light the word πορίζεσθαι gains especial importance.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη γ', ἂν πολὺ ἐπιρρέῃ, πολὺ καὶ τὸ ἀπὶόν εἶναι, καὶ μεγάλ' ἅττα τὰ τρήματα εἶναι ταῖς 25 ἐκροαῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Χαραδριοῦ τινα αὖ σὺ βίον λέγεις, ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις οἶον πεινῆν καὶ πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν;

30 ΚΑΛ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ διψῆν γε καὶ διψῶντα πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Λέγω, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας ἔχοντα καὶ δυνάμενον πληροῦν χαίροντα εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

XLIX. ΣΩ. Εὖγε, ὦ βέλτιστε· διατέλει γὰρ ὥσπερ ἥρξω, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀπαισχνυνεῖ. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, μηδ' ἐμὲ ἀπαισχνυνθῆναι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰπέ, εἰ καὶ ψωρῶντα καὶ κνησιῶντα, ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνηῖσθαι, κνώμενον 5 διατελοῦντα τὸν βίον εὐδαιμόνως ἔστι ζῆν.

494 25. ἐκροαῖς: this compound with
b ἐκ is very unusual, but also here very exact.

27. χαραδριοῦ: according to Arist. *Anim. Hist.* ix. 11, the χαραδριός was a bird of ugly voice and color, which lived in chasms and clefts of the rock, and came forth only at night. Others describe it as a very greedy bird, ὅς ἑμα τῷ ἐσθίειν ἐκκρίνει. It is this peculiarity which explains the reference here. The duck has that reputation with us. — ἄλλ' οὐ: we might also have simple οὐ (456 e), or καὶ οὐ (Kr. 59, 1, 10).

28. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις: viz. as the above (ἀλλ' . . . ἐπιρρεῖν) used expressions. The following answer of Callicles, λέγω κτέ., saves Socrates the trouble of enumeration. — τὸ τοιόνδε: see on 490 e.

c XLIX. 1. εὖγε: the verb is reg-

ularly omitted with this exclamation, 494 which is usually ironic. By the words c τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἀπάσας, Callicles gives Socrates an open field for attack. Hence the ironical praise. Callicles need only continue to make such rash statements to be soon silenced.

2. ὡς ἔοικε: by this expression Socrates reminds Callicles of the principle he had laid down in 482 e (cf. 489 a), in order, by this ironical praise of his determination which shrinks from no consequence, to make acceptable the diversion of the discussion to less pleasant subjects. At the same time, he shows that he feels himself compelled, by the results of Callicles' moral view, to carry the investigation into this field.

4. ἀφθόνως ἔχοντα τοῦ κνηῖσθαι: the gen., on account of the meaning

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς ἄτοπος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς δημη- α
γόρος.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, Πῶλον μὲν καὶ Γοργίαν
καὶ ἐξέπληξα καὶ αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐποίησα, σὺ δὲ οὐ μὴ
10 ἐκπλαγῆς οὐδὲ μὴ αἰσχυνομένης· ἀνδρείος γὰρ εἶ. ἀλλ'
ἀποκρίνου μόνον.

ΚΑΛ. Φημὶ τοῦνν καὶ τὸν κνόμενον ἡδέως ἂν βιῶναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἡδέως, καὶ εὐδαιμόνως;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

15 ΣΩ. Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κνησιώῃ, ἢ ἔτι τί σε ο
ἐρωτῶ; ὅρα, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τί ἀποκρινεῖ, εἰάν τις σε τὰ
[ἐχόμενα] τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἅπαντα ἐρωτᾷ· καὶ τούτων τοι-
ούτων ὄντων κεφάλαιον, ὃ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, οὗτος οὐ
δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχυρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος; ἢ τούτους τολμήσεις λέ-
20 γειν εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, εἰάν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ αἰσχύνει εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς
λόγους;

ΣΩ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄγω ἐνταῦθα, ὦ γενναῖε, ἢ ἐκεῖνος, ὅς

⁴⁹⁴ of the adverb (cf. φθονεῖν τινὶ τινος).

^c — κνησθαι: contracted like ζῆν, ψῆν, etc. Cf. πεινῆν in b above.

d 6. ὥς ἄτοπος εἶ κτλ.: rudeness instead of response. — δημηγόρος: see on 482 c.

8. τοιγάρτοι: this strong inferential particle (cf. 471 c) serves to compel Callicles, who would gladly have evaded the answer by the general reproach ὥς ἄτοπος εἶ, to a definite answer, by reference to 487 a, b.

10. ἀνδρείος: with an allusion to 491 b. It is contrasted with ἐκπλαγῆναι, because, besides φρόνησις, bravery is the only virtue recognized by Callicles as necessary for a statesman. He must, therefore, display this quality himself.

16 f. τὰ ἐχόμενα: used absolutely ⁴⁹⁴ would not indeed be unexampled (cf. ^e Isoc. vi. 29 ἐκ τῶν ἐχομένων γνώσεσθε), but in connection with τούτοις ἐφεξῆς is pleonastic. Otherwise Plato's usage is either τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα (Rep. iii. 389 e) or τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς (Tim. 30 c, Phileb. 34 d).

18. κεφάλαιον: without the article is rather uncommon (cf. 453 a, 472 c), but does occasionally occur. Cf. Dem. ii. 31. — οὗτος: points emphatically back to ὃ τῶν κιναιδῶν βίος, which has already received especial stress through the preceding word κεφάλαιον.

21. εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγων: is the same reproach which was made above, 482 e.

ἀν φῇ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρωσιν,
 25 εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διορίζηται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὅποιαί 495
 ἀγαθαὶ καὶ κακαί; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγε, πότεροιν φῆς
 εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναί τι τῶν ἡδέων, ὃ οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἀγαθόν;

ΚΑΛ. Ὡς δὴ μοι μὴ ἀνομολογούμενος ἦ ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν
 30 ἕτερον φήσω εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὸ φημι εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Διαφθείρεις, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τοὺς πρώτους λόγους,
 καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μετ' ἐμοῦ ἱκανῶς τὰ ὄντα ἐξετάζεις, εἴπερ
 παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα σαντῶ ἐρεῖς.

ΚΑΛ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

35 ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν ὀρθῶς ποιῶ οὐτ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ ποιῶ τοῦτο,
 οὔτε σύ. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ἄθρει, μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ἦ τὸ ἀγαθόν,
 τὸ πάντως χαίρειν· ταυτὰ τε γὰρ τὰ νυνδὴ αἰνιχθέντα
 πολλὰ καὶ αἰσχροὶ φαίνεται συμβαίνοντα, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως
 ἔχει, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ.

494 24. ἀνέδην: without limitation, from
 the same root as ἀνίημι. — οὕτω: see
 on 468 c ἀπλῶς οὕτως.

495 26. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν: the last at-
 tempt to come to an understanding.
 Cf. *Crito* 44 b. The answer of Calli-
 cles tends to bring into the foreground
 the question of the identity or oppo-
 sition of the agreeable and the good.

29. ἀνομολογούμενος: is not to be
 connected with ἀνομολογέσθαι, "to re-
 peat an admission already made and
 to come to an agreement," but is from
 ὁμολογούμενος in composition with α-
 privative. By this expression Calli-
 cles makes plain the recklessness of
 his thinking and the obstinacy of his
 disposition. The sentence is con-
 densed by the omission of a self-
 evident clause: "in order that I may
 not make my statement inconsistent,
 (which I will do) if I say," etc.

31. διαφθείρεις τοὺς πρώτους λό- 495
 γους: cf. *Prot.* 360 a διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς
 ἐμπροσθεν ὁμολογίας. Callicles' words
 in 491 e and elsewhere gave reason
 to expect that he would speak his
 sentiments roundly without any hesi-
 tation. Cf. 492 d.

32. ἱκανῶς . . . ἐξετάζεις: has refer-
 ence to 487 e ἐάν τι σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
 ὁμολογήσῃς μοι, βεβασανισμένον τοῦτ'
 ἡδὴ ἔσται ἱκανῶς. — εἴπερ . . . ἐρεῖς:
 "if you will persist in speaking," with
 a decidedly unfavorable color.

33. σαντῶ: rather stronger than σοί.

34. καὶ γὰρ σύ: complete the sen- b
 tence from what precedes.

36. ἄθρει: like σκοπεῖν and similar
 verbs has the construction of verbs
 of fear.

37. αἰνιχθέντα: denotes the conse-
 quences previously intimated, though
 not definitely stated, by Socrates.

40 ΚΑΛ. Ὡς σύ γε οἶει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Σὺ δὲ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ταῦτα ἰσχυρίζεαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

Λ. ΣΩ. Ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ ὥς σοῦ σπουδά-
ζοντος;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ, διελού τάδε· ἐπι-
στήμην που καλεῖς τι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐ καὶ ἀνδρείαν νυνδὴ ἔλεγές τινα εἶναι μετὰ ἐπι-
στήμης;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐλεγον γάρ.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι οὖν ὥς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης
δύο ταῦτα ἔλεγες;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡδονὴν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐτερον δὴπου, ὦ σοφώτατε σύ.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐτέραν ἡδονῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα ταῦτα, ὅτι Καλλικλῆς

495 40. ὥς σύ γε οἶει: evasive, as 473

b. The following question inquires whether Callicles still holds to his previous statement, while accepting the consequences of it.

c. L. 1. ἐπιχειρῶμεν: see on 492 d ἐπεξέρχει. Notice the determination and assurance of the answers of Callicles.

• 4. διελού: because it is a question of distinction between ideas.

7. νυνδὴ ἔλεγες: inasmuch as Callicles had in 491 a, b classed together ἀνδρεῖοι and φρόνιμοι.

10. ὥς ἕτερον (sc. ὄν): the omission of the partic. in the acc. abs.

with an adj. and ὥς is very rare; e.g. 495 Prot. 323 b ὥς ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἁμωσγέπως μετέχειν αὐτῆς. But Heindorf supplies ὄν.

14. ὦ σοφώτατε σύ: a humorously d ironical intimation that Socrates was asking something quite self-evident. But Callicles should not recognize an ἐπιστήμην and an ἀνδρεία, in addition to "the good," if this is to find its realization in ἡδονή. The argument which begins 497 d is based upon this contradiction.

17. ὅπως μεμνησόμεθα: this use of ὅπως with the fut. is distinctively a colloquialism, the majority of exam-

ἔφη Ἀχαρνεύς ἡδὺ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτόν εἶναι, ἐπιστή-
μην δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἕτερον.

20 ΚΑΛ. Σωκράτης δέ γε ἡμῖν ὁ Ἀλωπεκῆθεν οὐχ ὁμολο-
γεῖ ταῦτα; ἢ ὁμολογεῖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ· οἶμαι δέ γε οὐδὲ Καλλικλῆς, ὅταν
αὐτὸς αὐτὸν θεάσῃται ὀρθῶς. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, τοὺς εὔ-
πράττοντας τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν οὐ τὸνναντίον ἡγεῖ
25 πάθος πεπονθέναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστὶν ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις,
ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν ὥσπερ περὶ ὑγείας ἔχει καὶ
νόσου; οὐ γὰρ ἅμα δῆπου ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ νοσεῖ ὁ ἄνθρω-
30 πος, οὐδὲ ἅμα ἀπαλλάττεται ὑγείας τε καὶ νόσου.

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οἷον περὶ οὗτου βούλει τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαβὼν
σκόπει. νοσεῖ που ἄνθρωπος ὀφθαλμούς, ᾧ ὄνομα ὀφθαλ-
μῖα;

495 ples being found in Aristophanes.

^d For statistics, see GMT. 274.

17 f. Καλλικλῆς ἔφη Ἀχαρνεύς: a humorous imitation of the custom which prevailed in the public assembly, according to which any one who introduced a motion or resolution had to add to his own name the name of the deme to which he belonged; cf. the famous line which used to afford Philip of Macedon so much amusement, Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους Παιανιεὺς τὰδ' εἶπεν. Callicles falls in with the humor immediately. Ἀχαρναί belonged to the φυλὴ Οἰνιῆς, Ἀλωπεκῆ to the φυλὴ Ἀντιοχίς.

19. τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ: does not properly belong in this summing up (ὅπως μνησθόμεθα) of the foregoing steps, which define expressly the fact that

ἐπιστήμη and ἀνδρεία on the one hand 495
are quite distinct from ἡδονή (τὸ ^d
ἡδύ) on the other. Still, by reason of the identity of ἡδύ and ἀγαθόν main-
tained by Callicles, the ἀγαθόν would be very easily substituted for the ἡδύ.

23. αὐτὸς αὐτόν: "himself," i.e. his own mind.

27. ἐναντία: i.e. logically contrary and contradictory ideas, between which a mean is not to be thought of.

32. ἀπολαβὼν: used absolutely equiv. to "separately." Cf. Rep. iii. 392 e ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἀδύνατοι λέγουν, οὐ κατὰ ὅλον, ἀλλ' ἀπολαβὼν μέρος τι πειράσσομαι σοὶ ἐν τούτῳ δηλῶσαι. The gen. τοῦ σώματος depends on περὶ οὗτου (μέρους) θοῶλει.

33. ἀνθρώπος: the same as ὁ ἄνθρω- 496
πος above. a

35 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐ δῆπου καὶ ὑγιαίνει γε ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.^{not in last}

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ὅταν τῆς ὀφθαλμίας ἀπαλλάττηται, ἄρα τότε καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἀπαλλάττεται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ
40 τελευτῶν ἅμα ἀμφοτέρων ἀπήλλακται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἦκιστά γε.

ΣΩ. Θαυμάσιον γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἄλογον γίγνεται· ἦ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

45 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἶμαι, ἐκάτερον καὶ λαμβάνει καὶ ἀπολλύει;^{locus}

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθένειαν ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

50 ΣΩ. Καὶ τάχος καὶ βραδυτῆτα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὰγαθὰ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὰναντία τούτων, κακά τε καὶ ἀθλιότητα, ἐν μέρει λαμβάνει καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀπαλλάττεται ἐκατέρου;

55 ΚΑΛ. Πάντως δῆπου.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν εὐρωμεν ἄρα ἅττα, ὧν ἅμα τε ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἅμα ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἂν εἴη τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὁμολογοῦμεν ταῦτα; καὶ εὖ μάλα σκεψάμενος ἀποκρίνου.

⁴⁹⁶ 37. οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν: by the addition of οὐν, the relative seems to acquire the force of an indefinite. See Kr. 51, 15, 3; H. 285, 1002 a.

^a 42. θαυμάσιον . . . γίγνεται: "the result (γίγνεται) so stated is unreasonable." Note that the Greek uses the ind. of the necessary conclusion,

whereas Eng. would prefer the ideal ⁴⁹⁶ 'would be.' ^a

58 f. καὶ εὖ μάλα κτέ.: with this c formula Socrates warns Callicles of the importance of being careful in his response, — a warning which the latter ignores in the reckless assurance of his answer.

60 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ὑπερφνω̄ς ὡς ὁμολογῶ.^{1000 highly}

ΛΙ. ΣΩ. Ἰθι δὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὁμολογημένα. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον ἢ δὴ ἄνιάρων εἶναι; αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνιάρων ἔγωγε· τὸ μέντοι πεινῶντα ἐσθίειν ἡδύ.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐγὼ· μανθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἄνιάρων. ἢ οὐχί;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ διψῆν;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

10 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἔτι πλείω ἐρωτῶ, ἢ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπασαν ἔνδειαν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἄνιάρων εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Ὅμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· διψῶντα δὲ δὴ πίνειν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἡδὺ φῆς εἶναι;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου οὐ λέγεις τὸ μὲν διψῶντα λυπούμενον δῆπου ἐστίν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ πίνειν πλήρωσίς τε τῆς ἐνδείας καὶ ἡδονῆ;

496 ΛΙ. 1 f. τὸ πεινῆν ἔλεγες πότερον:
c the question, by coming late in the sentence, gains in animation. Cf. Rid. §§ 309, 310.

2 f. αὐτὸ λέγω τὸ πεινῆν: added by Socrates that Callicles may not think at the same time of the satisfaction of the hunger. How close that idea lay is shown by Callicles' answer, in which he tries to guard himself by adding this idea.

d 5. καὶ ἐγὼ· μανθάνω: the asyndetic union of two such expressions, one expressing assent, the other comprehension, is quite isolated and contrary

to usage. Cf. 474 c, 490 d. — ἄλλ' 496 οὖν: but in any case, frequently associated with γέ. Cf. 506 b and *Apol.* 27 c ἀλλ' οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, 34 e, *Prot.* 327 c ἀλλ' οὖν ἀληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοί.

9. σφόδρα γε: see on *μάλιστα* in e below.

12. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα: further questions are superfluous.

16. τούτου οὐ λέγεις κτέ.: the concrete example διψῶντα πίνειν Socrates uses to distinguish and characterize the two ideas clearly. The generaliz-

20 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸ πίνειν χαίρειν λέγεις;

ΚΑΛ. Μάλιστα.

ΣΩ. Διψῶντά γε;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

25 ΣΩ. Λυπούμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθάνει οὖν τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὅτι λυπούμενον χαίρειν λέγεις ἅμα, ὅταν διψῶντα πίνειν λέγῃς; ἢ οὐχ ἅμα τοῦτο γίγνεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον καὶ χρόνον εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος βούλει; οὐδὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρει. ἔστι ταῦτα ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εὖ γε πράττοντα κακῶς πράττειν ἅμα ἀδύνατον φῆς εἶναι.

35 ΚΑΛ. Φημί γάρ.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιῶμενον δέ γε χαίρειν δυνατὸν ὁμολόγηκας. 497

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

40 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

⁴⁹⁶ e ation that pain and pleasure can both be present in the same act follows later.

22. **μάλιστα**: like *σφόδρα γε* in d above, gives emphatic assent. *μάλιστα* has become the general word for "yes" in modern Greek, almost to the exclusion of *ναί*.

29 f. *εἴτε ψυχῆς εἴτε σώματος*: for Socrates' argument it is immaterial whether pleasure and pain are looked upon as something bodily or something psychical; for psychology, not so. But here the question is only

of the nature of the ideas themselves, the peculiarity of their association at the same place and time, which distinguishes them from that other class of mutually exclusive ideas.

34. *φῆς*: with reference to 495 e. The answer of Callicles shows that he still maintains his statement.

40. *οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα σοφίζει*: Callicles ⁴⁹⁷ avoids admitting his defeat by complaining of Socrates' methods. Cf. 511 a. *σοφίζεσθαι* is much the same as "subtilize," "quibble."

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ ἀκκίζει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· καὶ πρόθι γε
 ἔτι εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν—

ΚΑΛ. Τί ἔχων ληρεῖς;

ΣΩ. Ἵνα εἰδῆς, ὡς σοφὸς ὢν με νουθετεῖς. οὐχ ἅμα
 45 διψῶν τε ἕκαστος ἡμῶν πέπνυται καὶ ἅμα ἡδόμενος διὰ
 τοῦ πίνειν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις.

ΓΟΡ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου καὶ ἡμῶν
 ἕνεκα, ἵνα περαινθῶσιν οἱ λόγοι.

50 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' αἰεὶ τοιοῦτός ἐστι Σωκράτης, ὦ Γοργία.
 σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγου ἄξια ἀνερωτᾷ καὶ ἐξελέγχει.

ΓΟΡ. Ἀλλὰ τί σοὶ διαφέρει; πάντως οὐ σὴ αὕτη ἡ
 τιμή, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· ἀλλ' ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει ἐξελέγξαι
 ὅπως ἂν βούληται.

55 ΚΑΛ. Ἐρώτα δὴ σὺ τὰ σμικρὰ τε καὶ στενὰ ταῦτα, ε
 ἐπείπερ Γοργία δοκεῖ οὕτως.

497 41. ἀκκίζεσθαι: 'this word and its
 a derivative ἀκκισμός are used to denote any kind of mock modesty or prudery, especially, though not exclusively, on the part of women.' Thompson. To Socrates' words of encouragement Callicles angrily replies, "What nonsense are you still talking?" whereby, however, Socrates is not deterred from continuing his talk in the courtly manner which is characteristic of him. On the phrase ἔχων ληρεῖς see on 490 e.

b 47. οὐκ οἶδα ὅτι λέγεις: Callicles sees that from this new turn Socrates will draw the same conclusion which he has drawn above (ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). Hence he repeatedly refuses to answer, and so shows plainly that he wishes to break off the conversation. This leads to the deprecatory remark of Gorgias.

48. μηδαμῶς: *don't!* To be completed by some such general phrase as οὕτω ποιήσης. The omission of the verb is common. Cf. *Symp.* 175 b μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ' εἴτε αὐτόν.— That Gorgias here enters as mediator is quite in keeping with the role assigned him in this dialogue, in accordance with which he is distinguished from his companions by his personal dignity. See *Introd.* § 13.

53. τιμή: in a judicial sense, "the penalty decreed by the court." Hence the words οὐ σὴ κτέ. are equivalent to "this is no fault of yours," "the blame cannot be laid upon you."— ὑπόσχες: equiv. to ὑπ' σεαυτόν. See on παρασχεῖν 456 b and 475 d.

55. Callicles allows himself to be c persuaded by Gorgias to continue the conversation, but not without repeated expression of his disinclina-

LII. ΣΩ. Εὐδαίμων εἶ, ὦ Καλλίκεις, ὅτι τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι πρὶν τὰ σμικρά· ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ ᾔμην θεμιτὸν εἶναι. ὅθεν οὖν ἀπέλιπες, ἀποκρίνου, εἰ οὐχ ἅμα παύεται διψῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν καὶ ἡδόμενος.

5 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πεινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν ἅμα παύεται;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν λυπῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἅμα
10 παύεται;

d

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἅμα παύεται, ὥς σὺ ὠμολόγεις· νῦν δὲ οὐχ ὁμολογεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε· τί οὖν δῆ;

15 ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ ταῦτ' ἀγίνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰ γαθὰ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιανοῖς. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅμα παύεται,

⁴⁹⁷ tion. — στενά: mean, paltry, is in
c keeping with the view expressed by Callicles in 485 d of the relative provinces of philosophy and politics.

LII. 1 f. τὰ μεγάλα μεμύησαι κτέ.: two kinds of Eleusinian mysteries were distinguished, the greater and the lesser. In the great procession which on the 20th of Boedromion (September) conducted Iacchus to Eleusis, no one could take part who had not received previously at Athens the less and preparatory consecration (μύησις, κάθαρσις, προτέλεια) in the month Anthesterion (February). By this he became eligible to initiation into the Greater Mysteries; and after initiation, as an initiated member (μύστης), to the ἐποπτεία or view of the mysterious sacred relics and participation in the holy rites which were

connected with the arrival of the pro-
cession at Eleusis and took place in
the so-called τελεστήριον. — Socrates
meets with most cutting irony the disdainful contempt with which Callicles regards dialectical methods. A different simile for the same matter is found in 514 e.

3. ὅθεν ἀπέλιπες: the interrupted argument is resumed again by Socrates at the point where it had been broken off by Callicles' refusal to answer.

7. ἡδονῶν: corresponding with what precedes we might expect ἡδόμενος. The noun is used owing to ἐπιθυμιῶν, which stands on the same plane as πεινῶν and as a kind of ἔνδεια (496 d) is an ἀνιανόν. Hence the employment of λυπῶν below.

14. τί οὖν δῆ: well! what then? d
See on 453 b and 515 e.

τῶν δὲ οὐ, ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ἂν εἴη τὰ
 ἡδέα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τὰ ἀνιάρὰ τοῖς κακοῖς; ἐὰν δὲ βούλη,
 καὶ τῇδ' ἐπίσκεψαι· οἶμαι γάρ σοι οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ὁμολογεῖ-
 20 σθαι. ἄθρει δέ· τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς οὐχὶ ἀγαθῶν παρουσία
 ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς, ὥσπερ τοὺς καλοὺς οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας καλεῖς ἄφρονας καὶ δει-
 λούς; οὐ γὰρ ἄρτι γε, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνδρείους καὶ φρονίμους
 25 ἔλεγες· ἢ οὐ τούτους ἀγαθοὺς καλεῖς;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; παῖδα ἀνόητον χαίροντα ἤδη εἶδες;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄνδρα δὲ οὐπω εἶδες ἀνόητον χαίροντα;

30 ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου.

ΚΑΛ. Εἶδον.

497
 d 17. ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων: this seems
 otiose after the preceding sentence.
 If genuine, it must be considered as
 mere conversational fulness.

19. τῇδε: refers naturally, accord-
 ing to the regular usage, to the argu-
 ment begun in τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς κτέ. The
 introduction of this argument is, how-
 ever, delayed by the parenthetical
 clause οἶμαι . . . ἄθρει δέ. In this
 clause ταύτῃ, though in sense also
 applicable to the argument which
 follows, is in form to be connected
 with τῇδε. The subject of ὁμολο-
 γεῖσθαι is general, and can be supplied
 from the clause πῶς οὖν κτέ.

e 20 f. τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, τοὺς κακοὺς:
 the art. as in 490 e collects the indi-
 viduals into a class or species. ἀγα-
 θῶν is used on account of its nearness
 to ἀγαθοὺς, otherwise we should expect
 ἀρετῶν as in 506 d. The way in which

we arrive at these ideas of distinction 497
 between species is shown by the same e
 expressions which are employed in
 other places to explain the relation
 of the ideas to the things themselves.
 So besides παρουσία (παρεῖναι) we find
 κοινωνία and of things also μετέχειν
 employed.

23 f. ἄφρονας καὶ δειλούς: "un-
 reasoning and cowardly creatures."
 The absence of the art. does not
 cause obscurity, because the connex-
 ion shows ἀγαθοὺς to be the predicate.
 In the words ἀνδρείους κτέ. Socrates is
 referring to 489 e and 491 b.

30. τί τοῦτο: see on 448 b above.

32. εἶδον: the tense is due to the
 preceding question. English would
 require 'I have seen.' This would
 be permissible also in Greek. The
 aor. of verbs of perception states the
 fact; the pf. retains the image. The

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; 498

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

35 ΣΩ. Πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν;

40 ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον· εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε.

45 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δ' οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί;

ΚΑΛ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὥς ἔοικεν.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ 50 ἀνδρεῖοι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀμφότεροι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα ὁμοίως;

ΚΑΛ. Μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί.

ΣΩ. Ἀπιόντων δ' οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν;

497 negation of the fact involves the negation of the image; hence the neg. is usually followed by the aorist. The pf. with the neg. is, however, also found; cf. *Prot.* 310 e. But the difference in the force is evident. In 38, below, the tense may be due to the desire for consistency, or to ἥδη.

498 38. ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο: gives us to understand that Socrates was expecting a more definite answer.

b 43. ἀμφότεροι μᾶλλον: Callicles

tries to return such answers as will not afford Socrates any chance for argument. Such action borders on rudeness, and is almost equivalent to a refusal to answer. The addition that he makes, however, gives Socrates a hold. The answers which follow show that Callicles is not stating his real sentiments. The artistic design of the author is therefore now to make his defeat seem all the more decisive.

55 ΚΑΛ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι παραπλησίως, ὥς σὺ φῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; c

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

60 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί;

65 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ [οἱ ἀγαθοὶ] καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί;

LIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις. d

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῆς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθοὺς, κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας;

⁴⁹⁸
c 66. ἄρ' οὖν κτέ.: this conclusion comes from the fact that Socrates, on the basis of the view set forth by Callicles in 491 e ff., uses in the predicate ἀγαθοί in place of χαίρουσι, and κακοί in place of λυποῦνται, whereas these same words in the subject have an entirely different meaning, which is to be seen from the explanation of Callicles in 491 c d. The two predicates are to be conceived as belonging to two different sentences, thus: οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ and οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τε καὶ οἱ κακοὶ παραπλησίως εἰσὶ κακοί.

d LIII. 1. ἀλλὰ λέγεις: this statement of Callicles may be meant in earnest, inasmuch as the previous words of Socrates are really some-

what confusing, although they are simply a paradoxical conclusion from Callicles' paradoxical propositions. But by confessing his inability to comprehend, Callicles gives Socrates the opportunity of supplying a proof of his previous exposition, and setting forth the principles upon which it rests. The distinction made in 497 e now becomes of value.

3. κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν: both the subj. as well as the subst. on which the gen. depends are to be supplied from the context. Note the chiasmus of the arrangement. — τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ κτέ.: the preds. are τὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς ἀνίας, the art. defining a class. The art. with ἀγαθὰ refers back to ἀγαθῶν. We should also expect one with κακά.

5 ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τὰγαθὰ, αἱ ἡδοναί,
εἵπερ χαίρουσιν;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακὰ, αἱ
λύπαι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάρεστιν.

ΣΩ. Κακῶν δέ γε παρουσία φῆς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς e

15 κακοὺς· ἥ οὐκέτι φῆς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἱ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἱ ἂν ἀνιῶν-
ται;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον, οἱ δ' ἦττον ἦττον, οἱ δὲ
παραπλησίως παραπλησίως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν φῆς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι
τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ

25 τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἥ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλοὺς;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Συλλόγισαι δὴ κοινῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ, τί ἡμῖν συμβαίνει
ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων· καὶ δις γάρ τοι καὶ τρίς φασιν
καλὸν εἶναι τὰ καλὰ λέγειν τε καὶ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ἀγαθὸν 499

30 μὲν εἶναι τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν φαμεν. ἥ γάρ;

498 20. οἱ μὲν γε μᾶλλον κτέ.: is to be
e completed from the context thus:
οἱ μὲν (ἦν) μᾶλλον (χαίρωσι) μᾶλλον
(ἀγαθοὶ) κτέ.

28. δις γάρ καὶ τρίς: this proverb
is ascribed to Empedocles. Plato
employs it also in *Phil.* 59 e, where we

read: τὸ δις καὶ τρίς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον 498
ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. Cf. *Soph. Phil.* e
1238 δις ταῦτά βούλει καὶ τρίς ἀναπολεῖν
μ' ἔπη. The first καὶ means also, and its
force extends over both members, as
Phaedo 63 e ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δις
καὶ τρίς πίνειν τοῦς τι τοιοῦτον ποιούντας.

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἄφρονα καὶ δειλόν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δὲ αὖ τὸν χαίροντα;

35 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δὲ τὸν ἀνιώμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ἀνιᾶσθαι δὲ καὶ χαίρειν τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ὁμοίως, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον τὸν κακόν;

40 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως γίγνεται κακὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κακός; οὐ ταῦτα συμβαίνει καὶ τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα, εἴαν τις ταῦτα φῇ ἡδέα τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; οὐ ταῦτα ἀνάγκη, ὦ Καλλίκλεις;

LIV. ΚΑΛ. Πάλαι τοί σου ἀκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ἐνθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ἐνδῶ ὁτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχει ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ σὺ οἶε ἐμὲ ἢ καὶ ἄλλον ὄντιν οὖν ἀνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι
5 τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους.

499 43. τὰ πρότερα ἐκείνα: refer proba-
b bly to the discussion of 494 a-495 a, where Socrates had urged Callicles to reflect whether he was determined to abide by his statement that ἡδὺ and ἀγαθόν are the same.

LIV. 1. πάλαι τοι κτέ.: like all who try only to gain their point, not to arrive at the truth, Callicles seeks to evade the now inevitable confession of his error by representing his previous statement as a mere joke. But cf. 495 a-c.

3. τούτου: ἔχουσθαι, to hold fast, takes the gen. See G. 171, 1; H. 738.— ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια: boys easily receive as genuine what one tries to im-

pose upon them. Farther than this, 499 the comparison is not to be pressed.
b — ὥς δὴ σὺ οἶε: see on 468 e. Callicles tries to heighten the probability that he was only joking, by himself characterizing his first statement as nonsensical.

5. ἡδονάς: the natural position would be τὰς μὲν ἡδονὰς βελτίους κτέ. The reason for the post-position is that the word is an afterthought of Callicles, added from the sudden consciousness that τὰς μὲν was not sufficiently definite. Just as if you suppose that I, etc., do not believe that some are better, — pleasures, I mean, — others worse.

Σο. Ἴον ἰού, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὥς πανοῦργος εἶ, καί μοι c
 ὥσπερ παιδὶ χρῆν, τοτὲ μὲν αὖ φάσκων οὕτως ἔχειν, τοτὲ
 δὲ ἐτέρως, ἐξαπατῶν με. καίτοι οὐκ ᾤμην γε κατ' ἀρχὰς
 ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐκόντος εἶναι ἐξαπατηθήσεσθαι, ὥς ὄντος φίλου.
 10 νῦν δὲ ἐψεύσθην, καὶ ὥς ἔοικεν ἀνάγκη μοι κατὰ τὸν
 παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ
 διδόμενον παρὰ σοῦ. ἔστιν δὲ δῆ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὃ νῦν λέγεις,
 ὅτι ἡδοναὶ τινὲς εἰσιν αἱ μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ κακαί· ἥ γάρ;
 Καλ. Ναί.

15 Σο. Ἄρ' οὖν ἀγαθαὶ μὲν αἱ ὠφέλιμοι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ a
 βλαβεραί;

Καλ. Πάνν γε.

Σο. Ὡφέλιμοι δέ γε αἱ ἀγαθὸν τι ποιοῦσαι, κακαὶ δὲ αἱ
 κακόν τι;

499 6. ἰὸν ἰού: exclamation of surprise and wonder, usually with a side-idea of ill-treatment (σχετλιαστικὸν ἐπίρρημα), as *Ar. Nub.* 1 ἰὸν ἰὸν, ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον ἀπέραντον, but it also expresses pleasure, as e.g. *Rep.* iv. 432 d καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδάν, Ἴον ἰού, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαῦκων· κινδυνεύομεν τι ἔχειν ἵχνος (*trace*) καί μοι δοκεῖ οὐ πάνν τι ἐκφευγεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς. *Εἰ* ἀγγέλλεις, ἥ δ' ὅς.—πανοῦργος: sometimes associated with δεινός, denotes a rather excessive adroitness, bordering on rascality, as “artful,” “sly”; also “knavish.”

7. ὥσπερ παιδί: by a delicate use of his own comparison, Socrates characterizes Callicles' conduct in acting as if he were dealing with boys, not men, as improper and unworthy.—τότε μὲν αὖ: it must be confessed that αὖ in this position gives trouble. Cron thinks that it recalls a similar allegation in 491 b; but that is rather far-fetched.

8. καίτοι κτέ.: in 495 a Socrates' 499 faith in Callicles' *παρησία* is shaken; c in 497 a, that in his *σοφία*, and now, that in his *εὐνοία*.

9. ἐκόντος εἶναι: on the use of εἶναι in phrases, see GMT. 780 and H. 956 a.

10 f. κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον: a common way of introducing a proverb; cf. *Symp.* 195 b.

11. τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν κτέ.: a mixture of two proverbs. The first one means literally, to “treat well what is at hand,” i.e. ‘to make the best of what one has,’ according to the English saying. In almost the same sense we use the more colloquial ‘grin and bear it.’ The second proverb, δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον, applies more exactly to the case in point, the διδόμενον being naturally τὸ λεγόμενον. An English proverb which has much the same force is, ‘do not look a gift-horse in the mouth.’ After τοῦτο, τὸ διδόμενον serves for a relative clause.

18. κακαί: we should naturally ex- d

20 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τὰς τοιάσδε λέγεις, οἷον κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἅς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἡδονάς; ἄρα τούτων αἱ μὲν ὑγίειαν ποιοῦσαι ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ἰσχὺν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ἀρετὴν τοῦ σώματος, αὗται μὲν ἀγαθαί, αἱ δὲ

25 τὰναντία τούτων κακαί;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ λύπαι ὡσαύτως αἱ μὲν χρησταί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πονηραί;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

30 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰς μὲν χρηστὰς καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας καὶ αἰρετέον ἐστὶν καὶ πρακτέον;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τὰς δὲ πονηρὰς οὔ;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δῆ.

35 ΣΩ. Ἐνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν πρακτέον εἶναι, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ἐμοί τε καὶ Πῶλῳ. ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα δεῖν πάντα τᾶλλα πράττεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνο τῶν ἄλλων; σύμψηφος ἡμῖν εἶ καὶ 500

40 σὺν ἐκ τρίτων;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄρα ἔνεκα δεῖ καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα πράττειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων.

⁴⁹⁹ pect βλαβεραί, but κακός is elsewhere
^d also used in this sense.

24. αὗται μὲν: resumes αἱ μὲν . . .
τοῦ σώματος.

^e 37 f. τέλος . . . τὸ ἀγαθόν: cf.
468 a ff. The subst. embraces in one
idea what has been said, and thus
⁵⁰⁰ gives it a form of general application.

^a 39. σύμψηφος: reminds again of

the formal vote, and hence sounds ⁵⁰⁰
somewhat solemn. Cf. 501 c and ^a
473 e f.

40. ἐκ τρίτων: "of the third part."
Thompson. Cf. Symp. 213 b ὑπολύετε,
παῖδες, Ἀλκιβιάδην, ἵνα ἐκ τρίτων (i.e.
with Agathon and Socrates) κατακέη-
ται. In Tim. 54 a ἐκ τρίτου is used
in much the same sense.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

45 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν παντὸς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι, ποῖα ἀγαθὰ — τῶν ἡδέων — ἐστὶν καὶ ὅποια κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον.

ΚΑΛ. Τεχνικοῦ.

LV. ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησθῶμεν δὴ ὧν αὖ ἐγὼ πρὸς Πῶλον καὶ Γοργίαν ἐτύγχανον λέγων. ἔλεγον γάρ, εἰ μνημονεύεις, ὅτι εἶεν παρασκευαὶ αἱ μὲν μέχρι ἡδονῆς, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μόνον παρασκευάζουσai, ἀγνοοῦσαι δὲ τὸ βέλτιον 5 καὶ τὸ χεῖρον, αἱ δὲ γινώσκουσai ὅτι τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὅτι κακόν. καὶ ἐτίθην τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν μαγειρικὴν ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τέχνην, τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην. καὶ πρὸς φιλίου, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, μήτε αὐτὸς οἶον δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν μηδ' ὅτι ἂν τύχης

500 45. παντὸς ἀνδρός: possessive gen. a in pred. See H. 732 a, c.

45 f. ποῖα . . . τῶν ἡδέων: the position of the gen. shows that it is an example of ἐπιφορά, based on the conclusion drawn in 499 b. The use of ὅποια after ποῖα may be due to euphonic reasons, or to its distance from the beginning of the question.

46. τεχνικοῦ: i.e. of a man who understands the matter thoroughly, who is a master of his profession (whether art or science). Only this man can decide what is to be done and what not. The same point is made in *Crito* 47 a.

LV. 1. ὧν αὖ: the αὖ belongs to the dem. included in the relative. The arguments which Socrates again calls to mind were set forth in 464 b ff.

b 3. παρασκευαί: contrivances. This word, which is not found in the passage referred to, is used generally instead of ἐπιτηδεύσεις, θεραπεῖαι, as

drawing more attention to the end in view (μέχρι ἡδονῆς). The prep. shows that the contrivances are not claimed to reach ἡδονή, but must be varied and directed until the object is compassed; hence παρασκευάζουσai is conative. — αὐτὸ τοῦτο: i.e. the general idea, ἡδονή.

6 f. τῶν μὲν, τῶν δέ: take up αἱ μὲν, αἱ δέ. On the part. gen. with τιθέσθαι, see G. 169, 2; H. 732 a.

8. πρὸς φιλίου: so 519 c. Cf. *Phaedr.* 234 c εἰπὲ πρὸς Διὸς φιλίου. This adjuration is designed to remind Callicles of his ostentatious profession of εὐνοία, which he had so quickly forgotten.

9. μήτε αὐτός: finds its correlative in μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ, while μηδέ serves only to connect the two sections of the first member. — ὅτι ἂν τύχης κτέ.: implies perverseness in addition to chance. Cf. 495 a, b, and 499 c.

- 10 παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτ' αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὕτως
ἀποδέχου ὡς παίζοντος· ὁρᾷς γάρ, ὅτι περὶ τούτου ἡμῖν ^c
εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἂν μᾶλλον σπουδάσειέ τις καὶ σμι-
κρὸν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὄντινα χρὴ τρόπον
ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ
15 ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν
ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν ὑμεῖς
νῦν πολιτεύεσθε, ἢ ἐπὶ τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ,
καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὗτος ἐκείνου διαφέρων. ἴσως οὖν βέλ-
τιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἐπεχείρησα, διαιρεῖσθαι, διελ- ^a
20 μένους δὲ καὶ ὁμολογήσαντας ἀλλήλοις, εἰ ἔστιν τούτῳ
διττῷ τῷ βίῳ, σκέψασθαι, τί τε διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν καὶ
ὁπότερον βιωτέον αὐτοῖν. ἴσως οὖν οὐπω οἶσθα τί λέγω.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ δῆτα.

500 12. οὐ: depends upon μᾶλλον and ^c
is explained in ἡ τοῦτο. Cf. *Crito*
44 c τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ
δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι
ἢ φίλους. See *Kr.* 47, 27, 8.—σπου-
δάσειε: in reference to an investiga-
tion which one should seriously prose-
cute.

12 f. σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχων: indicates
that the question is important for
every one, not merely for statesmen
and philosophers.

14. τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ: ironically added
as a matter already decided, because
Callicles had so defined the sphere of
the "real man."

17. ἐπὶ τόνδε: anacoluthic, as if
ἐπὶ πότερον χρὴ βίον παρακαλεῖν had
preceded, whereas with πότερον we
must supply τοῦτον, i.e. τὸν τρόπον ζῆν
χρῆ.

18. διαφέρων: on the pred. use of
the partic., see GMT. 830.

19. ὡς ἄρτι ἐπεχείρησα: we think
at first of the question raised in 491 d

ff. as to the nature of self-control, ⁵⁰⁰
which leads naturally to a distinction ^c
between what is good and what is
pleasant, but we are also reminded of
the earlier conversation with Polus
and Gorgias (464 b) in which a dis-
tinction was drawn between true arts
and various tricks of dexterity, which
are designed only to cajole.

20. εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.: to be conceived, ^d
not as an interr. clause depending
upon ὁμολογήσαντας, but as the prota-
sis of a logical conditional sentence,
the apodosis of which is formed by
βέλτιστόν ἐστιν . . . σκέψασθαι. The
further investigation as to τί διαφέ-
ρετον can only take place in case the
existence of these two views of life is
definitely settled.—ὁμολογήσαντας:
as well as διελομένους and διαιρεῖσθαι,
whose meaning is defined by its refer-
ence to 495 c, are used absolutely.

22. ὁπότερον βιωτέον: sc. βίον. Cf.
485 d and *Apol.* 38 a δ ἀνεξέταστος
βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπων.

Σα. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι σαφέστερον ἐρῶ. ἐπειδὴ ὠμολογή-
 25 καμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μὲν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ,
 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην
 τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος
 θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ — αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ
 σύμφαθι ἢ μὴ· σύμφης;

30 ΚΑΛ. Οὕτως φημί.

LVI. Σα. Ἴθι δὴ, ἅ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον,
 διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν.
 ἔλεγον δέ που, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὕσσοποικὴ οὐ μοι δοκεῖ τέχνη
 εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία, ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ, λέγων ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτου 501
 5 οὐ θεραπεύει καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἔσκεπται καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ὦν
 πράττει, καὶ λόγον ἔχει τούτων ἐκάστου δοῦναι, ἡ ἰατρικὴ·
 ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς, πρὸς ἣν ἡ θεραπεία αὐτῇ ἔστω

500 d 27. τὴν μὲν κτέ.: explains ἐκατέρου
 κτέ. by substituting for the somewhat
 philosophical phrase (μελέτην . . .
 κτήσεως) one less technical (θήραν).
 But before Socrates proceeds further
 he deems it necessary to have these
 assumptions definitely agreed to,
 since, although they are indeed the
 result of the preceding investigations,
 Callicles has not expressly acceded
 to them.

e LVI. 1. πρὸς τούσδε: the dis-
 tinctions between various ideas which
 have been drawn in ch. XVIII.—XX.
 serve for Polus as well as Gorgias,
 inasmuch as the latter entered the
 discussion again in 463 e of his own
 accord.

2. διομολόγησαι: the *ἰδ* implies
 'finally,' 'definitely.' We should be
 more apt to use the *καί* in the demon-
 strative instead of the relative clause.
 — ἔδοξα: Cron thinks the use of the
 aor. instead of the pres. implies that
 Callicles must have already at the

time come to a decision, though he
 had not expressed one. But while
 such was doubtless the case, it is not
 easy to draw such a conclusion from
 the tense, for the Greeks in such an
 expression looked rather to the idea
 of the whole complex.

4. ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ: the clause is to 501
 be completed from the first member. a
 The following ἡ μὲν . . . ἡ δὲ κτέ. are
 arranged chiasmatically.

5. αἰτίαν: cf. 465 a, where the ref-
 erence was especially to the means
 employed (ὦν προσφέρει); here it is
 more general (ὦν πράττει).

6. ἡ δ' ἰατρικὴ: the addition of the
 substantive at the end of the first
 member was not necessary for clear-
 ness, but very conducive to it. Simi-
 larly *Prot.* 351 a.

7. ἡ δ' ἑτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.: an-
 other case of anacoluthon. If the
 speaker had followed the line of
 construction begun in the previous
 clause, we should have had some

- ἅπαντα, κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται, οὔτε τι τὴν φύσιν σκεψαμένη τῆς ἡδονῆς οὔτε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλόγως τε
 10 παντάπασιν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη, τριβῇ καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μνήμην μόνον σωζομένη τοῦ εἰωθότος γίνεσθαι, ᾧ δὴ καὶ πορίζεται τὰς ἡδονάς. ταῦτ' οὖν πρῶτον b
 σκόπει εἰ δοκεῖ σοι ἰκανῶς λέγεσθαι, καὶ εἶναί τινες καὶ
 15 προμηθίαν τινὰ ἔχουσαι τοῦ βελτίστου περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, αἱ δὲ τούτου μὲν ὀλιγωροῦσαι, ἐσκεμμένοι δ' αὖ, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ, τὴν ἡδονὴν μόνον τῆς ψυχῆς, τίνα ἂν αὐτῇ τρόπον γίγνοιτο, ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων ἢ χεῖρων τῶν ἡδονῶν, οὔτε σκοπούμεναι οὔτε μέλον αὐταῖς ἄλλο ἢ χαρίζεσθαι μόνον,
 20 εἴτε βέλτιον εἴτε χεῖρον. ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, c
 δοκοῦσίν τε εἶναι, καὶ ἔγωγέ φημι τὸ τοιοῦτον κολακείαν εἶναι καὶ περὶ σῶμα καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ ἄλλο ὅτου

501 such phrase as οὔτε τὴν φύσιν κτέ., on
 a which τῆς ἡδονῆς would depend, as in the case of τούτου above. In true conversational style, however, he is diverted from his line of thought by the relative clause, and proceeds to a detailed account of the method of the ἐμπειρία which κομιδῇ ἀτέχνως ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἔρχεται. The result is that τῆς ἡδονῆς is left without government, and that too without the speaker or hearers noticing it.

9. ἀλόγως: as 465 a δ ἂν ἢ ἄλογον πρᾶγμα, because the distinctive feature of a τέχνη consists in its ability δοῦναι λόγον. This must not be conceived as closely modifying διαριθμησαμένη, but as being a general criticism on οὐδὲν διαριθμησαμένη ("quite foolishly").

10. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: probably belongs to the following negation. Cf. *Apol.* 17 a ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. See on 450 b.

12. ᾧ δῆ: refers to the whole preceding clause, i.e. equiv. to τῷ σφύζεσθαι μνήμην κτέ. b

14. τοιαῦτα ἄλλαι: "according to their nature similar, but different in their application." Supply δοκοῦσιν out of the preceding δοκεῖ.

15. προμηθίαν τοῦ βελτίστου: designed to be in sharp contrast with the μνήμην τοῦ εἰωθότος γίνεσθαι above.

16 f. ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ: i.e. in the case of the body.

18. ἥτις δὲ ἡ βελτίων κτέ.: is a circumlocutory reference to φύσις, as οὔτε μέλον in the following member is to αἰτία. The abs. partic. μέλον is likewise combined with an appos. partic. in *Phaedr.* 235 a ὡς οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶν τοῦ πολλὰ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτῷ μέλον τοῦ τοιούτου.

22. καὶ περὶ ἄλλο: indefinite and c merely preparatory.

ἂν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν θεραπείῃ, ἀσκέπτως ἔχων τοῦ ἀμείνονός
τε καὶ τοῦ χείρονος· σὺ δὲ δὴ πότερον συγκατατίθεσαι
25 ἡμῖν περὶ τούτων τὴν αὐτὴν δόξαν ἢ ἀντίφης;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῶ, ἵνα σοι καὶ περανθῇ
ὁ λόγος καὶ Γοργία τῷδε χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον δὲ περὶ μὲν μίαν ψυχὴν ἔστιν τοῦτο, περὶ α
δὲ δύο καὶ πολλὰς οὐκ ἔστιν;

30 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ δύο καὶ περὶ πολλὰς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀθρόαις ἅμα χαρίζεσθαι ἔστι, μὴδὲ
σκοποῦμενον τὸ βέλτιστον;

ΚΑΛ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

LVII. ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, αἰτινές εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιτηδεύ-
σεις αἱ τοῦτο ποιοῦσαι; μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ βούλει, ἐμοῦ ἔρω-
τῶντος, ἢ μὲν ἂν σοι δοκῇ τούτων εἶναι, φάθι, ἢ δ' ἂν μὴ,
μὴ φάθι. πρῶτον δὲ σκεψώμεθα τὴν αὐλητικὴν. οὐ
5 δοκεῖ σοι τοιαύτη τις εἶναι, ᾧ Καλλίκλεις, τὴν ἡδονὴν
ἡμῶν μόνον διώκειν, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν φροντίζειν;

501 23. ἀσκέπτως ἔχων: like ἀμελῶν
c or ὀλιγωρῶν. Cf. above, b.

24. συγκατατίθεσαι: reminds again
of voting (as above, 500 a. σύμψηφος).
It is regularly used without an obj.
Here we must consider δόξαν as tak-
ing the place of the word ψῆφον, to
be construed with this verb after the
analogy of the regular phrase θέσθαι
ψῆφον. See Thompson. συγκατατίθε-
σθαι has also the meaning "lay aside
for future use."

26. οὐκ ἔγωγε κτέ.: an emphatic
assent (see on 453 d). But Callicles
weakens it by the addition of ἵνα . . .
χαρίσωμαι, referring to 497 b, c.

d 28 f. περὶ δὲ δύο κτέ.: this exten-
sion to several souls was necessary in
order that the investigation might be
directed to political activity.

31. μὴδέ: "without."

LVII. 4. τὴν αὐλητικὴν: Socrates
so chooses his examples that he passes
from species to species in an ascend-
ing scale, and at the same time grad-
ually approaches nearer to rhetoric.
Playing the flute passed for the low-
est species of music. Cf. the boyish
words of Alcibiades in Plut. Alc. 2
αὐλείτωσαν Θηβαίων παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ
ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι. In Athens it was
left mostly to such as made a busi-
ness of it. Female flute-players were
accustomed to appear at banquets.
The instrument was probably more
like a clarinet than a flute.

6. διώκειν, φροντίζειν: these infini-
tives, while in sense epexegetic to τοι-
αύτη εἶναι, are syntactically dependent
on δοκεῖ. See on 487 c.

501

d

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ τοιαίδε ἅπασαι, οἷόν ἡ κιθαριστική ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν;

10 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἢ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία καὶ ἢ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις οὐ τοιαύτη τίς σοι καταφαίνεται; ἢ ἡγεῖ τι φροντίζειν Κωησίαν τὸν Μέλλητος, ὅπως ἐρεῖ τι τοιοῦ-

501 9. ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν: Plato considers as a species of flattery only that kind of cithara-playing which was practised in the musical contests at the public festivals. On the other hand, he recognizes a variety of this music which may be helpful to the proper cultivation of the soul of the individual who practises it, and indeed may elevate his moral feeling. This he himself recommends in *Rep.* iii. 399 d f. Cithara-playing was a part of the education of all young Athenians.

11. ἢ τῶν χορῶν διδασκαλία: διδασκαλία denotes the drill of the chorus for orchestral exhibition as well as for singing. It was the business of the poet. Hdt. i. 23 says of Arion ἐόντα κιθαροῦν τῶν τότε ἐόντων οὐδενὸς δεύτερον καὶ διθυράμβον πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν ποιήσαντά τε καὶ ὀνομάσαντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ. What is to be understood here by choruses is explained by the addition ἢ διθυράμβων ποίησις. It is not all choric lyric which is condemned, but only that part of it which from its connexion with the Dionysus cult had found entrance into Athens and had there been much fostered by the state, which entrusted both native and foreign musicians with the arrangement and production of the dithyramb at the Dionysiac festivals, where con-

tests (ἀγῶνες) took place in it. The founder of dithyrambic melic was the just-named Arion of Methymne (B.C. 600), who resided at the court of Periander of Corinth. He was said to have introduced the *strophic* arrangement, and the so-called *cyclic* chorus (consisting of fifty members), which was thus named because the chorus was arranged in a circle around the altar. The second period of the dithyramb begins with the settling in Athens of Lasus of Hermione, a contemporary of the Pisistratidae and a teacher of Pindar. But it soon degenerated in Athens by excessive over-refinement and fantastic cultivation, until it received a new impulse towards the end of the Peloponnesian war by the more artistic cultivation of the dramatic and musical elements by Philoxenus of Cythera.

13. Κινησίας: a very popular dithyrambic poet about the middle of the Peloponnesian war, who deserves a great deal of censure for having helped to debase dithyrambic poetry. He tried to produce a striking effect by fantastic, misty, and often immoral subjects, combined with a pompous diction, excess of imagery, and shallow figures of speech. And he succeeded in a way, for he was ridiculed by the comic

τον, ὅθεν ἂν οἱ ἀκούοντες βελτίους γίγνοιντο, ἢ ὅτι μέλλει
15 χαριεῖσθαι τῷ ὄχλῳ τῶν θεατῶν;

502

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κινησίου γε
πέρι.

ΣΟ. Τί δέ; ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ Μελῆς ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον
βλέπων ἐδόκει σοι κιθαρωδεῖν; ἢ ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὐδὲ πρὸς
20 τὸ ἡδιστον· ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς· ἀλλὰ δὴ σκό-
πει· οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδικὴ δοκεῖ σοι πᾶσα καὶ ἡ τῶν
διθυράμβων ποίησις ἡδονῆς χάριν ὑρῆσθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΟ. Τί δέ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὕτη καὶ θαυμαστή, ἢ τῆς τρα- b
25 γωδίας ποίησις ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς

501 poets Strattis (who composed a com-
e edy upon him), Plato Comicus, and
also Aristophanes in the *Clouds* and
the *Frogs*, as a sinner against art
and taste,—one of those who are
called in *Nub.* 333 κυκλίων χορῶν ἁμα-
τοκάμπται. Of his father Meles we
know less; he was certainly less im-
portant than Cinesias, though he also
is ridiculed by the comic poets.

502 15. τῶν θεατῶν: just as in English
a the general designation for the peo-
ple who fill the theatre is 'audience,'
whether the performance be an opera
or a drama, so the Greeks used *θεα-
ταί*, "the spectators," as a general
designation for the crowds who
thronged the Dionysiac theatre, no
matter what sort of a performance
was given. So, just below (20), we
find ἡνία γὰρ ἄδων τοὺς θεατάς.

21. οὐχὶ ἢ τε κιθαρωδική: this
conclusion we must suppose to be
permitted because at the moment
Callicles can cite no example to the
contrary. *κιθαριστική* (above, 501 e)
and *κιθαρωδική*, which are properly
distinct (cf. *κιθάρισις* and *κιθαρωδία* *Io*

533 b), are here interchanged in ac-
cordance with colloquial usage. To a
fix the meaning of *κιθάρισις*, the adj.
ψιλή was added. Cf. *Legg.* 669 e.

24. ἡ σεμνὴ: viewed in the light b
of the result which Socrates deduces,
this word as well as *θαυμαστή* may be
considered ironic. But tragedy was
regularly designated *σεμνή*, "vener-
ated," as being the most noble pre-
sentation of poetry before the public
mind, both from its sage maxims and
from the moral effect which was as-
cribed to it. Socrates' actual view of
poetry is well stated in *Apol.* 22 b, c
ἐγγων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τοῦτο,
ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖεν ἀ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ
φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ
θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί.

25. ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακε: the order of
the whole sentence is involved; τί δέ
δὴ (ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο) ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν.
After giving the general question,
Socrates follows it by a disjunctive
special one. The repetition of the art.
ἡ is illustrated by Stallbaum from
Symp. 213 e τὴν τοῦτον ταυτηνὴ τὴν
θαυμαστήν κεφαλὴν. It is not common.

τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδή, ὥς σοι δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐάν τι αὐτοῖς ἡδὺ μὲν ἦ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δέ, ὅπως τοῦτο μὲν μὴ ἔρει, εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δέ
30 καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄσεται, ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν ἐάν τε μὴ; ποτέρως σοὶ δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἢ τῶν τραγωιδῶν ποίησις;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὤρμηται καὶ τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεα-
35 ταῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ κολακείαν εἶναι;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, εἴ τις περιέλοιτο τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό

⁵⁰² For the construction ἐπὶ τινι, cf. *Lach.*

^b 183 a ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, *Xen. Mem.* i. 3. 11 σπουδάζειν . . . ἐφ' οἷς οὐδ' ἂν μαινόμενος σπουδάσειεν. We find περὶ τι in *Phaedo*, 64 d φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονάς. For the pf. equiv. to a pres., cf. the passage from *Phaedo* just quoted.

25 f. πότερόν ἐστιν . . . ὥς σοι δοκεῖ: the more usual idiom would require πότερον δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι.

27 ff. ἐάν μὲν, εἰ δέ: this variation in the employment of the cond. particles has come to be a rule; i.e. the negative of an ἐάν μὲν clause is introduced by εἰ δέ. If the condition is particular, we find εἰ with the fut. indic.; if generic, εἰ with the pres. indic., which latter is frequently omitted. In the earlier usage the custom was to give the favorable condition first; hence εἰ δέ μὴ comes to have an unpleasant or unfavorable

connotation, as here. Cf. also 481 b. ⁵⁰² The omission of μὲν after ἐάν is probably due to its employment with ἡδὺ. On the repetition of μὲν and δέ with both clauses, see on 512 a.

29. ἀηδὲς καὶ ὠφέλιμον: the connexion of these two words with καὶ seems somewhat strange, when one considers both the relation of the ideas themselves and the fact that they are preceded by ἡδὺ μὲν . . . πονηρὸν δέ. The design is probably to emphasize the co-existence of the two ideas, and not their distinctness. There is no contradiction to ἀηδὲς in the following ἐάν τε χαίρωσιν κτέ.; it refers to the manner in which the spectators will receive his words, concerning which the poet has no reason to trouble himself, provided what he says is correct. — On the omission of ὅν, see GMT. 902; H. 984 a.

30. λέξει καὶ ἄσεται: viz. in the dialogue and choruses.

39. περιέλοιτο: Socrates conceives c

40 τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν καὶ τὸ μέτρον, ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγοι
γίνονται τὸ λειπόμενον;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς πολὺν ὄχλον καὶ δῆμον οὗτοι λέγον-
ται οἱ λόγοι;

45 ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Δημηγορία ἄρα τίς ἐστίν ἡ ποιητική.

d

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ῥητορικὴ δημηγορία ἂν εἴη· ἡ οὖν ῥητο-
ρεῦεν δοκοῦσί σοι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις;

50 ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν ἄρα ἡμεῖς ἡγρήκαμεν ῥητορικὴν τινα πρὸς
δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἶον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων, ἣν οὐ πάνν ἀγάμεθα·
κολακικὴν γὰρ αὐτὴν φαμεν εἶναι.

55 ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

LVIII. ΣΩ. Εἰεν· τί δὲ ἡ πρὸς τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον

502 the difference between prose and
c poetry to lie simply in the dress,
which in the case of poetry sur-
rounds the thought as the shell does
the kernel, and is only so far of
value.

40. μέλος : i.e. the musical element,
the melody, which is especially promi-
nent in lyric productions.—ῥυθμόν :
i.e. the regular movement, at the basis
of which lies the μέτρον, syllable and
verse measure.

41. γίνονται : prove to be.

d 46. δημηγορία : here employed with-
out any unpleasant connotation. It
might seem somewhat strange that
Callicles so readily admits that δημη-
γορία is ῥητορικὴ,—an admission on
which the whole deduction rests.
The reason may be that these word-

artists were very prone to extol the 502
universality of their art, without re- d
gard to consequences. See Socrates'
conversation with Gorgias (especially
ch. XI.).

52. οἶον . . . γυναικῶν : one is cer-
tainly justified in assuming according
to this passage that women were ad-
mitted to the tragedies ; whether they
also had the right to attend the com-
edies remains doubtful. The admis-
sion of slaves to the theatre was
always restricted.

LVIII. 1. εἰεν : marks the conclu-
sion of one part of the argument, viz.
the premises from which the conclu-
sion is to be drawn. Its employment
here, however, also draws especial
emphasis to the fact that these prem-
ises are definitely settled.

ρήτορικὴ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν δῆμους ο
 τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, τί ποτε ἡμῖν αὕτη ἐστίν;
 πότερόν σοι δοκοῦσιν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ λέγειν οἱ
 5 ῥήτορες, τούτου στοχαζόμενοι, ὅπως οἱ πολῖται ὡς βέλ-
 τιστοὶ ἔσονται διὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγους, ἣ καὶ οὗτοι πρὸς
 τὸ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις ὠρμημένοι, καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ
 ἰδίου τοῦ αὐτῶν ὀλιγωροῦντες τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὥσπερ παισὶ
 προσομιλοῦσι τοῖς δῆμοις, χαρίζεσθαι αὐτοῖς πειρώμενοι
 10 μόνον, εἰ δέ γε βελτίους ἔσονται ἢ χείρους διὰ ταῦτα,
 οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν;

503

ΚΑΛ. Οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς· εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ
 κηδόμενοι τῶν πολιτῶν λέγουσιν ἅ λέγουσιν, εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ
 οἷους σὺ λέγεις.

15 ΣΑ. Ἐξαρκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι διπλοῦν, τὸ μὲν

502 2. ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν: in the politi-
 e cal sense of the word. Cf. Soph. Ant.
 737 πόλις γὰρ οὐκ ἔσθ' ἥτις ἀνδρὸς ἔσθ'
 ἐνός.

3. τοὺς τῶν ἐλευθέρων: is ironic.
 They consider themselves to be free
 men, although they are really, even
 according to the true opinion of Cal-
 licles (cf. 489 c above), slaves. Cf.
 Dem. Ol. iii. 30 τὸ μὲν πρότερον στρα-
 τεύεσθαι τολμῶν αὐτὸς δὲ δῆμος δεσπότης
 τῶν πολιτευομένων ἦν καὶ κύριος αὐτὸς
 ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, — νῦν δὲ τοῦναν-
 τλον κύριοι μὲν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν καὶ διὰ τούτων ἅπαντα πράττεται,
 ὑμεῖς δ' ὁ δῆμος ἐν ὑπέρτερον καὶ προσθή-
 κης μέρει γεγέννησθε.

6. ἣ καὶ οὗτοι κτέ.: testimony to
 the correctness of this statement is
 found in the very numerous refer-
 ences and complaints found in the
 orators, notably Demosthenes. Of
 course, Plato meant by τὸ βέλτιστον
 something a little different from the
 orators. Cf. Isoc. de Pace § 5 καὶ

γάρ τοι πεποιθήκατε τοὺς ῥήτορας μελε- 502
 τᾶν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐ τὰ μέλλοντα τῇ e
 πόλει συνοίσειν, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀρέσκοντας
 ὑμῖν λόγους ἐροῦσιν. The apparent
 pleonasm arising from the recurrence
 of the same idea in but slightly var-
 ied form is artistic in showing that
 this thought lay uppermost in the
 speaker's mind.

8. ὥσπερ παισὶ: reminds of 464 d.

12. οὐκ ἀπλοῦν: the word has its 503
 fundamental meaning. The question a
 requires a double answer. Cf. Lach.
 188 c ἀπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμὸν περὶ λόγων
 ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ
 διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἦν δόξαίμινε φιλό-
 λογος εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς μολόλογος. Cf. also
 468 c ἀπλῶς οὕτως.

15. εἰ γὰρ καί: καί does not belong
 to τοῦτο, but to εἰ. Socrates expresses
 himself as satisfied with the division
 made by Callicles, but recognizes
 even under this condition at least the
 possibility of a good, commendable
 rhetoric.

ἕτερόν που τούτου κολακεία ἂν εἴη καὶ αἰσχροὶ δημηγορία, τὸ δ' ἕτερον καλόν, τὸ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὡς βέλτισται ἔσονται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱ ψυχαί, καὶ διαμάχεσθαι λέγοντα τὰ βέλτιστα, εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα ἔσται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. 20 ἀλλ' οὐ πώποτε σὺ ταύτην εἶδες τὴν ῥητορικὴν. ἦ ὅ
εἴ τινα ἔχεις τῶν ῥητόρων τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν, τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγέ σοι εἰπεῖν τῶν γε νῦν ῥητόρων οὐδένα.

25 ΣΑ. Τί δέ; τῶν παλαιῶν ἔχεις τινὰ εἰπεῖν, δι' ὅντινα αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν Ἀθηναῖοι βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἤρξατο δημηγορεῖν, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ χείρους ὄντες; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν οὗτος. c

ΚΑΛ. Τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν

503 19. εἴτε ἡδίω εἴτε ἀηδέστερα: Demosthenes, who in many speeches combats the πρὸς ἡδονήν and πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν, says in *Ol.* iii. 18, in harmony with Plato's teaching, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὰ βέλτιστα ἀντὶ τῶν ἡδέων, ἂν μὴ συναμφοτέρα ἐξῇ, λαμβάνειν.

b 21. τοιοῦτον εἰπεῖν: *speak of as such.*

21 f. τί οὐχὶ . . . ἔφρασας: in passionate questions τί οὐ is usually construed with the aorist. The question marks impatience that a thing which is future is not past. The idea is usually modal, "why will you not?" Cf. *Phaedo* 86 d εἴ τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο. Differ-ent in 468 c.

26. αἰτίαν ἔχουσιν: a ῥῆμα μέσον (vox media). Originally "to bear the blame," it was gradually worn down until it became merely a circumlocution for λέγεσθαι, as *Theaet.* 169 a ὦν δὴ σὺ περὶ αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν, or *Rep.* iv. 435 e οἱ δὲ καὶ

ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (sc. θυμοειδεῖς εἶναι). Usually, however, it retains its bad sense, e.g. *Apol.* 38 c ὄνομα ἔχετε καὶ αἰτίαν—ὡς Σωκράτης ἀπεκτόνατε.

28. οὐκ οἶδα τίς ἐστιν: when τίς c instead of the more regular ὅστις is used after a neg., it should be conceived rather as a direct question. See on 447 d.

29. Θεμιστοκλέα κτέ.: it is noteworthy that Callicles passes over Aristides, whom Socrates mentions later with respect, and whom also Demosthenes in *Ol.* iii. 21 speaks of among the statesmen who were still honored down to his time. But Callicles was probably hardly able to appreciate the uprightness and unselfishness of Aristides, which was displayed so prominently in the formation of the Delian League.—ἀκούεις: Greek, like the Eng., often uses the pres. of the verbs of perception where the pf. would be more exact. See GMT. 28; H. 827.

30 γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα, οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας;

Σο. Εἰ ἔστιν γε, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἣν πρότερον σὺ ἔλεγες ἀρετὴν, ἀληθῆς, τὸ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι καὶ τὰς αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων· εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐν τῷ
35 ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ ἡναγκάσθημεν ἡμεῖς ὁμολογεῖν, ὅτι αἱ μὲν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν πληρούμεναι βελτίῳ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, αὐτάς μὲν ἀποτελεῖν, αἱ δὲ χείρῳ, μὴ· τοῦτο δὲ τέχνη τις εἶναι· τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα τούτων τινὰ γεγονέναι ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε πῶς εἶπω.

LIX. Σο. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν ζητῆς καλῶς, εὐρήσεις· ἴδωμεν δὴ οὕτως ἄτρεμα σκοπούμενοι, εἴ τις τούτων τοιούτος γέγο-

503 30 f. Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ
c τετελευτηκότα: we must guard against drawing the conclusion from this passage that this dialogue was intended to be understood as held soon after Pericles' death. See *Introd.* § 18. For νεωστὶ simply means "lately" as compared with the other statesmen mentioned, and the interval between that and the date of the dialogue may still have been a great one. Cf. *Hdt.* vi. 40. See also on 523 b. The same is true of the *Lat. nuper*, as we see from *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii. 50. 126 Quid ea, quae nuper, id est paucis ante seculis, medicorum ingeniis reperta sunt.

31. οὗ ἀκήκοας: sc. λέγοντος. A possible reference to 455 e.

32. εἰ ἔστιν γε κτέ.: "yes, if, etc." The answer is so closely connected with the preceding question that there is no need of supplying an apod. In the second member, εἰ δὲ μὴ κτέ., for which we must supply a pred. from the first, instead of the expected criticism of the men mentioned we have

a question based on the principle just proved. c

34. τοῦτο: viz. τὸ . . . ἀποπιμπλάναι. As a pred. supply ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆς ἐστίν. We should expect after ἄλλ' ὅπερ . . . ὁμολογεῖν some expression corresponding to τὸ . . . ἀποπιμπλάναι, instead of which we find ὅτι κτέ., due to ὁμολογεῖν, with which we must again supply ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆς ἐστίν to govern ἀποτελεῖν.

34 f. ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ λόγῳ: refers to 499 e. τοῦτο δὲ continues the recapitulation, and refers to 500 a. Instead of τέχνην τινὰ, which we should expect, we find by an anacoluthon the nom. as if ὁμολογήθη preceded. On the neglect of the assimilation in τοῦτο, see *Kr.* 61, 7, 4.

39. οὐκ ἔχω: Callicles does not understand the standard of judgment, to the exposition of which Socrates now turns.

LIX. 2. οὕτως ἄτρεμα: quietly, just as we are. οὕτως is frequently used by itself to denote "under the conditions or circumstances in which we are at present," and often with

νευ. φέρε γάρ, ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον λέγων, ἂν λέγῃ, ἄλλο τι οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐρεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποβλέπων
 5 πρὸς τι; ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες δημιουργοὶ βλέπον-
 τες πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον ἕκαστος οὐκ εἰκῇ ἐκλεγόμενος
 προσφέρει ἂν προσφέρει πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ'
 ὅπως ἂν εἰδὸς τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ὃ ἐργάζεται. οἷον εἰ
 βούλει ἰδεῖν τοὺς ζωγράφους, τοὺς οἰκοδόμους, τοὺς ναυ-
 10 πηγούς, τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας δημιουργούς, ὄντινα βούλει
 αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰς τάξιν τινὰ ἕκαστος ἕκαστον τίθῃσιν ὃ ἂν
 τιθῇ, καὶ προσαναγκάζει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ πρέπον τε
 εἶναι καὶ ἀρμόττειν, ἕως ἂν τὸ ἅπαν συστήσῃται τεταγμέ- 504
 νον τε καὶ κεκοσμημένον πρᾶγμα· καὶ οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι

503
 d an adverb when it is to be translated separately. Sometimes it follows the adverb, and sometimes it has itself an explanatory addition, as *Prot.* 351 c ἀπλῶς οὕτω, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς. *Cf.* 460 e, 464 b, 468 c, 478 a, 494 d.

4 f. ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι: with a view to something, which must, in contrast with εἰκῇ, be a definite object, as is afterwards more clearly shown. See on 474 d.

e 5 ff. οἱ ἄλλοι . . . προσφέρει: a case of part. apposition. See G. 137, n. 2; H. 624 d. *Cf.* 450 d. The thought with προσφέρει is of the single articles out of which the object is to be made.—δημιουργοί: see on 452 a.

8. ὅπως ἂν . . . σχῇ: a general rel. sentence, giving the opposite to εἰκῇ, "that it may acquire for itself some form." The second aor. of ἔχειν is the only second aor. which seems to have an ingressive force. See Gildersleeve's note to Morris' *Thuc.* i. 12. 3.—εἶδος: i.e. the outward appearance which an object displays, its figure and form, an image of which the artist of course carries in

his mind and gazes upon with the 503
 eye of fancy. e

8 f. εἰ βούλει ἰδεῖν: with such conversational expressions we should refrain from supplying any definite apod., as doubtless none was felt. The force of this phrase approaches that of a mild imv., σκόπει, after which the objective clause follows naturally with ὡς. The subject ἕκαστος distributes the τοὺς ζωγράφους which has been appropriated as the obj. of ἰδεῖν.

13. συστήσῃται: is applicable to 504
 the form as a whole, because it is only a
 by the harmony of its several parts (τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ ἀρμόττειν) that it exists. *Cf.* *Phaedr.* 269 c τὸ δ' ἕκαστα . . . λέγειν τε καὶ τὸ ὅλον συνίστασθαι.

14. κεκοσμημένον: this word, as well as κόσμος below (19), has, of course, no reference to any external adornment, but only to an endowment with such qualities as are requisite for the ἀρετή of the whole. See on e below.

14 f. οἱ τε δὴ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί: would require properly some such

15 δημιουργοὶ καὶ οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, οἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, παιδοτρίβαι τε καὶ ἰατροί, κοσμοῦσί που τὸ σῶμα καὶ συντάττουσιν. ὁμολογοῦμεν οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Τάξεως ἄρα καὶ κόσμου τυχοῦσα οἰκία χρηστὴ ἂν
20 εἴη, ἀταξίας δὲ μοχθηρά;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πλοῖον ὡσαύτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ σώματά φαμεν τὰ ἡμέτερα;

25 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἢ ψυχὴ; ἀταξίας τυχοῦσα ἔσται χρηστὴ, ἢ
τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου τινός;

ΚΑΛ. Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν πρόσθε καὶ τοῦτο συνομολογεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ὀνομά ἐστιν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῷ ἐκ τῆς
30 τάξεώς τε καὶ τοῦ κόσμου γιγνομένῳ;

ΚΑΛ. Ὑγίειαν καὶ ἰσχὺν ἴσως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε. τί δὲ αὖ τῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγιγνομένῳ ἐκ c

⁵⁰⁴ pred. as κοσμοῦσιν ἕκαστος τὸ ἐαυτοῦ
a ἔργον. But the general thought is here, as often, to be completed by a kind of zeugma from the special one to which the discussion hurries.

15. οὓς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν: sc. in 500 e, which in turn refers to 464 b ff.—The body serves in general as an analogy for the soul.

18. ἔστω: the impv. indicates only a tentative concession, which Callicles reserves the privilege of recalling if he chooses. The same feeling is felt in ἀνάγκη συνομολογεῖν below.

b 24. καὶ μὴν κτέ.: is to be completed with necessary changes from the preceding question of Socrates (τάξεως ἄρα κτέ.). By καὶ μὴν (and indeed) we pass to the more impor-

tant part of the argument. Here ⁵⁰⁴ also the general ideas τάξις and κόσμος receive special limitations.

29 f. τῷ γιγνομένῳ: belongs to ὀνομά ἐστιν, while ἐν τῷ σώματι, in looser relation to the whole, denotes the range to which the question extends.

31. ἴσως λέγεις: in the answer of Callicles shows that, while indeed according to his feelings he would regard such a relation as false and impossible, his reason compels him to admit its truth.

32. ἐγγιγνομένῳ: the use of the c compound verb here, in place of the simple one in the other member of the comparison, is probably due to its close connexion with ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

τῆς τάξεως καὶ τοῦ κόσμου; πειρῶ εὐρεῖν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὄνομα.

35 ΚΑΛ. Τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκράτες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ σοι ἡδιόν ἐστιν, ἐγὼ ἐρῶ. σὺ δέ, ἂν μὲν σοι δοκῶ ἐγὼ καλῶς λέγειν, φάθι. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔλεγχε καὶ μὴ ἐπίτρεπε. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ταῖς μὲν τοῦ σώματος τάξεσιν ὄνομα εἶναι ὑγιεινόν, ἐξ οὗ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ὑγίεια γίγνεται
40 καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ τοῦ σώματος. ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ταῖς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τάξεσιν καὶ κοσμήσειςιν νόμι- d
μόν τε καὶ νόμος, ὅθεν καὶ νόμιμοι γίνονται καὶ κόσμιοι.
ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν δικαιοσύνη τε καὶ σωφροσύνη. φῆς ἢ οὐ;

45 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

LX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐκείνος,
ὁ τεχνικός τε καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ τοὺς λόγους προσοίσει ταῖς

⁵⁰⁴ 35. τί δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγεις: on the
^c meaning of the interr. form, see on 503 b. The question is of the nature of an evasion of the answer, which Callicles pushes upon Socrates to escape responsibility. Cf. 470 b.

37. φάθι: see on 475 e. — εἰ δὲ μή: see on 502 b. — ἔλεγχε: with this and ἐπίτρεπε (yield) the neuter object ("what I say?") is understood. In a similar way ἐπιτρέπειν is used absolutely, *Apol.* 35 b and elsewhere.

40. ἀρετὴ: used at first in the general sense of "proper function or condition," so that it can afterwards appear in its moral force without thereby the standard of judgment being changed.

^d 42 f. νόμόν τε καὶ νόμος: sc. ὄνομα εἶναι. Both expressions are found elsewhere associated in order to express the idea as fully and completely as possible, e.g. *Crito* 53 c. Here there is the more reason to add

νόμος because Callicles had previously ⁵⁰⁴
used this word in the passage where ^d
he first gave expression to his scorn of right and law (ch. XXXVIII. ff.). The corresponding disposition is also elsewhere called κόσμος. Cf. the passage in *Crito* τὰς τε ἐννομιμμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους. Apropos is *Phaedo* 114 e κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἄλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑαυτῆς κόσμῳ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ.

44. ταῦτα: with free reference to what precedes and without assimilation to the predicate, denotes the qualities expressed by νόμιμοι and κόσμιοι.

45. ἔστω: see on a above.

LX. 1. πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων: in the choice of words Socrates goes back to what was said in 503 e.

2. προσοίσει κτέ.: cf. above, 503 e. Although it is by the λόγοι especially that the soul will be shaped, yet

ψυχαῖς, οὓς ἂν λέγῃ, καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀπάσας, καὶ δῶρον
 εἴαν τι διδῶ, δώσει, καὶ εἴαν τι ἀφαιρῇται, ἀφαιρήσεται,
 5 πρὸς τοῦτο αἰεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων, ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολί-
 ταις δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς γίγνηται, ἀδικία δὲ
 ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ σωφροσύνη μὲν ἐγγίγνηται, ἀκολασία
 δὲ ἀπαλλάττηται, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνηται, κακία δὲ
 ἀπίη. συγχωρεῖς ἡ οὔ;

10 ΚΑΛ. Συγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, σώματί γε κάμνουντι
 καὶ μοχθηρῶς διακειμένῳ σιτία πολλὰ διδόναι καὶ τὰ
 ἡδίστα ἢ ποτὰ ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν, ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει αὐτὸ ἔσθ' ὅτε
 πλέον, ἢ τοῦναντίον κατὰ γε τὸν δίκαιον λόγον καὶ ἔλατ-
 15 τον; ἔστι ταῦτα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

505

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, λυσιτελεῖ μετὰ μοχθηρίας σώματος
 ζῆν ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ζῆν μοχθηρῶς. ἡ
 οὐχ οὕτως;

20 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀποπιμπλάναι, οἷον πει-
 νῶντα φαγεῖν ὅσον βούλεται ἢ διψῶντα πιεῖν, ὑγιαίνοντα

⁵⁰⁴ other influences may be brought to
^d bear, just as the orator or statesman
 (a good specimen of such an orator
 was Demosthenes) has power to cause
 gifts to be made to the people—as,
 for example, the *θεωρικόν*, the *δικαστι-*
κόν, the *στρατιωτικόν*, and the *βουλευ-*
τικόν, and the division of booty, pub-
 lic spectacles, etc.—and also to be
 taken away from them, for example,
 by taxes (*εἰσφοραὶ*) or the abolition
 of the gifts mentioned.—The connex-
 ion forbids us to think of any rougher
 kind of deprivation, which seemed to
 Polus (466 c) so enviable a privilege
 of power.

5. αὐτοῦ: poss. gen., to be closely
 connected with τοῖς πολίταις ("his
 fellow-citizens").
^e

13. ὃ μὴ ὀνήσει: the generic idea
 causes the negative μή.

14. τοῦναντίον: is certainly adver-
 bial, and to be attached to ἔλαττον
 (ὀνήσει). The sense of this difficult
 passage seems to be something like
 this: "What advantage is there in giv-
 ing to a sick man anything which can-
 not profit him, more or less"; literally,
 "sometimes more, or on the contrary,
 at least rightly considered, less."

22 f. ὑγιαίνοντα . . . πολλά: is
 added to make the contrast stronger. ^a

μὲν ἑώσωιν οἱ ἱατροὶ ὥς τὰ πολλά, κάμνοντα δὲ ὥς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν οὐδέποτε ἑώσωιν ἐμπίμπλασθαι ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ; συγ-
25 χωρεῖς τοῦτο γε καὶ σύ;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγώ γε.

b

ΣΩ. Περὶ δὲ ψυχὴν, ὧ ἄριστε, οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἔως
μὲν ἂν πονηρὰ ᾖ, ἀνόητός τε οὖσα καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ
ἄδικος καὶ ἀνόσιος, εἵργειν αὐτὴν δεῖ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ
30 μὴ ἐπιτρέπεω ἄλλ' ἅττα ποιεῖν ἢ ἀφ' ὧν βελτίων ἔσται·
φῆς ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

ΣΩ. Οὐτῷ γάρ που αὐτῇ ἄμεινον τῇ ψυχῇ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

35 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ εἵργειν ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖ κολάζειν;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ κολάζεσθαι ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἢ ἡ
ἀκολασία, ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ φῶς.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ἅττα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἄλλον
40 τινὰ ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς
τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος.

505 23 f. ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: see on 450 b.

a 28. ἀνόητος κτέ.: see in the discus-
b sion with Polus the remark at 477 b,
where the πονηρία of the soul is de-
scribed in the same way.

29. ἀνόσιος: Plato prefers to use
only two endings with this adj., which
usually, especially in later Greek, has
three. The common collocation, as
in the present passage, with several
other adjs. of only two endings, may
perhaps explain his usage.

33. οὕτω . . . ἄμεινον: sc. than if it
were differently dealt with. Cf. 468 b.

38. ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ φῶς: refers
naturally to the second member, for

which a predicate is to be supplied 505
from the first. Socrates has in mind b
491 e ff. The contradiction between
this admission and the statement
made at the first (νυνδὴ), Callicles
seeks, in his accustomed manner, to
evade.

41 f. αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων: Calli- c
cles has given in the investigation
also a practical example of that ἀκολα-
σία which he had defended in theory.
For him the investigation is only a
trial of wits. In οὗτος ἀνὴρ κτέ. we
may have a reminiscence of the ex-
pression used by Callicles of Socrates
in 489 b.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐδέ γέ μοι μέλει οὐδὲν ὦν σὺ λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα σοι Γοργίου χάριν ἀπεκρινάμην.

45 ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τί οὖν δὴ ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν λόγον καταλύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς γνῶσει.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους φασὶ μεταξύ θέμις εἶναι α καταλείπειν, ἀλλ' ἐπιθέντας κεφαλὴν, ἵνα μὴ ἄνευ κεφαλῆς 50 περιίῃ. ἀπόκρυναι οὖν καὶ τὰ λοιπά, ἵνα ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος κεφαλὴν λάβῃ.

LXI. ΚΑΛ. 'Ὡς βίαιος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες. εἰ δὲ ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ἑάσεις χαίρειν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ἢ καὶ ἄλλω τῷ διαλέξει.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἄλλος ἐθέλει; μὴ γάρ τοι ἀτελῇ γε τὸν 5 λόγον καταλείπωμεν.

ΚΑΛ. Αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν δύναιο διελθεῖν τὸν λόγον, ἢ λέγων κατὰ σαυτὸν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος σαυτῷ;

505 46. καταλύομεν: this idiomatic use of
C the pres. instead of the fut. of a course of action to be immediately taken is also idiomatic in Latin and English. See Kr. 53, 1, 9. In a somewhat similar manner the pres. is used of the immediate consequence by Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* 32 εἰ δὲ φησιν οὗτος, δεῖξάτω καὶ παρασχέσθω, κἀγὼ καταβαίνω. Cf. 513 c.

47. αὐτὸς γνῶσει: refuses to answer. "You will have to decide that."

d 48. οὐδὲ τοὺς μύθους: to say nothing of a λόγος which is directed to a definite object. The proverb, which Socrates quotes, seems to rest upon a religious feeling, in accordance with which myths had to be completely narrated in order not to draw upon the narrator the anger of the deity. Cf. *Phileb.* 66 d τὸ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις, *Euthyd.* 301 e τὸν

κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθέναι. — θέμις: "right acc. to sacred law." 505 d

50. περιίῃ: the change from the pl. (τοὺς μύθους) to the sing. is explained by the freedom of conversation. Cf. *Prot.* 319 d τοῖς οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν μαθὼν . . . συμβουλευεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ.

LXI. 1. ὥς βίαιος εἶ: cf. 491 e ὥς ἡδὺς εἶ. — βίαιος: usually in contrast with πείθειν, e.g. *Polit.* 304 d εἶτε διὰ πειθοῦς εἶτε διὰ τινος βίας is applied here by Callicles to Socrates' persistent argument; cf. *Apol.* 35 d εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζομένην.

4. τίς οὖν κτέ.: since the question assumes the necessity that some one take the role of respondent, a causal clause follows.

4 f. μὴ . . . καταλείπωμεν: for let us no longer leave, etc.

6. αὐτὸς δὲ κτέ.: the question has

St. I. p. 505.

Σο. Ἴνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ^e
 ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι; ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει
 10 ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι οὕτως. εἰ μὲντοι ποιήσομεν, οἶμαι
 ἔγωγε χρῆναι πάντας ἡμᾶς φιλονίκως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέ-
 ναι τὸ ἀληθὲς τί ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγομεν καὶ τί ψεύδος·
 κοινὸν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἅπασιν φανερόν γενέσθαι αὐτό. δίκαιμι
 μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐγὼ ὥς ἂν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν· ἐὰν δέ τῳ ⁵⁰⁶
 15 ὑμῶν μὴ τὰ ὄντα δοκῶ ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαντῷ, χρὴ ἀντιλαμ-

⁵⁰⁵ a tone of reproof. αὐτός is opposed
^d to ἄλλῃ διαλεγόμενος. The require-
 ments of the question can be fulfilled
 in two ways, — either in continuous
 discourse, as 464 b–466 a, or in the
 form of a dialogue, which Socrates
 employs later (ch. LXII.).

^e 8. τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου: Epichar-
 mus was a native of Cos, but early
 went to Sicily (Megara) and devoted
 himself there to the study of medicine
 and philosophy, especially the Pytha-
 gorean and Empedoclean. But his
 claim to fame rests on his comedies.
 He stands at the head of the Sicilian
 comic poets, being noted for the ethi-
 cal nature of his poetry. It was full
 of sententious sayings, and thereby
 aroused Plato's interest to the highest
 degree. He flourished during the
 Persian war, under the government
 of Gelo. The verse here cited reads,
 according to Athenæus:

τὰ πρὸ τοῦ δὴ ἄνδρες ἔλεγον
 εἰς ἐγὼν ἀποχρέω (i.e. ἀποχρῶ, I am
 sufficient).

Socrates means that he is himself
 assuming a burden which according
 to the nature of the matter requires
 two. The answer is in construction
 connected with the question of Calli-
 cles in order to disclose for the others'
 consideration the doubtful side, as it

were, of such a demand. With this ⁵⁰⁵
 the following ἀτὰρ (however) agrees. ^e

11. φιλονίκως ἔχειν: see on 457 d.
 Socrates wishes to direct ambition
 only to proper objects.

12. τί ψεύδος: ψεύδος is frequently
 found opposed to ἀληθές. Cf. *Apol.*
 34 e εἴτε οὖν ἀληθές, εἴτε οὖν ψεύδος,
Euthyd. 272 a ἐάν τε ψεύδος ἐάν τε
 ἀληθές ᾗ. The article with ἀληθές is
 due to its position. We should also
 have in like manner τὸ ψεύδος, did it
 precede τί ἐστίν. Cron thinks it de-
 notes that truth is *single*, while error
 has many forms.

14 f. ἐὰν . . . δοκῶ, χρὴ κτέ.: is an ⁵⁰⁶
 anticipatory cond. sentence, χρὴ with
 the inf. having the force of an imv.
 Cf. ἐπιλαμβάνου in b below.

15. ὁμολογεῖν ἐμαντῷ: Socrates is
 about to combine the two roles of
 questioner and respondent, and hence
 will have to answer to his own state-
 ments.

15 f. ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι: with the
 gen., means to "break in upon a
 discourse for the purpose of contest-
 ing a point," as in *Rep.* i. 336 b καὶ ὁ
 Θρασύμαχος πολλάκις καὶ διαλεγόμενων
 ἡμῶν μεταξὺ ἔρμα ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ
 λόγου. On the other hand ἐπιλαμβάν-
 εσθαι, used below in b, means simply
 "to arrest the discussion." See on
 469 c.

βάνεσθαι καὶ ἐλέγχειν. οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω
 ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ὥστε, ἂν τὶ φαίνεται
 λέγων ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν ἐμοί, ἐγὼ πρῶτος συγχωρήσομαι.
 λέγω μέντοι ταῦτα, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι διαπερανθῆναι τὸν
 20 λόγον· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεσθε, ἔωμεν δὴ χαίρειν καὶ ἀπίωμεν.

ΓΟΡ. Ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, χρῆναί πω
 ἀπιέναι, ἀλλὰ διεξελθεῖν σε τὸν λόγον· φαίνεται δέ μοι **b**
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκεῖν. βούλομαι γὰρ ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἀκοῦσαί σου αὐτοῦ διόντος τὰ ἐπίλοιπα.

25 ΣΟ. Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ αὐτὸς ἡδέως μὲν ἂν
 Καλλικλεί τούτῳ ἔτι διελεγόμην, ἕως αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ Ἀμφί-
 ονος ἀπέδωκα ῥῆσιν ἀντὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήθου· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σύ, ὦ
 Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλεις συνδιαπερᾶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὖν
 ἐμοῦ γε ἀκούων ἐπιλαμβάνου, εἴαν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς
 30 λέγειν. καὶ με εἰάν ἐξελέγῃς, οὐκ ἀχθесσθήσομαί σοι **c**

506 17. ἂν τὶ φαίνεται κτέ.: the em-
a phasis is on the indefinite, as in 472 a.

21. ἄλλ' ἐμοὶ κτέ.: on the assump-
 tion by Gorgias of the role of media-
 tor, and the justice of his claim to
 speak in the name of all, see Introd.
 § 13 *fin.* Cf. 497 **b**. His request to
 proceed is a part of the artistic ma-
 chinery of the dialogue, in that it
 affords an opportunity for a general
 summary of what has been already
 learned in the discussion, which was
 necessary in order to proceed intelli-
 gently. — οὐ . . . πω: a rather unusual
 'tnesis,' of which another example is
 found in *Meno* 72 **d** οὐ μέντοι ὡς βού-
 λομαί γέ πω κατέχω τὸ ἐρωτώμενον.

b 23. βούλομαι γάρ κτέ.: with these
 words Gorgias expresses his approba-
 tion of Callicles' opinion that a re-
 spondent is not necessary. The
 chestnuts are good, — but just as
 good without the intervention of the

cat. Hence γάρ to give a reason for 506
 the continuance of the discussion, **b**
 καὶ αὐτός to show his agreement with
 Callicles, and αὐτοῦ to exclude the
 idea of co-operation. The following
 καὶ αὐτός in the answer of Socrates
 corresponds to the similar expression
 of Gorgias.

26 f. Ἀμφίωνος: Socrates answers
 with a pleasant allusion to 485 **e**.
 He will really assume the character
 of Amphion, which had been imputed
 to him, and as Amphion had in the
 plays of Euripides defended his call-
 ing, so will he prove that the claim
 of philosophy to be followed as a
 calling in life is a just and weighty
 one.

27. ἀπέδωκα: the indic. is due to
 assimilation with the preceding indic.
 with ἂν of the unfulfilled condition.

28 f. ἄλλ' οὖν . . . ἐπιλαμβάνου: see
 on 496 **d** and **a** above.

ὥσπερ σὺ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ μέγιστος εὐεργέτης παρ' ἐμοὶ ἀναγεγράφει.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγε, ὦ ἀγαθέ, αὐτὸς καὶ πέραινε.

LXII. ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐμοῦ ἀναλαβόντος τὸν λόγον. Ἄρα τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν; Οὐ ταῦτόν, ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν. Πότερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρακτέον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔνεκα τοῦ ἡδέος; Τὸ ἡδὺ ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο, οὗ παραγενομένου ἡδόμεθα, ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὗ παρόντος ἀ ἀγαθοί ἐσμεν; Πάνν γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγαθοί γέ ἐσμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, ὅσ' ἀγαθά ἐστίν, ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ὦ Καλλί- 10 κλεις. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἢ γε ἀρετῇ ἐκάστου, καὶ σκεύους

⁵⁰⁶ 31 f. εὐεργέτης ἀναγεγράφει: this phrase is found in Hdt. viii. 85, and was doubtless technical, the fut. pf. expressing like the legal pf. the finality and fixity of the action. It was quite common for Greek states to confer the title of εὐεργέτης on citizens or strangers, especially foreign statesmen or princes, for services rendered them. The decree conferring the honor was engraved on stone and preserved. In *Apol.* 36 d Socrates claims the title for himself. The greatest benefit consists, according to 458 a, in freeing a man from error.

33. ὦ ἀγαθέ: a friendly manner of address, which frequently, however, has an ironical coloring, or a tone of condescension, depreciation, or correction. So in *Lat.* o bone, cf. *Hor. Sat.* ii. 3. 31; or bone vir in comedy.

LXII. 3. ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ Καλλικλῆς ὡμολογήσαμεν: sc. in 495 c ff. Cf. especially 500 d.

6. παραγενομένου, παρόντος: the

words may have been designedly ⁵⁰⁶ chosen with reference to the nature of the ideas ἡδὺ and ἀγαθόν, the former being only a condition, the latter an actuality.

5. ἡδὺ δέ ἐστιν κτέ.: on the ἡδὺ, cf. what Callicles has himself remarked in 494 a, b, above, and especially *Phileb.* 53 c ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηκόαμεν, ὡς αἰεὶ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς. On the ἀγαθόν, cf. above 468 b ἔνεκ' ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες and *Phileb.* 54 c οὐκοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἔνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται' ἂν—Τό γε μὴν οὐ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκά του γιγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται' ἂν, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκείνῳ ἐστι. This distinction, however, even if intended, is not preserved, as can be seen from the following (8) ἀρετῆς τινος παραγενομένης. See on 497 e.

10. ἀρετή: the subst. to denote the d form in which the Good manifests itself in persons and things. According to its real nature the Good re-

καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς αὐ καὶ ζώου παντός, οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ
 κάλλιστα παραγίγνεται, ἀλλὰ τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ
 τέχνῃ, ἥτις ἐκάστω ἀποδέδοται αὐτῶν. ἄρα ἔστιν ταῦτα;
 'Εγὼ μὲν γάρ φημι. Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον καὶ κεκοσμη-
 15 μένον ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου; Φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. Κόσμος
 τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστω ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος ἀγαθὸν
 παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Καὶ ψυχὴ
 ἄρα κόσμον ἔχουσα τὸν ἐαυτῆς ἀμείνων τῆς ἀκοσμήτου;
 'Ανάγκη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε κόσμον ἔχουσα κοσμία; Πῶς
 20 γὰρ οὐ μέλλει; Ἡ δέ γε κοσμία σώφρων; Πολλή 507
 ἀνάγκη. Ἡ ἄρα σώφρων ψυχὴ ἀγαθή. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω
 παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλα φάναι, ὧ φίλε Καλλίκλεις· σὺ δ' εἰ
 ἔχεις, δίδασκε.

ΚΑΛ. Λέγ', ὠγαθέ.

25 ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ ὅτι, εἰ ἡ σώφρων ἀγαθὴ ἔστιν, ἡ τοῦναν-
 τίον τῇ σώφρονι πεπονθυῖα κακὴ ἔστιν· ἥν δὲ αὕτη ἡ

506 mains one and the same, but its
 d manifestation (the ἀρετή) assumes
 various names according to circum-
 stances.

11. τῷ εἰκῇ: on the use of the art.
 with adverbs, see Kr. 50, 5, 10. The
 dat. is in the same construction as
 those following.

12 f. τάξει καὶ ὀρθότητι καὶ τέχνῃ:
 the two latter words simply complete
 the first. We might translate them
 as adjs. The addition of κάλλιστα
 seems to admit the possibility of a
 kind of ἀρετή being brought about by
 other means than τάξει κτέ.

e 16. ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκεῖος: the nature
 of each thing conditions the peculiar-
 ity of its κόσμος. Hence this may
 receive different names, according to
 the conditions.

507 22 f. σύ... δίδασκε: Socrates turns
 a now again to Callicles and tries to

draw him into the conversation, be- 507
 cause the argument has now been a
 brought just to the point where
 Callicles broke it off before.

24. λέγε: go on with your exposi-
 tion. This answer is a refusal to co-
 operate and at the same time a neg.
 answer to εἰ ἔχεις.

25 ff. The idea of σωφροσύνη is de-
 fined in the most general way by the
 expression τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν.
 We attain to the idea of righteous-
 ness and piety by restricting the
 προσήκοντα to definite domains, ac-
 cording to the personages (men and
 gods) towards whom we have du-
 ties to perform. We attain to the
 idea of bravery by distinguishing
 between especial divisions of the idea
 πράττειν. Accordingly, we have on
 the one side διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν, on
 the other ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν.

ἄφρων τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος. Πάνυ γε. Καὶ μὴν ὁ γε σώ-
φρων τὰ προσήκοντα πράττει ἂν καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ
ἀνθρώπους· οὐ γὰρ ἂν σωφρονοῖ τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα
30 πράττων. Ἀνάγκη ταῦτ' εἶναι οὕτω. Καὶ μὴν περὶ μὲν
ἀνθρώπους τὰ προσήκοντα πράττων δίκαι' ἂν πράττοι, b
περὶ δὲ θεοὺς ὅσια· τὸν δὲ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ὅσια πράττοντα
ἀνάγκη δίκαιον καὶ ὁσιὸν εἶναι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Καὶ μὲν
δὴ καὶ ἀνδρεῖόν γε ἀνάγκη· οὐ γὰρ δὴ σώφρονος ἀνδρός
35 ἔστιν οὔτε διώκειν οὔτε φεύγειν ἅ μὴ προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἅ
δεῖ καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας
φεύγειν καὶ διώκειν, καὶ ὑπομένοντα καρτερεῖν ὅπου δεῖ·
ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σώφρονα, ὥσπερ c
διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ ὁσιὸν ἀγαθὸν
40 ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράτ-
τειν ἅ ἂν πράττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ
εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα

507 36. ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας: added by
b Socrates in his enumeration because
it is just in these spheres that σωφρο-
σύνη is usually exercised. The point
at which bravery necessarily coin-
cides with it comes out in this way
most emphatically. The exhibition
of bravery under such conditions is
also discussed in *Lach.* ch. xviii.

c 39 f. ἀγαθὸν . . . τελέως: 'the per-
fection of goodness.' Cope. All the
virtues combined make the ἀγαθὸν
ἄνδρα. Wisdom is omitted, probably
because Socrates has in mind only
the earlier discussion, and besides he
is taking for the moment the popular
point of view; hence the collocation
of ὁσιον with δίκαιον, as in *Protagoras*.
Besides, as Socrates' view was that
all evil-acting springs from ignorance,
the fact that a man was δίκαιος, ἀν-

δρεῖος, and δσιος would presuppose 507
the possession of wisdom. c

41. τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα κτέ.: not
in the sense "he who is fortunate,"
so often found, but in the sense of
the clause εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἅ ἂν
πράττη preceding; otherwise it would
be equivalent to μακάριον καὶ εὐδαί-
μονα, and the syllogism would gain
nothing. Plato therefore conceives
εὖ πράττειν ἅ ἂν πράττη the necessary
basis for μακάριον εἶναι, and the latter
as the natural result of the former.
Hence there is no case of a fallacia
secundum dictionem (by
the use of homonyms or ἀμφιβολία),
but the conclusion ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἄθλιος
is correctly and legitimately obtained
by a combination of the second state-
ment with the first and without any
fallacious or sophistical reasoning.

ἄθλιον· οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων τῷ σώφρονι, ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ὃν σὺ ἐπῆνεις.

LXIII. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὕτω τίθεμαι καὶ φημι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ, τὸν βουλόμενον, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην μὲν διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, καὶ παρασκευαστέον μάλιστα μὲν μηδὲν δεῖσθαι τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, ἐὰν δὲ δεηθῇ ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων, ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις, ἐπιθετέον δίκην καὶ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει εὐδαίμων εἶναι. οὗτος ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὁ σκοπὸς εἶναι, πρὸς ὃν βλέποντα δεῖ ζῆν, καὶ πάντα εἰς τοῦτο τὰ

507 LXIII. 1 f. καὶ φημι ταῦτα: the repetition of ταῦτα causes these principles to appear especially weighty.

2 f. τὸν βουλόμενον . . . διωκτέον: the verbal is equivalent here to δεῖ with the inf. The regular case for the agent is the dat.; the acc. is rare. See H. 991 a, and cf. 480 e. The position of ὡς ἔοικεν, which belongs to the whole clause, is noteworthy.

d 4. ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν: i.e. to the full extent of his power, a phrase whose origin can be readily seen. Cf. Hdt. vi. 116 οὗτοι μὲν δὴ περιέπλεον Σούνιον. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ποδῶν εἶχον τάχιστα ἐβοήθειον ἐς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ ἔφθησαν ἀπικόμενοι πρὶν ἢ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἥκειν, and Thuc. ii. 90. 4 Πελοποννήσιοι . . . ἔπλεον ὡς εἶχε τάχους ἕκαστος ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. On the use of the gen. with such adverbs as ὡς, ἄριστα, and ἱκανῶς, and ἔχειν, see G. 168, 3; H. 757 a.

5. παρασκευαστέον: in a middle sense, as is frequently the case with verbals, but only when used impersonally.

7. ἢ ἰδιώτης ἢ πόλις: disjunctive apposition to ἄλλος τις τῶν οἰκείων.

Contrasted with πόλις, ἰδιώτης denotes the individual; with ἄρχων, the common man who holds no office; with δημιουργός and similar words, one who is not versed in a certain thing.—ἐπιθετέον δίκην: Socrates deduces from the principles proven exactly the conclusions which, in his argument with Polus, had so offended Callicles. Cf. 480, 481.

9 f. πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ: "all the powers of the body and soul." Cf. the passage quoted below (10), and Crito 46 b τὰ ἐμὰ. The construction of καὶ πάντα κτέ. shows another example of the common Greek idiom of following a rel. by a demonstrative. See on 452 d. —εἰς τοῦτο: takes up again οὗτος ὁ σκοπός for the purpose of recapitulating in its correlative clause, ὅπως κτέ., the substance of what has been explained; οὕτω again reiterates in one word the whole previous participial clause, and connects it with πράττειν, which has the same construction as ζῆν. The positive directions summarized in οὕτω are still further fixed (after Plato's habit) by the following negative direction

- 10 αὐτοῦ συντείνοντα καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως δικαιοσύνη
παρέσται καὶ σωφροσύνη τῷ μακαρίῳ μέλλοντι ἔσεσθαι,
οὕτω πράττειν, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἑῶντα ἀκολάστους εἶναι καὶ
ταύτας ἐπιχειροῦντα πληροῦν, ἀνήνυτον κακόν, ληστοῦ
βίον ζῶντα. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ προσφιλεῖς ἂν
15 εἷη ὁ τοιοῦτος οὔτε θεῷ· κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτῳ δὲ
μὴ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, φιλίᾳ οὐκ ἂν εἷη. φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὃ
Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους 508
τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ

506 in the exegetical participial clause
d οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἑῶντα . . . πληροῦν. Af-
ter πληροῦν we find the parenthetical
criticism ἀνήνυτον κακόν, while the
life of the man who attempts what is
deprecatd in the participial clause,
is characterized very emphatically by
the appositional tag which completes
this rambling, intensely conversa-
tional sentence.

10. συντείνοντα: the image is that
of drawing the bow and aiming, to
the employment of which, σκόπος has
led the way. We find in *Rep.* ix.
591 c the same image in a similar
connexion, ὃ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ
αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο ξυντείνων βίωσεται.

e 13. ἀνήνυτον κακόν: "an evil to
which there is no end." The striving
to satisfy the desires is also called an
ἀνήνυτον ἔργον in *Phaedo* 84 a, and
compared with the web of Penelope,
which was begun every day anew.
On the apposition, see G. 137, 3; H.
626.

13 f. ληστοῦ βίον ζῶντα: for the
appositional partic. see Kr. 56, 15, 3.

15. ἀδύνατος: in an active sense.

16. κοινωνία: in passing, Socrates
shows that the only foundation for
an all-embracing view of the world
is found in correct moral principle.

Both in nature and in the universe 507
the harmony of the parts with each
other and with the whole is essential
for existence. The state, and, pro-
ceeding further, the moral condition
of the individual soul, should there-
fore be modelled on the principle of
general order which pervades the
world.—οἱ σοφοί: those especially
meant are the Pythagoreans, to whose
views Plato had had recourse before.
Cf. 493 a. Pythagoras is said first
to have applied to the world the
name κόσμος. He was followed by
Empedocles with his scientific sys-
tem, according to which there are
two principles in the world,—love,
φιλότης (στοργή, Ἀφροδίτη, ἁρμονία),
and hate, νεῖκος. The former is the
cause of association and union, the
latter of separation and disunion.
Cf. Emped. 94, Karst. Ἄλλοτε μὲν
φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, |
Ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ διχ' ἕκαστα φορεύμενα
νεῖκος ἔχθει.

18. συνέχειν: the subj. of the inf. 508
is τὴν κοινωνίαν, as is shown by the
art. as well as the connexion. Cf.
Soph. 242 e τὸ δὲν . . . ἔχθρα καὶ φιλίᾳ
συνέχεται. The omission of the art.
in enumerations is common. See on
450 d.

σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα
 20 κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ᾧ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολα-
 σίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις,
 καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ
 γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται.
 σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμε-
 25 λείς. εἶεν· ἡ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔστιν,

508 19. **δικαιοσύνη**: an unusual word
^a for justice, formed like *κοσμοδότης* and *ισότης*. It was probably chosen here on account of the assonance. Similarly *Prot.* 331 **b** ταυτὸν ἔστι δικαιοσύνη δσιότητι. Xenophon also uses the word.

22. **καὶ ταῦτα**: the regular Greek expression for "and that too." See H. 612 a.

22 f. **ἡ γεωμετρικὴ**: adds a limitation to the *ισότης*, that absolute equality, which is impossible in any government. *ισότης* alone is purely arithmetical equality ($a=b$); *ισότης γεωμετρικὴ* is ratio or proportion ($a:b::c:d$). Plato distinguishes between two kinds of *ισότης* in *Leg.* vi. 757 **b**, the one *τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ*, the arithmetical; the second, *τὴν ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀρίστην ἰσότητα*, the geometric, which is not comprehensible by every man, and which is dependent upon the judgment and decision of the gods. Of this he says (*ib.*): *τῷ μὲν μέλει πλείω, τῷ δ' ἐλάττω σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρω, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μέλεισι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μέλεις, τοῖς δὲ τοῦναντίον ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέροις ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον*. On this *ισότης*, which is here opposed to *πλεονεξία*, is founded the administration of justice in the state (*ib.* τὸ

πολιτικὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον). Aristotle also (*Nic. Eth.* v. 6, 7, Bekk.) ^a refers τὸ ἐν διανομῇ δίκαιον back to *ἀναλογία*, i.e. to *ισότης λόγων*, and adds, καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν γεωμετρικὴν οἱ μαθηματικοί. Isocrates expresses himself to the same effect in *Areop.* (vii.) 20 ff., where he says of Solon and Cleisthenes, μέγιστον αὐτοῖς συνεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ καλῶς οἰκεῖν τὴν πόλιν, ὅτι δυοῖν ἰσοτήτοι νομιζομένοι εἶναι, καὶ τῆς μὲν ταῦτ' ἄσπις ἀπονεμούσης, τῆς δὲ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστοις, οὐκ ἡγνόουν τὴν χρησιμωτέραν κτέ. Thompson also quotes Plut. *Mor.* 719 **b**, according to which Lycurgus 'expelled from Lacedaemon arithmetical equality, holding it to be democratic and levelling in principle, and introduced the geometric, as better suited to a temperate oligarchy and monarchy.'

24. **γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελής**: Plato considered mathematics as a necessary preliminary to philosophy. Hence the well-known *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσὶτω μου τὴν στέγην* upon his house.

25. **εἶεν**: see on 466 c. Cf. 472 d, 480 a.—**ἡ ἐξελεγκτέος δὴ κτέ.**: the alternative appears as the obvious and necessary result of what precedes. The meaning and construction are similar to 482 **b** (*ὡς οὐ κτέ.*). See on 467 a.

St. I. p. 508.

ὥς οὐ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης κτήσεται εὐδαίμονες οἱ **b**
 εὐδαίμονες, κακίας δὲ οἱ ἄθλιοι (ἄθλιοι), ἥ εἰ οὗτος ἀληθής
 ἐστιν, σκεπτέον τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα. τὰ πρόσθεν ἐκείνα,
 ὦ Καλλίκλεις, συμβαίνει πάντα, ἐφ' οἷς σύ με ἤρου, εἰ
 30 σπουδάζων λέγοιμι, λέγοντα ὅτι κατηγορητέον εἴη καὶ
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑέος καὶ ἐταίρου, εἴαν τι ἀδικῇ, καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ
 ἐπὶ τοῦτο χρηστέον· καὶ ἂ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ ᾧ σου συγχω-
 ρεῖν, ἀληθῇ ἄρα ἦν, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι,
 ὅσῳ περ αἰσχίον, τοσοῦτ' ἀκίον· καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὁρ- **c**
 35 θῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι δίκαιον ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστή-
 μονα τῶν δικαίων, ὃ αὖ Γοργίαν ἔφη Πῶλος δι' αἰσχύνῃ
 ὁμολογῆσαι.

LXIV. Τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων σκεψώμεθα, τί ποτ'
 ἐστὶν ἂ σὺν ἐμοὶ ὀνειδίζεις, ἄρα καλῶς λέγεται ἡ οὖν, ὥς
 ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἐμαντῶ οὔτε τῶν
 φίλων οὐδενὶ οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγί-
 5 στων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἀτι-
 μοι [τοῦ ἐθέλοντος], ἂν τε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ νεανικὸν **d**

⁵⁰⁸ 27. οἱ ἄθλιοι ἄθλιοι: if the emen-
^b dation is correct, we have an example
 of chiasmus, as in 498 d.

28. τί τὰ συμβαίνοντα: the sing. τί
 inquires for the general result, which
 may include various details. See
 Kr. 61, 8, 2.

32. ἂ Πῶλον αἰσχύνῃ κτέ.: with
 this Socrates avoids the accusation
 that he may have defended those prin-
 ciples only for the sake of confuting
 his adversary. They are seen now to
 be quite necessarily bound together
 with a moral view of life. Note the
 difference in the tenses, συγχωρεῖν
 (equiv. to συνεχάρει) and below (37)
 ὁμολογῆσαι (equiv. to ὡμολόγησε).

^c LXIV. 3. ὥς οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ κτέ.:

this objection Callicles had only ⁵⁰⁸
 brought forward as a possibility, not ^c
 as an actual fact (486 a, b). Socrates
 treats it as the latter, but even
 thus it does not misrepresent Calli-
 cles' sentiments.

5 f. ὥσπερ οἱ ἀτιμοι: see on 486 c.
 As the reading stands, τοῦ ἐθέλοντος
 must be considered as a variant for
 ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ. In spite of Plato's
 fondness for ποικιλία, it is hardly
 likely that he would use βούλεσθαι
 and θέλειν as identical in meaning.

6 f. τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο: in appo- ^d
 sition to the whole clause, but more
 especially to the words which follow.
 See on 447 a. For the meaning, see
 on 482 c.

δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, εἰάν τε χρήματα
 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, εἰάν τε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἰάν τε, τὸ
 ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ
 10 αἰσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ σοὺς λόγος. ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς ὅστις πολ-
 λάκις μὲν ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐδὲν δὲ κωλύει καὶ ἔτι λέγεσθαι·
 οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως
 αἰσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ
 15 ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ
 τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἰσχίον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ
 κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν
 καὶ συλλήβδην ὅτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ
 ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχίον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀδικου-
 μένῳ. ταῦτα ἡμῖν ἄνω ἐκεῖ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε λόγοις οὕτω
 20 φανέντα, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγροι- 509
 κότερόν τι εἰπεῖν ἐστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἀδαμαντίνους λόγους,

508
 d 10. ὅστις: viz. ἐστίν. The omis-
 sion of the verb in the dependent
 question is very uncommon.

11. ἔτι: almost equivalent to ἔτι
 πλεονάκις.

e 13. τέμνεσθαι τὸ σῶμα: may be a
 delicate allusion to 473 c (ἐκτέμνηται)
 as τὸ βαλλάντιον and κλέπτειν to 486 c
 (ὕπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν
 τὴν οὐσίαν), but it is more probable,
 owing to its common association with
 βαλλάντιον, that τέμνεσθαι is used
 generally like the Lat. *secari*. In
 view of Socrates' poverty, this savors
 of humor.

14. βαλλάντιον: a leathern purse
 for carrying money, which was fas-
 tened to the girdle. The βαλλαντιο-
 τόμοι (*cut-purses*) were men who made
 a business of slipping off such purses
 in the market-places and the baths,
 and against whom it was difficult to
 protect one's self. This sentence is

also a commentary on the mischiev- 508
 ous results of the principle defended
 by Callicles, which was sure to intro-
 duce the most outrageous kinds of
 ἀδικία. Apropos of this, cf. also the
 view of Thrasymachus in *Rep.* i. 344,
 especially b καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδρα-
 ποδισταὶ κτέ., οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες
 τῶν τοιούτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται·
 ἐπειδὴν δὲ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν
 χρήμασι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδισάμενος
 δουλώσεται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν
 ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέ-
 κληνται.

20 f. καὶ εἰ ἀγροικότερόν τι εἰπεῖν: 509
 see on 462 e. The καὶ εἰ shows that
 the word used is correct, though
 harsh. See crit. note on 503 a. The
 definite indic. is used in order to ex-
 cuse the unusual comparison of argu-
 ments to iron and steel fetters. The
 simile is well chosen, and is a good
 retort on Callicles, who in 484 a had

ὥς γοῦν ἂν δόξειεν οὕτωςί, οὓς σὺ εἰ μὴ λύσεις ἢ σοῦ τις
 νεανικώτερος, οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄλλως λέγοντα ἢ ὥς ἐγὼ νῦν
 λέγω καλῶς λέγειν· ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν αἰεί,
 25 ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως ἔχει, ὅτι μέντοι ὦν ἐγὼ ἐντε-
 τύχηκα, ὥσπερ νῦν, οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἄλλως λέγων μὴ
 οὐ καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὖ τίθημι ταῦτα
 οὕτως ἔχειν· εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει καὶ μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν **b**
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἔτι τούτου μείζον μεγί-
 30 στον ὄντος, εἰ οἶόν τε, τὸ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην, τίνα
 ἂν βοήθειαν μὴ δυνάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοηθεῖν ἐαντῷ κατα-
 γέλαστος ἂν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ εἶη; ἄρα οὐ ταύτην, ἣτις ἀπο-
 τρέψει τὴν ^{ἀνίστη}μεγίστην ἡμῶν βλάβην; ἀλλὰ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη
 ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι βοη-

509 characterized the laws and moral
a rules as bonds which the true man
 must break through (*διαρρήξας*).

22. οὕτωςί: "as matters stand," i.e.
 so far as these principles have been
 tested. They may be attacked with
 new arguments, in which case new
 defences would have to be made. —
 εἰ μὴ λύσεις: the stern minatory con-
 ditional form. See on 502 **b**.

23. νεανικώτερος: i.e. who is more
 powerful and courageous, just as Cal-
 licles surpassed Polus, and Polus Gor-
 gias. — ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: cf. 506 **a** οὐδὲ
 γὰρ ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω.

25 f. ὦν . . . ἐντετύχηκα: on this
 unusual kind of attraction, see G.
 153, 2; H. 996 **a**. We miss a mention
 of the persons with ὥσπερ νῦν.

26 f. μὴ οὐ: after a negated lead-
 ing verb, the negative of the inf. is
 generally made by μὴ οὐ. See *Madv.*
Syn. § 211; *GMT.* 815.

27. αὖ τίθημι: sc. as against the op-
 posing opinions of all others. This
 statement now, taken as a basis (εἰ δὲ

οὕτως ἔχει) leads to a conclusion which 509
 is given in the form of a question. **a**
 τίθημι is frequently used of the laying
 down of a principle or assumption.
Cf. Rep. ii. 361 **b** τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν
 δίκαιον, *Theaet.* 191 **c**.

29 f. τούτου μείζον μεγίστου ὄντος: **b**
 notice the comparison of the superla-
 tive.

33. ἀλλά: introduces a more defi-
 nite and detailed statement of a
 thought involved in the previous
 question.

34. ταύτην εἶναι τὴν αἰσχίστην
 κτέ.: a noteworthy instance of the
 employment of a very common con-
 struction, which is as old as Homer
 (*Kr. Di.* 55, 3, 8). Logically we should
 expect ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν μὴ δύνασθαι
 βοηθεῖν αἰσχιστον εἶναι. But βοήθειαν,
 being uppermost in the speaker's
 mind, is made the subject, instead of
 cognate accusative, drawing also the
 predicate after it (see on 449 **b, c**).
 In this way μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν is
 characterized as a species, and the

- 35 *θεῖν μήτε αὐτῷ μήτε τοῖς αὐτοῦ φίλοις τε καὶ οἰκείοις,*
δευτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου κακοῦ καὶ τρίτην τὴν τοῦ **c**
τρίτου καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως, ὡς ἐκάστου κακοῦ μέγεθος πέφυ-
κεν, οὕτω καὶ κάλλος τοῦ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑκαστα βοη-
θεῖν καὶ αἰσχύνῃ τοῦ μή. ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ οὕτως ἔχει, ὧ
 40 *Καλλίκλεις;*

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

- LXV. ΣΩ. Δυοῖν οὖν ὄντοι, τοῦ ἀδικεῖν τε καὶ ἀδικεῖ-
 σθαι, μείζον μὲν φαμεν κακὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ
 ἀδικεῖσθαι. τί οὖν ἂν παρασκευασάμενος ἄνθρωπος βοη-
 θήσειεν αὐτῷ, ὥστε ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὠφελίας ταύτας ἔχειν,
 5 *τὴν τε ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι;* **d**
πότερα δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν; ὧδε δὲ λέγω· πότερον ἐὰν
 μὴ βούληται ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται, ἢ ἐὰν δύναμιν
 παρασκευάσῃται τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐκ ἀδικήσεται;

ΚΑΛ. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ἐὰν δύναμιν.

- 10 ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν; πότερον ἐὰν μὴ βούληται

509 most shameful species, of *βοήθεια*,
b which was pretty exactly Plato's
 opinion of the assistance which the
 orators were in the habit of rendering
 to themselves and their friends before
 a court. This assimilation is extended
 to the following clauses, *δευτέραν* etc.,
 for the sake of consistency.

c 38. *ἐφ' ἑκαστα*: viz. *κακά*, which
 are conceived as the enemy to be
 fought. Instead of *αἰσχύνῃ* we should
 have expected *αἰσχύνῃ*.

41. *οὐκ ἄλλως*: it is remarkable
 that after his utterances in 505 **d** Cal-
 licles allows himself to be again drawn
 into the discussion. 'Εκὼν ἀέκοντί γε
θυμῷ; For that the answer slips from
 him unconsciously, instead of being
 a willing admission, seems to follow
 from *ἔστω σοι τοῦτο* (510 **a**), where

his earlier disposition again becomes 509
 plain. **c**

LXV. 1. *τοῦ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.*: in appo-
 sition to the *δυοῖν*.

4. *ἀμφοτέρας*: the following inves-
 tigation takes up each of the two
 cases separately.

6. *δύναμιν ἢ βούλησιν*: what has **d**
 been determined in 466 **d** regarding
δύνασθαι and *βούλεσθαι* still holds
 good, but is expanded in what follows.

7. *ἀδικήσεται*: the fut. middle as a
 passive occurs more commonly with
 pure verbs. See Kr. 39, 11; H. 496.

9. *δῆλον δὴ κτέ.*: the form of the
 answer shows very willing agreement,
 which applies, however, only to this
 particular point.

10. *τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ κτέ.*: cf. *Phaedo*
 78 **d** *τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον*

St. I. p. 509.

ἀδικεῖν, ἱκανὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν — οὐ γὰρ ἀδικήσει — ἢ καὶ
ἐπὶ τοῦτο δεῖ δύνάμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην παρασκευάσασθαι, e
ὥς, ἐὰν μὴ μάθῃ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσῃ, ἀδικήσῃ; τί οὐκ
αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι
15 δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἐμπρο-
σθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὐ, ἥνίκα ὠμολογήσαμεν
μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικούντας
πάντας ἀδικεῖν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω σοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως, ἵνα διαπε- 510
20 ράνῃς τὸν λόγον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, παρασκευαστέον ἐστι
δύνάμιν τινα καὶ τέχνην, ὅπως μὴ ἀδικήσομεν.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶν τέχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν
25 ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὥς ὀλίγιστα; σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥπερ
ἐμοί. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἄρχειν δεῖν ἐν
τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας
ἐταῖρον εἶναι.

509 ἀνθρώπων ἢ ἵππων . . . ; ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτα
d ἔχει κτέ. It is not necessary to sup-
ply περί or some other word; when
put thus freely at the beginning of
the sentence, the genitive is held up
to view and the case lost sight of. See
Rid. § 27. The acc. also is occasion-
ally thus 'freely' used. Cf. Lyc. 28
καὶ ταῦτα ἐμοῦ θεωρήσατε, ὥς δικαίαν
τὴν ἐξέτασιν ποιουμένου περὶ τούτων.

e 12. δύνάμιν καὶ τέχνην . . . μάθη
καὶ ἀσκήσῃ: an example of chiasmus.
Knowledge is preserved and strength-
ened by practice.

13. ὥς . . . ἀδικήσῃ: the causal
use of ὥς is not common. See Kr.
65, 8; H. 925. — αὐτά: for the neut.
pl. referring to two preceding fem.
sings. see Kr. 68, 3, 5; H. 630, 633.

13 f. τί οὐκ . . . ἀπεκρίνω: see on 509
503 b. e

17. βουλόμενον: for the usual
ἐκόντα, in order not to diminish the
contrast between δύναμις and βούλη-
σις. Besides, it has just been shown
to Polus that he who does wrong does
only what seems to him good, not
what he wishes, because the wish is
always for the good.

22. ἀδικήσομεν: according to (the 510
amended) Dawes' canon ὅπως in ob-
ject clauses cannot be construed with
the first aor. subjv. either act. or mid-
dle. See GMT. 363, 364. a

28. ἐταῖρον: the common word
to express party affiliation (hence
also ἐταιρεῖαι, "clubs"), as in *Apol.*
21 a ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἐταῖρος.

ΚΑΛ. Ὅραῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς ἐγὼ ἐτοῖμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, **b**
 30 ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάννυ καλῶς εἶρη-
 κέναι.

LXVI. ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐάν σοι δοκῶ εἶ λέγειν.
 φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἐκάστω εἶναι ὥς οἶόν τε μάλιστα,
 ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, “ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ
 ὁμοίῳ.” οὐ καὶ σοί;

5 ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅπου τύραννός ἐστιν ἄρχων ἄγριος καὶ
 ἀπαίδευτος, εἴ τις τούτου ἐν τῇ πόλει πολὺ βελτίων
 εἴη, φοβοῖτο δήπου ἂν αὐτὸν ὁ τύραννος καὶ τούτῳ
 ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ νοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτε δύναίτο φίλος γενέ- **c**
 10 σθαι;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

510 **b** 29. ὁράς κτέ.: expression of joy
 that Socrates, with whom Callicles
 has had so often to agree unwillingly and under protest, now speaks
 quite to his liking. This view is
 the one thought of his life. Cf.
 475 a.

LXVI. 1. σκόπει . . . ἐάν σοι
 δοκῶ κτέ.: for the construction with
 σκόπει see H. 1016 c, and on 452 c.
 Cf. above in a. ‘What is worth no-
 ticing upon this usage is that ἐάν
 gives a different shade of meaning
 from the more usual εἰ. The ques-
 tion submitted is represented by it
 as a perfectly open one; whereas εἰ
 would limit the speaker’s foregone
 conclusion, and give a certain ap-
 pearance of positiveness. ἐάν is
 therefore chosen for the sake of ex-
 pressing more perfect courtesy, in
 contexts such as this, which relate
 to the conduct of a dialogue.’ Rid.
 § 64.

2. ἕκαστος ἐκάστω: does not de- **b**
 note an unlimited reciprocity, but
 a restricted one, as is shown by the
 following ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ.

3. ὅνπερ . . . λέγουσιν: which the
 wise men of old mean when they say
 (λέγουσιν). The following proverb
 occurs very early, e.g. in Homer ρ 218
 ὥς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὥς τὸν
 ὁμοῖον. Plato often employs it, e.g.
 Prot. 337 d τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ
 φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, Symp. 195 b
 ὁ γὰρ παλαιὸς λόγος εἶδ’ ἔχει, ὥς ὁμοῖον
 ὁμοίῳ αἰεὶ πελάζει, Lys. 214 b τὸ ὁμοῖον
 τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ φίλον εἶναι. Of
 kindred import is the well-known
 verse ἤλιξ ἤλικα τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε
 τέρπε γέροντα, alluded to in Phaedr.
 240 c.

6. ὅπου τύραννός κτέ.: ‘where a
 savage and illiterate ruler is lord and
 master.’ Cope. In what follows, τοῦ-
 του refers to τύραννος, τούτῳ through
 αὐτόν to the τίς.

Σα. Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις πολὺ φανλότερος εἴη, οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως· καταφρονοῖ γὰρ ἂν αὐτοῦ ὁ τύραννος καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὡς πρὸς φίλον σπουδάσειεν.

15 ΚΑΛ. Καὶ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ.

Σα. Λείπεται δὴ ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὃς ἂν ὁμοήθης ὦν, ταῦτ' ἀψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐθέλῃ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκείσθαι τῷ ἄρχοντι. οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδική-
20 σει. οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;

a

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

Σα. Εἰ ἄρα τις ἐννοήσειεν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν νέων, τίνα ἂν τρόπον ἐγὼ μέγα δυναίμην καὶ μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίῃ, αὕτη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αὐτῷ ὁδὸς ἐστίν, εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ἐθίξειν

510 12. οὐδ' ἂν οὕτως: is to be completed according to the previous remark of Socrates.

c

16. ἄξιος λόγου φίλος: pred. after λείπεται. According to the nature of the case none other could come under consideration as lasting friends of the tyrant, even if they should show themselves friendly for a time.

17. ταῦτ' ἀψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν: like τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι is the external sign of a similarity of disposition and friendliness. See on 473 a.

18. ὑποκείσθαι: in the elsewhere not uncommon meaning, "to be subject to." Its use here is to emphasize the degradation in the eyes of a free man. Cf. also *Crito* 53 e ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιάσει πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ δουλεύων.

d 19. χαίρων ἀδικήσῃ: the partic. denotes the result of the verb. "He will have no reason to rejoice," i.e. he will not injure him with impunity. Cf. *Soph. O. R.* 363 ἀλλ' οὐ τι χαίρων δὲς γε πημονὰς ἐρεῖς.

22. εἰ ἄρα τις: the case which So-

crates here assumes in illustration 510 serves not only to enliven the discourse, but also to show (as opposed to the objections of ch. XL.) how unworthy and debased an object would have to be set before educators if the possession of power in the state is to be the leading aim of mankind.—Noteworthy is the use of the direct question after the introductory protasis, and furthermore the omission of some apodosis corresponding to the protasis, like γνῶνῃ ἂν ὅτι, in place of which we find ὡς ἔοικεν. Kr. gives other similar examples in 65, 5, 14. Similar cases occur in Latin.—ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει: see on 468 c. The position is noteworthy.

510

d

23. μηδεὶς με ἀδικοίῃ: μή was the negative of the wish, underlying the question, and is thus retained. It is therefore not necessary, with GMT. 292, 2, to suppose an idea of prevention to be involved. *How could I obtain great power and no one do (prevent any one from doing, GMT.) me wrong?*

25 αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ
 παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὁμοίος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.
 οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτῳ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ μέγα δύ- e
 30 νασθαι, ὡς ὁ ὑμέτερος λόγος, ἐν τῇ πόλει διαπεπράζεται.

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν; ἢ πολλοῦ δεῖ, εἴπερ
 ὁμοίος ἔσται τῷ ἄρχοντι ὄντι ἀδίκῳ καὶ παρὰ τούτῳ μέγα
 δυνήσεται; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε, πᾶν τὸ ὑναντίον οὕτως ἢ
 35 παρασκευὴ ἔσται αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὸ οἶψ τε εἶναι ὡς πλείστα
 ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην· ἢ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μέγιστον αὐτῷ κακὸν ὑπάρξει μοχθηρῷ⁵¹¹
 ὄντι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λελωβημένῳ διὰ τὴν μίμησιν τοῦ
 40 δεσπότου καὶ δύναμιν.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω
 καὶ κάτω, ὧς Σώκратες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμού-
 μενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκείνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται,
 καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα;

⁵¹⁰ 30. διαπεπράζεται: the fut. pf. is
 e employed to express finality or fixed-
 ness. Cope translates, "he will es-
 tablish for himself a lasting immu-
 nity from," etc. See on 469 d.

35. ἐπὶ τὸ οἶψ τε εἶναι: this is
 considered by Callicles and Polus as
 an end to be desired.—On the change
 of case, οἶψ and ἀδικοῦντα, see on
 492 b.

⁵¹¹ 40. καὶ δύναμιν: the way to be-
 a come powerful, says Socrates above,
 is to imitate the δεσπότης. Hence καὶ
 δύναμιν is the power (τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι)
 obtained by this μίμησις (ὅπως ὅτι μά-
 λιστα ὁμοίος ἔσται).

41. ὅπῃ στρέφεις: the last conclu-⁵¹¹
 sion of Socrates is not agreeable to
 Callicles, who therefore declares it an
 arbitrary perversion of the argument.
 The στρέφειν ἄνω κάτω (see on 481 e),
 the twisting this way and that of
 words and ideas so that their sense
 was reversed, was an important de-
 partment of Eristic.

43. ἐὰν βούληται: the use of βού-
 λεσθαι again shows that the detailed
 explanation by Socrates of the differ-
 ence between βούλεσθαι and δοκεῖν
 (ch. XXIII. f.) was in vain. Hence
 Socrates himself ceases to regard it
 in his answer.

St. I. p. 511.

45 Σο. Οἶδα, ὦγαθὲ Καλλίκλεις, εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί, καὶ ὁ
 σοῦ ἀκούων καὶ Πώλου ἄρτι πολλάκις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ὀλίγου πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄκουε,
 ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ μέν, ἂν βούληται, ἀλλὰ πονηρὸς ὢν καλὸν
 καὶγαθὸν ὄντα.

50 ΚΑΛ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν;

Σο. Οὐ νοῦν γε ἔχοντι, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. ἡ οἶει
 δεῖν τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, ὥς πλείστον χρό-
 νον ζῆν, καὶ μελετᾶν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας, αἱ ἡμᾶς ἀεὶ ἐκ
 τῶν κινδύνων σφύζουσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἦν σὺ κελεύεις ἐμὲ
 55 μελετᾶν τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασφύ-
 ζουσαν.

ΚΑΛ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ὀρθῶς γέ σοι συμβουλεύων.

LXVII. Σο. Τί δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε; ἡ καὶ ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπι-
 στήμη σεμνή τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι;

511 45. εἰ μὴ κωφός γ' εἰμί: "otherwise
 b I would have to be deaf." Cf. Prot.

349 e κάλλιστον . . . εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε.

46. πολλάκις: 486 b, 466 c, et al.

48. ἀποκτενεῖ μέν κτέ.: cf. Plut. Agis
 20 ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἅγισ ἐπὶ τὴν στραγγάλην
 πορευόμενος, ὡς εἶδε τινα τῶν ὑπηρετῶν
 δακρύοντα καὶ περιπαθοῦντα, "παῦσαι
 με" εἶπεν, "ὦ ἄνθρωπε, κλαίων. καὶ γὰρ
 οὕτως παρανόμως καὶ ἀδίκως ἀπολλύμε-
 νος κρείττων εἰμί τῶν ἀναιρούντων."

50. καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν: καὶ is
 climactic and the art. emphatic. "So
 far from this circumstance mitigating
 the outrage, is it not just the revolt-
 ing part of it," i.e. especially revolt-
 ing? Callicles puts himself in the
 place of the one who suffers the
 wrong, but with a feeling quite the
 reverse to that of Agis, quoted in
 the preceding note. In a similar
 manner Apollodorus says in [Xen.]
 Apol. 28 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτο ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρα-

τες, χαλεπώτατα φέρω ὅτι ὀρῶ σε ἀδί- 511
 κως ἀποθνήσκοντα. τὸν δὲ λέγεται κατα- b
 ψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν, Σὺ
 δέ, ὦ φίλτατε Ἀπολλόδωρε, μᾶλλον ἂν
 ἐβούλου με ὀρᾶν δικαίως ἀποθνήσκοντα;

51. ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει: assumes
 that the statement has already been
 proved by the course of the argu-
 ment. Cf. 527 c.

52 f. δεῖν . . . ζῆν: against such an
 over-valuation of life Socrates de-
 clares himself also in Apol. 28, 29;
 Crito 48 b.

55. τὴν ῥητορικὴν: the position is c
 very emphatic. For examples of the
 rel. clause preceding the antecedent,
 see Kr. 51, 11.

57. συμβουλεύων: connected in
 construction with the last words of
 Socrates, as is frequently the case in
 answers. Cf. 451 d ὀρθῶς γε λέγων
 σὺ, 473 b ἀληθῆ γε οἰόμενος ἴσως. See
 Kr. 56, 8, 7.

ΚΑΛ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν σῶζει γε καὶ αὕτη ἐκ θανάτου τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
 5 πους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν, οὗ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπι-
 στημῆς. εἰ δ' αὕτη σοι δοκεῖ σμικρὰ εἶναι, ἐγὼ σοι μεί- d
 ζονα ταύτης ἐρῶ, τὴν κυβερνητικὴν, ἣ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχὰς
 σῶζει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα, ἐκ τῶν
 ἐσχάτων κινδύνων, ὥσπερ ἡ ῥητορική· καὶ αὕτη μὲν
 10 προσεσταλμένη ἐστὶν καὶ κοσμία, καὶ οὐ σεμνύνεται
 ἐσχηματισμένη ὡς ὑπερήφανόν τι διαπραττομένη, ἀλλὰ
 ταυτὰ διαπραττομένη τῇ δικανικῇ, ἐὰν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίνης
 δεῦρο σώσῃ, οἶμαι δὴ ὀβολοὺς ἐπράξατο, ἐὰν δὲ ἐξ
 Αἰγύπτου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, ἐὰν πάμπολυ, ταύτης τῆς
 15 μεγάλης εὐεργεσίας, σώσασα ἂ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, καὶ αὐτὸν e

511 LXVII. 5. τοιοῦτον: has its cor-
 c relative in οὗ, which, like other relative
 adverbs, often stands for a
 prepositional phrase, as here equiv.
 to ἐν φ. Frequently we find τι added
 to τοιοῦτον. The sense of τοιοῦτον is
 made clear by the context.

d 8. τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα:
 probably this phrase was a common
 one, and we must therefore not press
 a contrast between τὰ σώματα and
 τὰς ψυχάς, which latter refers espe-
 cially to their lives. Thompson sup-
 poses, with some probability, that
 σώματα refers to the other members
 of the passenger's family, who may
 be conceived as belonging to him.
 Perhaps "goods and chattels" may
 be as good a rendering as any.

10. προσεσταλμένη: "retired," i.e.
 unpretending. Still stronger is συνε-
 σταλμένος, as e.g. in Isoc. Panath.
 230 ἀπ' αἰ φρονιμώτερος γεγεννημένος
 καὶ συνεσταλμένην ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν
 ("with a feeling of humility").

11. ἐσχηματισμένη: cf. Soph. 268 a

ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἂ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους 511
 ὡς εἰδῶς ἐσχημάτισται ("which he has d
 pretended to know").

12. τῇ δικανικῇ: used by Socrates
 instead of τῇ ῥητορικῇ because this
 species of the art affords the most
 room for comparison.

13. δὴ ὀβολοὺς: i.e. about six cents.
 The price was accordingly very low,
 if, as is shown by what follows, the
 fare from Egypt or Pontus (a dan-
 gerous voyage besides) for a whole
 family, including baggage, was only
 two drachmae, or about thirty-five
 cents. — ἐπράξατο: 'gnomic' or 'em-
 piric' aorist.

15. αὐτόν: the regular designation e
 for the master of the house, who is
 frequently opposed to the rest of the
 family as here. See on 447 c. The
 order of enumeration is noteworthy
 as showing the low estimation in
 which the women were held. The
 pl. may be due to assimilation to
 παῖδας, as we say "wife and child," or
 it may be collective, "women folks."

καὶ παῖδας καὶ χρήματα καὶ γυναῖκας, ἀποβιβάσας εἰς
 τὸν λιμένα δύο δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἔχων τὴν
 τέχνην καὶ ταῦτα διαπραξάμενος ἐκβὰς παρὰ τὴν θάλατ-
 ταν καὶ τὴν ναῦν περιπατεῖ ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι. λογίζε-
 20 σθαι γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐπίσταται, ὅτι ἀδελόν ἐστιν, οὐστινὰς τε
 ὠφέληκεν τῶν συμπλεόντων οὐκ ἐάσας καταποντωθῆναι
 καὶ οὐστινας ἔβλαψεν, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς βελτίους 512
 ἐξεβίβασεν ἢ οἱ ἐνέβησαν, οὔτε τὰ σώματα οὔτε τὰς
 ψυχὰς. λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ, εἰ μὲν τις μεγάλοις καὶ
 25 ἀνιάτοις νοσήμασιν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα συνεχόμενος μὴ
 ἀπεπνίγη, οὗτος μὲν ἀθλιός ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν, καὶ
 οὐδὲν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληται· εἰ δέ τις ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώμα-

511 18. παρὰ τὴν θάλατταν: also effective in the portrayal of the seaman's unpretending nature.

19. ἐν μετρίῳ σχήματι: with unassuming carriage, has nothing to do with the dress, but merely with the deportment (cf. above, προσεσταλμένη). Perhaps there is a slight hit at Gorgias' pompous manner. See Intro. § 5 fin.

19 f. λογίεσθαι... ἐπίσταται: naturally not meant in full earnest, and not without some color of irony. The change of tense in ὠφέληκε and ἔβλαψε is probably due merely to the frequency of the form.

20 f. οὐστινας ὠφέληκε κτέ.: reminds us of Matt. xviii. 6, where of those who offend it is said: συμφέρει αὐτῷ ἵνα... καταποντισθῇ ἐν τῷ πελάγει τῆς θαλάσσης.

512 23. ἢ οἱ ἀνέβησαν: it is a Greek peculiarity to compare different states by employing the gen. of the reflexive. Here a clause takes its place.

24. λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ: the force of the neg. extends over the whole

sentence, which is developed antithetically. Since both leading clauses are hypothetical, we have a double employment of μὲν and δέ. The first member of the antithesis is given first only for the sake of the contrast; we should use a subordinate clause in English, and lay the most stress on the second member, and, too, on its conclusion. Cf. *Apol.* 28 ο ἐγὼ οὖν δεῖνὰ ἂν εἶην εἰργασμένος, εἰ δτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταπτον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἴλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, τότε μὲν οὐ ἐκείνοι ἔταπτον ἔμενον—τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ φήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν—ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς ἢ θάνατον ἢ ἄλλο δτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. See on 502 b and 499 d.

26. ἀθλιός ὅτι οὐκ ἀπέθανεν: some such idea as this frequently occurs in Plato; for example, in the *Republic* and *Laws*. Cf. *Crito* 47 d, ο εἰ ἂν διολέσωμεν (sc. τὸ σῶμα) ἄρα βιωτὸν ἡμῖν ἐστί διεφθαρμένου αὐτοῦ; Οὐδαμῶς. Socrates makes there a similar estimate of the relationship of soul to body.

* τος τιμιωτέρω, τῇ ψυχῇ, πολλὰ νοσήματα ἔχει καὶ ἀνίατα, τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστὶν καὶ τοῦτον ὀνήσει, ἂν τε ἐκ
30 θαλάττης ἂν τε ἐκ δικαστηρίου ἐάν τε ἄλλοθεν ὁποθενοῦν σώσῃ· ἀλλ' οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ζῆν τῷ μοχθηρῷ ὅ
ἀνθρώπῳ· κακῶς γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ζῆν.

LXVIII. Διὰ ταῦτα οὐ νόμος ἐστὶ σεμνύνεσθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, καίπερ σφύζοντα ἡμᾶς· οὐδέ γε, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τὸν μηχανοποιόν, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγοῦ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδενὸς ἐλάττω ἐνίοτε δύναται σφύζειν· πόλεις
5 γὰρ ἐστὶν ὅτε ὅλας σφύζει. μή σοι δοκεῖ κατὰ τὸν δικανικὸν εἶναι; καίτοι εἰ βούλοιο λέγειν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἅπερ ὅ
ὑμεῖς, σεμνύνων τὸ πρᾶγμα, καταχώσειεν ἂν ὑμᾶς τοῖς λόγοις, λέγων καὶ παρακαλῶν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖν γίνεσθαι μηχανοποιούς, ὥς οὐδὲν τᾷλλά ἐστιν· ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ

512 LXVIII. 1. νόμος: usage, custom.
b Cf. τὰ νομιζόμενα.

3. μηχανοποιόν: Socrates has in mind the constructors of great machines which were used in the defence of beleaguered cities, and of which the second Punic war offers a celebrated example. The military engineer saves at the same time the lives of many men, — the orator only one life at a time. — μὴ (οὐχ) ὅτι: see on 450 e.

4. ἐλάττω δύναται σφύζειν: this use of the neut. acc. is extended from the cognate. Cf. *Apol.* 30 c ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε. On the pl., cf. the adverbial use of the neut. pl. by Thucydides. 'A chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.' *Rid.* § 43.

5. μή σοι δοκεῖ: the answer assumed in the following καίτοι would run as above: μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. For the interrogative μή, see G. 282, 2. —

κατὰ . . . εἶναι: to be comparable to, i.e. 512
worthy to be put upon the same plane
b with. Cf. *Apol.* 17 b ὁμολογήην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ.

7. τὸ πρᾶγμα: "his business." — καταχώσειεν: would cover under a mass, c
e.g. of arrows, like obruere. Cf. *Hdt.* vii. 225 ἐν τούτῳ σφέας τῷ χώρῳ ἀλεξιμένους . . . κατέχωσαν οἱ βάρβαροι βάλλοντες. The use of this word brings up the image of war and the hurling machines of the μηχανοποιοί, whose weapons, however, in this case are to be λόγοι instead of λίθοι.

8. λέγων: the omission of an object clause is accounted for by the addition of παρακαλῶν, which at the same time extends and defines λέγων. The use of δεῖν is rather strange; it would go better with λέγων. Perhaps there is a mixture of two constructions. For the matter, cf. 486 c.

9. ὥς κτέ.: see on 509 e.

9 f. ἱκανὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος: for his case is strong enough,

- 10 λόγος. ἀλλὰ σὺ οὐδὲν ἤττον αὐτοῦ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς ἐκείνου, καὶ ὡς ἐν ὀνειδίει ἀποκαλέσαις ἂν μηχανοποιόν, καὶ τῷ ὑεὶ αὐτοῦ οὐτ' ἂν δοῦναι θυγατέρα ἐθέλοις, οὐτ' ἂν αὖ τῷ σαντοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ἐκείνου. καίτοι ἐξ ὧν τὰ σαντοῦ ἐπαινεῖς, τίνι δικαίῳ λόγῳ τοῦ μηχανο-
 15 ποιῶ καταφρονεῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον; οἷδ' d ὅτι φαίης ἂν βελτίων εἶναι καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων. τὸ δὲ βέλτιον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἀρετή, τὸ σφάζειν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ ὄντα ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν, καταγέλαστός σοι ὁ ψόγος γίγνεται καὶ μηχανοποιῶ καὶ
 20 ἱατροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, ὅσαι τοῦ σφάζειν ἔνεκα πεποιήνται. ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε, ὅρα μὴ ἄλλο τι τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἢ τὸ σφάζειν τε καὶ σφάζεσθαι. μὴ γὰρ

512 11. ἀποκαλέσαις: call slightlyly.

c Cf. Soph. Ai. 726 τὸν τοῦ μανέντος ἀπίβουλευτοῦ στρατοῦ ξύναμιον ἀποκαλοῦντες. The displacement of the first οὔτε from its normal position is common enough.

14. ἐξ ὧν: stands either for ἐκ τούτων ἐξ ὧν ("for the reasons for which you praise your art") or ἐκ τούτων ἃ ("from that which you say in praise of your art"), more likely the latter. See H. 996 a.

d 16. βελτίων καὶ ἐκ βελτιόνων: such combinations are common. Cf. *Phaedr.* 246 a θεῶν μὲν οὖν ἵπποι τε καὶ ἡνίοχοι αὐτοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, *Lys. in Agor.* 18 δοῦλον καὶ ἐκ δούλων ὄντα, *Soph. Phil.* 384 πρὸς τοῦ κακίστου κακῶν κακῶν Ὀδυσσέως, 874 εὐγενὴς γὰρ ἡ φύσις καὶ εὐγενῶν, *Paul ad Phil.* iii. 5 Ἑβραῖος ἐξ Ἑβραίων. — In this passage, moreover, we see in its worst colors the opposition between the theory championed by Callicles and his actual practices. The former is a kind of sophistical latitudinarianism;

the latter, the narrow-mindedness of 512 d Greek tradition.

17. μὴ ἔστιν: the regular accentuation of ἔστι after μὴ and τοῦτο.

18. ὄντα: constr. with the understood subject of σφάζειν. — ὁποῖός τις ἔτυχεν: "without regard to moral qualities."

22 f. μὴ γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν, τὸ ζῆν κτέ.: the change from the subjv. to the indic. *ἔστι* may be due to forgetfulness on the part of the speaker, who, after giving the keynote to the sentence with the μὴ γὰρ at the beginning, shifts to the independent, straightforward indic. construction. If the *ἔστι* is to be construed rigidly with μὴ, understanding again *ὅρα*, then we must consider that Socrates rejected the subjv., which may refer either to the present or the future, for the indic., which leaves no ambiguity as to its time sphere. That Socrates is aware of the grammatically uncertain structure of his sentence is shown by the τοῦθ' ὅρα below. But see Goodwin's view, GMT. 269,

τοῦτο μέν, τὸ ζῆν ὅποσονδὴ χρόνον, τὸν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ^e
 ἄνδρα ἐατέον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ φιλοψυχητέον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιτρέ-
 25 ψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ καὶ πιστεύσαντα ταῖς γυναιξίν,
 ὅτι τὴν εἰμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι, τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ
 σκεπτέον, τίς ἂν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν μέλλοι χρόνον βιώναι
 ὡς ἄριστα βιοίῃ, ἄρα ἐξομοίων αὐτὸν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ
 ἐν ᾗ ἂν οἰκῇ, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὁμοιότατον γίγνεσθαι ⁵¹³
 30 τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μέλλεις τούτῳ προσφιλεῖς εἶναι
 καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει· τοῦθ' ὅρα εἰ σοὶ λυσιτε-

⁵¹² 23 f. **τόν γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνδρα**: has
^e reference to the lengthy exposition of
 Callicles in ch. XXXVIII. ff., espe-
 cially 485 c, d, where the activity of
 Socrates is characterized as unmanly.
 Wherein true manliness consists, So-
 crates shows in his defence, *Apol.* ch.
 XVI. f. and XXIX.—**ἐατέον**: cf. 484 c
 ἐάσας φιλοσοφίαν. For the construc-
 tion, see on 507 c.

24 f. **ἐπιτρέψαντα . . . τῷ θεῷ**: this
 feeling of submission to God's decrees
 Socrates preserved even to his death.
Cf. Apol. 41 d οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ
 κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτή-
 σαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τού-
 του πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ
 τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλόν
 ἐστὶ τοῦτο ὅτι ἦδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλά-
 χθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι.

25. **περὶ τούτων**: for emphasis, in-
 stead of the simple acc. ταῦτα. But
 see *Rid.* § 106.—**ταῖς γυναιξίν**: be-
 cause these hold more firmly to what
 is old and time-honored, both in dialect
(cf. Crat. 418 c αἱ γυναῖκες μάλιστα τὴν
 ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν σφύζουσι, *Cic. de Or.* iii.
 12. 45) and in belief. This same old
 belief is expressed by Hector Z 488,
 μοῖραν (i.e. τὴν εἰμαρμένην) δ' οὔ τινα
 φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν. It is
 ridiculed as an old wives' tale by the

Epicurean Velleius in *Cic. de Nat.* ⁵¹²
Deor. i. 20. 55 as follows: Hinc ^e
 vobis exstitit primum illa
fatalis necessitas quam εἰμαρ-
μένην dicitis, ut, quidquid ac-
 cidat, id ex aeterna veritate
 causarumque continuatione
 fluxisse dicatis. Quanti au-
 tem haec philosophia aesti-
 manda est cui tamquam ani-
 culis et iis quidem indoctis,
fato fieri videantur omnia?
 By the words **ἐπιτρέψαντα κτέ.**, Socra-
 tes declares in a delicate way that
 this belief of the women harmonizes
 with the principles of true manliness
 better than the view of the highly
 cultured Callicles.

26. **οὐδ' ἂν εἰς**: *οὐδεὶς* is separated
 for the sake of emphasis. See G. 77,
 1, 2; H. 290 a.—**τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ**: see
 on 452 c. *ἐπὶ* denotes the immediate
 succession.

27. **μέλλοι**: is optative by assimi-
 lation to the potential *ἂν βιοίῃ*.

29. **καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα**: introduces the ⁵¹³
 application to Callicles and his rela-
 tion to the Athenian state. In sense
 the clause depends on **σκεπτέον** above,
 but loosely.

31. **τοῦθ' ὅρα**: returns to the be-
 ginning, since the sense has become

λεῖ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅπως μή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, πεισόμεθα ὅπερ φασὶ
 τὰς τὴν σελήνην καθαιρούσας, τὰς Θετταλίδας· σὺν τοῖς
 φιλτάτοις ἢ αἵρεσις ἡμῶν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς
 35 ἐν τῇ πόλει. εἰ δέ σοι οἶε ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων παραδώ-
 σειν τέχνην τινὰ τοιαύτην, ἣτις σε ποιήσει μέγα δύνα- b
 σθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε ἀνόμοιον ὄντα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἴτ'
 ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ
 ὀρθῶς βουλεύει, ὦ Καλλίκλεις· οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ
 40 εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφυῶς ὁμοῖον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνή-
 σιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ καὶ
 ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους γε πρὸς. ὅστις οὖν σε
 τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει,

513 somewhat obscured by the interven-
 a ing additions. The use of σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί
 resumes the previous unemphatic σέ, inasmuch as each one wishes to obtain the others' acceptance of his own view of life.

33. τὰς Θετταλίδας: the Thessalian women were very skilful in sorcery and poisoning. They stood in close relation to the night-goddess Hecate; hence people ascribed to them the power to draw the moon from the heavens. Strepsiades says in *Ar. Nuḗ*. 749 γυναῖκα φαρμακίδ' εἰ πριάμενος Θετταλὴν | καθέλοισι νύκτωρ τὴν σελήνην κτέ. Cf. *Hor. Epod.* 5. 45 quae sidera excantata voce Thes-sala | lunamque caelo deripit. For this, however, the goddess exacted punishment, for Suidas says αἱ τὴν σελήνην καθαιροῦσαι Θετταλίδες λέγονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ τῶν παίδων (v. l. ποδῶν) στερίσκεσθαι. εἴρηται ἐπὶ τῶν ἑαυτοῖς τὰ κακὰ ἐπισπωμένων ἢ παροιμία. Cf. also *Plin. N. H.* xxx. 1. 2 (6). Aristophanes' designation of them under the name φαρμακίς, while it implies that their art consisted in

the manipulation of drugs, does not 513
 limit us to that view, because Herod- a
 otus, vii. 114, uses the verb φαρμακεῖν in speaking of the sacrifice of white horses by the Magi to the river Strymon.

33 f. σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις: at the risk of our dearest interests. For the asyn deton, see on 450 b. — τὰ φίλτατα: denotes the soul and its ἀρετή, as in *Prot.* 314 a ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβείης καὶ κινδυνεύης. In αἵρεσις lies a play on καθαιρεῖν.

35. ὄντινούν ἀνθρώπων: recalls the promises made for rhetoric by Gorgias.

39. μιμητὴν: imitation is not to be b
 thought of, for immoral action with a correct moral feeling is impossible. Hence the similarity must be original (αὐτοφυῶς).

41. φιλίαν τῷ δήμῳ: substantives involving action, either physical or mental, sometimes take the construction of their corresponding adjs. or verbs. Cf. 522 d βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ, *Apol.* 30 a τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. *H.* 765 a.

42. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῷ Πυριλάμπους: see on 481 d.

ὥς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν·^c
 45 τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι
 χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται· εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο
 λέγεις, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ. λέγομέν τι πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Καλ-
 λίκλεις;

LXIX. ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εἶ
 λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος·
 οὐ πάνν σοι πείθομαι.

ΣΑ. Ὁ δῆμον γὰρ ἔρως, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ἐνὼν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ
 5 τῇ σῇ ἀντιστατεῖ μοι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν πολλάκις ἴσως καὶ βέλ-
 τιον ταῦτά ταῦτα διασκοπώμεθα, πεισθήσει. ἀναμνή-
 σθητι δ' οὖν, ὅτι δύο ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὰς παρασκευὰς ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἕκαστον θεραπεύειν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν, μίαν μὲν πρὸς

513 44. πολιτικός εἶναι: since these
 b words would be understood if not
 present, the special insertion of them
 can only serve to emphasize the
 identity of wish and result.

c 45. τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων:
 as an illustration of the sentiment,
cf. Dem. Ol. iii. 19 ἀλλ' οἶμαι μέγα τοῖς
 τοιούτοις ὑπάρχει ("comes to the aid
 of") λόγοις ἢ παρ' ἐκάστου βούλησις.

47. ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ: a humorously
 pathetic mode of address, borrowed
 from the Homeric usage (Θ 281 *et*
al.). *Cf. also Soph. O. R. 950* ὦ
 φίλτατον γυναικὸς Ἰοκάστης κῆρα *etc.*
 Our use of the word 'heart' in ten-
 der address is analogous. *Cf. Shaks.*
Love's Labor Lost, v. 3: 'Good heart,
 what grace hast thou thus to re-
 prove?' *etc.*

LXIX. 2. τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος:
 namely that they listen gladly only
 to that which harmonizes with their
 opinions, and are very loath to offer
 on the altar of more perfect knowl-
 edge the views they have come to

cherish; hence they remain unde-⁵¹³
 cided, as Meno says, *Meno 95 c* ἕπερ οἱ
 πολλοὶ πέπονθα· τοτὲ μὲν μοι δοκοῦσι,
 τοτὲ δὲ οὐ. The candor of Callicles
 here as compared with his earlier
 obstinacy is quite remarkable. For
 the asyndeton, see on 450 b.

5. ἴσως: this addition shows that
 the fulfilment of the condition is still
 very doubtful. *Cf. Socrates' remarks*
on the necessity of time to convince,
in Apol. 19 a, 37 a, b, quoted on 455 a.

7. δ' οὖν: but then, emphasizes, in d
 contrast to the uncertain hope just
 expressed, what must happen in any
 case. *Cf. Apol. 17 a.* The Latin
 equivalent is certe. Socrates has
 in mind at the moment ch. LV. f.,
 where, however, reference was made
 to the conversation with Gorgias and
 Polus in ch. XIX. f.

8. ἕκαστον: subject to θεραπεύειν.

8 f. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν: epexe-
 getic to μίαν (*sc. παρασκευήν*). μὴ
 καταχαρίζομενον limits ὁμιλεῖν which
 belongs also to πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, and

ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, μὴ
 10 καταχαριζόμενον ἀλλὰ διαμαχόμενον. οὐ ταῦτα ἦν ἂ
 τότε ὠριζόμεθα;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν ἑτέρα, ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, ἀγεννὴς καὶ
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ κολακεία τυγχάνει οὔσα· ἡ γάρ;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω εἰ βούλει σοι οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἑτέρα ὅπως ὥς βέλτιστον ἔσται τοῦτο, εἴτε
 σῶμα τυγχάνει ὃν εἴτε ψυχὴ, ὃ θεραπεύομεν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιχειρητέον ἡμῖν ἐστὶν τῇ πόλει
 20 καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν, ὥς βελτίστους αὐτοὺς τοὺς
 πολίτας ποιοῦντας; ἄνευ γὰρ δὴ τούτου, ὥς ἐν τοῖς ἔμπρο-
 σθεν ἡγύρισκομεν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος ἄλλην εὐεργεσίαν οὐδε-
 μίαν προσφέρειν, ἐὰν μὴ καλὴ καγαθὴ ἢ διάνοια ἢ τῶν 514

⁵¹³
 d requires the supplying of an indefinite
 subject. See on 512 d ὄντα.

10. καταχαριζόμενον: used in *Apol.*
 35 c with the acc. (τὰ δίκαια). δια-
 μάχεσθαι frequently takes περί τινος.
 See also on 502 b, 503 a.

e 15. εἰ βούλει: added by Callicles
 here, as εἰ σοι ἡδίων in 514 a, ἵνα σοι
 χαρίσωμαι 516 b, to avoid responsi-
 bility. It is almost parenthetical.

16. ἡ . . . ἑτέρα: there is no need
 of an explanatory appositional clause
 corresponding to ἡ πρὸς ἡδονήν, since
 the inference from d is sufficient.
 The lacking verb (τυγχάνει οὔσα) on
 account of the parallelism must be
 taken from the preceding words of
 Socrates. ὅπως . . . τοῦτο is added
 to correspond to ἀγεννὴς . . . κολα-
 κεία, thus, "is directed to that end,
viz." etc. The connexion is a loose
 one.

20. θεραπεύειν: the addition of the

inf. here is an afterthought, after the ⁵¹³
 object which in sense belongs to it
 e has been already proleptically con-
 nected with the preceding verb. Cf.
Crato 52 c ἐπιθυμία σε . . . ἄλλων νόμων
 ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι. See *Kr.* 61, 6, 8; *Rid.*
 § 180.

20 f. ὥς . . . ποιοῦντας: connected
 (as a correlative) epexegetically with
 οὕτως. Cf. *Phaedo* 59 a σχεδόν τι
 οὕτω διεκείμεθα, ὅτε μὲν γελῶντες,
 ἐνίοτε δὲ δακρύοντες. The position of
 the οὕτως, which in sense is to be
 construed with θεραπεύειν, is due to
 the form of the sentence. The par-
 tics. agree in case with the unex-
 pressed subj. of θεραπεύειν, *viz.* ἡμᾶς.

23. ἐὰν μὴ κτέ.: explains ἄνευ δὴ ⁵¹⁴
 τούτου. — διάνοια: i.e. the inner activ-
 ity of the soul itself, its reasoning,
 thinking; hence it is often used for
 the mode of thought, the disposition,
 and even for the soul itself. a

μελλόντων ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινων ἢ
25 ἄλλην δύναμιν ἡντιοῦν. θῶμεν οὕτως ἔχειν;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, εἴ σοι ἥδιον.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους, ὦ Καλλίκευς,
δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ
οἰκοδομικά, ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα
30 οἰκοδομήματα, πότερον ἔδει ἂν ἡμᾶς σκέψασθαι ἡμᾶς
αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐξετάσαι, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα τὴν τέχ-
νῃν ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, τὴν οἰκοδομικὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦ
ἐμάθομεν; ἔδει ἂν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

35 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν δεύτερον αὖ τόδε, εἴ τι πώποτε οἰκοδόμημα
ᾧκοδομήκαμεν ἰδίᾳ ἢ τῶν φίλων τινὶ ἢ ἡμέτερον αὐτῶν,
καὶ τοῦτο τὸ οἰκοδόμημα καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἔστιν· καὶ εἰ
μὲν ἡύρισκομεν σκοπούμενοι διδασκάλους τε ἡμῶν ἀγα-
θοὺς καὶ ἐλλογίμους γεγονότας καὶ οἰκοδομήματα πολλὰ
40 μὲν καὶ καλὰ μετὰ τῶν διδασκάλων ᾧκοδομημένα ἡμῖν,

514 27. εἰ οὖν παρεκαλοῦμεν κτέ.: by a series of analogies Socrates tries to show that the profession of statecraft implies various preliminary qualifications, and that the incipient statesman ought to be subjected to an examination as to his education and previous habits, instead of following the Athenian practice. Cf. *Prot.* 319d ἐπειδὴν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως δέη βουλευσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως δὲ χαλκεὺς σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος ναύκληρος, πλούσιος πένης, γενναῖος ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς ἐπιπλήττει ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν μαθὼν οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐθενὸς αὐτῷ, ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ, *Xen. Mem.* iv. 2. 1-7.

28. δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες: almost equivalent to δημοσιεύοντες. — τῶν

πραγμάτων: must be considered as 514 part. gen. after δημοσίᾳ πράξοντες, and is not to be construed with the following clause, with Cron. ^a

29. ἢ τειχῶν ἢ νεωρίων ἢ ἱερῶν: these are themselves the greatest public works, but the addition of μέγιστα serves to emphasize the importance of the matter and the responsibility of the person.

30. πότερον: the second member of the double question is found in the ἢ οὐ which follows the repeated ἔδει ἂν below.—ἔδει ἂν: instead of ἔδει, shows that the whole condition is purely fictitious and unreal. The simple ἔδει would have drawn attention only to the inf. GMT. 423.

35. δεύτερον αὖ τόδε: to be completed from the preceding πότερον κτέ. ^b

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλ-
 λάγημεν, οὕτω μὲν διακειμένων νοῦν ἔχόντων ἦν ἂν ἰέναι
 ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἔργα· εἰ δὲ μήτε διδάσκαλον εἶχομεν
 ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξαι οἰκοδομήματά τε ἢ μηδὲν ἢ πολλὰ
 45 καὶ μηδενὸς ἄξια, οὕτω δὲ ἀνόητον ἦν ἂν που ἐπιχειρεῖν
 τοῖς δημοσίοις ἔργοις καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἀλλήλους ἐπ' αὐτά.
 φῶμεν ταῦτα ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

LXX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα, τά τε ἄλλα κἂν εἰ
 ἐπιχειρήσαντες δημοσιεύειν παρεκαλοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ὥς
 ἱκανοὶ ἰατροὶ ὄντες, ἐπεσκεψάμεθα δῆπου ἂν ἐγώ τε σέ
 καὶ σὺ ἐμέ, “φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς

514 41. ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν: would lead us
 c to expect as a contrast κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν
 διδασκάλων. But κοινῇ is omitted as
 self-evident, while ἰδίᾳ gives a certain
 definiteness to διὰ ἡμῶν.

42. διακειμένων (viz. ἡμῶν): is used
 absolutely; νοῦν ἔχόντων is to be con-
 nected with ἦν as above, 500 a παντὸς
 ἀνδρός.

45. οὕτω δέ: correlative with οὕτω
 μέν. See on 512 a. — ἀνόητον ἦν ἂν:
 cf. below, ο καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν and
 ἀνόητον ἂν εἶναι.

d LXX. 1. οὐκοῦν οὕτω πάντα: these words would seem to indicate the conclusion of the induction and the transition to its application to the question under discussion. Meanwhile, however, Socrates cites another example which is still closer to his idea. Hence τά τε ἄλλα καί, which at the same time sums up and emphasizes. — κἂν: is to be resolved into καὶ ἂν, the καί being correlative with τέ, and not going with εἰ in the sense “even.” For the repetition of the ἂν, two lines below, see 465 c, d, and on 475 e.

2. δημοσιεύειν: the general word 514
 d to denote the public practice of any profession or business which is for the benefit of the community. See on 452 a δημιουργός. In the case of physicians, are included not merely those who are in the service of the government, but also private practitioners. See on 455 b.

3. ὥς . . . ὄντες: expresses in a different form what is found above, a, in the phrase ἐπὶ τὰ οἰκοδομικά, viz. the department of activity to which attention is drawn.

4. φέρε κτέ.: change to direct quotation occurs frequently as here, without the employment of a definite verb of saying. — δέ: often employed in lively questions which are closely connected with the words of another. So here. Socrates offers himself to the state as a physician, but in what state of health is his own body? Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 26 (in the myth of Prodicus, after Κακία had praised her gifts) καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀκούσας ταῦτα, ὦ γύναι, ἔφη, ὄνομα δέ σοι τί ἐστι;

5 ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; ἢ ἤδη τις ἄλλος διὰ Σωκρά-
την ἀπηλλάγη νόσου, ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος; ” κὰν ἐγώ,
οἶμαι, περὶ σοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐσκόπουν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ἡγρί- e
σκομεν δι’ ἡμᾶς μηδένα βελτίω γεγονότα τὸ σῶμα, μήτε
τῶν ξένων μήτε τῶν ἀστῶν, μήτε ἀνδρα μήτε γυναῖκα,
10 πρὸς Διός, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ᾦν τῇ ἀλη-
θείᾳ, εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε πρὶν
ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ
κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ
λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν ἐπιχειρεῖν
15 μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτοὺς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλ-
λους τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν
εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;

ΚΑΛ. *Εμοιογε.

514 d 6. ἡ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος: cf. 502 d and 515 a. The distinction between slaves and freemen, which was always present to the mind of a Greek, is emphasized here because it was common for slaves to be treated by less skilled physicians, who might themselves be slaves, as we learn from *Legg.* iv. 720 c ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ ξυνοεῖς ὅτι δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων ὄντων τῶν καμνόντων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς μὲν δούλους σχεδόν τι οἱ δούλοι τὰ πολλὰ ἰατρεύουσιν. Cf. *Herm. Gr. Alt.* iv.³ § 38.

e 11. ἀνθρώπους: from the particular to the general, which also includes the particular. We should say “people” in the same way. It is remarkable, however, how quickly Socrates returns to the first person in the next clause. One must have in mind an individual before he can give particulars.

12. ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι: is the contrast to κατορθῶσαι. When one is beginning in a profession much is necessarily, from inexperience, done

at a risk, and may or may not suc- 514
ceed. For the phrase ὅπως ἐτύχομεν, cf. 521 c, *Crito* 45 d τὸ σὺν μέρος, ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράττουσι, “the success of your sons is left as far as you are concerned to the caprice of chance.” *Prot.* 353 b ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, τοῦτο λέγουσι, qui quidquid in buccam venit dicunt. The usual inference is unfavorable. The partic. is to be supplied from the following verb.

14. εἰ τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμεῖαν: the proverb denotes, “to begin with the large instead of with the small.” Cf. *Lach.* 187 a εἰ γὰρ νῦν, πρῶτον ἄρξεσθε παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑέσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαλεῖν ἐν πίθῳ ἢ κεραμεῖα γιγνομένη. A proverb from the potter’s art was natural among the Athenians, where the art flourished (*Κεραμεικός*).

- Σο. Νῦν δέ, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐπειδὴ σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς 515
 20 ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἐμὲ δὲ
 παρακαλεῖς καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ὅτι οὐ πράττω, οὐκ ἐπισκεψό-
 μεθα ἀλλήλους, “φέρε, Καλλικλῆς ἤδη τινα βελτίω πεποίηκε
 τῶν πολιτῶν; ἔστιν ὅστις πρότερον πονηρὸς ὢν, ἀδικός
 τε καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ ἄφρων, διὰ Καλλικλέα καλὸς τε
 25 καὶ ἀγαθὸς γέγονεν, ἢ ξένος ἢ ἀστὸς, ἢ δούλος ἢ ἐλεύθερος;”
 λέγε μοι, εἰάν τις σε ταῦτα ἐξετάζη, ὦ Καλλίκευς, τί ἔ-
 30 ρεῖς; τίνα φήσεις βελτίω πεποιηκέναι ἄνθρωπον τῇ
 συνουσίᾳ τῇ σῇ; ὁκνεῖς ἀποκρίνασθαι, εἴπερ ἔστιν τι
 ἔργον σὸν ἐτι ιδιωτεύοντος, πρὶν δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν;
 30 ΚΑΛ. Φιλόνικος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

LXXI. Σο. Ἄλλ’ οὐ φιλονικία γε ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ’ ὡς
 ἀληθῶς βουλόμενος εἰδέναι, ὅντινά ποτε τρόπον οἶει δεῖν
 πολιτεύεσθαι ἐν ἡμῖν. ἢ ἄλλον τοῦ ἄρα ἐπιμελήσει ἡμῶν
 ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα, ἢ ὅπως ὅτι βέλτιστοι
 5 πολῖται ὦμεν; ἢ οὐ πολλάκις ἤδη ὠμολογήκαμεν τοῦτο
 δεῖν πράττειν τὸν πολιτικὸν ἄνδρα; ὠμολογήκαμεν ἢ οὐ;

515 19. ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν: a pathetic
 a address. See on 513 c.

20. ἄρτι ἄρχει: on the age of Cal-
 licles at the time of this dialogue, see
 Introd. § 15.—On the matter, cf. *Apol.*
 38 c ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ
 πρότερον μῆτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπι-
 μελεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖν, ὅπως
 ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσταιτο,
 μῆτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς
 πόλεως.

22. φέρε κτέ.: see on 514 d.

23 f. ἀδικός τε κτέ.: various kinds
 of πονηρία, as contrasted with the
 corresponding virtues. Cf. 491 e ff.

b 28. εἴπερ κτέ.: Socrates’ opinion
 can be readily perceived. Between
 these repeated questions we must
 assume short pauses. On the pos-

sessive pronoun followed by the gen., 515
 see H. 691; G. 137, n. 1. b

30. φιλονικος εἶ: the accusation
 is a confession of weakness, having
 much the same force as Crito’s an-
 swer (*Crito* 54 d) ἀλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. See on 457 d.

LXXI. 3. ἐν ἡμῖν: cf. ἐν τοῖς πολί-
 ταις, ἐν τῷ δήμῳ. In spite of the ad-
 dition of δεῖν, no subject for πολιτεύ-
 εσθαι is expressed. But we should
 not feel the ellipsis in English, and
 often make such without noticing
 it.—ἡμῖν: seems to be a kind of
 ethical dat. See G. 184, 3, n. 6;
 H. 770. Cope translates the clause,
 ‘whether we shall find you concern-
 ing yourself about anything else,’
 etc.

ἀποκρίνου. ὁμολογήκαμεν· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σοῦ ἀποκρινόμεναι.
εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα παρασκευάζειν τῇ
ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, νῦν μοι ἀναμνησθεῖς εἰπὲ περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν
10 ἀνδρῶν ὧν ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἰ ἔτι σοι δοκοῦσιν
ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται γεγονέναι, Περικλῆς καὶ Κίμων καὶ Μιλ- α
τιάδης καὶ Θემιστοκλῆς.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοί, δῆλον ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν
15 βελτίους ἐποίει τοὺς πολίτας ἀντὶ χειρόνων; ἐποίει ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅτε Περικλῆς ἤρχετο λέγειν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,
χείρους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ ὅτε τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως.

515 7. ὑπὲρ σοῦ: cf. *Apol.* 22 *e* ὥστε
c με ἐμάντων ἀνερῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ,
so that I asked myself in the name of
the oracle.

11. πολῖται: the idea of this word
(as also of πολιτεύεσθαι) approaches
so near that of "statesmen" that it
is frequently used in that sense; e.g.
in the speech of Diodotus against
Cleon (*Thuc.* iii. 42. 5) *χρὴ τὸν ἀγαθὸν*
πολίτην μὴ ἐκφοβοῦντα τοὺς ἀντεροῦν-
τας ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον
λέγοντα. Cf. below, *e*. Above we
find πολιτικὸς ἀνὴρ and also ἀνὴρ sim-
ply, used in the same sense; cf.
517 a.

a 15. ἐποίει: sc. in the course of his
activity as a statesman.—ἀντὶ χειρό-
νων: the brachylogy is here harder
than in the case where the relation is
reversed; e.g. *Polit.* 308 a ἀντ' ἐλευθέ-
ρων γενόμενοι δούλοι. We might have
expected ἐκ.

17. ἤρχετο λέγειν: here denotes
not so much Pericles' first appear-
ance before the people as the first
period of his political life. This

began even before the death of Ephialtes, who, owing to the machina-
tions of his enemies, was murdered
shortly after the banishment of Cimon
(460 B.C.). The height of Pericles'
power was reached after the death
of Cimon and the banishment of Thu-
cydides, son of Melesias (443 B.C.).—
On the construction of ἤρχεσθαι, see
on 488 a.

18. τὰ τελευταῖα ἔλεγεν: Socrates
is referring again, not so much to
Pericles' last oratorical efforts, but to
the last period of his political activ-
ity, which fell within the first years
of the Peloponnesian war. On the
result of his last speech (430 B.C.)
Thucydides (ii. 65) remarks: *Τοιαῦτα*
ὁ Περικλῆς λέγων ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς Ἀθη-
ναίους τῆς τε ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλύειν
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἀπάγειν
τὴν γνώμην. οἱ δὲ δημοσίᾳ μὲν τοῖς
λόγοις ἀνεπίειθοντο . . . οὐ μέντοι πρότε-
ρόν γε οἱ ζῦπαντες ἐπαύσαντο ἐν ὀργῇ
ἔχοντες αὐτὸν πρὶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν.
—On the neut. pl., see on 512 b and
Kr. 46, 3, 2.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἴσως δὴ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων, εἶπερ ἀγαθός γ' ἦν ἐκείνος πολίτης.

ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ τόδε μοι εἰπὲ ἐπὶ τούτῳ, εἰ λέγονται Ἀθηναῖοι διὰ Περικλέα βελτίους γεγονέναι, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναν-
25 τὶον διαφθαρῆναι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. ταυτὶ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἀκούω, Περικλέα πεποιηκέναι Ἀθηναίους ἀργούς καὶ δειλοὺς καὶ λάλους καὶ φιλαργύρους, εἰς μισθοφορίαν πρῶτον κατα-
στήσαντα.

ΚΑΛ. Τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώ-
30 κρατες.

515 20. ἀνάγκη: is adverbial dat. cor-
d responding to the adverb ἴσως.

e 22. τί οὖν δὴ: see on 453 b and 497 d. The reply of Socrates shows that he intends Callicles himself to draw the necessary inference from what he proceeds to bring forward.

26. ἀργούς κτέ.: this accusation is based upon a suspicion that Pericles, in order to bring about certain desirable measures in the government, employed bribery disguised under the names of μισθὸς στρατιωτικός, δικαστικός, ἐκκλησιαστικός, and θεωρικός, of which, however, only the first two can be ascribed to Pericles. On this dole the Athenian citizens could live in a poor way at the expense of the state, and they lost perhaps some of that energy which was characteristic of them in earlier times.—δειλοὺς: the Athenians became timid, as a natural consequence of their inactivity, in that they (much later however) withdrew from personal war service, and depended on mercenaries exclusively.

27. λάλους: to activity in the real service of the state, principally of course in the assembly, was soon

joined a desire to seek entertainment 515 in public. For here their curiosity, a natural failing, was nourished by continual gossip and talk. This was the case in the time of Demosthenes (Phil. i. 10), of Paul (Acts xvii. 18), and is the case at the present day. See on 461 e.—φιλαργύρους: the desire to obtain money from the public treasury became continually stronger and more universal, and wrought great damage to the government. At the time of Demosthenes the continuance of the θεωρικόν was especially injurious, because the means for military purposes were thereby greatly curtailed. Plato's criticism of Pericles was always unfavorable, which, however, is not to be wondered at, since his youth fell during the years of Athenian depression, which the oligarchy ascribed to the mistakes of the great democratical leader.—μισθοφορίαν: on the growth and effects of this policy at Athens and elsewhere, see Grote, Hist. xi. 281 (c. lxxxvii.).

29. τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων: the Laconian imitators (λακωνίζοντες, λακωνομαχοῦντες) in Athens were thus

Σα. Ἀλλὰ τάδε οὐκέτι ἀκούω, ἀλλ' οἶδα σαφῶς καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σύ, ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡῦδοκίμει Περικλῆς καὶ οὐδεμίαν αἰσχροὺς δίκην κατεψηφίσαντο αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡνίκα χείρους ἦσαν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι ἐγεγόνεσαν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τοῦ Περικλέους, κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κατεψηφίσαντο, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ θανάτου ἐτίμησαν, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς πονηροῦ ὄντος.

LXXII. ΚΑΛ. Τί οὖν; τούτου ἔνεκα κακὸς ἦν Περικλῆς;

Σα. Ὅντων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιούτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ

⁵¹⁵ named from having their ears often broken in the *πυγμή* by the straps with which the hands were covered (see *Herm. Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 37, p. 347). They formed a party, hostile to the democracy, which saw in Lacedaemon the model of a noble state, and looked to her for help. They practised Lacedaemonian severity in all external matters; hence they wore mustaches, short mantles, *etc.*, and practised gymnastics very diligently. To harden the body, they even engaged in boxing, which was forbidden in Sparta. They became naturally, therefore, butts for ridicule. *Cf. Prot.* 342 b. — By this remark Callicles here accuses Socrates of partisanship.

⁵¹⁶ ^a 34. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι: with bitter irony. If they were really good, the righteousness of the judgment of Pericles would have been recognized; but if this judgment was unrighteous, then Pericles did not make them good. — ὑπ' αὐτοῦ: γίγνομαι, as passive of ποιῶ, requires ὑπό for the agent.

35 f. κλοπὴν αὐτοῦ κτέ.: in the

second year of the Peloponnesian war, when Pericles returned from an expedition against the Spartan coast, the slumbering discontent of the people, caused by the devastation of Attica by the Spartans and the ravages of the plague in Athens, broke out against him in the form of an accusation as a result of which he was fined a sum of money, the amount of which (15, 50, 80 talents) is not certain. *Thuc.* ii. 59; 65. See on 515 d. That the ostensible charge was embezzlement of the public funds is supported by this passage alone, but that various rumors were current of his dishonesty can be gathered from the story of Alcibiades' advice to him in *Plut. Alcib.* vii. Περικλεῖ δὲ βουλόμενος ἐντυχεῖν ἐπὶ θύρας ἦλθεν αὐτοῦ. πυθόμενος δὲ μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν καθ' ἑαυτόν, ὅπως ἀποδώσει λόγον Ἀθηναίοις, ἀπὼν δ' Ἀλκιβιάδης· "εἴτα" ἔφη "βέλτιον οὐκ ἦν σκοπεῖν αὐτόν, ὅπως οὐκ ἀποδώσει λόγον Ἀθηναίοις;"

LXXII. 4. εἰ παραλαβὼν: not designed as an epexegetis to τοιούτος ὢν, which merely gives the general

5 λακτίζοντας [ἐαυτὸν] μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιούντας δι' ἀγριότητα. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι κακὸς εἶναι ἐπιμελητὴς ὅστις οὖν ὅτου οὖν ζῶου, ὃς ἂν παραλαβὼν ἡμερώτερα ἀποδείξῃ ἀγριώτερα ἢ παρέ- b λαβε; δοκεῖ ἢ οὐ;

10 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε, ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τόδε τοῖνυν μοι χάρισαι ἀποκρινάμενος· πότε- ρον καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῶν ζώων ἐστὶν ἢ οὐ;

ΚΑΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνθρώπων Περικλῆς ἐπεμέλετο;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἔδει αὐτούς, ὥς ἄρτι ὠμολογοῦμεν, δικαιότερους γεγενέσθαι ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων ὑπ' ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπεμελεῖτο αὐτῶν ἀγαθὸς ὢν τὰ πολιτικά;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἳ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί, ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος. σὺ δὲ τί φῆς; οὐχ οὕτως;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀγριωτέρους γε αὐτοὺς ἀπέφηνεν ἢ οἴους παρέλαβε, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς αὐτόν, ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο.

⁵¹⁶ idea which runs through all the preceding thought, but added to give those details to the simile which seem to be requisite. — παραλαβὼν: receiving for training. See on 483 e. — The position of the words λακτίζοντας, κυρίττοντας, and δάκνοντας is probably merely a chance one.

6. ἀπέδειξε: the word means "to show or prove as the result of a process," often in mathematical reasoning; here as the result of training. Cf. below c ἀπέφηνεν. Hence also the expression ἀποδεικνύναι τινὰ στρατηγόν. See on 484 b.

b 10. ἵνα σοι χαρίσωμαι: see on

513 e. The reply of Socrates is full of irony. ⁵¹⁶ b

11. ἀποκρινάμενος: for the tense, see on 491 c.

16. ἔδει: without ἂν. See on 514 a.

17. ἀντὶ ἀδικωτέρων: see on 515 d.

20. οἳ γε δίκαιοι ἡμεροί ὥς ἔφη Ὅμηρος: there is no such direct assertion in any passage of Homer, but the same sense is seen in ζ 120, ι 175 ἢ β' οἳ γ' ὄβρισταί τε καὶ ἀγριοὶ οὐδὲ δίκαιοι. Here, moreover, the leading thought is the utter exclusion of any idea of δικαιοσύνη from the ἀγριοί.

24. ὃν ἦκιστ' ἂν ἐβούλετο: cf. Arol. 25 d ἐστὶν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται

25 ΚΑΛ. Βούλει σοι ὁμολογήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δοκῶ γέ σοι ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω δὴ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἀγριωτέρους, ἀδικωτέρους τε καὶ χείρους;

30 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἀγαθὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ Περικλῆς ἦν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου.

ΚΑΛ. Οὐ σύ γε φῆς.

ΣΩ. Μὰ Δί' οὐδέ γε σὺ ἐξ ὧν ὁμολόγεις. πάλιν δὲ
35 λέγε μοι περὶ Κίμωνος· οὐκ ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτὸν οὔτοι
οὓς ἐθεράπευεν, ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἐτῶν μὴ ἀκούσειαν τῆς
φωνῆς; καὶ Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγῇ
προσεξήμιωσαν; Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι εἰς τὸ **e**

⁵¹⁶ ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μάλλον
^c ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι. For ὅν, see on 453 **e**.
The ellipsis is to be supplied from
what precedes.

d 33. οὐ . . . φῆς: see on 450 **d**.

35. ἐξωστράκισαν αὐτόν: Cimon was a supporter of the Lacedaemonian league, and also caused the Athenians to send aid to the Spartans in the third Messenian war. But when the Athenians were dismissed in so humiliating a manner at Ithome, his opponent, Pericles, turning to account the indignation of the people, succeeded in effecting his banishment in B.C. 461. The term of banishment by ostracism was limited by law to ten years. But Cimon was recalled about B.C. 457, also at the instance of Pericles. Since ostracism (Herm. Gr. Alter. i. § 130) was properly not a punishment, Socrates, in the words ἵνα αὐτοῦ δέκα ἔτη μὴ ἀκούσειαν, is merely making a point against the influence of Cimon in the state.

37. Themistocles was banished in ⁵¹⁶ B.C. 471, and went to Argos. Here he was accused by the Spartans of participation in the treason of Pausanias, or μηδισμός, and to escape investigations fled to the Persian king, a step which was followed by the confiscation of his magnificent property at Athens.

38. προσεξήμιωσαν: and in addition they punished, etc. Cf. Apol. 20 **a** σφίσιν ξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσεῖδέναι. — τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι: this short adverbial expression seems to have been used simply as a distinguishing epithet, and it is not likely that the Greeks supplied or felt any ellipsis such as is suggested by Cron, viz. τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι (Μαραθῶνι alone) παραταξάμενον (μαχεσάμενον) or νικήσαντα. The epithet is the more emphatic as the victors at Marathon (Μαραθωνομάχαι Ar. Nub. 986) were unusually revered by posterity. In consequence of the unfortunate expe-

βάραθρον ἐμβαλεῖν ἐψηφίσαντο, καὶ εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸν πρῶ-
 40 τανιν, ἐνέπεσεν αὖν; καίτοι οὗτοι, εἰ ἦσαν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί,
 ὥς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ταῦτα ἔπασχον. οὐκουν οἱ γε
 ἀγαθοὶ ἡνίοχοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὐκ ἐκπίπτουσιν ἐκ τῶν
 ζευγῶν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ θεραπεύσωσιν τοὺς ἵππους καὶ αὐτοὶ
 ἀμείνους γένωνται ἡνίοχοι, τότε ἐκπίπτουσιν· οὐκ ἔστι
 45 ταῦτ' οὐτ' ἐν ἡνιοχείᾳ οὐτ' ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔργῳ οὐδενί· ἡ δοκεῖ
 σοι;

ΚΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν,
 ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολι- 517
 50 τικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει. σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγεις τῶν γε νῦν
 οὐδένα, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ προείλου τούτους τοὺς
 ἄνδρας· οὗτοι δὲ ἀνεφάνησαν ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς νῦν ὄντες,
 ὥστε, εἰ οὗτοι ῥήτορες ἦσαν, οὔτε τῇ ἀληθινῇ ῥητορικῇ
 ἐχρῶντο — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐξέπεσον — οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ.

516 dition against Paros, Miltiades was,
 6 on the prosecution of Xanthippus,
 declared guilty of ἀπάτης τοῦ δήμου,
 and fined fifty talents. According
 to Hdt. vi. 136, his adversary de-
 manded the penalty of death, which
 was averted by the intercession of
 friends.

39. εἰ μὴ διὰ: "if it had not been
 for." The prytanis probably exerted
 his influence before the division,
 though this whole story seems to be
 much overdrawn.

40 f. εἰ ἦσαν . . . ἔπασχον: opposi-
 tion to generic present. Cf. 471 a.
 Goodwin (GMT. 410) considers this
 as a case of real opposition to the
 past.

41. οὐκουν κτέ.: the neg. contained
 in οὐκουν (Kr. 69, 51, 2) applies not
 to the second member alone, but to
 the two members together; the co-

existence of the two clauses is denied. 516
 This form sharply emphasizes the
 self-contradiction which is fundamen- 6
 tal in Callicles' view. — The results of
 the whole argument are now summed
 up as briefly as possible.

50. σὺ δὲ κτέ.: with ὠμολόγεις 517
 must be supplied the participial
 clause of the preceding sentence.
 From this also we must take a verb
 of saying to govern a τινάς also to be
 supplied from οὐδένα of the clause
 τῶν . . . ἔμπροσθεν.

52. ἐξ ἴσου: has almost the force
 of an adj. See Kr. 43, 4, 5; H. 798 f.

54. οὐ γὰρ ἐξέπεσον: we find addi-
 tions, such as ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, ἀρχῆς,
 τυραννίδος, and the like; also δόξης,
 οὐσίας (ἐκ τῶν ἐόντων, Hdt. iii. 14).
 The verb ἐκπίπτειν serves thus as a
 passive to ἐκβάλλειν, though the im-
 age is that of a chariot driver who is

LXXIII. ΚΑΛ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μή ποτέ τις τῶν νῦν ἔργα τοιαῦτα ἐργάσῃται, οἷα βούλων ὅς βούλει εἰργασται.

ΣΩ. ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ' ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ μᾶλλον οἰοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει· ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν 10 τούτων διέφερον ἐκείνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου. ναὺς δὲ καὶ τείχη καὶ νεώρια καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐγὼ σοι ὁμολογῶ δεινότερους εἶναι ἐκείνους τούτων ἐκπορίζειν. πρᾶγμα οὖν γελοῖον ποιούμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὃν διαλε- 15 γόμεθα, οὐδὲν πανόμεθα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ περιφερόμενοι καὶ

517 thrown out. Cf. the English phrase
 a 'fall through,' as applied to a design or project.—οὔτε τῇ κολακικῇ: sc. with which they might have saved themselves, according to Callicles' view (511 c, 486 b), but which Pericles despised.

LXXIII. 1. ἀλλὰ μέντοι . . . μὴ ποτε: "But yet, the men of the present day are at least far from being able to," etc.

b 3. ὅς (ὅστις) βούλει: used like the Lat. *quivis*, by a looseness of construction. Cf. *Phileb.* 43 d τριῶν οὖν ὄντων ἡμῖν ὄντων βούλει, *Crat.* 432 a ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός. *Rid.* § 189.

4 f. ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι: as far, that is, as their being servants of the city is concerned. See *Madv. Syn.* § 151, GMT. 781, for examples. The distinction here drawn rests also, as is quickly shown, on what has been

demonstrated in ch. XIX. ff. But it 517
 is more extensive. b

7. μεταβιβάζειν: "to give another direction to." See on 493 a. This verb and ἐπιτρέπειν are resumed by οὐδὲν τούτων, and depend on διέφερον. A similar passage (without the intervening acc.) is *Prot.* 328 a ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβιάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν.

8. ἐπιτρέπειν: we must supply a dat. from the preceding acc. See on 460 d. The verb has a slightly different sense in 504 c.

10. τούτων: note the variety in the use of the pronouns; τούτων is the same as τῶν νῦν above, and hence ἐκείνοι is required to take the place of τούτους above.

11. ναὺς κτέ.: cf. 455 d.

12. εἶναι: equiv. to ὅτι ἦσαν.

15. εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ περιφερόμενοι: similar in form, but not in meaning, to

ἀγνοοῦντες ἀλλήλων ὅτι λέγομεν. ἐγὼ οὖν σε πολλάκις
οἶμαι ὠμολογηκέναι καὶ ἐγνωκέναι, ὥς ἄρα διττὴ αὕτη τις
ἢ πραγματεία ἐστὶν καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, α
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα διακονικὴ ἐστίν, ἥ δυνατόν εἶναι ἐκπορί-
20 ζειν, εἰ μὲν πεινῇ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν, σιτία, εἰ δὲ διψῇ,
ποτά, εἰ δὲ ῥιγῶ, ἱμάτια, στρώματα, ὑποδήματα, ἀλλ' ὧν
ἔρχεται σώματα εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν· καὶ ἐξεπίτηδές σοι διὰ
τῶν αὐτῶν εἰκόνων λέγω, ἵνα ῥᾶον καταμάθῃς. τούτων
γὰρ ποριστικὸν εἶναι ἡ κάπηλον ὄντα ἡ ἔμπορον ἡ δημι-
25 ουργόν του αὐτῶν τούτων, σιτοποιὸν ἡ ὀψοποιὸν ἡ ὑφάν- e
την ἡ σκυτοτόμον ἡ σκυτοδεψόν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν
ὄντα τοιοῦτον δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεραπευτῇν

517 the English phrase "argument in
c a circle," i.e. a coming back again
to the point of departure. Cf. *Rep.*
v. 456 b ἡκομεν εἰς τὰ πρότερα περι-
φερόμενοι.

16. ἀλλήλων: is to be connected,
as a kind of subjective or possessive
gen., with the following indirect ques-
tion. See H. 733; Kr. 47, 10, 8.
"Each other's language."

17. διττὴ κτέ.: notice the posi-
tion of the τῆς, which belongs to
διττή, "a kind of doubled." See on
491 c.

d 19. ἡ μὲν ἐτέρα: the second mem-
ber of the correlation is divided into
two parts of which the first is indi-
cated by ὅτι ἐστίν τις κτέ. (below, e),
and the other by τὴν δὲ . . . δεσποίνης
εἶναι τούτων (518 a).—ἡ . . . εἶναι:
the shift from the regular indir. disc.
indic. to an inf. is not uncommon.
Cf. *Rep.* x. 616 b ἔφη ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρ-
ταίους ὁθεν καθαρῶν ἄνωθεν κτέ. *Rid.*
§ 281; GMT. 755.

21 f. ἀλλ' ὧν ἔρχεται κτέ.: anything
else, that the body comes to want.

24. ποριστικὸν εἶναι κτέ.: in what

follows, three varieties are distin- 517
guished. The κάπηλος is the small d
dealer, hawker or shopkeeper, who
deals properly with products of the
land (among which are included wines
in 518 b); the ἔμπορος is the regular
merchant and wholesale dealer. Cf.
Prot. 313 c. The δημιουργός is the
one who prepares from the raw mate-
rial the various articles demanded by
the needs of the body.

26. σκυτοδεψόν: is unusual for βυρ- e
σοδέψης (tanner).

27. ὄντα τοιοῦτον: includes under
one expression all the divisions and
subdivisions of the ποριστικὸν εἶναι, but
owing to the introduction of θαυμα-
στόν ἐστιν the construction is changed
and the partic. takes the place of the
inf. What Socrates wishes to ex-
plain is that one who attends to the
needs of the body, even though he
may understand nothing of either
gymnastics or medicine, may very
easily himself become possessed of
the idea that he is the genuine con-
server of the body, as well as inspire
the same belief in others.

εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι, ὅτι ἔστιν τις παρὰ
 ταύτας ἀπάσας τέχνη γυμναστική τε καὶ ἰατρική, ἣ δὴ τῷ
 30 ὄντι ἐστὶν σώματος θεραπεία, ἥνπερ καὶ προσήκει τούτων
 ἄρχειν πασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ χρῆσθαι τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις
 διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν τῶν σιτίων ἢ
 ποτῶν ἐστὶν εἰς ἀρετὴν σώματος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας
 ταύτας ἀγνοεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ ταύτας μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς τε 518
 35 καὶ διακονικὰς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι περὶ σῶμα πρα-
 ματείας, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν καὶ ἰατρι-
 κὴν κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεσποίνας εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα οὖν
 ταῦτα ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ περὶ ψυχὴν, τότε μὲν μοι δοκεῖς μαν-
 θάνειν ὅτε λέγω, καὶ ὁμολογεῖς ὡς εἰδὼς ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω·
 40 ἦ κεις δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον λέγων, ὅτι ἄνθρωποι καλοὶ καγα-
 θοὶ γεγόνασιν πολῖται ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶ b
 οἷτινες, δοκεῖς μοι ὁμοιοτάτους προτείνεσθαι ἀνθρώπους
 περὶ τὰ πολιτικά, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ περὶ τὰ γυμναστικά ἐμοῦ
 ἐρωτῶντος, οἷτινες ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν ἢ εἰσὶν σωματῶν
 45 θεραπευταί, ἔλεγές μοι πάννυ σπουδάζων, Θεαρίων ὁ ἀρτο-
 κόπος καὶ Μίθαικος ὁ τὴν ὀψοποιίαν συγγεγραφὼς τὴν

517 28. παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδότι: added as
 e a restrictive explanation to the pre-
 ceding τοῖς ἄλλοις, which is far too
 general a statement for Socrates.

28 f. παρὰ ταύτας ἀπάσας: see on
 τὰς ἄλλας κτέ. below, 518 a.

518 34. δουλοπρεπεῖς: plays on 485 b
 a and similar expressions in the earlier
 conversation with Callicles, e.g. 485 d.
 The attributes of rhetoric and philo-
 sophy are just reversed.

36. τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας: "arts ordi-
 narily designated as such."

b 45. Θεαρίων: and the following-
 named persons are sometimes men-
 tioned by later authors, Μίθαικος for
 example, among those whom Athe-

naeus xii. 12 cites as authors of works 518
 on cookery (τὰ ὀψαρτυτικά). The b
 title of his work can be surmised
 from this passage. That the art of
 cookery, especially in rich and proud
 Syracuse, was early developed, Plato
 testifies in *Rep.* iii. 404 d Συρακοσίαν
 τράπεζαν καὶ Σικελικὴν ποικιλίαν ὕψου.
Cf. Hor. *Od.* iii. 1. 18 Siculae da-
 pes. The ἀρτοκόπος is at the same
 time a cake-baker. The ἄρτος made
 from wheat meal was a festival
 dainty, as is to be judged from Athe-
 naeus iv. 14 Σόλων δὲ τοῖς ἐν πρυτα-
 νείῳ σιτουμένοις μάζαν παρέχειν κελεύει,
 ἄρτον δὲ ταῖς ἑορταῖς προσπαρτιθέναι.
 Sarambus probably had a wine-shop.

Σικελικὴν καὶ Σάραμβος ὁ κάπηλος, ὅτι οὗτοι θαυμάσιοι
γεγόνασιν σωμάτων θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοὺς c
παρασκευάζων, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον.

LXXIV. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγανάκτεις, εἴ σοι ἔλεγον ἐγὼ
ὅτι “ ἄνθρωπε, ἐπαίεις οὐδὲν περὶ γυμναστικῆς · διακόνους
μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, οὐκ
ἐπαίοντας καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν περὶ αὐτῶν, οἷ, ἂν οὕτω
5 τύχωσιν, ἐμπλήσαντες καὶ παχύναντες τὰ σώματα τῶν
ἀνθρώπων, ἐπαινούμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, προσαπολοῦσιν αὐτῶν a
καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας σάρκας · οἱ δ’ αὖ δι’ ἀπειρίαν οὐ τοὺς
ἐστιῶντας αἰτιάσονται τῶν νόσων αἰτίους εἶναι καὶ τῆς
ἀποβολῆς τῶν ἀρχαίων σαρκῶν, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσι
10 τότε παρόντες καὶ συμβουλευόντές τι, ὅταν δὴ αὐτοῖς ἦκη
ἢ τότε πλησμονὴ νόσον φέρουσα συχνῶ ὕστερον χρόνῳ,
ἅτε ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγεινοῦ γεγονυῖα, τούτους αἰτιάσονται καὶ

518 LXXIV. 1. Ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἡγα-
c νάκτεις: as Callicles really did when
Socrates proved to him that he under-
stood nothing at all of statecraft.

2. ὅτι: see on 521 b.

3. παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους: the
addition of ἀνθρώπους (“fellows”) is
contemptuous.

4. καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν: is used by Plato
regularly of persons. Schanz, ii. 2
proll. 1, has collected only sixteen
cases where it is not so used. Three
such examples are found in the *Gor-
gias*, viz. 514 a, 526 a, in addition to
the present passage. — περὶ αὐτῶν:
refers according to sense to γυμνα-
στικῆς, but is made general in view
of b above.

4 f. ἂν οὕτω τύχωσιν: see on 514 e.
Here, “if they so chance,” i.e. per-
haps.

d 6 f. προσαπολοῦσιν . . . σάρκας:
Demosthenes expresses the same idea

by a somewhat different simile in 518
Ol. i. 15 ὥσπερ οἱ δανειζόμενοι βράδιως d
ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγάλοις τόκοις μικρὸν εὐπορή-
σαντες χρόνον ὕστερον καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων
ἀπέστησαν. Also with the following
ἀλλ’ οἱ ἂν αὐτοῖς τύχωσιν παρόντες cf.
Dem. Ol. i. 16 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἄγνων μὲν,
ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθ’ ὅτι πολλὰ
ὑμεῖς οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστά-
τους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν
ὀργῇ ποιεῖσθε ἂν τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην
ἐκβῆ, Phil. ii. 34 ὁρῶ γὰρ ὥς τὰ πολλὰ
ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοὺς
ὑπὸ χεῖρα μάλιστα τὴν ὀργὴν ἀφιέν-
τας.

7. οἱ δ’ αὖ: the construction is
loose, but the context prevents am-
biguity.

10 f. ἦκη φέρουσα: gives a pic-
ture, — “it is actually at hand, bring-
ing disease with it,” — for the more
prosaic “has brought about disease.”
See on 491 c.

- ψέξουσιν καὶ κακὸν τι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν οἰοί τ' ὧσι, τοὺς δὲ
 προτέρους ἐκείνους καὶ αἰτίους τῶν κακῶν ἐγκωμιάσουσιν."
- 15 καὶ σὺ νῦν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὁμοιότατον τούτῳ ἐργάζει·
 ἐγκωμιάζεις ἀνθρώπους, οἳ τούτους εἰστιάκασιν εὐωχοῦν-
 τες ὧν ἐπεθύμουν, καὶ φασὶ μεγάλην τὴν πόλιν πεποιηκέ-
 ναι αὐτούς· ὅτι δὲ οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστιν δι' ἐκείνους
 τοὺς παλαιούς, οὐκ αἰσθάνονται. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης⁵¹⁹
- 20 καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φό-
 ρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασιν τὴν πόλιν· ὅταν
 οὖν ἔλθῃ ἡ καταβολὴ αὕτη τῆς ἀσθενείας, τοὺς τότε
 παρόντας αἰτιάσονται συμβούλους, Θεμιστοκλέα δὲ καὶ
 Κίμωνα καὶ Περικλέα ἐγκωμιάσουσιν, τοὺς αἰτίους τῶν
- 25 κακῶν· σοῦ δὲ ἴσως ἐπιλήψονται, εἰ μὴ εὐλαβῇ, καὶ τοῦ
 ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὅταν καὶ τὰ ἀρχαῖα προσαπολ-
 λύωσι πρὸς οἷς ἐκτήσαντο, οὐκ αἰτίων ὄντων τῶν κακῶν^b
 ἀλλ' ἴσως συναιτίων. καίτοι ἔγωγε ἀνόητον πρᾶγμα καὶ
 νῦν ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀκούω τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν πέρι.
- 30 αἰσθάνομαι γάρ, ὅταν ἡ πόλις τινὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν

⁵¹⁸ 16. τούτους: is defined by the fol-
^e lowing τὴν πόλιν. With καὶ φασὶ
 the subject changes, so that αὐτούς
 refers to the same as οἳ, while τού-
 τους furnishes the subject for καὶ
 φασὶ.

18. οἰδεῖ καὶ ὕπουλός ἐστι: the
 first term denotes an external swell-
 ing or bloated condition, which may,
 however, for the time have all the
 appearance of health; the latter, the
 internal and hence invisible seat of
 disease.

⁵¹⁹ 20. φόρων: duties and imposts
^a which the Athenians imposed upon
 other states, but expended only for
 their own interests.

21. καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν: with a
 side hit at 490 c and a more definite

reference to 455 e. Cf. Dem. Ol. iii. ⁵¹⁹
 29, quoted on 490 c. ^a

22 f. τοὺς τότε παρόντας κτ.: again
 the same thought as in d above.

25. σοῦ . . . ἐπιλήψονται: contains
 an allusion to 486 a. For the parti-
 tive gen., see H. 738 a, and on 469 c.
 — καὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ἐταίρου Ἀλκιβιά-
 δου: on the value of this prophecy
 of Socrates for determining the date
 of this discussion, see Introd. § 19.
 For the reader, the life of Alcibiades
 will serve as a most convincing proof
 of the soundness of Socrates' state-
 ments.

29. ὁρῶ, ἀκούω: Socrates desires ^b
 to emphasize that in the past as well
 as the present the same thing has
 been repeating itself.

μεταχειρίζεται ὡς ἀδικοῦντα, ἀγανακτούντων καὶ σχετλια-
ζόντων ὡς δεινὰ πάσχουσι· πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τὴν πόλιν
πεπονηκότες ἄρα ἀδίκως ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀπόλλυνται, ὡς ὁ τούτων
λόγος· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ψεῦδός ἐστιν. προστάτης γὰρ πόλεως
35 οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ποτε ἀδίκως ἀπόλοιτο ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως ἧς c
προστατεῖ· κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταῦτόν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ
προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί. καὶ γὰρ οἱ σοφι-
σταί, τὰλλα σοφοὶ ὄντες, τοῦτο ἀτοπον ἐργάζονται πρᾶγμα·
φάσκοντες γὰρ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλοι εἶναι πολλάκις κατ-
40 ηγοροῦσιν τῶν μαθητῶν, ὡς ἀδικοῦσι σφᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς τε
μισθοὺς ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ ἄλλην χάριν οὐκ ἀποδιδόντες
εἶ παθόντες ὑπ' αὐτῶν· καὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου τί ἂν ἀλογώ- d
τερον εἶν πρᾶγμα, ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους γενομέ-
νους, ἐξαιρεθέντας μὲν ἀδικίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ διδασκάλου, σχόν-
45 τας δὲ δικαιοσύνην, ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ ὃ οὐκ ἔχουσιν; οὐ δοκεῖ

519 31. ἀγανακτούντων: depends upon
b αἰσθάνομαι: with the omission of αὐτῶν.
The pl. is due to the plural idea, and
to the ἀνδρῶν. The statement holds
good for *all*, though the action affects
the individual only.

33. ἄρα: postpositive, as in *Prot.*
355 b ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστι κατὰ-
δηλον ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι
χρώμεθα ἄρα. Here it serves to char-
acterize the assumption as a result
that follows of itself.

c 35. οὐδ' ἂν εἰς: see on 512 e.

36. ὅσοι κτέ.: loose connexion.
The same case, "as well in regard to
those who, *etc.* . . . as, *etc.*"

37. προσποιοῦνται: Socrates is
thinking of the task which each
class assumes, viz. to make the sub-
ject of their treatment better, to
endow him with virtue. The pre-
tended statesman promises this re-
sult to the whole body of citizens;

the sophist, to the individual. *Cf.* 519
Isocr. xiii. 5 f. c

40. σφᾶς αὐτούς: *themselves indeed*,
with more emphasis than the simple
σφᾶς, which is more usual as the in-
dir. reflexive. *Cf.* 520 b.

42. καί: but little different from d
καί τοι (*and yet*) in rejoinders, espe-
cially to statements made by the
speaker. *Cf.* *Apol.* 29 b καὶ τοῦτο πῶς
οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστίν; *Dem.* vi. 16 καὶ τίς
ἂν ταῦτα πιστεύσειεν;

43. ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς κτέ.: *sc.* as one
must assume, according to the state-
ment of the sophists. The addition of
ἐξαιρεθέντας ἀδικίαν . . . ἀδικεῖν τούτῳ
(just here lies the ἀδικία) ὃ οὐκ ἔχου-
σιν serves to bring out very strongly
the want of consistency in the theory.

44. σχόντας: *after they had gotten*.
See on 503 e. *Cf.* *Apol.* 19 a, *Soph. El.*
1256 μόλις γὰρ ἔσχον νῦν ἐλεύθερον
στόμα.

σοι τοῦτο ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὧ ἐταῖρε; ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν με ἡνάγκασας, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, οὐκ ἐθέλων ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

LXXV. ΚΑΛ. Σὺ δ' οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' εἴης λέγειν, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀποκρίνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Ἐοικά γε· νῦν γοῦν συχνούς τείνω τῶν λόγων, ἐπειδὴ μοι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἀλλ' ὠγαθέ, εἰπέ 5 πρὸς φίλιον, οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἄλογον εἶναι ἀγαθὸν φάσκοντα πεποιηκέναι τινὰ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ, ὅτι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθὸς γεγονώς τε καὶ ὧν ἔπειτα πονηρός ἐστιν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀκούεις τοιαῦτα λεγόντων τῶν φασκόντων 10 παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετὴν;

ΚΑΛ. Ἐγωγε· ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις ἀνθρώπων πέρι οὐδ' 520 εὐδὸς ἀξίων;

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν περὶ ἐκείνων λέγοις, οἱ φάσκοντες προ-
εστάναι τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη 15 ἔσται, πάλιν αὐτῆς κατηγοροῦσιν, ὅταν τύχωσιν, ὡς πονη-
ροτάτης; οἷε τι διαφέρειν τούτους ἐκείνων; ταῦτόν, ὧ

519 d 46. ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγορεῖν: here de-
notes the delivery of a long, connected
discourse as opposed to dialectic in-
vestigation. It is also a reply to Cal-
licles' accusation in 482 c ὡς ἀληθῶς
δημηγόρος ὢν.

e LXXV. 3. εἰκά γε (sc. οἶός τ' εἶναι κτέ.): is a partial assent to the assertion implied in Callicles' question, "You would doubtless be quite capable," etc. — The following clause with γοῦν seems to be urged in proof, but it is really more of a complaint. — συχνούς . . . τῶν λόγων: cf. 465 c συχνὸν λόγον ἀποτέτακα. The part. gen. emphasizes the distinctness of the arguments. — For the agreement of the adjective in gender and number with the subst., cf. Xen. Cyr. iii.

2. 2 πολλὴν τῆς χάρας, iv. 5. 4 τῶν 519
ἄρτων τοὺς ἡμίσεις. e

5. πρὸς φίλιον: see on 500 b.

10. παιδεύειν . . . εἰς ἀρετὴν: cf. Xen. Cyn. 13. 3 ἐπ' ἀρετήν.

11. ἀλλὰ τί ἂν λέγοις: what would 520
one have to say? "One need not waste
words over such people." Callicles, al-
though at bottom himself a sophist, af-
fects to despise the class in accordance
with Gorgias' view concerning them.
See Introd. § 8, especially note 22.

15. ὅταν τύχωσιν: has here much
the force of "occasionally." See on
518 c.

16. ταῦτόν: emphatic asyndeton,
which as an answer to the question
immediately preceding has the effect
of a negation.

μακάρι', ἐστὶν σοφιστῆς καὶ ῥήτωρ, ἢ ἐγγύς τι καὶ παρα-
 πλήσιον, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πρὸς Πῶλον· σὺ δὲ δι' **β**
 ἄγνοϊαν τὸ μὲν πάγκαλόν τι οἶε εἶναι, τὴν ῥητορικὴν, τοῦ
 20 δὲ καταφρονεῖς. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κάλλιόν ἐστὶν σοφιστικὴ
 ῥητορικῆς ὅσῳ περ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς καὶ γυμναστικὴ
 ἱατρικῆς. μόνοις δ' ἔγωγε καὶ ἄμην τοῖς δημηγόροις τε
 καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγ-
 ματι, ὃ αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν, ὥς πονηρόν ἐστιν εἰς σφᾶς,
 25 ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ ἅμα καὶ ἑαυτῶν κατηγορεῖν,
 ὅτι οὐδὲν ὠφελήκασιν οὓς φασιν ὠφελεῖν. οὐχ οὕτως **ε**
 ἔχει;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ προέσθαι γε δήπου τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἄνευ μι-
 30 σθοῦ, ὥς τὸ εἶκός, μόνοις τούτοις ἐνεχώρει, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ
 ἔλεγον. ἄλλην μὲν γὰρ εὐεργεσίαν τις εὐεργετηθείς,
 οἶον ταχὺς γενόμενος διὰ παιδοτρίβην, ἴσως ἂν ἀπο-

520 17. ἢ ἐγγύς κτέ.: on the use of
α the adverb, see Kr. 62, 2, 4. τὶ goes
 with it as τὶς with the adj., "pretty
 nearly." See on 491 c.

β 20. τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ κτέ.: cf. 464 b ff.

22. καὶ ἄμην: the position of καὶ
 here, which would properly be con-
 nected with μόνοις, is due to the de-
 sire to emphasize this latter word by
 putting it at the head of the sen-
 tence.

23. τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι: that which
 receives their training, whether it be
 a whole commonwealth or an indi-
 vidual. The abstract neut. general-
 izes, as in *Prot.* 312 c, where of the
 sophists themselves it is said: καίτοι
 εἰ τοῦτ' (i.e. what a sophist is) ἄγνοεῖς
 οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα,
 οὐτ' εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακὸν πράγματι.

25. ἢ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ κτέ.: without,
 at the same time. Cf. *Phaedr.* 245 d

τοῦτο δὲ οὐτ' ἀπόλλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι
 520 δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε **β**
 γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι. Cron sup-
 plies from οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν the words
 ἀνάγκην εἶναι, but it is very doubtful
 whether the Greeks felt the ellipsis.
 Cf. 471 d.

29. προέσθαι τὴν εὐεργεσίαν: every **ε**
 piece of instruction given the scholar
 by the teacher is looked upon as a
 benefit, and the pay is simply a com-
 pensation for benefit received. To
 προέσθαι, which of itself denotes a
 freewill gift, is added ἄνευ μισθοῦ in
 order to make more plain the con-
 trast with the practice of the soph-
 ists, which ran so counter to the
 customary ideas of the Greeks (cf.
Apol. 19 e f., 31 b, 33 a). The prac-
 tice of Protagoras, as it is told us in
Prot. 328 b, c, is noteworthy in this
 connexion.

στερήσειε τὴν χάριν, εἰ πρόοιτο αὐτῷ ὁ παιδοτρίβης
καὶ μὴ συνθέμενος αὐτῷ μισθὸν ὅτι μάλιστα ἅμα
35 μεταδιδούς τοῦ τάχους λαμβάνοι τὸ ἀργύριον· οὐ γὰρ δ
βραδυτῆτι, οἶμαι, ἀδικοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' ἀδικία·
ἧ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεῖ, τὴν ἀδικίαν, οὐδὲν
40 δεινὸν αὐτῷ μήποτε ἀδικηθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ ἀσφαλὲς ταύτην
τὴν εὐεργεσίαν προσέσθαι, εἶπερ τῷ ὄντι δύναιτό τις ἀγα-
θούς ποιεῖν. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΚΑΛ. Φημί.

LXXVI. ΣΩ. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα, ὥς ἔοικε, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας
συμβουλάς συμβουλευεῖν λαμβάνοντα ἀργύριον, οἷον
οἰκοδομίας περὶ ἧ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν, οὐδὲν αἰσχρόν.

ΚΑΛ. Ἐοικέ γε.

5 ΣΩ. Περὶ δέ γε ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρό-
πον ὥς βέλτιστος εἴη καὶ ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ
ἧ πόλιν, αἰσχρόν νενόμισται μὴ φάναι συμβουλευεῖν, ἐὰν
μή τις αὐτῷ ἀργύριον διδῷ. ἧ γάρ;

ΚΑΛ. Ναί.

10 ΣΩ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο αἰτιὸν ἔστιν, ὅτι μόνῃ αὕτῃ

520 34. ὅτι μάλιστα: to be connected
C with the partic. clause ἅμα μεταδιδούς,
simul atque tradit.—ἅμα: on
the adv. with the partic., see H. 976;
GMT. 858.

d 39 f. οὐδὲν δεινὸν κτέ.: see on 517 a,
and cf. *Apol.* 28 b οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ἐν
ἐμοὶ στή. It has much the force of
the English, 'there is no danger that,'
etc. See Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.*
iii. 204.

LXXVI. 1 f. τὰς μὲν ἄλλας συμ-
βουλάς: almost equiv. to τὰς περὶ
ἄλλων συμβουλάς.

5 f. ὄντιν' ἂν τις τρόπον κτέ.: epe- 520
getic to ταύτης τῆς πράξεως, "this
matter." The ἀρετὴ πολιτικὴ which the
sophists professed to teach included
both sides, — management of one's
own household and of the state. Cf.
Prot. 318 e τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβου-
λα περὶ τε τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα
τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν
τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνα-
τάτος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

7. μὴ φάναι . . . ἐὰν μή: generic
conditional of the present. The first
μὴ is due to the infinitive.

τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν τὸν εὖ παθόντα ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ αὐτ' εὖ ποιεῖν· ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν εὐεργεσίαν αὐτ' εὖ πείσεται· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ· ἔστι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχοντα;

15 ΚΑΛ. Ἔστιν.

521

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ ποτέραν οὖν με παρακαλεῖς τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως, διόρισόν μοι, τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι ἔσονται, ὡς ἱατρόν, ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα καὶ πρὸς χάριω ὁμιλήσοντα; τάληθ' μοι εἶπέ, Καλλί-
20 κλεις· δίκαιος γὰρ εἶ, ὥσπερ ἡρξω παρρησιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἐμέ, διατελεῖν ἅ νοεῖς λέγων· καὶ νῦν εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἶπέ.

520 11 f. αὐτ' εὖ ποιεῖν: the old way of
e writing was ἀντενποιεῖν; but a verb can retain its original form only when compounded with a preposition. See H. 581. Gratitude is only a kind of justice.

12. ὥστε καλὸν δοκεῖ τὸ σημεῖον εἶναι: sc. as testimony to the fact that the teacher has really made him better. The common form of the conditional, where the second member is the converse of the first, is ἐὰν μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ μή. See on 502 b. The use of εἰ with fut. indic. also in the first member emphasizes the rarity of the case. The subject of εὖ ποιήσας is indefinite, 'any one,' as of μὴ φάναι above.

521 16 f. τὴν θεραπείαν τῆς πόλεως:
a denotes political activity in the sense shown in ch. LVI. above, and in accordance with the principles deduced in ch. XIX. ff. The correct answer to the question propounded would be: "As matters are, I invite you to neither mode; for the one is immoral, the other (as Socrates also makes plain in *Apol.* 31 d f.), for the present impossible." Hence, also, Socrates

intimates that the only way of engag- 521
ing in true politics is at present lim- a ited in Athens to the improvement of individuals in private intercourse. The use of the article with *θεραπείαν* implies that both kinds have been previously mentioned,—as is more definitely stated in the following explanation. Cf. *Crat.* 439 a εἰ οὖν ἔστιν μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα δι' ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δι' αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων ἢ μάθησις.

17. τὴν τοῦ διαμάχεσθαι: cf. *Apol.* 29 b αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος (ἀμαθία) ἡ τοῦ σέσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. According to *Madv. Syn.* 49 a, the expegetic gen. is usually found only with the inf.

18. ὡς ἱατρόν: see on 514 d.—ἢ ὡς διακονήσοντα: the two words ὡς ἱατρόν have caused a shift in the construction where we should have expected (cf. 513 d) something like ἢ τὴν τοῦ καταχαρίζεσθαι κτέ. In the answer of Callicles we have a simple verbal quotation of Socrates' words, without the speaker's troubling himself to observe any fixed construction. One might supply παρακαλῶ σε.

ΚΑΛ. Δέγω τοίνυν ὅτι ὡς διακονήσονται. b

ΣΩ. Κολακεύονται ἄρα με, ὦ γενναιότατε, παρακαλεῖς.

25 ΚΑΛ. Εἰ σοι Μυσὸν γε ἡδιον καλεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὡς εἰ μὴ ταῦτά γε ποιήσεις —

ΣΩ. Μὴ εἴπῃς ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηκας, ὅτι ἀποκτενεῖ με ὁ βουλόμενος, ἵνα μὴ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ εἴπω, ὅτι πονηρός γε ὢν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα· μηδ' ὅτι ἀφαιρήσεται ἐάν τι ἔχω, ἵνα μὴ
30 αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἴπω ὅτι “ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος οὐχ ἔξει ὅτι χρήσεται αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ με ἀδίκως ἀφείλετο, οὕτως καὶ λαβὼν
ἀδίκως χρήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἀδίκως, αἰσχροῦς, εἰ δὲ αἰσχροῦς, κακῶς.”

LXXVII. ΚΑΛ. Ὡς μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύειν μῆδ' ἂν ἐν τούτων παθεῖν, ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδὼν καὶ οὐκ ἂν

521 ^b 24. *κολακεύονται*: pronounces such a judgment upon *διακονήσονται* that its opposition to the idea *γενναῖος* (*γενναιότατε*, *γενναῖως* εἰπέ) is strongly emphasized.

25. *εἰ σοι Μυσὸν γε* κτέ.: when two conditional clauses are contrasted by *εἰ μὲν* . . . *εἰ δὲ μή*, we not infrequently find the conclusion of the first condition omitted. GMT. 482; H. 904 a. The sense of this passage seems to be: “Yes! if you prefer to use the vilest name for it.” The Mysians were so despised that even slaves brought from Mysia were as little thought of as the Sardinians at Rome. Hence *Μυσῶν ἔσχατος* was a proverb (*Theæt.* 209 ^b *τὸ λεγόμενον Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον*), meaning “the vilest of the vile.” Cic. *pro Flacc.* 27 *Quid porro in Graeco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam si quis despiciatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus esse dicatur?* *κολακεῖν* was an unpleas-

ant word to the Greek ear, and doubtless offended the euphemistic taste of Callicles. Cf. the English proverb, ‘to call a spade a spade.’ — *ὡς*: see on 509 e. — This passage has troubled the editors. 521 b

27. *ὁ πολλάκις εἴρηκας*: 486 a, b, 511 b. Polus, however, had already said the same.

29. *ἐάν τι ἔχω*: to be compared with *χρήσεται αὐτοῖς* in the line below.

30. *ὅτι ἀλλ' ἀφελόμενος*: *ὅτι* is often used to introduce a direct quotation. For examples, see Spieker, *Am. Jour. Phil.* v. 220.

LXXVII. 1. *ὡς μοι δοκεῖς*: to be understood as a sportive exclamation. Cf. 490 e. c

2. *μῆδ' ἂν ἐν*: see on 512 e. — *ὡς οἰκῶν ἐκποδῶν*: “as if you dwelt outside the world,” where no one could reach you.

2 f. *ἂν εἰσαχθεῖς*: see on 458 a, and cf. Xen. *An.* i. 1. 10 *αἰτέι εἰς δισχιλίους ξένους καὶ τριῶν μηνῶν μισθόν, ὡς οὕτως περιγενόμενος ἂν τῶν ἀντιστασιωτῶν.*

εἰσαχθεῖς εἰς δικαστήριον ὑπὸ πάνν ἴσως μοχθηροῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ φαύλου.

- 5 ΣΩ. Ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί, ὃ Καλλίκλεις, ὡς ἀληθῶς, εἰ μὴ οἶομαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει ὄντινούν ἄν, ὅτι τύχοι, τοῦτο παθεῖν. τόδε μέντοι εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἐάνπερ εἰσῶ εἰς δικαστήριον περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων ὃ σὺ λέγεις, πονηρός τίς μ' ἔσται ὃ εἰσάγων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν χρηστὸς μὴ 10 ἀδικούντ' ἄνθρωπον εἰσαγάγοι· καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι. βούλει σοι εἶπω δι' ὅτι ταῦτα προσδοκῶ;

ΚΑΛ. Πάνν γε.

- ΣΩ. Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ 15 πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὗς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἅ σὺ παραινεῖς,

521 The difference in the participles is the same as it would be in direct discourse: οἰκῶ ἐκποδῶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἰσαχθείην. Cf. 486 b.

5. ἀνόητος ἄρα εἰμί: the particle ἄρα has the force, "as it seems," as frequently. Socrates is not to be understood as saying that he is ἀνόητος, but only that according to Callicles' view he would be.

6. ὄντινούν ἄν, ὅτι τύχοι: "any one may experience anything." The more usual mood would be subjv. ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ, instead of optative. But the opt. is not uncommonly found by attraction in relative sentences which are dependent on clauses with ἂν (either opt. or indic.). GMT. 558. On the subject-matter, cf. *Meno* 94 e ἐγὼ (Anytus is introduced as speaking) μὲν οὖν ἂν σοι συμβουλευσάμην, εἰ ἐθέλεις ἐμοὶ πεῖθεσθαι, εὐλαβεῖσθαι. ὡς ἴσως μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει βῆδιδόν

(βῆδόν) ἔστιν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους ἢ 521 εὖ· ἐν τῇδε δὲ καὶ πάνν. *Apol.* 31 d, c, and *Dem. Ol.* iii. 11 ff. also agree with this.

7 ff. τόδε . . . προσδοκῶ: these d words sound like a prophecy in the mouth of Socrates, but were probably intended by Plato as a severe criticism on his accusers.

8. περὶ τούτων τινὸς κινδυνεύων: referring to the nature of the punishment to be undergone. Cf. above, b. —δ': where we should more naturally have δῶ, but see on 486 d.

13. ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος: this limitation is intended to be exact, as the repetition of μόνος shows. On the matter, see *Apol.* 30 d ff.

16. οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον: the repetition in a changed form of the idea already expressed serves to heighten the contrast. See on οὗτος 452 e.

τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. ὁ αὐτὸς δέ μοι ἤκει λόγος, ὅνπερ πρὸς Πῶλον ἔλεγον· κριν-
 20 νοῦμαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν παιδίοις ἱατρὸς ἂν κρίνοιτο κατηγοροῦν-
 τος ὁψοποιοῦ. σκόπει γάρ, τί ἂν ἀπολογοῖτο ὁ τοιοῦτος
 ἄνθρωπος ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς, εἰ αὐτοῦ κατηγοροῖ τις λέ-
 γων ὅτι “ὦ παῖδες, πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὅδε εἵργασται
 ἀνὴρ καὶ αὐτούς, καὶ τοὺς νεωτάτους ὑμῶν διαφθείρει τέμ-
 25 νων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ,⁵²²
 πικρότατα πώματα διδὸν καὶ πεινῇν καὶ διψῇν ἀναγκά-
 ζων, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ πολλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡνώ-

⁵²¹ 18. τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα: this employ-
^e ment of Callicles' epithet (cf. 486 c) is probably not without design on Socrates' part, according to whose view it applies better to rhetoric than to philosophy.

19. ὁ αὐτὸς . . . λόγος: in the passage referred to (464 d) Socrates is actually speaking to Gorgias, who has taken Polus' place for the time, but what he says applies just as well to Polus, as is seen by reference to 463 e and 465 a.

19 f. κρινούμαι: probably passive; but if so, it is the only example in Attic prose (see Kr. 39, 11, A). On the other hand, the fut. middle of ἀδικέω is regularly used for fut. passive. Cf. 509 d, and see H. 496 a.

22. ἐν τούτοις ληφθείς: cf. 486 a εἰ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος. How ἐν τούτοις is to be understood, is shown by τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστὰς below.

23. ὦ παῖδες: what follows as far as εὐώχουν ὑμᾶς is a parody on the accusation made against Socrates, especially in so far as he was declared to be a corrupter of the young.

24. ἀνὴρ: without the art. because it is disparaging. But see H. 674. — τοὺς νεωτάτους: instead of τοὺς νέους,

because the supposed judge himself ⁵²¹ is a child. ^e

24 f. διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ: are loosely connected with κακὰ εἵργασται as denoting two species of the evils complained of, — διαφθείρει the more severe treatment by τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, — ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ, the less severe by ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων. The latter is explained by πικρότατα κτέ. and πεινῇν . . . ἀναγκάζων in chiasmic position. It denotes, therefore, the condition of wretchedness and discomfort brought about by fasting and nauseating medicines. While διαφθείρει reminds one of the accusation before the court, ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ applies especially to the customary criticisms which were made against Socrates. See on 522 b below.

27. οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ: a compressed ⁵²² expression, in which οὐ, though really ^a without a verb, is connected with the following clause as equiv. to οὐκ εὐώχων, ὥσπερ κτέ. Cf. *Symp.* 179 d, e (θεοί) ἐποίησαν τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ (Ὀρφέως) ὑπὸ γυναικῶν γενέσθαι οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλεῖα . . . ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μικρῶν νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν. Cf. *Dem. Phil.* i:34. Translate οὐχ ὥσπερ by “whereas.”

χουν ὑμᾶς·” τί ἂν οἶει ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα
 ἱατρὸν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν; ἢ εἰ εἴποι τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅτι “ταῦτα
 30 πάντα ἐγὼ ἐποιοῦν, ὧ παῖδες, ὑγιεινῶς,” πόσον οἶει ἂν
 ἀναβοῇσαι τοὺς τοιοῦτους δικαστάς; οὐ μέγα;

ΚΑΛ. Ἴσως· οἴεσθαί γε χρή.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οἶει ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ ἂν αὐτὸν ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι
 χρή εἰπεῖν;

35 ΚΑΛ. Πάνυ γε.

LXXVIII. ΣΩ. Τοιοῦτον μέντοι καὶ ἐγὼ οἶδ' ὅτι πάθος
 πάθοιμι ἂν εἰσελθὼν εἰς δικαστήριον. οὔτε γὰρ ἡδονὰς
 ἅς ἐκπεπόρικα ἔξω αὐτοῖς λέγειν, ἅς οὗτοι εὐεργεσίας καὶ
 ὠφελίας νομίζουσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτε τοὺς πορίζοντας ζηλῶ
 5 οὔτε οἷς πορίζεται· ἐάν τέ τίς με ἢ νεωτέρους φῇ διαφθεί-
 ρειν ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους κακηγορεῖν

522 30. πόσον: not τί, because the up-
 a roar would be characterized by volume rather than by distinctness.

31. ἀναβοῇσαι: sc. as the judges of Socrates really did. Hence the repeated entreaty of Socrates, μὴ θορυβεῖτε. Cf. *Apol.* 30 c ἐφ' οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε.

32. ἴσως κτέ.: is, according to the sense, a decisive affirmation, though it is given unwillingly and grudgingly. —οἴεσθαί γε χρή: is not very appropriate here; it is frequently employed where the speaker answers himself, e.g. *Crito* 53 c καὶ οὐκ οἶει ἄσχημον ἂν φαίνεσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα; οἴεσθαί γε χρή, *Prot.* 325 c.

33. ἐν πάσῃ ἀπορίᾳ κτέ.: cf. *Hdt.* ix. 98 ἐν ἀπορίῃ εἶχοντο ὅτι ποίεωσι.

LXXVIII. 2. οὔτε γάρ: the corresponding member to this is ἐάν τέ τίς με κτέ.

b 4 f. ἐγὼ δὲ (while I) . . . πορίζεται: is outside of the regular construction.

5. ἢ νεωτέρους: in view of τοὺς
 πρεσβυτέρους we might expect τοὺς
 νεωτέρους. If the reading is sound,
 we must look upon νεωτέρους as en-
 tirely indefinite in the sense of
 “young people,” and τοὺς πρεσ-
 βυτέρους as “the older” as compared
 with them, e.g. their fathers, etc.

6. ἀπορεῖν ποιοῦντα: this accusa-
 tion was actually made against Socra-
 tes, as we see from *Meno* 79 e, where
 Meno says, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκουον μὲν
 ἔγωγε πρὶν καὶ συγγενέσθαι σοι, ὅτι σὺ
 οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς
 ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν, and Socrates
 himself says in *Theaet.* 149 a λέγουσι
 περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν.—τοὺς πρε-
 σβυτέρους κτέ.: an example is afforded
 by *Apol.* 29 d ff., where Socrates re-
 presents himself as saying to any one
 he meets, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν κτέ., χρη-
 μάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος
 ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὥς πλεῖστα, φρονήσεως
 δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὥς

λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς
 ἔξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι “δικαίως πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ πράττω c
 τὸ ὑμέτερον δὴ τοῦτο, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί,” οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν.
 10 ὥστε ἴσως, ὅτι ἂν τύχω, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

ΚΑΛ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὧ Σώκρατες, καλῶς ἔχειν ἀνθρω-
 πος ἐν πόλει οὕτως διακείμενος καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ
 βοηθεῖν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχον, ὧ Καλλίκλεις, ὃ σὺ
 15 πολλάκις ὡμολόγησας· εἰ βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη αὐτῷ, μήτε
 περὶ ἀνθρώπους μήτε περὶ θεοὺς ἄδικον μηδὲν μήτε εἶρη- a
 κὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια ἑαυτῷ
 πολλάκις ἡμῖν ὡμολόγηται κρατίστη εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν
 ἐμέ τις ἐξελέγχοι ταύτην τὴν βοήθειαν ἀδύνατον ὄντα
 20 ἐμαυτῷ καὶ ἄλλῃ βοηθεῖν, αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς
 καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις ἐξελεγχόμενος καὶ μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου, καὶ εἰ

⁵²² βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖ οὐδὲ φρον-
 b τίσεις; Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 49 ff.

7. λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους: corresponds to πικρότατα πῶματα διδούς in the comparison.

8. ὅτι δικαίως κτέ.: Socrates really speaks in this vein in *Apol.* 30 e ff.

c 10. ὅτι ἂν τύχω: see on 521 c.

12. καὶ ἀδύνατος ὢν: in form co-ordinate with, but in sense explanatory of, οὔτως διακείμενος, which refers to what precedes.

14. εἰ ἐκεῖνό γε κτέ.: the apod. is to be sought in the implied affirmation to the question δοκεῖ σοι καλῶς ἔχειν. Cf. 503 c. The addition of ἐν to the pron. makes it very emphatic, as in *Rep.* vii. 537 b (though here the order is different) μὴ καὶ αὕτη τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη.

15. βεβοηθηκὼς εἴη: not to be considered as a circumlocutory perfect; but the partic. denotes a condition

brought about by a course of action ⁵²²
 (εἰρηκὼς μήτε εἰργασμένος) which, ^c
 begun in the past, still continues.

17. αὕτη γάρ τις βοήθεια: the use of τις instead of the art. shows that d
 Socrates feels he is stretching language a little. The dat. is after the analogy of the preceding dat. with the partic.; but see on 513 b.

19. ἐξελέγχοι: should confute me by showing. Hence the partic. follows the analogy of verbs of showing.

20 f. καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις: “whether . . . or.”

21. μόνος ὑπὸ μόνου: the disgrace, to the mind of Socrates, consists, not in the fact that one suffers a defeat at the hands of his adversary ἐναντίον πολλῶν, but in the unsuspected weakness which is thus laid bare. Hence, so far as the purpose in hand is concerned, ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν would be equivalent to ἀδικίαν.

διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀδυναμίαν ἀποθνήσκωμι, ἀγανακτοῖν ἄν·
 εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς ῥητορικῆς ἐνδεῖα τελευτῶν ἔγωγε, εὖ οἶδα ὅτι ῥαδίως ἰδοὺς ἄν με φέροντα τὸν θάνατον. αὐτὸ
 25 μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, ὅστις μὴ παντά-
 πασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνανδρός ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν
 φοβεῖται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἀδικημάτων γέμοντα τὴν ψυχὴν
 εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφικέσθαι πάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ
 βούλει, σοὶ ἐγώ, ὥς τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ἐθέλω λόγον λέξαι.
 30 ΚΑΛ. Ἄλλ' ἐπέειπερ γε καὶ τᾶλλα ἐπέρανας, καὶ τοῦτο
 πέρανον.

LXXIX. ΣΩ. “Ἄκουε δὴ,” φασί, “μάλα καλοῦ λόγου,” 523
 ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὥς

522 23. εἰ δὲ κολακικῆς κτέ.: so Socrates also declares after his sentence, *Apol.* 38 d ἀπορία μὲν ἐάλακα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα, οἳ ἂν ὑμῖν ἥδιστ' ᾗ ἀκούειν, and in 38 e, after he has given a characterization of that rhetoric to the use of which he would not lower himself, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἰροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν.

e 24 f. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ κτέ.: the fear of death Socrates declares also in the *Apology* to be due to the worst kind of ignorance,—that which thinks it knows what it does not know. “Death is commonly considered an evil, although no one knows but that it is the greatest good (*Apol.* 29 a, 37 b). On the other hand, evil is to be greatly feared for its consequences, both here and hereafter.” τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν is the “act of dying,” τὸ τεθνάναι, the resulting condition, death, which latter Socrates discusses in *Apol.* 40 c.

26. ἀλόγιστος: cf. *Apol.* 37 c οὕτως 522
 ἀλόγιστος . . . ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογί-
 ζεσθαι.

29. λόγον: denotes here, not a dialectical proof, but a “story,” a “tale.” Cf. λογογράφος. κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα is used in the same way in *Apol.* 40 c.

LXXIX. 1. ἄκουε δὴ: a solemn be- 523
 ginning, in order to stimulate interest. Similarly *Tim.* 20 d ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, λόγον μάλα μὲν ἀτόπου, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθοῦς, *Theaet.* 201 d ἄκουε δὴ ὅσα ἀντὶ δυνεράτος. The gen. with ἀκούω gives the λόγος almost the authority of a person. See G. 171, 2, n. 1; H. 742 c.

2. The distinction between λόγος and μῦθος, which are often contrasted, is that λόγος is said of the true and the actual; μῦθος, of the fictitious. By this distinction Socrates wishes to call attention to the fact that a truth lies at the basis of the following myth, while the dress of it is a matter of indifference,—not that he actually believes the story as it stands. In this light we must also consider

ἀληθῇ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ
 Ὅμηρος λέγει, διενείμαντο τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ ὁ Ποσει-
 5 δῶν καὶ ὁ Πλούτων, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον.
 ἦν οὖν νόμος ὃδε περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ Κρόνου, καὶ αἰὲ καὶ
 νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς, τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν μὲν δικαίως τὸν
 βίον διελθόντα καὶ ὁσίως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς μακάρων b

523 his statement *ὡς ἀληθῇ κτέ.*, looking
 a to his explanation in *Phaedo* 114 d
 τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δυσχυρίσασθαι οὕτως
 ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρόπει νῦν
 ἔχοντι ἀνδρὶ, ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἡ
 τοιαύτ' αἴτια περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ
 τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπεὶ περ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ
 ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὕσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπει
 μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰομένῳ
 οὕτως ἔχειν. See Thompson's note.

3 f. ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος λέγει: Socrates
 refers to O 187 ff., where Poseidon
 says:—

τρῆς γὰρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφεοὶ
 οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα,
 Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Ἀίδης ἐνέροι-
 σιν ἀνάσσω.
 τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ'
 ἔμμορε τιμῆς.
 ἦ τοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολλὴν ἅλα ναιέμεν
 αἰεὶ
 παλλομένων, Ἀίδης δ' ἔλαχε ζόφον
 ἡρέοντα,
 Ζεὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ
 νεφέλῃσιν
 γαῖα δ' ἔτι ξυγὴ πάντων καὶ μακρὸς
 Ὀλύμπτος.

Socrates commences with this pas-
 sage so as to be able to assume there-
 from an empire of the dead, or the
 existence of the soul after death, as
 an admitted fact which requires no
 proof.

5. παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλαβον:
 by making thus the sway over the
 world a matter of inheritance simply,

Socrates avoids the common story of 523
 hostile relations between Cronus and a
 his sons.

6 f. ἦν οὖν νόμος ἐπὶ Κρόνου . . .
 ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς: "that is, the fundamen-
 tal distinction between good and evil
 is also an eternal one. The addition
 of ἐν θεοῖς is appropriate, inasmuch
 as the law which was in force during
 the reign of Cronus is made perpetual
 by being adopted by his successors,
 the gods.—καὶ αἰὲ καὶ νῦν: from that
 time to the present.

8 f. εἰς μακάρων νήσους: according b
 to Homer, δ 564, Zeus transferred his
 favorites (Rhadamanthys and Mene-
 laus, the latter a son-in-law of Zeus,
 are especially mentioned) alive to the
 Ἡλύσιον πεδίοον, where they pass a
 blissful existence. The first mention
 of the Islands of the Blessed is found
 in Hesiod (ἔργα κ. ἡ. 170), who makes
 them the place to which the men of
 the fourth race, the heroes and chief-
 tains of the Trojan war are sent after
 death as their reward. The punish-
 ment, on the other hand, of the men
 of the second and third races is that
 after death they must wander in Ha-
 des (ib. 152 ἐς εὐρώεντα δόμον κρυεροῦ
 Ἀΐδαο). The myth is then further de-
 veloped, and the Isles of the Blessed
 become gradually in the common be-
 lief, largely through Pindar's influ-
 ence, the abode of all the righteous
 after death. Cf. Pind. *Ol.* xi. 75 ff.
 (Gildersleeve).

νήσους ἀπιόντα οἰκεῖν ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἐκτὸς κακῶν,
 10 τὸν δὲ ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως εἰς τὸ τῆς τίσεώς τε καὶ δίκης
 δεσμωτήριον, ὃ δὴ Τάρταρον καλοῦσιν, ἵναί. τούτων δὲ
 δικασταὶ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ ἔτι νεωστὶ τοῦ Διὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἔχοντος ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων, ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ δικάζοντες
 ἣ μέλλοιεν τελευτᾶν. κακῶς οὖν αἱ δίκαι ἐκρίνοντο· ὃ τε
 15 οὖν Πλούτων καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων ἰόν-
 τες ἔλεγον πρὸς τὸν Δία, ὅτι φοιτῶεν σφίσιν ἄνθρωποι
 ἐκατέρωσε ἀνάξιοι. εἶπεν οὖν ὁ Ζεὺς· “ἀλλ’ ἐγώ,” ἔφη, c
 “παύσω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κακῶς αἱ δίκαι

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 b ὅσοι δ’ ἐτόλμασαν ἐστρὶς
 ἐκατέρωθι μέιναντες ἀπὸ πάμπαν
 ἀδίκων ἔχειν
 ψυχάν, ἔτειλαν Διὸς ὁδὸν παρὰ Κρόνου
 τύρσιν· ἔνθα μακάρων
 νᾶσος ὠκεανίδες
 αἰραὶ περιπνέουσιν, κτέ.

Tartarus was originally, according to Homer, the prison of the Titans; cf. Θ 13, 478. Plato alone makes it the prison of all wrong-doers. The term μακάρων νήσους became stereotyped very early; hence we never find the prose word μακαρίων used in it.

9. ἐν πάσῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ: on the omission of the art., see G. 142, 4, n. 5; H. 672 b.

11 f. τούτων δὲ δικασταί: the representation of a court of the dead, with other judges besides Pluto himself, and before the souls enter Hades, is first found in the Platonic version of the myth.

12. ἔτι νεωστί: (still more recently, when, etc.) is contrasted with ἐπὶ Κρόνου, so that τοῦ Διὸς . . . ἔχοντος forms the explanation of it. Heindorf connects ἔτι νεωστί with ἔχοντος, and translates: recente adhuc Iovis imperio. See on 503 c.

13. ζῶντες ἦσαν ζώντων: this presentation is quite in harmony with the mythical form which Socrates adopts. The object is to show the contrast between a judgment which is human, uncertain, and based on external appearances, and the true one, which is based on accurate inspection of the unveiled truth. For this purpose the human tribunal is supposed in the myth to have existed first; the second tribunal is then made by Plato to arise as a substitute for the first, although naturally it must be conceived as existent ever since the creation of man. The first tribunal admits of the same criticism as the one in use among men deserves.

15. οἱ ἐπιμεληταί: who these are remains uncertain. The addition οἱ ἐκ μακάρων νήσων shows that they abode there, though their functions probably extended also to Tartarus. On the attraction of the preposition, see G. 191, n. 6; H. 788 a.

17. ἐκατέρωσε: i.e. as well to Tartarus as to the Isles of the Blessed; hence ἀνάξιοι refers both to reward and punishment.

18. νῦν μὲν γὰρ κτέ.: note the repeated employment of γὰρ, which cor-

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 b

δικάζονται. ἀμπεχόμενοι γάρ," ἔφη, "οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνον-
 20 ται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν," ἡ δ' ὅς, "ψυχὰς
 πονηρὰς ἔχοντες ἡμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ
 γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὴν ἡ κρίσις ἦ, ἔρχονται
 αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώ-
 κασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπὸ τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ α
 25 ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς
 αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὤτα καὶ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκα-
 λυμμένοι. ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοῖς πάντα ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται,
 καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀμφιέσματα καὶ τὰ τῶν κρινομένων. πρῶ-
 τον μὲν οὖν," ἔφη, "πανστέον ἐστὶν προειδότας αὐτοὺς τὸν
 30 θάνατον. νῦν γὰρ προΐσασι. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ
 εἴρηται τῷ Προμηθεὶ ὅπως ἂν παύσῃ αὐτῶν. ἔπειτα γυμ-

523 responds well to the strongly marked
 c (repeated ἔφη) direct speech.

21. ἡμφιεσμένοι: the 'clothing' is to be understood in the wider sense, as everything external which would affect the estimation of a man, — e.g. beauty of person, noble origin, wealth, etc. Cf. 451 e, and *Prot.* 319 c κὰν πᾶν καλὸς ἢ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν γενναίων.

22 f. ἔρχονται κτέ.: here the Attic court is visible behind the myth.

α 25. πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς: sense-perception is, according to Plato, always untrustworthy, and hence the knowledge gained through it is always uncertain, often untrue. With that, Socrates contrasts the knowledge which is gained by the immediate and thoughtful action of the soul itself, which he represents here as soul-perception.

27. ἐπίπροσθεν γίγνεται: "comes before them," "puts itself in their way." Their wrappings become a hindrance to perception of the truth.

28 f. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν: introduces

the preliminaries which must first be 523
 settled. d

30. τοῦτο: is the condition of προείδησις mentioned in the previous clause. Closely connected with it is αὐτῶν as a gen. of possession, such as we see occurring with θανάμειν, e.g. *Phaedo* 89 a ἐγὼ γε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ (in him) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο κτέ., *Apol.* 17 a μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα. The regular const. with both verbs is an acc. of the person with a gen. of the thing.

31. τῷ Προμηθεὶ: in the Attic cult, Prometheus was honored next to Hephaestus and Athena as a benefactor of mankind. As such he bore the surname πυρφόρος, under which name Sophocles celebrates him in *Oedipus Coloneus*, where he says of the neighborhood which Oedipus enters (*O. C.* 54 ff.): χῶρος μὲν ἱερὸς πᾶς δδ' ἐστ', ἔχει δέ νιν | σεμνὸς Ποσειδῶν ἡδ' ὁ πυρφόρος θεὸς | Τιτὰν Προμηθεύς. Of his enmity with Zeus, which Aeschylus, following Hesiod, made the

νοὺς κριτέον ἀπάντων τούτων · τεθνεώτας γὰρ δεῖ κρίνε-
σθαι. καὶ τὸν κριτὴν δεῖ γυμνὸν εἶναι, τεθνεώτα, αὐτῇ τῇ
ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν θεωροῦντα ἐξαίφνης ἀποθανόντος
35 ἐκάστου, ἐρήμον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ καταλιπόντα
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πάντα ἐκείνον τὸν κόσμον, ἵνα δικαία ἡ κρί-
σις ᾖ. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐγνωκὼς πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς
ἐποιησάμην δικαστὰς ὑεῖς ἑμαντοῦ, δύο μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας,
Μίνω τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυν, ἓνα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης, Αἰακόν ·

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d central point of his magnificent poem, there is no mention either in Sophocles or in Plato, who also, in the *Prot.* 320 d, in the myth of the Gods related by the sophist, says: προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμήσαι τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. As a Titan he is called the son of Iapetus. — Not to be mistaken is the allusion to Aeschylus *P. V.* 248–251, though with a modification of the tone:

ΠΡ. Θνητοὺς ἔπαυσα μὴ προδέρκεσθαι μόρον.

ΧΟΡ. Τὸ ποῖον εὐρὼν τῆσδε φάρμακον νόσου;

ΠΡ. Τυφλὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας κατέφκισα.

ΧΟΡ. Μέγ' ὠφέλημα τοῦτ' ἐδωρήσω βροτοῖς.

— ὅπως αὖ παύση: see on 481 a and 480 d. Whether the manner of bringing about this desired object was also prescribed to Prometheus, or left to his own ingenuity, is not said. — αὐτῶν: must be taken as the gen. of the person, with τοῦτο as object of παύση. As a rule we have the reverse.

e 32. ἀπάντων τούτων: i.e. clothes, etc., mentioned above. — τεθνεώτας γάρ κτέ.: does not give the reason, but simply the explanation of the preceding expression; for τεθνεώτας κτέ. is no basis for γυμνοὺς κτέ., but rather the reverse.

33 f. αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν τὴν ψυχὴν: emphasizes the immediateness of the scrutiny on the side both of object and subject.

34. ἐξαίφνης: combined, just like ἄμα, with the partic., which it either precedes or follows. See on 520 c.

37. πρότερος ἢ ὑμεῖς: on account of his position as king of the gods, for πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ πάντα νοήσας. Hes. *ἔργα κ.* ἡ. 267.

38 f. ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας . . . Εὐρώπης: the prep. ἐκ can be used of parentage or of place of origin; here the latter. According to Hom. *Ξ* 321 f. Minos and Rhadamanthys were sons of Europa, and born in Crete, of which Minos was afterwards king, while Aeacus was called the son of Aegina. Minos was famed as a wise law-giver, Rhadamanthys and Aeacus for their wisdom, justice, and piety. — The Greeks of Plato's time divided the earth into two parts. Cf. Isoc. *Paneg.* 179 τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης τῆς ὑπὸ τῷ κόσμῳ κειμένης, δίχα τετμημένης καὶ τῆς μὲν Ἀσίας, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης καλουμένης. Plato must accordingly reckon Crete as belonging to Asia, unless we are to conceive that he had in mind the fact that Phoenix or Agenor, father of Phoenix and Cadmus and grand-father of Europa, was king of Phoenicia. To these three, which are also

40 οὗτοι οὖν ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωσι, δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι, 524
ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ, ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδῷ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων
νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας
Ῥαδάμανθους κρινεῖ, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης Αἰακός·
Μίνω δὲ πρεσβεία δώσω ἐπιδιακρίνειν, εἰς ἀπορήτόν τι
45 τὼ ἐτέρω, ἵνα ὡς δικαιοτάτῃ ἡ κρίσις ᾗ περὶ τῆς πορείας
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις."

LXXX. Ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ὦ Καλλίκεις, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὺς
πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι **b**
λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὧν, ὡς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτων διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς
5 καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων· ἐπειδὰν δὲ διαλυθῇτον
ἄρα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, οὐ πολὺ ἥττον ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν ἔχει τὴν

523 mentioned by Dem. *de Cor.* (xviii.)
^e 127, the Attic hero Triptolemus is added in *Apol.* 41 a.

524 40. ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι: Socrates is
^a thinking of the 'asphodel meadow' of Hom. *λ* 539, 573. According to Homer, it seems to have stretched through the whole of Hades, and to have been the abiding place of the shades. Cf. *ω* 13 αἴψα δ' ἵκοντο κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα | ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἶδωλα καμόντων. Plato places it at the entrance of Hades.

41. ἐν τῷ τριόδῳ: expegetical ap-
position according to the σχῆμα καθ'
ἕλον καὶ μέρος. For the matter, cf.
Verg. *Aen.* vi. 540 hic locus est,
partis ubi se via findit in
ambas: | dextera quae Ditis
magni sub moenia tendit, |
hac iter Elysium nobis; ac
laeva malorum | exercet poe-
nas et ad impia Tartara mit-
tit.—τὼ ὁδῷ: the fem. dual of the
art. does not occur in Attic. See H.
272 a, Meisterhans,² 46, 17 e.

44. ἐπιδιακρίνειν: "to give the final
verdict." The office here assigned to
Minos is not the same which Homer
(*λ* 568) makes him fill. Cf. 526 d.

45. περὶ τῆς πορείας: not concern-
ing their course on earth, but as
to whether they shall take the road
to Tartarus or that to the Isles of the
Blessed. Cf. *Phaedo* 107 d ἐν ἀρχῇ
τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.

LXXX. 2 ff. The conclusions which **b**
are drawn from the story here nar-
rated do not begin until d below,
ἐπειδὰν οὖν. The intervening state-
ments contain supplementary matter,
which is drawn by very easy deduc-
tions, partly from philosophy, partly
from experience.

3. ὁ θάνατος κτέ.: cf. *Phaedo* 64 c
εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ
τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ
σῶμα γεγενῆσθαι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ
τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείσαν αὐτὴν καθ'
αὐτὴν εἶναι.

6. οὐ πολὺ ἥττον: would lead us
to expect something like ἢ ὅτε ἔζη.

ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ, ἦνπερ καὶ ὅτε ἔζη ὁ ἄνθρωπος, τό τε σῶμα
τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰ θεραπεύματα καὶ τὰ παθή-
ματα ἔνδηλα πάντα. οἷον εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα ^c
10 φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ζῶντος, τούτου καὶ ἐπειδὴν
ἀποθάνῃ ὁ νεκρὸς μέγας, καὶ εἰ παχύ, παχὺς καὶ ἀπο-
θανόντος, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως· καὶ εἰ αὖ ἐπετήδευε κομᾶν,
κομήτης τούτου καὶ ὁ νεκρός. μαστιγίας αὖ εἴ τις ἦν καὶ
ἰχνη εἶχε τῶν πληγῶν οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἢ ὑπὸ μαστί-
15 γων ἢ ἄλλων τραυμάτων ζῶν, καὶ τεθνεῶτος τὸ σῶμα
ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ταῦτα ἔχον· (καὶ) κατεαγότα εἴ του ἦν μέλη ἢ
διεστραμμένα ζῶντος, καὶ τεθνεῶτος ταῦτα ἔνδηλα. ἐνὶ ^d
δὲ λόγῳ, οἷος εἶναι παρεσκεύαστο τὸ σῶμα ζῶν, ἔνδηλα
ταῦτα καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τινα

524 The transition to the rel. clause is caused by the expression ἔχει τὴν ἔξιν.

7. ἔξιν: by *ἐξίς* is to be understood the general appearance and condition which a body assumes in virtue of its inner nature, not that nature itself, and not a condition due solely to external agencies. Cf. *Theaet.* 153 b. — ἦνπερ κτέ.: on the omission of the verb, see Kr. 62, 4, 1; H. 613. — τό τε σῶμα κτέ.: the correlative member follows in a different form in *d* ταῦτον δὴ μοι κτέ. The reason for the change lies in the long-drawn-out οἷον clause, through which the speaker loses the construction.

8. θεραπεύματα, παθήματα: the marks borne by the body are divided into two classes from the point of view of subject and object. See on παθήματα in *d* below. On the -μα termination, see G. 129, 4; H. 553, 1.

10. ἀμφοτέρα: see on 477 d.

12. κομᾶν: to wear the hair long, somewhat after the fashion of the Spartans, was customary at Athens

only up to the age of the Ephebus, 524 with the exception of such men as from their rank (*ἱππεῖς*), or love of display, chose thus to adorn themselves. Hair cut quite short, however, was considered ἀνδραποδώδης θρίξ. See *Herm. Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 23.

14. οὐλὰς: as the explanation ἰχνη . . . πληγῶν shows, this word denotes not the fresh wounds (*ώτειλαί*), but the scars which remained after they had healed.

17 f. ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ: sc. εἰπεῖν, like *ὡς δ* συνελόντι εἰπεῖν. See on 462 b.

18. τὸ σῶμα: in regard to body. Constr. with οἷος εἶναι, which depends upon παρεσκεύαστο (*he had formed himself*). So also the middle with the inf. in 507 d, 511 b.

19 ταῦτα: though referring generally to the preceding clause, is used according to the constructio ad sensum, inasmuch as the traces are meant; so that ἢ πάντα κτέ. very readily follows it.

19 f. ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον: more indefi-

20 χρόνον. ταῦτόν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἄρα καὶ περὶ τὴν
 ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὧ Καλλίκλεις· ἔνδηλα πάντα ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ
 ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὰν γυμνωθῇ τοῦ σώματος, τὰ τε τῆς φύσεως
 καὶ τὰ παθήματα, ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἐκάστου πράγ-
 ματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἀφί-
 25 κωνταῖ παρὰ τὸν δικαστήν, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας παρὰ τὸν
 Ῥαδάμανθυν, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθυσ ἐκείνους ἐπιστήσας θεᾶται
 ἐκάστου τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ εἰδὼς ὅτου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις
 τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ἐπιλαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὅτουοῦν
 βασιλέως ἢ δυνάστου κατείδεν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν τῆς ψυχῆς,

524 nite than *Phaedo* 80 c, where Socrates
 d says of the same thing ἐπιεικῶς συχ-
 νὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον.

20. ταῦτόν δὴ κτέ.: the analogy of the soul with the body is discussed first in a general way, and then as far as possible worked out in details.

22. τὰ τῆς φύσεως: see on 450 c, 453 e.

23. τὰ παθήματα: in stating (above, b) the condition of the body, when separated from the soul, Socrates (Plato) uses the expression *θεραπεύματα καὶ παθήματα*. Here, referring to the soul, he uses *παθήματα* alone. At the basis of this variation seems to lie some such theory as the following: The human body is susceptible of improvement, by care and training; this care must be exerted by the man himself; hence *θεραπεύματα* are the results of this care. On the other hand, a lack of care will subject the body to the evil effect of outside evil influences, and thereby to deterioration; *παθήματα* are the results of this outside influence. The soul is not susceptible of improvement, being perfect at the outset; but lack of care will, just as in the case of the body, subject the

soul to the influence of outside forces. 524
 There is therefore no place for *θερα-* d
πεύματα when speaking of the soul.

24. ἔσχεν: see on 503 e, 519 d.—
 ἐπειδὰν οὖν: Socrates resumes his story where he had broken off at the conclusion of ch. LXXIX.

25. οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας: an example of distributive apposition. See on 450 c, 503 d. The correlative second member is simply indicated in 526 c by the words *ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα κτέ.*

26. ἐπιστήσας: "he halts them." e
 They would probably otherwise go their own way.

27. ὅτου ἐστίν: see on 447 d.

28. τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως: why just this example is chosen, is seen from what is said in 470 e.—ἐπιλαβόμενος: see on 519 a.

29. κατείδεν: another case of 'gnomic aorist,' which gives a certain degree of liveliness to the recital. So εἶδεν, ἀπέπεμψεν. See on 484 a.—οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὄν κτέ.: the following passage can be traced in Tac. *Ann.* vi. 6 neque frustra prae-stantissimus sapientiae firmare solitus est, si recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse aspicì laniatus et ictus, quando

30 ἀλλὰ διαμεμαστιγωμένην καὶ οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιιορκιῶν
καὶ ἀδικίας, ἃ ἐκάστη ἢ πράξις αὐτοῦ ἐξωμόρξατο εἰς τὴν 525
ψυχὴν, καὶ πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας καὶ
οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἄνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι· καὶ ὑπὸ
ἐξουσίας καὶ τρυφῆς καὶ ὕβρεως καὶ ἀκρατίας τῶν πρά-
35 ξεων ἀσυμμετρίας τε καὶ αἰσχροτόητος γέμουσαν τὴν ψυ-
χὴν εἶδεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ἀτίμως ταύτην ἀπέπεμψεν εὐθὺ τῆς
φρουρᾶς, οἳ μέλλει ἐλθοῦσα ἀνατλήναι τὰ προσήκοντα
πάθῃ.

LXXXI. Προσῆκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ὃ
ἄλλου ὁρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίνεσθαι καὶ ὀνί-
νασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι

524 ut corpora verberibus, ita
e saevitia, libidine, malis con-
sultis animus dilaceretur.

30. διαμεμαστιγωμένην: after the analogy of the body, which belongs to a μαστιγίας (cf. above in e). Likewise σκολιὰ καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ corresponds to διεστραμμένα, and καὶ . . . εἶδεν may also have some connexion with παχύς above e.

525 31. α: refers to both the previously
a named conditions; see on ταῦτα above, d. Socrates shows us the immoral condition of the soul under three aspects: 1. The vital principle of morality is δικαιοσύνη, hence ἀδικία is placed first. Beside this, as its worst form, stands perjury, the punishment of which after death was assumed even in the Homeric age; cf. Γ 278, T 259 Ἐρινύες, αἱ θ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν | ἀνθρώ-
πους τίνυνται ὃ τις κ' ἐπ' ἴστρον ὁμόσση. ἀδικία accordingly corrupts the very nature itself of the soul. 2. The natural development of the soul depends upon its knowledge of the truth. Lies restrict that development, and hence warp and twist the soul. This image

at the same time corresponds to the 525
familiar view of the nature of truth. a

3. Since the activity of the soul is from within outwards, there is need of fixed, definite limits. If this quality — σωφροσύνη — is lacking, or rather if it lapses into ἀκολασία, which according to its surrounding conditions appears as ἐξουσία, τρυφή, and ὕβρις (ἀκρατία is a general term, applicable to all forms), then the proper relation between the separate parts of the soul is destroyed, and its form as a whole becomes unsymmetrical and ugly. One naturally thinks of the extension which the ἐπιθυμίας strive for.

36. ἀτίμως: corresponds to the ἀτίμια imposed by earthly judges. — εὐθὺ τῆς φρουρᾶς: for the gen., see G. 182, 2, and on 486 a.

LXXXI. 1. προσῆκει κτέ.: the
purpose of the punishment deter-
b mines also its measure. To the consideration of this point, Socrates now turns.

2. τιμωρουμένῳ: the passive of the middle. See H. 499 a; Kr. 52, 10, 11.

3. ἢ παραδείγματι κτέ.: in this

ὁρῶντες πάσχοντα ἂν ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους
 5 γίνωνται. εἰσὶν δὲ οἱ μὲν ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην
 διδόντες ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὔτοι, οἱ ἂν ἰάσιμα
 ἁμαρτήματα ἁμάρτωσιν· ὅμως δὲ δι' ἀλγηδόνων καὶ ὀδυ-
 νῶν γίγνεται αὐτοῖς ἡ ὠφελία καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν ᾿Αιδου·
 οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄλλως ἀδικίας ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. οἱ δ' ἂν
 10 τὰ ἔσχατα ἀδικήσωσι καὶ διὰ τοιαῦτα ἀδικήματα ἀνίατοι
 γένωνται, ἐκ τούτων τὰ παραδείγματα γίγνεται, καὶ οὔτοι
 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὐκέτι ὀνίνανται οὐδέν, ἅτε ἀνίατοι ὄντες, ἄλλοι
 δὲ ὀνίνανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέ-
 γιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας
 15 τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ

⁵²⁵
 b also, as is shown by what follows, the object is improvement, but of others rather than the one punished. The terror-theory is put in the mouth of the Sophist in the *Protagoras*, who says *Prot.* 324 b ὁ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρελθυθότος ἔνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αἰθεὶς ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα. Plato's theory concerning the punishments of the lower world implies, though it does not expressly mention, the doctrine of the wandering habits of souls which he expounds in other treatises. For the dat., cf. 479 e, and see G. 136, x. 3; H. 941.

4. φοβούμενοι: because fear leads to reflection, reflection to more correct views, which result in avoidance of evil and corrupt moral habits.

5. ὠφελούμενοί τε καὶ δίκην διδόντες: the second partic. is logically subordinate to the first ("by undergoing"), though formally co-ordinate. See on 460 d. The correla-

tive to οἱ μὲν κτέ. is οἱ δ' ἂν κτέ., in ⁵²⁵
 e, which assumes that form on account of his proximity to οἱ ἂν ἰάσιμα
 b κτέ.

10. ἀνίατοι: since wrong-doing c strikes at the very nature of the soul, the soul becomes more or less injured with every new evil deed. And indeed it may go so far in the path of wickedness as to be at last incapable of turning back; that is, it may become incurable. Cf. *Phaedo* 113 e οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων κτέ. We must note, however, that the punishment is not determined according to the evil acts as such,—these the judge may not even know,—but by the condition of the soul as brought about by them.

11. τὰ παραδείγματα: the art. is employed on account of the previous mention of this in b, as a result to be gained.

15. παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους: as we are accustomed to hang up warnings that the passer-by may think over them carefully.

ἐν ᾿Αιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς αἰὲ τῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνου-
 μένοις θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα. ὦν ἐγὼ φημι ἓνα καὶ α
 Ἀρχέλαον ἔσεσθαι, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει Πῶλος, καὶ ἄλλον
 ὅστις ἂν τοιοῦτος τύραννος ᾗ· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς
 20 εἶναι τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἐκ τυράννων καὶ βασι-
 λέων καὶ δυναστῶν καὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πραξάντων γεγονό-
 τας· οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
 τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνουσι. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις καὶ
 Ὅμηρος· βασιλέας γὰρ καὶ δυνάστας ἐκεῖνος πεποίηκεν
 25 τοὺς ἐν ᾿Αιδου τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον τιμωρουμένους, Τάνταλον e
 καὶ Σίσυφον καὶ Τιτυόν· Θερσίτην δέ, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος
 πονηρὸς ᾗν ἰδιώτης, οὐδεὶς πεποίηκεν μεγάλας τιμωρίας
 συνεχόμενον ὡς ἀνίατον· οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐξῆν αὐτῷ· διὸ
 καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ᾗν ἢ οἷς ἐξῆν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Καλλι-

525 16. ἐν ᾿Αιδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ:
 c both expressions are placed side by
 side by the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος.

17. θεάματα καὶ νουθετήματα: the
 second substantive gives the design
 of the first.

d 18. Ἀρχέλαον: cf. 470 d-471 d.

20 f. εἶναι . . . γεγονότας: parti-
 cipial periphrasis. See Kr. 56, 3, 3,
 and crit. note on 510 b.

21. δυναστῶν: men possessed of
 power, not merely in monarchical
 and oligarchical, but also in demo-
 cratical states; hence the addition of
 the explanation with καί. Cf. 479 a,
 524 e, 526 b and see on 492 b. Be-
 low (30) in the same sense we find
 ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων.

22. διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν: cf. above, 525 a.
 The expression very forcibly reminds
 us of the representations of Polus and
 Callicles, when praising what they con-
 ceived to be the highest happiness.

23. τούτοις: "to these statements,"
 "to this view of the matter."

25 f. Τάνταλον, Σίσυφον, Τιτυόν: 525
 cf. Hom. λ 576-600. All three were
 rulers: Tantalus, the founder of the
 house of the Pelopidae, was king in
 Sipylus; Sisyphus, in Corinth; Ti-
 tyus, in Euboea. Thersites was a bad
 and despicable man, but his sphere
 of action was limited and he experi-
 enced rough treatment even during
 his lifetime; B 211-277.

28. ἐξῆν: sc. τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοσιώ-
 τατα ἁμαρτήματα ἁμαρτάνειν. This was
 the reason why Thersites was not
 held to be ἀνίατος.

29. εὐδαιμονέστερος: Socrates here
 expresses himself with less exact-
 ness than in 473 c.—ἀλλὰ γάρ: for,
 you see. The clause thus introduced
 serves a two-fold purpose. It ex-
 presses more plainly and definitely
 what had already been implied above,
 and it paves the way, by the words
 καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροί, for the new
 thought which begins with οὐδὲ
 μὴν.

30 κλεις, ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ
 γιγνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι· οὐδὲν μὴν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τούτοις 526
 ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἐγγίγνεσθαι, καὶ σφόδρα γε ἄξιον ἀγα-
 σθαι τῶν γιγνομένων· χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ
 πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν γενό-
 35 μενον δικάιως διαβιῶναι. ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι·
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἔσον-
 ται καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν τοῦ δικαίως b
 διαχειρίζειν ἃ ἂν τις ἐπιτρέπῃ· εἰς δὲ καὶ πάννυ ἐλλόγιμος
 γέγονε καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλληνας, Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσι-
 40 μάχου· οἱ δὲ πολλοί, ὦ ἄριστε, κακοὶ γίνονται τῶν δυνα-
 στῶν.

LXXXII. Ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον, ἐπειδὴν ὁ Ῥαδάμανθους
 ἐκεῖνος τοιοῦτόν τινα λάβῃ, ἄλλο μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἶδεν
 οὐδέν, οὐθ' ὅστις οὐθ' ὠντινων, ὅτι δὲ πονηρὸς τις· καὶ

525 30. καί: "also." Is closely con-
 e nected with τῶν δυναμένων.

526 32 f. ἀγασθαι τῶν γιγνομένων: cf.
 a 482 d οὐκ ἄγμαι Πῶλον. The acc. is
 rare and states simply the obj.; the
 gen. gives the cause, and may be a
 person or a thing. With the person
 is generally found either a participial
 or an adverbial clause. See H. 784.

33. γιγνομένων: after ἐγγίγνεσθαι,
 as *Crito* 44 d ἐργάζεσθαι after ἐξεργά-
 ζεσθαι, is quite in accordance with the
 customary usage. — χαλεπὸν γάρ: in
 our admiration for the 'self-made'
 man we forget that he has had every
 incentive to rise, while we withhold
 our sympathy from fallen greatness,
 which has had every temptation to
 fall.

35. ὀλίγοι: as also οἱ σφόδρα πονη-
 ροί. The most stand in the mean,
 according to *Phaedo* 90 a, b οἷε τι
 σπανιώτερον εἶναι ἢ σφόδρα μέγαν ἢ

σφόδρα σμικρὸν ἐξευρεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἢ 526
 κύνα ἢ ἕλλο ὅτιοῦν; ἢ αὖ αἰσχρὸν ἢ a
 καλὸν κτέ.;

37 f. τὴν τοῦ διαχειρίζειν: notice b
 the expegetical gen. See on 521 a.

38. α . . . ἐπιτρέπῃ: sc. power or
 property, or whatever it be. Plato is
 probably thinking of Aristides' posi-
 tion as general of the confederate
 army during the war against the
 Persians and as one of the founders
 of the Delian league, by which espe-
 cially he gained his reputation for
 probity. Cf. *Plut. Arist.* especially
 ch. XXIII.-XXV. The καὶ before εἰς
 has almost the force of "and that,
 too."

LXXXII. 1. ὅπερ οὖν ἔλεγον:
 goes back to 524 e.

3. οὐθ' ὅστις κτέ.: sc. as was the
 case in life, when the name of the
 man was followed by the name of
 his father to indicate his family.

τοῦτο κατιδὼν ἀπέπεμψε εἰς Τάρταρον, ἐπισημηνάμενος,
 5 ἑάν τε ἰάσιμος ἑάν τε ἀνιάτος δοκῇ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ ἐκέισε c
 ἀφικόμενος τὰ προσήκοντα πάσχει. ἐνίστε δ' ἄλλην εἰσ-
 ιδὼν ὁσίως βεβιωκυῖαν καὶ μετ' ἀληθείας, ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου,
 ἣ ἄλλου τινός, μάλιστα μὲν, ἔγωγέ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις,
 φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονή-
 10 σαντος ἐν τῇ βίῳ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ ἐς μακάρων νήσους
 ἀπέπεμψε. ταῦτα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Αἰακός· ἐκάτερος δὲ
 τούτων ῥάβδον ἔχων δικάζει· ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν
 κάθεται, μόνος ἔχων χρυσοῦν σκῆπτρον, ὥς φησιν Ὀδυσ-
 σεὺς ὁ Ὀμήρου ἰδεῖν αὐτὸν d

15 χρύσειον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιστεύοντα νέκυσσι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν λόγων
 πέπεισμαι, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανοῦμαι τῇ κριτῇ ὥς

526 4. ἐπισημηνάμενος: in accordance
 b with the results of his scrutiny, the
 judge puts upon him a mark and thus
 decides his fate. Cf. *Rep.* x. 614 c
 σημεία περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων,
 —also of the judges of the dead.

c 6 f. ἄλλην κτέ.: the omission of
 ψυχὴν is so harsh that Heindorf in-
 serts it — but unnecessarily — after ἣ
 ἄλλου τινός. These latter words form
 with what follows (μάλιστα μὲν instead
 of ἣ, “whether philosopher or not,
 but especially,” etc.) an explanatory
 apposition to the general idea, ἰδιώτου.

7. μετ' ἀληθείας: cf. the opposite
 description in 525 a above.

9. τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος: ‘to attend
 to one’s own business,’ was for a Greek
 to be both σώφρων and δίκαιος. That
 this did not, however, exclude him
 from taking interest in other people’s
 lives is shown by Socrates’ words in
Apol. 33 a τὰ ἑμαντοῦ πράττοντος. The

contrary of this phrase is πολυπραγ- 526
 μονεῖν, “to meddle officiously with, c
 and to attack unreasonably the rights
 of others.” Cf. *Apol.* 31 c.

12. ῥάβδον ἔχων: the staff was the
 badge of public authority, and was
 borne by heralds, seers, priests, gen-
 erals, and others, but especially by
 judges. Cf. *Dem. de Cor.* (xviii.) 210
 καὶ παραλαμβάνειν γε ἅμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ
 καὶ τῇ συμβόλῳ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ τῆς πό-
 λεως νομίζειν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν δεῖ. Also
 σκῆπτρον (from σκῆπτεσθαι, to lean on,
 ρ 199) had originally this value; e.g.
 A 234 ff., β 37, but became later the
 name for the badge of a ruler alone.

15. The quotation is from *Hom.* d
 λ 569.

17. ἀποφανοῦμαι: the simple φα-
 νοῦμαι is always middle, in the sense
 “appear”; the compound ἀπο- is
 almost always transitive or active in
 sense, “present,” “show.”

ὕγιεστάτην τὴν ψυχὴν· χαίρειν οὖν ἑάσας τὰς τιμὰς τὰς
 τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀλήθειαν σκοπῶν πειράσομαι
 20 τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι βέλτιστος ὢν καὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐπειδὰν
 ἀποθνήσκω ἀποθνήσκειν. παρακαλῶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
 πάντας ἀνθρώπους, καθ' ὅσον δύνamai, καὶ δὴ καὶ σὲ
 ἀντιπαρακαλῶ ἐπὶ τοῦτον τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον,
 ὃν ἐγὼ φημι ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀγώνων εἶναι, καὶ
 25 ὀνειδίζω σοι, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει σαυτῷ βοηθηῆσαι, ὅταν
 ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ἦν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ
 ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης ὑόν, ἐπειδάν
 σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἄγῃ, χασμήσει καὶ εἰλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν
 ἦττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σὲ ἴσως τυπτήσῃ τις καὶ
 30 ἐπὶ κόρρῃς ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακίῃ.

LXXXIII. Τάχα δ' οὖν ταῦτα μῦθός σοι δοκεῖ λέγε-
 σθαι ὥσπερ γραὸς καὶ καταφρονεῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐδέν γ'
 ἂν ᾦν θαυμαστὸν καταφρονεῖν τούτων, εἴ πῃ ζητοῦντες
 εἴχομεν αὐτῶν βελτίω καὶ ἀληθέστερα εὐρεῖν· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς,
 5 ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οὔπερ σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλή-

526 23. ἀντιπαρακαλῶ: with reference
 e to 521 a and 485 e ff. — τὸν ἀγῶνα:
 brings up before us at once the public
 games, at which a prize was awarded.
 The name is quite applicable to the
 progress of human life, which is really
 a contest between different systems as
 practised by different men. Cf. the
 passage from *Phaedo* quoted on 527 e.
 But a judicial trial was also called
 ἀγών, and such a one awaits every
 man at the last judgment. Cf. *Apol.*
 34 e εἰ δὲ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουὶ τοῦ
 ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη.

25. ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσει κτέ.: cor-
 responds closely to the objections
 urged by Callicles in 486 a, b, νῦν γὰρ
 εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος κτέ. In what fol-
 lows, the words καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρῃς ex-

press even an augmentation of the
 e insult.

LXXXIII. 2. ὥσπερ γραὸς: cf.
 the proverb ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕβρις
Theaet. 176 b. So also in Latin, Ger-
 man, and English. Cf. *Hor. Sat.* ii. 6.
 77 Cervius haec inter vicinus
 garrit anilis | ex re fabellas.

4. ἀληθέστερα: of course in com-
 parison with other views which can
 show less claim to truth. Cf. 493 d.
 Grades of truth are conceivable as
 steps in that approximation to the
 perfect truth which abides with God.
 This approximation is nothing more or
 less than knowledge, which has the
 stronger claim to be considered truth
 the better foundation it has.

5. σοφώτατοί ἐστε: such (ironi-

νων, σύ τε καὶ Πῶλος καὶ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδείξαι, **b**
 ὡς δεῖ ἄλλον τινὰ βίον ζῆν ἢ τοῦτον, ὅσπερ καὶ ἐκείσε
 φαίνεται συμφέρων. ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις τῶν ἄλλων
 ἐλεγχομένων μόνος οὗτος ἡρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον
 10 ἐστὶν τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλ-
 λον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ
 εἶναι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ τι κακὸς
 γίγνηται, κολαστέος ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν μετὰ
 τὸ εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι **c**
 15 δίκην· καὶ πᾶσαν κολακείαν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν
 περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ περὶ ὀλίγους καὶ περὶ πολλούς,
 φευκτέον· καὶ τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὕτω χρηστέον ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον
 αἰεὶ, καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ πράξει.

Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἱ ἀφικό-
 20 μενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὡς ὁ λόγος
 σημαίνει. καὶ ἕασόν τινά σου καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνοήτου
 καὶ προπηλακίσαι, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία σύ γε **d**

527 cal) flattery was submitted to by the

a Sophists the more easily since mod-
 esty did not prevent them from ap-
 plying this epithet to themselves.
Cf. Prot. 337 d, where Hippias says
 ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχρὸν τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν
 πραγμάτων εἰδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας
 τῶν Ἑλλήνων κτέ.

b 7. ἐκείσε: like ἐκεῖ, of life beyond
 the grave; opposed to ἐνθάδε 525 b.
 The terminus in quem is used,
 inasmuch as the effect is meant, which
 reaches even to the beyond.

9. ἡρεμεῖ: "stands fast and im-
 movable against all attacks."

11. οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν κτέ.: as Aeschylus
 makes the messenger of Amphiaraus
 say in *Sept. c. Theb.* 592 οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν
 ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει. These words,
 as is well known, were applied by

the Athenians to Aristides. *Plut.* 527
Arist. iii. fin. The two modes of life
 discussed admit of distinction accord-
 ing to appearance and reality.

14. τὸ γίγνεσθαι: sc. δίκαιον. **c**

17. ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον: expegetic to
 οὕτω.

19. ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος: begins the
 conclusion, which is peculiarly pa-
 thetic.—ἐνταῦθα: "in the direction
 of the attainment of our own perfec-
 tion." See on ἐκείσε above in **b**.
Cf. Apol. 36 c ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ᾔα, οἱ
 ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἑμαυτῷ ἔμελλον
 μηδὲν ὕψελος εἶναι. For the adverb of
 'place where' with a verb of motion,
 see on 456 b.

20 f. ὡς . . . σημαίνει: cf. 511 b.

22 f. σύ γε θαρρῶν: thrown in with **d**
 emphasis, because what follows in-

- θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην πληγὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι ᾗς καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, ἀσκῶν ἀρε-
- 25 τήν. καῖπειτα οὕτω κοινῇ ἀσκήσαντες, τότε ἤδη, ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι, ἐπιθησόμεθα τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἣ ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ, τότε βουλευσόμεθα, βελτίους ὄντες βουλευέσθαι ἢ νῦν. αἰσχυρὸν γὰρ ἔχοντάς γε ὥς νῦν φαινόμεθα ἔχειν, ἔπειτα νεανιεύεσθαι ὥς τι ὄντας, οἷς οὐδέποτε ταῦτα δοκεῖ
- 30 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· εἰς τοσοῦτον ἤκομεν ἀπαιδευσίας· ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι τῷ λόγῳ χρῆσόμεθα τῷ νῦν παραφανέντι, ὃς ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἀριστος τοῦ βίου, τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἀσκούντας καὶ ζῆν καὶ τεθνάναι. τούτῳ
- 35 οὖν ἐπώμεθα, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παρακαλῶμεν, μὴ ἐκείνῳ ᾧ σὺ πιστεύων ἐμὲ παρακαλεῖς· ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιος, ὧ Καλλίκλεις.

527 flicts the deepest disgrace, πατάξαι.

d With πατάξαι the repetition in thought of *ἑασόν τινα* is the easiest construction. On the common object of the three infs., see on 493 c *soi*.

23. τὴν ἄτιμον ταύτην κτέ.: says Socrates, with reference to 527 a and 486 c.

23 f. οὐδὲν γὰρ δεινὸν πείσει: external rough treatment will not affect the real man.

25. καῖπειτα: refers to ἀσκῶν, but it is more exactly defined by οὕτω . . . ἀσκήσαντες. — τότε ἤδη: emphatic position. The addition ἐὰν δοκῇ χρῆναι indicates that they may then find something more important to do.

26. ἐπιθησόμεθα κτέ.: cf. 521 d. This is the answer to Callicles' advice in 484 c ff. On the other hand,

ὅποιον ἂν τι ἡμῖν δοκῇ can serve for 527 Polus. Cf. 466 c ff. d

27. τότε: explained by βελτίους κτέ.

28. ὥς . . . ἔχειν: a polite expression which can hardly be misunderstood by those present.

31. ἀπαιδευσίας: in contrast to the παιδεία on which Callicles and Polus prided themselves. See on 461 b, c. — ὥσπερ οὖν ἡγεμόνι: the λόγος is treated as a living being, to whose guidance one can trust himself. It is the principle from which all other moral regulations proceed.

33. οὗτος: finds its explanation in καὶ . . . τεθνάναι.

34 f. For the conclusion, cf. *Phaedo* 114 c ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα χρὴ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν πᾶν ποιεῖν, ὥστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀθλον καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ μεγάλῳ.

CRITICAL APPENDIX.

EDITIONS.

a. COMPLETE EDITIONS OF PLATO.

The following are the most important:—

Platonis Opera quae extant omnia ex nova Ioannis Serrani interpretatione.

Henrici Stephani de quorundam locorum interpretatione iudicium, et multorum contextus Graeci emendatio. 3 voll. Folio. Paris, 1578.

(The pages of this edition, divided into paragraphs (a, b, c, d, e), have been adopted as a standard of reference in later editions.)

Platonis Dialogi (Gr. et Lat.) ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 8 voll. Bero-
lini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation
of Mss.)

*Platonis Opera Omnia rec., prolegg. et comm. illustr. Godofredus Stall-
baum.* 10 voll. Lipsiae, 1827–1877.

*Platonis Dialogi secundum Thrasylli tetralogias dispositi. Ex rec. C. F.
Hermann.* 6 voll. Lipsiae, 1851–53.

*Platonis Opera quae feruntur omnia ad codices denuo collatos ed. Marti-
nus Schanz.* Lipsiae, 1875–.

b. SEPARATE EDITIONS OF THE GORGIAS.

The following are the principal more recent editions of the *Gorgias*
alone:—

Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Heinrich Kratz. Stuttgart, 1864.

The Gorgias of Plato, with notes by Theodore D. Woolsey. Revised edi-
tion. Hartford, 1869 (reprint of the ed. of 1848).

The Gorgias of Plato, with English Notes, Introduction, and Appendix.
By W. H. Thompson. London, 1871.

*Platonis Gorgias, emendatus atque illustratus nec non prolegomenis et in-
dice instructus. Edidit R. B. Hirschig.* Traiecti ad Rhenum, 1873.

Platos Ausgewählte Dialoge. Erklärt von C. Schmelzer. Zweiter
Band, *Gorgias.* Berlin, 1883.

*Platons Gorgias. Erklärt von Julius Deuschle. Vierte Auflage, bearbeitet
von C. W. J. Cron.* Leipzig, 1886. (This edition is the basis of
the present work.)

In addition to the complete translation by Jowett may be mentioned the scholarly work —

Plato's Gorgias, literally translated. By E. M. Cope. London, 1883.

CRITICAL NOTES.

In the notes which follow, the first reading is that of the present edition; the second, the variant, — usually the reading of Schanz in his edition of 1881 (*Platonis Opera*, vol. viii., Lipsiae), or of the Mss. which his investigations have shown to have the most weight, *viz.* the Bodleianus or Clarkianus B ('second hand,' b), or the Venetian T ('second hand,' t). Other manuscripts sometimes cited are classed generally as cod. or codd., including those designated by Schanz as 'apographa.'

TITLE. In the Mss. we find the following addition: ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς. ἀνατρεπτικός. Schanz brackets the last word.

447 a. καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν: is bracketed by S, following Cobet. Hirschig also *ad loc.* gives weighty reasons for the omission of the words. They may readily have crept in from a marginal gloss on κατόπιν . . . ἤκομεν, but a little fullness at the opening of the dialogue is not out of place.

447 b. καὶ: before ἐπιδίδεσθαι is bracketed by S, to make the connexion close with ὅταν βούλησθε, — a case of unnecessary accuracy.

447 d. ἀποκρίνεσθαι: B T. ἀποκρινεῖσθαι S after cod. and Coræes. But the customary tense in advertisements is the present.

448 b. τί δὲ τοῦτο: Cron, Kr. (62, 3, 11), and others supply ἐστίν instead of διαφέρει.

448 b. τίνα: B T. τί Cron following S, Buttmann, and Olympiodorus. It is true that the shift from τίνα to δπερ is harsh; but in view of the employment of τίνα with ἐκαλοῦμεν and καλοῦμεν it is better to retain the masculine. A more obvious emendation would be δνπερ for δπερ.

448 c. ἡρῃμέναι: S. εἰρῃμέναι B T. But in 514 d, B shows ἡδρίσκομεν. See on ἡρῃκέναι 459 c below. — On the Gorgianic peculiarities of this passage, cf. Volkmann, *Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer*, c. 38; Blass, *Att. Bered.*² i. 68 ff.; *Rhet. Graeci* ed. Spengel, especially vol. iii. In later times it became common to ascribe all kinds of rhetorical figures to the invention of Gorgias. Cf. Suid. Γοργίας: οὗτος πρῶτος τῷ ῥητορικῷ εἶδει τῆς παιδείας δύναμιν τε φραστικὴν καὶ τέχνην ἔδωκε, τροπαῖς τε καὶ μεταφοραῖς καὶ ἀλληγορίαις καὶ ὑπαλλαγαῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι καὶ ἀναδιπλώσεσι καὶ ἐπαναλήψεσι καὶ ἀποστροφαῖς καὶ παρισώσεσιν ἐχρήσατο.

448 e. μάλα γε: the eds. μάλα S (B T ?).

448 e. ἡρώτα: S following Bekker. ἐρωτᾷ B T.

449 b. ἀλλ' ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖ (ὑπισχνεῖ b): S. ὅπερ ὑπισχνῇ B T. If there is no gap after ἀποθέσθαι, we should naturally expect ὅπερ ἂν ὑπισχνῇ — a reading which is advocated by Morstadt. In any case, however, such an admonition to Gorgias, before he has had time to answer the question ἀρ' οὖν ἐθελήσας ἂν κτέ., is extremely harsh, and renders it probable that a reply of Gorgias has fallen out. For this reason, S supposes a gap before ὅπερ, and adopts the reading of b as given in the text. Cron reads ὑπισχνεῖ without the gap.

449 c. ὦν φημι: Cron, Hirschig, etc. ὦν φημί S, Thompson, etc.

449 c. μῆδένα ἂν . . . εἰπεῖν: the use of μῆ with the inf. even after verbs of saying was probably original, but the οὐ drove μῆ almost completely out. Examples are given in GMT. 685 *fin.*, and the whole subject is discussed by Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* i. 48 ff. In addition to this passage, cited on p. 49, n. 3, Professor Gildersleeve would now add *Rep.* vi. 497 b.

449 d. οὕτως: T S. οὕτω B Cron.

450 a. ἐλέγομεν: cod. Heindorf, S. λέγομεν B T.

450 d. πεττευτική: B T. παιδευτική (or πιστευτική) Richter. — Olympiodorus explains the equality of ἔργον and λόγον in the πεττεία as follows: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥίπτειν τὰς ψήφους (prob. equiv. to κύβος or πεττός) καὶ ἐπιλέγουσί τινα οἶον σ' ἐ' δ' ἢ τριέκτα ἥ τι τοιοῦτον. This would seem to indicate a game similar to our 'backgammon.' But that the λόγος element goes beyond this is seen from *Rep.* ii. 374 c πεττευτικός ἢ κυβευτικός ἰκανῶς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς γένοιτο μὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπισηδεῦον ἀλλὰ παρέργῳ χρώμενος, *Polit.* 292 c ἴσμεν γὰρ ὅτι χιλιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄκροι πεττευταὶ τοσοῦτοι (50) πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησιν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ποτε. In view of this and other considerations, Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 477 (1889), thinks the reference here is to a definite theory of the πεττεία. See also Cron, *Beitr.* 83 ff., and for a discussion of the details of the game, *Herm. Gr. Alter.*³ iv. § 55.

450 e. οὐχ ὅτι: The examples cited for this rare and exclusively Platonic construction are, besides this, *Prot.* 336 d Σωκράτη ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παίζει καὶ φησιν ἐπιλήσμων εἶναι, *Lys.* 220 a οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν, ὡς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχει, *Theaet.* 157 b τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. It is to be noticed that in *Lys.* 220 a alone the οὐχ ὅτι clause precedes. The sense, and also the feeling, is very closely given by the English, "not but that"; the other rendering, "although," fails to give the color. The common explanation is to supply some verb of saying, but that will not account for the second negative required. The question has been touched upon by Kratz in the appendix to his edition, by Münscher (*JJ.*, 1870), to whom Cron replies in *Beiträge*, 198 ff., and by Kühner, ii. 525, 4 b, who also recognizes the difficulty. Other scholars are inclined to look for the solution in the use of οὐ as a 'free negative.' The speaker anticipates the question, "Do you judge so, from the statements the party in question has made?" "No! because he actually said the contrary, in so many words."

450 e. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: cod. Heindorf, S. τοῖς λόγοις B T.

451 b. περιττόν: the word γυνῶσις, which follows in the Mss., is bracketed by S after Bekker.

451 b. ὅσα ἂν . . . τυγχάνῃ: B T. ὅσα . . . τυγχάνει S after Ast. But no specific combination of odd and even is thought of, but merely their general relations up to any magnitude. But see Kleist, *JJ*. cxxxix. 479, and critical note to 453 e.

451 d. τις: codd. S. τινῶν B T.

451 d. τί ἐστι: S after Heindorf. ἐστι B T: a case of 'haplography.'

451 d. οὗ: B T. ὃ S after Hirschig.

451 e. τὸ σκολιόν: the name was derived from σκολιός, *crooked, bent*, but variously explained. Some refer it to the order of succession of the singers, who alternated either around the table or in a zigzag across it; others, either to the air as compared with the solemn νόμος ὕρβιος, or to the verse-measure of the song, which, as the oldest kind of the especially logaedic μέλος, was thus named to distinguish it from the hexameter. Cf. Engelbrecht, *De Scoliorum Poesi*, and Gildersleeve, *Pindar*, I. E. xvi.

452 a. παιδοτρίβης: for the manner in which the distinction between παιδοτρίβης and γυμναστῆς gradually faded out, as well as the particulars of training of Greek youth, see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 36, p. 335 ff.; Grasberger, *Erziehung und Unterricht im klass. Alterthum*, i. p. 265 ff.

452 a. καὶ εἴποι: B T S. καὶ εἴποι ἂν Hirschig. But see note.

452 a. ὕγεια: is omitted by S following Hirschig. As the text stands, it is impossible to construe ὕγεια. But even with it omitted we are troubled by the following δέ, for which we should expect γάρ. Perhaps the true solution has not been reached. It might be possible to read ᾧ Σώκρατες; ὕγεια;

452 b. θαυμάζοιμι τᾶν: B T S. θαυμάζοιμι τᾶν Cron.

452 c. αὐτῷ: B. αὐτῷ T S.

452 e. For Anaximenes' views of oratory, cf. his *Ars Rhetorica*, ed. Spengel, c. 1.

453 a. πειθοῦς δημιουργός: the originator of this definition cannot be definitely fixed. Thompson quotes *Prolegomena ad Hermogenem*, where it is ascribed to Corax and Tisias, and Quint. ii. 15. 4, where Isocrates is credited with it.

453 b. ἐστίν (πειθῶ): S. ἐστιν T. ἐστὶ B, Cron.

453 c. καὶ ποῦ: B T. ἢ οὐ S after Deuschle. (Woolsey had previously made the same emendation in his edition of 1842.) These two words have given endless trouble to the editors, and occasioned numerous emendations, for which see Schanz's note. They seem genuine. In the first place, it is hard to explain how they got in, if they are not genuine. Then, they are read by one of the scholiasts, who makes an attempt to explain them with the words ἐν τῇ ποικίλῃ στοᾷ. With the Greeks especially, everything with name had to have local habitation. The way of fixing an individual was to

give his own name, his father's, and the place of abode. Socrates is here simply (unconsciously, it may be) following out this Greek habit. The *τὰ ποῖα* corresponds to the genitive, and *ποῦ* marks the scene of his labors. That Socrates does not follow up his comparison in the following question is not remarkable, nor is it necessary that he should follow it up, as Thompson thinks; and the omission of the words by Olympiodorus cannot be placed against the concurrent testimony of B and T. Apply the method to Simonides (Semonides) of Amorgus and Simonides of Ceus. Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, p. 11, defends the conjecture *ἢ οὐ*.

453 e. λέγωμεν: T S. λέγομεν B.

453 e. ὅσον ἐστίν: B T S. Rejected by Kratz. Kleist, *JJ.* cxxxix. 479, wishes to translate *ῥα* in *ῥα ὅσα ἂν τυγχάνῃ*, in 451 b above, by *quot cum que*, and not *quantum cum que*, 'wie viele arten es auf beiden seiten geben mag.' For the sake of consistency, he would also substitute *ῥα* for *ὅσον* in this passage. See Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 91 ff. But see note.

454 a. ἐστίν: B. ἐστι T. ἐστίν S.

454 a. ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν: B. ῥητορικὴ ἐστίν S.

454 c. ὅπερ γὰρ λέγω: on the use of *γὰρ* to resume an interrupted thought, see Shilleto's crit. note to Dem. *de Falsa Leg.* 107 (96), quoted by Thompson.

454 d. ῥ: S (B T?). *δέ* eds.

454 d. αὖ: B T. *δὲ* S.

455 a. πιστικὸς: t S. πιστικὸς B T Cron.

455 b. λατρῶν αἰρέσεως: cf. also *Gorg.* 514 d, and for details of treatment, etc., see Herm. *Gr. Alter.* iv.⁸ § 38.

455 d. τὰ νεώρια κτέ.: to Themistocles was due the fortification of Athens itself (Thuc. i. 90-93), as well as the erection and fortification of the Piraeus, with its commercial-harbor, ἐμπόριον, and its war-harbor, κανθάρου or Κανθάρου λιμὴν, for both of which the Athenians formerly used the open bay of Phalerum. The dockyards were built to hold four hundred ships. The so-called Long Walls, whose erection had probably been suggested by Themistocles, connected with the city the whole coast, from the southeastern end of the bay of Phalerum to the northwestern end of the peninsula of Piraeus, together with its three harbors (in addition to the chief harbor just mentioned, also Ζέα and Μουνυχία on the southeastern side). They consisted of the shorter Phalerian wall of thirty-five stades, and the longer Piraeian (Thuc. i. 107) wall of forty stades. To the latter was afterwards added about the time of the τριακοντούταις σπονδαί, for greater security, a second wall, parallel and six hundred feet distant. These two are often distinguished as τὸ βόρειον and τὸ νότιον τεῖχος, and are called by late authors τὰ μακρὰ σκέλη. For details of location, see Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland*, i. p. 265 ff., and Lolling's *Hellenische Landeskunde* (Müller's *Handb. der Klass. Altertumsw.* iii.) pp. 118, 299 ff.

455 e. τῶν: B T. τῆς S after Buttmann. τῆς τῶν Schaefer, Hirschig.

456 a. εἰ: B T. τί, εἰ S after Madvig.

456 b. ὅπη: B T. ὅποι S after codd. and Heindorf.

456 d. ἀγωνίᾳ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα: the last two words are bracketed by S after Findeisen, who puts a colon before ὅτι and a comma after ἐχθρῶν. With either reading an easy asyndeton is involved; and while τούτου ἔνεκα is rather redundant, it conflicts neither with sense nor construction. — On the ὅπλομαχία cf. *Lach. init.* τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις κτέ., *Euthyd.* 273 c. For the development of this practice, see *Herm. Gr. Alter.* iv.³ § 35.

456 d. ἀποκτεινύναι: B S. ἀποκτινύναι T. Schanz, vol. viii. *proll.* p. vi f. shows from the Mss. that the form ἀποκτεινύναι is better attested for the *Gorgias*, though in other dialogues the weight of evidence seems to be in favor of the second form.

456 e. μὴ ὑπάρχοντας: for the different varieties of asyndeton and their effect on the style, see Rehdantz, *Dem. Phil. Reden* Index, under the word 'asyndeton,' and Volkmann, *Rhetorik d. Gr. u. Röm.* § 48.

457 c. λόγων: B T. φιλολόγων S. λογίων Madvig. ἀνθρώπων Cobet. Any of these emendations would make the text more exact, it is true, but would not give any other advantage than that of formal exactness, there being no ambiguity of meaning as the passage stands.

457 d. φιλονεικοῦντας: S (vol. vii. *prolegg.*). φιλονεικοῦντας B T.

457 d. λοιδορηθέντες τε καὶ: is bracketed by S after Hirschig.

457 e. οὐ πᾶν ἀκόλουθα: Cobet maintains that οὐ πᾶν is an unqualified negation in classic Greek, although the sense "not entirely" is common in later authors. Cope and Riddell demand the weaker force here; and this corresponds much better with Socrates's whole bearing. See the discussion in App. to Cope's translation.

458 b. χρῆν: B T. χρῆ S with codd. See the note. The context, as well as ἔδει in the margin, b t, makes for the impf.

458 b. παροῦσιν: T S. παροῦσι B.

458 c. μὴ τινας: *Madv. Syn.* § 124, 1, and *Kr.* 54, 8, 12, consider the μὴ in this case to have an interrogative force, "whether." It is better to look at the indic. as an attempt to avoid any ambiguity, since the subjv. may have two sides, the indic. but one. See *GMT.* 369, 1.

458 c. κατέχωμεν: B t S. κατέχωμεν T.

458 d. ὥστε χαριεῖσθε: on ὥστε with the inf. to express tendency, 'so as to,' without specifying as to the reality of the occurrence, and with the indic. to express actual result, see Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 161 ff.

458 d. ἐρωτᾶν . . . βούλεται: is bracketed by S after Badham, perhaps rightly.

459 c. ηῦρηκέναι: S. εὔρηκέναι B T. Cf. 448 c. The evidence of inscriptions shows that after the middle of the fourth century, verbs in εὖ- were not augmented; the latest inscription containing ηῦ- dates from 321 B.C. See Reinach, *Traité d'Épigraphie Grecque*, 285, Meisterhans, *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*,² § 64, 14.

459 c. λόγον: B T. λόγον S after Hermann. See Thompson's note.

460 c. The reading here adopted is that of Thompson, which differs from Hirschig's only in the position of ἀεί. Schanz, followed by Cron, brackets οὐκοῦν . . . φαίνεται γε; but, as Thompson points out, the words οὐδέποτε ἀρα βουλήσεται ὃ γε δίκαιος ἀδικεῖν seem to require an intermediate step in the argument, while to retain the words τὸν ῥητορικὸν . . . τὸν δὲ in their present position is to disturb badly the otherwise plain course of reasoning. See the notes of Thompson and Hirschig *ad loc.*

461 b. ἡ οἶα: S with the eds. ἡ B T Cron. Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, p. 12, defends the explanation given in the note, which is now generally accepted.

461 c. ἐταίρους καὶ υἱεῖς (υἱεῖς): t and eds. ἐταίρους υἱεῖς B T. ἐταίρους S. I have adopted the first reading with a slight change in the spelling ('υἱός est un forme ionienne et vulgaire,' Reinach, *Epig.* p. 270; cf. Meisterhans, § 17, 4), though it must be confessed that υἱεῖς is decidedly suspicious.

462 d. οὐδεμία κτέ.: S, following Hirschig, divides the words as follows: ΣΩ. Οὐδεμία — φαθί. ΠΩ. Φημί δῆ. ΞΩ. Ἐμπειρία τις. τίς τις φαθί. ΠΩ. Φημί δῆ. ΣΩ. Χάριτος . . . Πῶλε. But one can hardly conceive how Polus could have failed to catch the spirit of the play, after Socrates had shown the way.

463 e. ἡ ῥητορικῇ: T Aristides S. ῥητορικῇ B Cron. In 451 a, 454 a, the article is omitted in both Mss., though it might stand as well there as here.

464 b. ἀντίστροφον μὲν τῇ γυμναστικῇ: Aristides, S after Heindorf. ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς B T.

464 d. ὅπερ: b Aristides. ὅπου B T. ὅπῃ δ S.

465 b. οὐσα καὶ: codd. καὶ B T S.

465 b. ἐσθήσει: S after Coraes. αἰσθήσει B T. ἐσθῆτι Aristides, — which would correspond better to usage than ἐσθήσει. See Schanz's note for the many emendations.

465 c. διέστηκεν: B T S. διέστηκε μὲν cod., the editions.

465 c. χρήσονται: T S after Bekker. χρῆσονται B Cron. Cf. 465 e.

466 a. ἀρ': S. ἀρ' B. ἀρ' T Cron.

466 b. δοκοῦσιν: T S. δοκοῦσι B Cron.

466 d. ὅτι: cod. S eds. εἰ ὅτι B T. εἰ οὐχὶ cod., Hermann, Cron.

466 d. ἐρωτήματα: codd. S. τὰ ἐρωτήματα B T.

466 e. οὐκοῦν: οὐκ οὖν S after Hermann, who defends this reading in the words: 'negativa responsio disiungi particulas postulat.' But, as Cron justly observes, Polus anticipated no such negative reply, but rather the contrary. He fails to see any difference in the two expressions used by Socrates; which makes the case for οὐκοῦν overwhelming.

466 e. φῆς: S after Baiter. ἔφης B T, Cron, eds. The passages in which this anomalous form occurs are as follows: Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1, 23; Pl. *Gorg.* 466, 496 (φῆς Baiter, S), *Euthyd.* 293 (-ησθα Baiter); Aeschines, ii. 86 (-ησθα Franke, Weidner); Aeschyl. *Ag.* 1613 (φῆς Dindorf, Hermann) and five pas-

sages from Lucian. The only passage remaining unchanged apparently is Xen. *Cyr.* iv. 1. 23, where it is true, as Cron says, that *φη*s cannot be read; but a change to *φησθα* is not difficult, and then, as the word is put into the mouth of a foreigner, Cyrus, it might have been designed. Phrynichus (ed. Rutherford, p. 225) says *φη*s: *ἔστι μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον· τὸ δὲ πλείστον ἔφησθα*. Lobeck questions the truth of this statement, and Rutherford denies flatly that *φη*s is Attic. Almost all modern editors agree with Rutherford.

466 e. ἀποδείξεις . . . ἐξελέγξας: B T. ἀποδείξας ἐξελέγξει S after Hirschig. It is true that Hirschig's reading makes the thought a little more exact, for strictly speaking the refutation consists in the proof. But, at the same time, the best proof of Polus's position would be the refutation of Socrates; so that in either case the general result is much the same.

467 a. κекτήσονται. ἡ: κекτήσονται, ἡ S.

467 b. τοῦτου πρόσθεν: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher. Its genuineness had been already questioned by Heindorf.

467 b. ὑπερφῶ: S. ὑπερφῶ B T Cron. Meisterhans, § 58, 11, says: 'In the acc. sing. the ending *ᾶ* instead of *ῶ* is found when a vowel precedes. In the case of *ὑγιᾶ*, we find a variation in the use of *ᾶ* and *ῶ* after 360 B.C.' The same seems to hold true for the neut. pl. Cf. 486 b.

467 d. πλούτου γὰρ ἔνεκα πλέουσιν: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

468 a. ἔνεκα: S. ἔνεκεν B T Cron and eds. Meisterhans, § 83, 26: 'The forms in -εν (*ἔνεκεν*, *εἵνεκεν*, *οὐνεκεν*) are entirely foreign to Attic.' The earliest example of *ἔνεκεν* is after 350 B.C.

468 e. ὥς δὴ σὺ κτέ.: Cron considers the construction here to be causal at bottom. Others regard it as exclamatory.

469 a. ζηλωτόν: B T. ζηλωτός cod. S after Ast, who remarks (Tom. xi. p. 169 f.): 'Quod conieceram (*Praef.* p. vi. T. 1) *ζηλωτός* id confirmatum nunc video a Flor. d., idque tam praegressa quam sequentia videntur flagitare.' But the reading of the codex itself rests probably upon an emendation, and the neuter is merely a case of colloquial inexactness. Cf. a similar case in *Legg.* v. 730 c, where it is said that 'who would be happy, must be truthful,' *πιστὸς γὰρ, ὁ δὲ ἀπιστος, φῖ φίλον ψεύδους ἐκούσιον· ὅτφ δὲ ἀκούσιον, ἄνους. ὦν οὐδέτερον ζηλωτόν*. Here probably no one will employ an emendation, although the author continues: *ἄφίλος γὰρ δὴ πᾶς ὁ τε ἀπιστος καὶ ἀμαθής*.

469 b. ἐλαϊνόν γε: S after Stobaeus. ἐλεεινὸν δὲ B T.

469 e. ἡντιν' ἂν σοι δοκῇ: codd. S. δόκοι B T.

470 a. πράττειν, ἀγαθόν τε: S. πράττειν ἀγαθόν τε Cron. ἀγαθόν τι Heindorf. Although the idea is plain enough, the arrangement of the words has caused great difficulty. Schleiermacher, followed by Cron, construes *ἀγαθόν τε* εἶναι closely with *ὠφελίμως πράττειν*, under the article, thus making *τέ* a 'postscript' *τέ*. To do this, he has to take *φαίνεται* as a complete predicate, in

the sense, "seem good or correct." Ast wrenches the construction so as to supply a predicate, μέγα δύνασθαι, to φαίνεται, and follows it by ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, making the contrast κακόν (sc. εἶναι) καὶ μικρὸν δύνασθαι in chiasmic position. But as Cron observes, it is quite out of the question to connect a τέ clause with a supplied predicate. Thompson uses the heroic treatment of bracketing the first τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι and the last δύνασθαι after μικρὸν. Most of the eds. — and this is best — put a comma after πράττειν, and construe ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι and καὶ τοῦτο κτέ. together. This is not without difficulties, as Cron shows. The second clause deviates from the construction, but of this Plato shows several examples in this same dialogue. Socrates changes his expression to bring out with greater emphasis the ἐὰν μὲν clause: "and that (καὶ τοῦτο), it seems, is the real μέγα δύνασθαι." This translation obviates the objection to τοῦτο. Cron does not like the τὸ with the second μέγα δύνασθαι, but the τό seems to have much the force of the English emphatic *the*, and that force can be brought out by adding the word 'real.' By thus making τοῦτο a reiteration of ἐὰν μὲν κτέ., we have the contrast εἰ δὲ μή coming regularly with ἐστίν to be supplied after κακόν.

470 a. δύνασθαι · σκεψώμεθα: S. δύνασθαι, σκεψώμεθα Cron after Hermann.

470 b. τὰντὸ: is bracketed as a dittograph by S, who refers to a similar case in *Theaet.* 186 d. This is not unlikely; but at the same time we can explain the word as it stands as showing a trace of sophistical quibbling.

470 d. ἐχθές: on the form, Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, § 295, says: 'ἐχθές was the regular Attic form, the old Ionic χθές being naturally retained in phrases like χθές τε καὶ πρόην and occasionally, as in Ar. *Nub.* 353, *Vesp.* 242, to help the metre. After a word ending in a vowel, ἐχθές yielded to its older rival even in prose.'

470 d. οὐκ οἶδα — ἄδικος (471 a): is translated by Cic. *Tusc. Disp.* v. 12 as follows: Haud scio, nunquam enim cum eo collocatus sum. — Ain' tu? an aliter id scire non potes? — Nullo modo — Tu igitur ne de Persarum quidem rege magno potes dicere, beatusne sit? — An ego possim, quum ignorem quam sit doctus, quam vir bonus? — Quid? tu in eo sitam vitam beatam putas? — Ita prorsus existimo: bonos beatos, improbos miseros — Miser ergo Archelaus? — Certe, si iniustus.

470 e. κάγαθόν: S. καὶ ἀγαθόν B T. Schanz, vol. ii. 2, *Prolegg.* § 1, shows that we find regularly καλὸς κάγαθός, more rarely, καλός τε κάγαθός, but not καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, or καλός τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

471 b. ὄν: S. νῖδν B T Cron. See critical note on 461 c.

471 b. On the general stylistic effect of the partic. see Gildersleeve, *Am. Jour. Phil.* ix. 136 ff., who discusses this passage, showing that we should naturally expect such an outburst from Polus, 'Πῶλος by name and πῶλος by nature.'

471 c. τοῦ Περδίκκου: cod. S. τὸν Περδίκκου B T. Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 118, thinks that perhaps it would be better to join τὸν γνήσιον with τὸν ἀδελφόν, in which case τὸν Περδίκκου ὄν would be a gloss by a later hand.

471 c. ἐπ' ἐτῇ: S after Ast. ἐπταετῇ B T. But Heindorf had already observed, before Ast, with the approval of Lobeck, *Phryg.* 407, 'Atticum magis esse ex grammaticorum praeceptis ἐπ' ἐτῇ.'

471 d. ἐπῆνεσα: B T. ἐπῆνεσα† S after Cobet.

471 d. τοῦ δὲ . . . ἡμεληκῆναι: Thompson construes this clause under ἐπῆνεσα in its full sense, considering that Socrates ironically calls his remark in 448 d (δῆλος γάρ μοι Πῶλος . . . ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν μᾶλλον μεμελέτηκεν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι) a compliment. This view has found a supporter in Packard, *Transactions Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877, 14. But the passage seems to be rather playful than ironic; and it is not uncommon in Greek to supply a colorless verb of saying from a preceding verb which involves it.

471 d. ὠγαθέ: ὠγαθέ B T. ὦ'γαθέ S.

472 a. εἶναι τί: S. εἶναί τι B T Cron. S is right in thinking the greater emphasis to be upon τί. This understatement implies much more importance, actual or pretended, in the persons mentioned than would be felt if εἶναι had the emphasis.

472 d. ἔστιν: S after Hermann. ἐστίν B T.

472 d. ἐν Πυθίου: cod. S. ἐν Πυθοῖ B T. Heindorf recommends ἐν Πυθίῳ, referring to the note of Suidas: Πύθιον ἱερὸν Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀθήνησιν ὑπὸ Πειιστράτου γεγονός, εἰς δ' τοὺς τρίποδας ἐτίθεσαν οἱ τῷ κυκλίῳ χορῷ νικῆσαντες τὰ Θαργῆλια. But we find also in Thuc. vi. 54. 7 ἐν Πυθίου. In C. I. A. i. 422, we have a dedication by Aristocrates, son of Scellius, which may have belonged to this offering. See Roberts, *Introduction to Greek Epigraphy*, i. p. 97.

472 e. πάντως . . . μέντοι: S after Stobaeus. ἀπάντων . . . μὲν τοίνυν B T.

473 b. Ἰσως: is bracketed by S, following a suspicion of Heindorf, who, however, afterwards recalled his suspicion by referring to *Phaedrus* 233 e.

473 b. ἀδικῶν: is bracketed by S after Dobree. But Socrates' words in d, εἰς ἀδικῶς ἐπιβουλεύων, seem to favor the retention of ἀδικῶν here.

473 c. καταπιττωθῇ: such punishments were but rarely inflicted in the Hellenic states, and were never sanctioned by law. When inflicted, they were dictated only by the fury of the moment, as we learn from Ath. xii. 26, p. 524 πρῶτον μὲν κρατήσας ὁ δῆμος καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκβαλὼν καὶ συναγαγὼν τὰ τέκνα τῶν φυγόντων εἰς ἄλωνίαις, βοῦς συναγαγόντες συνηλοῖσαν καὶ παρανομωτάτῳ θανάτῳ διεφθειραν· τοιγάρτοι πάλιν οἱ πλούσιοι κρατήσαντες ἅπαντας, ὧν κύριοι κατέστησαν, μετὰ τῶν τέκνων κατεπίττωσαν. Routh identified the punishment here mentioned with the Latin tunica molesta, alluded to by Juv. viii. 235, on which Mayor gives references; among others Plut. *de ser. num.* vind. 9 'some men are just like children, who often when they behold malefactors in the theatres in tunics of gold and purple shawls, crowned and dancing the pyrrich, admire and envy them as happy; until they are seen goaded and

scourged and discharging fire from that flowered and costly attire' (*πῦρ ἀνιέντες ἐκ τῆς ἀνθινῆς ἐκείνης καὶ πολυτελοῦς ἐσθῆτος*). Cf. *Herm. Gr. Alter.* ii. 1,³ § 18.

473 c. *εὐδαιμονέστερος*: cod. S. *εὐδαιμονέστατος* B T.

473 d. *διδούς δίκην*: cod. *δίκην δοὺς* S after Schmidt. *διδούς* B T. The pres. is better than the aor. because the punishment is kept up.

473 e. *διαφεύγων*: B T. *διαφυγών* cod. S. Socrates is speaking generally.

473 e. *ἐροῦ τινα*: Stallbaum. *ἔρου τινὰ* B T. *ἐροῦ τινὰ* S.

474 b. *ἀδικεῖν*: S as Heindorf and Ast, following Ficinus, demanded. *ἀδικεῖν*; the eds.

474 c. *εἶναι, τὸ*: *εἶναι τὸ* S and eds. Cron regards *πότερον* as an adj. with *τὸ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.* in apposition.

474 c. *τί δὲ δὴ*; *αἰσχίον*: Heindorf. *τί δὲ δὴ αἰσχίον* S after Aldus.

474 c. *αἰσχίον*;: eds. *αἰσχίον*. S.

474 e. *τὰ καλὰ, ἡ*: B S. *τὰ καλὰ τοῦ* T. *τὰ* omitted, cod. *καλὰ τοῦ* Thompson.

475 a. *θάτερον*: is said to be a Doric form, adopted into Attic, but this is doubtful. Attic inscriptions always have *ἔτερος*. Reinach, *Epig.* p. 249, thinks that originally in Attic *ἔτερον* may have been pronounced *ἄτερον*. But Smyth, *The Vowel System of the Ionic Dialects* (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1889), p. 20, claims *ἄτερος* itself for Attic. This claim, if true, would imply that old Attic has two forms, *ἄτερος* and *ἔτερος*, the former of which became fixed in the form *θάτερον*, dying out otherwise. Others hold the very reasonable view that *θάτερα* was a familiar form and *θάτερον* carelessly taken for the singular.

475 b. *κακῶ*: B T. *κακῶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις* S after Hirschig. Perhaps it is easier to bear with the inexactness than to explain the omission.

475 d. *χρόνῳ*: B T. Cron would either omit this word as not agreeing with the connexion, or change it to *λόγῳ* after Findeisen. But the usage is phraseological, and for that reason defensible.

476 c. *καί . . . κάεσθαι*: codd. S. *καίει . . . καίεσθαι* B T. So also in the following examples; but in 479 a, B T both have *κάεσθαι*. The spelling of this verb is still an open question. Only two inscriptions contain present forms, and they are both before 400 B.C., and both show the diphthong. Meisterhans, § 63, 24.

477 a. *ᾧδε*: S eds. *ᾧδε* B Cron.

477 d. *ὀμφότερα*: Rid., § 17, classes this with such expressions as *καὶ ταῦτα*, under the head of acc. in apposition. See another example in 524 c.

478 b. *τί*: B Stobaeus S. *τί οὖν* T. *ὦν λέγεις*, which follows *ἐστιν* in B T, is bracketed by S after Bekker and Ficinus.

478 c. *καὶ ὑγὴ εἶναι*: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. It is true that the addition is unnecessary, and even illogical, but it serves to emphasize the result of the endurance.

478 c. *ῥοικε*: B. *ῥοικεν* T S.

479 a. *μη διδόναι δίκην κτέ.*: this passage shows well the narrow line which sometimes separates the tendential from the substantival acc. with the inf. and may help to explain the way in which *ῥστε*, which with the inf. is post-Homeric, came to be introduced to fix the idea of tendency. See Gildersleeve, *The Consecutive Sentence in Greek*, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vii. 161 ff.

479 b. *οὕτω*: B T. *οὕτως* S and eds.

479 c. *εἰ μή σοί γε ἄλλως*: codd. eds. *εἰ σοί γε ἄλλως* B T. *εἰ σοί γε* S, who compares *Hipp.* ii. 367 *ἃ εἴ γε σὺ βούλει*. But the interpolation of *ἄλλως* is hard to explain, while *μή* could easily have dropped out, under the influence of itacism.

479 d. *ἀδικεῖν*: B T. *ἀδικοῦντα διδόναι δίκην* S after Hirschig.

480 a. *ἀδικήσει*: S after Heindorf. *ἀδικέσῃ* B T.

480 b. *ποιήσῃ*: S after Heindorf. *ποιήσῃ* B T.

480 b. *λέγωμεν*: B T. *λέγομεν* codd. S.

480 c. *τοῦναντίον*: Deuschle. *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον* B T S Cron. Cron, following Heindorf, thinks that we must supply *χρήσιμον εἶναι*, which would make *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον* correspond to *ἐπὶ τὸ ἀπολογεῖσθαι*. But this would leave *δεῖν* unaccounted for. Thompson supposes *ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον* to be a phrase equivalent to *εἰς τοῦναντίον* *Soph.* 221 a, or *κατὰ τοῦναντίον* *Tim.* 36 d, or *ἐξ ἐναντίας*, which is common enough. And if the *ἐπὶ* is kept, this is the only way of regarding it. But it is the sole example in such a phrase, and Deuschle bracketed it for that reason.

480 c. *δε*: B T. *τε* S with codd. and Heindorf.

480 e. *ἢ κάκεινα* (*κακεῖνα* B T). *ἢ κείνα* S after Hirschig.

481 a. *ἢ ἥρπакῶς*: S. *ἥρпакῶς* B T. *ἥρпакῶς ἢ* cod.

481 a. *ἀναλίσκη*: S after L, Dindorf, and Coraes. *ἀναλίσκεται* B T.

481 c. *φῶμεν*: B T. *θῶμεν* S after Madvig, who declares (*Adversaria*, i. 410) the connexion of a participle with *φάναι* not to be Greek. But *λέγειν* can be so construed, and we find *φάναι* followed by *μή* as if it were a verb of asseveration, which latter could take a participle.

481 d. *ἴδιον*: according to Rid. § 173, Plato combines with *ἦ* the following: *διπλοῦς*, *πολλαπλάσιος*, *διαφερόντως* (*διαφέρειν*), *ἀνομοῖος*, *ἐναντίος*, *τίς*.

481 d. *ὅτι* (*ὅ τι*) *ἂν φῇ*: S with cod. and Ast. *ὅτι ὅπως ἂν φῇ* B. *ὅτι ὅπως ἂν ἀντιφῇ* T. *ὅτι ὁπῶς ἂν φῇ* eds. after Bekker. It is a good example to show how variations might arise.

482 a. *ἂ νῦν*: Cron, who claims the authority of B T for the omission of *ἀεί*. But S (with the eds.) reads *ἀεί* without noting any change in B T, and it is perhaps better to restore it to the text here before *ἂ νῦν*.

482 a. *ἔμπληκτος*: is explained by the scholiasts and grammarians by *ἄστατος*, *εὐμετάβολος* (inconstans), with which agrees *Lysis* 214 c *μηδέποτε ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι*, ἀλλ' *ἔμπληκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους*.

482 a. *ἀεὶ τῶν αὐτῶν*: cod. S. *τῶν αὐτῶν* B T.

482 b. *Αἰγυπτίων*: B T. *Αἰγύπτιον* S after Stallbaum, following Olympiodorus, to obviate the omission of the art.; but see Reinach, *Epig.* p. 275: 'Jusqu'au IV^e siècle et même jusqu'au III^e on ne trouve que rarement le nom d'un peuple, d'un dème etc. précédé de l'article.'

482 b. *κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστέον τε*: S after Van Heusde. *κρείττον εἶναι ἀνάρμοστον τε* B T. *κρείττον ἀνάρμοστον τε εἶναι* Ast after Heindorf.

482 d. *διδάξοι*: B T. *διδάξει* codd.

482 e. *ἐναντί*: S on the basis of the reading of B, which according to S is *ἐναντι*. *ἐναντία* T.

483 a. *τοῦτο τὸ σοφόν*: Rid., § 15, considers this and similar cases as acc. in apposition to the sentence. Cf. *Theaet.* 167 b & *δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν*, and other examples, *Prot.* 352 e, *Theaet.* 158 b.

483 a. *κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι*: B T. *κάκιον . . . ἀδικεῖσθαι* S after H. Stephanus, — perhaps correctly.

483 c. *τὸ ἴσον*: on the principles of democratic government as conceived by the Greeks, the equality of the individuals as well as their subservience to law, see Busolt, *Gr. Alter.* i. § 45 (Müller's *Handbuch*, iv.).

483 e. *τὴν τοῦ δικαίου*: is bracketed by S after Schleiermacher.

483 e. *τὸν τῆς φύσεως*: eds. *τὸν φύσεως* S (B T?).

483 e. *τιθέμεθα*: is bracketed by S after Hermann.

484 a. *διαφυγών*: is bracketed by S after Naber, *καὶ διαφυγών* by Morstadt. Cron prefers the latter, but *καταπατήσας* would continue the metaphor of the escaping beast much better as a co-ordinate participle than it could as a subordinate.

484 c. *διαφθορά*: the speech of Callicles affords a good example of the *σεμνότης* which Aristides (*Rhet. Gr.* ed. Spengel, ii. 468) says is caused by the employment of *ὀνομαστικὰ λέξεις ἀντὶ ῥηματικῶν*.

484 e. *καὶ ἐπὶ*: B T S. *καπὶ* eds.

484 e. *τυγχάνει*: T S. *τυγχάνη* B.

485 b. *καὶ παλζοντας*: is bracketed by S after Morstadt.

485 b. *ψελλιζόμενον καὶ παλζον*: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

485 c. *ἡ παλζοντα ὄρα*: is bracketed by Morstadt.

485 e. *ψυχῆς ἔχων*: Nauck. *ψυχῆς* B T S.

485 e. *διαπρέπεις*: B T. *διατρέπεις* S after Grotius. It can hardly be said that the emendation of Schanz is any more satisfactory than the text. I have followed Nauck in inserting *ἔχων* to make the construction better Greek. But most likely the correct reading of the passage is beyond the efforts of the eds. The trouble with *διαπρέπεις* is that while not unknown to Euripides' vocabulary, it is never used transitively; hence Nauck's insertion, for which Cron suggests *λαχών*, which would serve as well. In this way *διαπρέπειν* would be used just as we find it in Eur. *Alc.* 602, where Admetus says to his father, with bitter irony, *ἦ τὰρα πάντων διαπρέπεις ἀψυχία*.

485 e. οὐτ' ἄν . . . λόγον: these words are shown by the metre, οὐτ' ἄν δίκης βουλαῖσι, as well as by the form βουλαῖσι, to have belonged in some form to Euripides. This has led Hartung to add them to the fg. with slight changes, though Nauck and Schanz do not feel justified in so doing.

486 a. λάκοις: S after Bonitz. λάβοις B T. λάκοις is not a prose word, but is very common in Euripides.

486 b. ειλγιγίως: B T S. ιλιγγίως b t Cron. Schanz, vii. Prolegg. § 1, compares all the passages, and refers to the note of Suidas: ειλγιγιῶ· τὸ μὲν ῥῆμα διὰ διφθόγγου, ἀντὶ τοῦ σκοτοδινῶ — τὸ δὲ ὄνομα ἱλιγγος διὰ τοῦ ι.

486 b. εὐφυνά: S. εὐφυνῇ B T. Cf. crit. note on 467 b.

486 c. κόρρης: the retention of η after the ρ in the words given in the note is explained as due to the fact that the older forms were κόρση, δέρση, etc., and that afterwards assimilation took place, as in the case of θάρσος to θάρρος. Curt. Stud. i. a 248.

486 c. πιθού: S after Cobet. πείθου B T Cron.

486 c. ταῦτ' ἀφείλ: eds. ταῦτα ἀφείλ S (B T?).

486 d. ἄσμενον: B S. ἄσμενον eds.

486 d. ῆ: B T. αῖς S after Stallbaum. αῖ cod. This deviation from the more rigid construction is quite comprehensible in the freedom of conversation. Cf. 521 b.

486 e. ἄν: B T. ἄν S after Bekker.

486 e. ταῦτ' ἤδη: eds. ταῦτα ἤδη S (B T?).

487 c. Τείσανδρον: S with inscriptions. Τίσανδρον B T Cron.

487 d. ταῦτά: S after Ficinus. ταῦτα B T. Cron remarks that ἐμοί makes for the first reading, for with ταῦτα we would more usually find ταῦτά μοι.

487 e. ἡ σῆ: B T S. σῆ eds.

488 a. ἔστιν: S Thompson. ἐστίν B Cron. ἐστί T.

488 a. ταῦτά: B S. ταῦτα T eds.

488 b. πλέον: S after Heindorf. πλεῖον B T.

488 b. ἔλεγον: is omitted by S, following common Greek usage. Both the position and the sense make for the omission.

489 a. τοῦτο, Καλλίκελεις: B T. τοῦτ' ὦ Καλλίκελεις S after Heindorf.

489 c. ἔρμαιον: B S. ἔρμαιον T.

489 c. συλλεγῆ: T b S. συλλέγη B.

489 c. φῶσιν κτέ.: the omission of an object to φῶσιν has caused a great deal of trouble, and it is certainly harsh to consider the word as used absolutely in the sense "declare," "speak"; but such must be done as yet, for the emendations and other explanations are not satisfactory. Schanz changes αὐτά to ἄττα. Cron construes αὐτά . . . νόμιμα with φῶσιν, and translates: 'Or do you think I mean (by the statement that τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ κρεῖττον are the same) that (i.e. the case) when . . . and these say that this and nothing else is lawful,' viz. ἂν φῶσιν. But this is too trying a species of mental gymnastics for conversation.

489 c. αὐτά: B T. ἄττα S after Heindorf, possibly with right. Some eds. insert comma after αὐτά. Cron omits comma both after φῶσιν and αὐτά.

489 d. τί: B T eds. τίνas S after Routh.

490 a. ῥήματα: cod. ῥήματι (defended by Winckelmann) B T. ῥήμά τι Deuschle. ῥηματία S after Badham.

490 a. ἔστιν: S and eds. ἐστιν B. ἐστὶν T Cron.

490 b. ἄθροοι: T S. ἄθροοι B Cron.

490 c. ἐν δὲ τῷ: codd. ἐν τῷ δὲ B T S, referring to Kr. 68, 5, 1.

490 c. περὶ σιτία: B T. Thompson follows Hirschig in bracketing the words, which certainly are here a violation of usage. Cf. his note *ad loc.*

491 a. ὡς: B T S. ὥσπερ Baiter.

491 d. ἐταῖρε;: cod. Bekker S. ἐταῖρε τί ἢ τί ἀρχομένους B. ἐταῖρε τί ἢ τί ἀρχοντας ἢ ἀρχομένους T. Many attempts have been made to emend this passage. Schanz gives the emendations of Stephanus, Cron, Bernardakes, Ast, Hermann, Stallbaum, Schuster, Madvig, Kratz, Kleanthes, Heindorf, Beck, E. Jahn, Findeisen, Baiter.

492 b. εἰεν: S. εἶησαν B T Cron.

492 c. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν: B. ταῦτ' ἐστὶ T. ταῦτ' ἄρα S.

492 d. ἀμόθεν: S after Bekker. ἀλλοθέν B T.

492 e. ἥδη: B T S. ᾗ δὲ Hermann, Cron. ὅπερ ἥδη cod. Thompson.

493 a. πειστικόν: Iamblichus, S. πιστικόν B T Stobaeus. Cf. 455 a.

493 a. τῶν δ' ἀμνητῶν: B T. τῶν ἀμνητῶν S after Madvig. But the passage offers an additional difficulty in αὐτοῦ where we desire αὐτῆς. If αὐτοῦ is genuine, we must conceive the clause τὸ . . . στεγανόν as in part. opposition to τοῦτο. This would make αὐτοῦ partitive genitive instead of possessive, which Cron insists upon calling it.

493 c. ἀπήκασε: T (in the margin) S. ἀπέκασε B T.

493 c. μετατίθεται: cod. eds. μετατίθασθαι B T S. Ast attempts to defend the reading of the Mss. by translating, 'Do I also persuade you to change your opinion to this, that,' etc. But, as Cron remarks, this gives an utterly impossible construction for καί, and besides there is no meaning in "also."

494 c. πληροῦν: S after Stephanus. πληροῦντα B T. πληροῦν, πληροῦντα καὶ χαίροντα Heindorf.

494 e. κνησιώη: S after Heindorf. κνησιοῖ B T. κνησιῷ Bekker, Cron. κνησιῷ Coraës.

494 e. ἐχόμενα: is bracketed by S.

495 a. ἀγαθαί: codd. S. αἱ ἀγαθαί B T. Heindorf appeals to 501 b; but since Bekker that has been read ἢ βελτίων, instead of ἡ βελτίων.

495 d. ἀγαθοῦ: B T. ἡδέος H. Schmidt, to make the clause correspond more accurately with the previous discussion. See the discussion in Cron, *Beiträge*, p. 156, 209.

496 a. ἀνθρωπος: S after Bekker. ἄνθρωπος B T Cron.

496 b. ἀπολλύει: B according to Gaisford. ἀπόλλυσι S after Cobet's dictum that forms in -ύω are not Attic. Thompson quotes Porson on Eur. *Medea*, 744: 'Observandum est hac forma, ea nempe ubi ύω pro υμι in fine verbi ponitur nunquam uti Tragicos; rarissime veteres Comicos; saepius mediae, saepissime novae Comodiae poetas. Paullatim et parce adhiberi coepta est sub mediam fere Aristophanis aetatem; tantum enim occurrit δμνύη *Av.* 1610, συμπαραιγνύων in ultima eius fabula Pluto 719. Cetera loca, ubi usurpari videtur, aut emendata sunt aut emendanda.' The evidence of the inscriptions seems to substantiate this. Meisterhans, § 74, 14, says: 'Regarding the transition of verbs in -νυμι to the -ω conjugation, we find in 5th cent. B.C. δμνύτω, δμνύντων, δμνύναι. The 4th cent. still shows δμνύναι, but also ὤμνον (336 B.C.). Only after the 2d cent. does the inf. take the -ω ending; στρωννύειν, δμνύνειν.'

496 c. ἄνθρωπος: S after Bekker. ἄνθρωπος B T Cron.

496 d. καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω: Hermann. καὶ ἐγὼ μανθάνω B T. Μανθάνω S after Ast.

496 e. φῆς: S after Baiter and Deuschle. ἐφης B T Cron. Cf. critical note on 466 e.

497 a. ἀκκίζει: the scholiasts connect the word with a certain woman named Ἀκκώ, who was so foolish that she took from the loom a half-finished garment, and, clad in it, conversed with her own image in a mirror. The story is varied in the different accounts, and the connexion between Ἀκκώ and this verb is very uncertain. We learn from Plutarch that Ἀκκώ was used like Μορμώ, etc., as a bugbear to terrify children, and we find its employment as early as Pindar, *fg.* 127, — which makes the loom story highly improbable.

497 a. ἔμπροσθεν —: Cron. ἔμπροσθεν; S. The interrogation after the imv. is difficult to account for.

497 a. τί ἔχων ληρεῖς;: S after Badham. ὅτι ἔχων ληρεῖς B T, without any division of persons.

497 d. ὡς ἐτέρων ὄντων: is bracketed by S after Deuschle.

497 e. ἄφρονας: B T. τοὺς ἄφρονας cod. S after Heindorf, who holds, however, the addition of the article to be unnecessary.

498 b. ἔμοιγε μᾶλλον: B T. ἔμοιγε, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως οἱ δειλοὶ S after a conjecture of Hermann. This addition would, however, make superfluous the following questions, ἀπίνονταν δ' οὐ μᾶλλον κτέ.

498 c. ἀγαθοὶ: Routh. ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ B T. S brackets the words ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ εἰσιν.

499 b. τοὺ τοῦ: T. τοῦ τοῦ B S. According to Cron, the authority seems to be on the side of the first accentuation, even when the expression is a joyful one.

499 d. ἄρα: S with Hermann after Heindorf. εἴ ἄρα B T.

499 e. ἔνεκα: S. ἐνεκεν B T Cron. See critical note on 468 a.

500 a. ἀγαθὰ—τῶν ἡδέων—ἐστίν: this reading follows a suggestion of Professor Gildersleeve in regard to the recitation of the passage. ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδέων ἐστίν B T eds.

500 a. ἀναμνησθῶμεν: S. ἀναμνησθῶμεν B eds.

500 c. ἐπὶ: is bracketed by S after Findeisen.

500 d. εἰ ἔστιν κτέ.: an example of the Schema Pindaricum, on which see Thompson *ad loc.* Gildersleeve on Pindar, *Ol.* xi(x) 61, and R. S. Haydon, *Am. Jour. Phil.* xi. No. 2.

501 a. ἡ δ' ἐτέρα τῆς ἡδονῆς κτέ.: it is impossible to look upon τῆς ἡδονῆς as a "free gen.," because the τοῦτου of the preceding clause has given the key to this, neither can Cron's explanation of it as 'gen. of belonging' ('angehörigkeit connexion'), with the translation "that which is directed to," be deemed satisfactory. Hirschig inserts ἡ before τῆς, supplying, and, as it seems, necessarily, τέχνη, in which case there would be a tacit acknowledgment of a τέχνη τῆς ἡδονῆς—an admission the very opposite of what Socrates intends, for he emphatically insists that the παρασκευὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς rests on ἐμπειρία only.

501 c. ἵνα σοὶ καὶ περανθῇ ὁ λόγος καὶ κτέ.: Cron, referring to Kr. 69, 32, 16. 17, considers this a case of the use of καὶ in clauses of purpose to add emphasis in the sense 'ja,' 'doch.' But while this use of καὶ is undoubted (*cf.* *Rep.* i. 346 a μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαινῶμεν) it seems much more natural here to make it correlative with the following καί, "both . . . and."

501 d. ἀθρόαις: T S Cron. ἀθρόαις B eds.

502 a. ἠυρήσθαι: S. εὐρήσθαι B T.

502 b. τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ . . . ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν; πότερον: S places the mark of interrogation after δὴ, construes with Hermann, ἡ σεμνὴ . . . with πότερον and brackets ἐφ' ᾧ ἐσπούδακεν after Cobet. The remedy is violent and perhaps needless.

502 b. ἐσπουδακῆναι: Curtius, *Verb.* ii. p. 154 ff., distinguishes five classes of perfects which are used originally as presents, *viz.* perfects of sound (κέκραγα), of sight and smell (δῶδα), of gesture (δειδέχεται, η 72), of emotion (δέδοικα), and intensive perfects. Under the same categories fall all those perfects which, though originally full perfects, have acquired a present meaning; *e.g.* ἐγγρήγορα, τέθνηκα, πεφόβημαι, ἐσπούδακα, πέφυκα, etc.

502 b. ὥς σοι (ὥς σοι T) δοκεῖ: B T. ὥς μοι δοκεῖ, ὥς σοι δοκεῖν, Kratz.

502 c. σοι: S. σοι Cron and eds.

502 d. ῥητορικῇ: codd. S after Heindorf. ἡ ῥητορικὴ B T.

502 d. ἠυρήκαμεν: S. εὐρήκαμεν B T.

503 a. εἰ γὰρ καί: according to Kr. 65, 5, 15, καὶ εἰ implies that the statement of the leading clause is absolutely unassailable, even in the extreme case which καὶ εἰ introduces; with εἰ καί the realization of the condition, which may easily happen, is still a matter of no importance, as far as the statement of the leading clause is concerned. *Cf.* also *Madv. Syn.* § 194 d.

503 a. **τοῦτο**: codd. Aristides, Heindorf, S. **τοῦτο** δ B T.

503 d. **εἶναι τοιούτον**: B T. S marks a gap after **εἶναι**, and omits the weakly attested **ἔχεις εἰπεῖν** after **γεγονέναι**. Heindorf thinks that some word like **ἐφάνη**, **ὡμολόγηται** is to be added, or **εἶναι** changed into **εἶη ἄν**. See the numerous conjectures in S.

503 e. **προσφέρει ἃ προσφέρει**: this reading of cod. has been adopted by the eds. since Heindorf. It is not certainly Plato's, of course, but it fills the space and makes sense. **προσφέρει** B T. S marks a gap after this word.

503 e. **αὐτοῦ**: codd. S. **αὐτῶν** B. **αὐτῶν** T.

504 c. **ἐκείνῳ**: S after Heindorf. **ἐκείνο** B T.

504 e. **αὐτοῦ**: B T. **αὐτῷ** Deuschle. **δι' αὐτοῦ** conjectured, but not adopted by S.

504 e. **πλέον, ἢ τοῦναντίον κατά γε**: B T. **πλέον ἢ τοῦναντίον, κατά γε** S after Schleiermacher's first edition. This passage has given a good deal of trouble, and the explanation given in the note is only the lesser of two evils. The second construction, that of S., Schleiermacher, and others, is thus paraphrased by Thompson: "What is the use of administering to a diseased body a variety of dishes when these will frequently be of no more service to it than abstinence and mortification (**τοῦναντίον πολλῶν σιτίων κτέ.**), nay, rightly considered will do it even less good than abstinence?" This view makes excellent sense, but is open to several objections. 1. The use of **τοῦναντίον** is harsh and probably unexampled. 2. There is a case of asyndeton before **κατά** which Woolsey, a good critic, pronounced intolerable, and which Heindorf was moved to avoid by the insertion of **ἤ**, an impossible remedy owing to the preceding **ἤ** (*than*). 3. This view involves the supplying of the positive **ὀνήσει** from the preceding **μὴ ὀνήσει**. No complete collection of examples of this usage seems to have been made. Kühner, ii. § 597 n., cites the following cases where a positive verb is supplied from a negative. Hom. E 819 **οὐ μ' εἶας μακαρέσσι θεοῖς ἀντικρὺ μάχεσθαι**, **ἀτὰρ** (sc. **ἐκέλευες**), Eur. Ph. 1217 **τί μ' οὐκ εἶσας ἐξ εὐαγγέλου φήμης ἀπελθεῖν ἀλλὰ** (sc. **ἐκέλευες**), Soph. O. R. 236 **τὸν ἄνδρ' ἀπαυδῶ τοῦτον**. . . **ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων** (sc. **αὐδῶ**), Eur. Supp. 467 **ἐγὼ δ' ἀπαυδῶ Ἄδραστος εἰς γῆν τῇνδε μὴ παρίεναι εἰ δ' ἔστιν κτέ.** (sc. **αὐδῶ**), Soph. E. 71 f. **καὶ μὴ μ' ἄτιμον τῆςδ' ἀποστείλῃτε γῆς**, **ἀλλ'** (sc. **στέλλετε**), Hdt. vii. 104 **ὁ νόμος**. . . **οὐκ ἔων φεύγειν ἀλλὰ** (sc. **κελεύων**), ix. 2 **οὐδὲ ἔων ἰέναι ἀλλὰ** (sc. **κελεύων**), Pl. Apol. 36 b **ἀμελήσας, ὧν οἱ πολλοί** (sc. **ἐπιμελοῦνται**). Add Soph. O. R. 818 **ὦν μὴ ἔξεστι**. . . **ὠθεῖν δ' ἀπ' οἴκων** (sc. **χρή**), Hdt. v. 82 **ἢ δὲ Πυθίη οὐδὲτερα τοῦτων ἔα ἀλλὰ** (sc. **ἐκέλευε**), vii. 143 **οἱ οὐκ ἔων**. . . **ἀλλὰ** (sc. **ἐκέλευον**). It will be noticed that the range in these passages is limited, and in every case (except Apol. 36 b) the positive is to be supplied after a disjunctive conjunction. A few cases are cited where adjs. are involved, but here also we find the conjunction. The peculiar passage Eur. O. 717 is different. No example, accordingly, is cited to support the usage of the text (according to Thompson's view). On the other hand the interpretation

advocated in the text is not free from objections. *τοὐναντίον* seems an unnecessarily strong adversative. Perhaps it would be better to consider the passage as a case of colloquial inexactness.

505 a. *ἐμπίπλασθαι*: T S. *ἐμπίπλασθαι* B. See Schanz, vol. xii. *praef.* § 15.

505 c. *καταλύομεν*: B T. *καταλύσομεν* S after Stephanus.

506 a. *ἄν τι*: S. *ἄν τι* B T Cron. See note on 472 a.

506 b. *ἔως . . . ἀπέδωκα*: the construction employed here must be carefully distinguished from the common use of the aor. indic. after *ἔως* of a definite past fact. See GMT. 613, 2 and *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. 416 n.

506 c. *ἀχθεσθήσομαι*: B T eds. *ἀχθέσομαι* Thompson after Hirschig, on the ground that the longer form is not Attic.

506 c. *ᾧ ἀγαθέ*: B. *ᾧγαθέ* T. *ὦγαθέ* S.

506 d. *οὐ τῷ εἰκῇ*: B T. *οὔτοι εἰκῇ* cod. Sauppe S. That *εἰκῇ* can be used with an article is proven by the passages quoted by Stallbaum: *Phileb.* 28 d *τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῇ δύναμιν*, *Tim.* 34 c *μετέχοντες τοῦ προστυχόντος τε καὶ εἰκῇ*. A kindred expression is found *Phileb.* 45 d *ἡδονάς . . . τῷ σφόδρα καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας*.

506 d. *κάλλιστα*: is bracketed by S after Coraës. We could very easily do without it.

508 b. *οἱ ἄθλιοι ἄθλιοι*: S after Heindorf. *οἱ ἄθλιοι* B T. *ἄθλιοι οἱ ἄθλιοι* Bekker. Ast and Vahlen both defend the Mss. reading, but unsuccessfully.

508 c. *ἐπὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ*: is bracketed by S after Morstadt, *τοῦ ἐθέλοντος* by Hirschig. On the ground of meaning and usage the latter is to be preferred.

508 d. *ἀποκτείναι*: B T. *ἀποκτεινύναι* S, to avoid change of tense.

509 a. *ἐστίν*: B T. *ἔστιν* S after Hermann (*ἔστι*).

509 a. *ὥσπερ νῦν*: B T. *ὥσπερ νῦν ὑμῖν* Coraës.

509 b. *τίνα ἄν*: B T. *τίνα δὲ* S after Hirschig.

509 b. *τὴν αἰσχίστην βοήθειαν*: B T. *τὴν αἰσχίστην † βοήθειαν* S. Morstadt brackets *τὴν αἰσχίστην* — *οἰκείοις*, Cobet even more.

509 c. *τοῦ ἀδικεῖν κτέ.*: on the gen. abs. with the articular inf. see *Am. Jour. Phil.* iii. 201, where *Crito* 44 d, *Polit.* 310 e, *Euthyd.* 285 d, are cited as being, in addition to the present passages, the only cases in Plato.

510 a. *ἐστὶ*: B. *ἐστίν* T S.

510 a. *ἀδικήσομεν*: S after Heindorf. *ἀδικήσωμεν* B T.

510 b. *ἐτοίμος*: S according to the rule of Herodian and other grammarians. *ἔτοιμός* B T.

510 b. *ἐστὶν ἄρχων*: Cron seems to consider this a case of participial periphrasis for the verb; but Alexander, in his article, *Am. Jour. Phil.* iv. 291, does not so regard, or at least does not mention it, and it is more likely from the following adjs. that *ἄρχων* is substantival.

510 b. *ὁμοῖος*: S. *ὅμοιος* B T. See on *ἐτοίμος* above.

510 c. οὕτως: S. οὗτος B T eds.

510 d. ταύτη: cod. S. αὐτῇ B T, defended by Ast.

510 d. ἀδικοίη, αὕτη: S with the second Basle ed. ἀδικοῖ ἡ αὐτῇ B T.

511 c. συμβουλευών: cod. S after Wytttenbach and Heindorf. συμβουλεύω B T.

511 d. τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ χρήματα: Packard (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.* 1877) considers σώματα an emphatic repetition of ψυχάς, the variation in the words being due to the frequency of the phrase σώματα καὶ χρήματα. He translates: "The art of navigation, which saves not only lives, but both lives and property."

511 e. γυναῖκας: B T. γυναῖκα S after Naber. Morstadt brackets καὶ παῖδας and καὶ γυναῖκας, and it must be said that ἡ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, which refers back to σώματα in d above, seems to favor this course.

512 a. οἶ: B T S with Ast and Winckelmann. οἶοι t codd.

512 a. ὀνήσει: S after Deuschle. ὀνήσειεν B T. ὀνήσειεν ἂν Heindorf.

512 c. αὐ τῷ σαντοῦ: αὐτὸς τῷ σαντοῦ codd. Cron. αὐτὸς B T. αὖ S. But there seems to be some need of an antithesis to τῷ εἰ αὐτοῦ.

512 d. ἔστιν: T S and eds. ἐστιν B Cron. Cron defends his manner of accentuation on the ground that the emphasis is on ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω.

512 d. ἧ ἢ τὸ: S after Heindorf. ἡ τὸ B. ἦ τὸ T. ἧ τοῦ eds.

512 d. μὴ γάρ: B T. ἦ γὰρ S following a suspicion of Ast. καὶ γὰρ Buttmann. ἦδὺ γὰρ Hermann. εἴη γὰρ Madvig.

512 e. ὀποσονδῇ (ὀπόσον δῇ): codd. Antoninus S. ὀπόσον δὲ B T.

512 e. βιοίη: S. βιόη B T Cron.

513 a. σὺν τοῖς φιλάτοις: the prep. σὺν is intensely personal, and always involves in the action of the verb the case it governs. In the classic Attic there seems to be no difference in meaning, only one in frequency, between it and μετὰ. It is regularly retained in legal phrases and in old formulae, as here, where the personal idea was originally predominant. Cf. Gildersleeve, μετὰ and σὺν, *Am. Jour. Phil.* viii. 218; Meisterhans,² § 83, 35. 47. 48.

513 b. πολιτικός: is bracketed by S after Heindorf and Ast, probably rightly.

513 c. τῷ αὐτῶν γάρ ᾗθει: this dat. (equiv. to 'according to,') is probably an extension of the dat. of interest; though Cron, following Kr. 48, 15, 4, looks at it as developed from the side of means.

513 c. πολλάκις ἴσως: is bracketed by S; ἴσως, Schaefer. Ast conjectures that ἴσως is to be put before πεισθήσει.

513 d. ἀναμνήσθητι: S. ἀναμνήσθητι B Cron.

513 d. θεραπεύειν καὶ: θεραπεύειν, καὶ S after Stallbaum. This would make ἕκαστον the object to θεραπεύειν, and καὶ σῶμα κτέ. in apposition with it,—a view which is held by Schleiermacher and Ast. On the other hand, Kratz agrees with Cron in making ἕκαστον the subj. of θεραπεύειν.

513 e. σοι: B T. σοι S and eds. with comma before and after εἰ βούλει.

513 e. **θεραπεύομεν**: B T. *θεραπεύομεν . . . S*, on the basis of a free rendering of Aristides which adds *σπουδαῖον καὶ καλόν*.

514 a. **θῶμεν**: B T. *φῶμεν S* after Madvig. Cf. 481 c.

514 a. **πράξοντες**: b S with eds. *πράξαντες B T Stallbaum, Cron. τάξαντες Madvig*. This passage has given a great deal of trouble. The Mss. reading seems to be utterly indefensible. Stallbaum, followed by Cron, regards the aor. as ingressive and equiv. to *ἐπιχειρήσαντες πράξαι*, but it is very doubtful whether the aor. of *πράττειν* can be thus used. No example is cited for it. On the other hand the fut. is not free from criticism.

514 b. **τὴν τέχνην ἣ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα**: is omitted by S, being only found on the margin of B T. Heindorf reads *ἡπιστάμεθα* in both cases, while Cobet omits *ἣ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα*.

514 c. **ἰδίᾳ διὰ ἡμῶν**: S after Madvig (*δι' ἡμῶν*). *ἰδίᾳ ἡμῶν B T* (defended by Ast). *διὰ ἡμῶν Voemel. ἴδια ἡμῶν Heindorf*.

514 c. **ἄν που**: S. *δήπου B T Cron*.

515 c. **πολιταί**: S after Hirschig. *οἱ πολιταί B T*. The apposition seems too harsh to be natural.

515 d. **ναί**: B T S after Stallbaum. *ἐποίει* the eds. after Aldus.

515 d. **ἀνάγκη**: S. *ἀνάγκη B T Cron, eds*.

516 a. **ἐαυτόν**: is bracketed by S after cod. and Ast, but retained by Cron.

516 b. **ἐπεμέλετο**: so B T eds. This is the only passage cited for Plato where this form of the imperf. is found. The evidence of the inscriptions is not conclusive. Meisterhans,² § 63, 4, says that after 380 B.C. the form *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι* is almost universal (*ἐπιμέλεσθαι: ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: 4: 34*); in regard to the usage before this time, owing to the uncertainty of the orthography, no certain conclusion can be reached. It seems likely, however, that Plato would hardly have varied his usage within six lines (cf. *ἐπεμελεῖτο* 18 below). In any case, L. Dindorf's claim that forms of *ἐπιμέλεσθαι* should be everywhere written in Plato is not borne out by inscriptions.

516 d. **προσεξημίωσαν**: B T. *πρὸς ἐξημίωσαν S* after Hermann. Cf. *Prot.* 311 d καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες.

516 e. **ἐν Μαραθῶνι**: B T. *Μαραθῶνι S*.

517 b. **μή**: B T. *οὐ μή S* after Madvig. But Schanz repudiates this emendation in *Grammatische Bemerkungen Rhein. Mus.* xli 152 ff., and now agrees with Ast, who (p. 432) regards *πολλοῦ δεῖ μή* as equivalent to *οὐ μή* with the subjunctive. The similar case in *Epist.* vii. 344 c he regards as an imitation, and therefore a confirmation, of a manner of expression not found elsewhere in Plato. *Rid.* § 60 also regards *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* as a substitute for *οὐ*, giving (in § 259) other examples where *πολλοῦ γε δεῖ* fill the place of a negative. Cron in his latest edition accedes to this view although in his third edition he looked upon *μή* with the subjv. as an unusual const. for the simple inf. after *δεῖ*, *δεῖ* taking the place of a negated verb of fear. Kühner § 589, 1, n. 1, says the passage is elliptical, "aber wahrlich es fehlt

viel daran, dasz man *besorgt sein sollte, ob nicht Einer der jetzt Lebenden solche Werke ausführen werde.*" Goodwin does not treat the question. In spite of the agreement of later editions, Cron seems to have been on the right track in his earlier edition. In the first place the position is against the explanation that πολλοῦ γε δεῖ is equivalent to οὐ. Then there is no occasion here for the strong οὐ μή construction. Callicles wants merely to say, "But at least you will admit that the men of the present day are far from being able to accomplish such acts." The usual const. (itself very rare) after δεῖ in this sense is the infinitive; but the inf. denies the fact, while Callicles would deny the likelihood merely. We have then a shift from the object construction to the final. Similar but not entirely parallel are passages like *Phaedo* 70 a τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ ἐπειδὴν ἀπαλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾗ, and the use of ἔδηλον μὴ in *Phaedo* 91 d.

517 d. ἐστίν: B T. ἔστιν S after Vögelin.

517 d. ἀλλ' ὦν: codd. S. ἄλλων ὦν B T (defended by Ast). τᾶλλα Heindorf after Ficinus.

518 a. περὶ σώμα πραγματείας: S after Cobet. περὶ σώματος πραγματεῖαν B T Cron. Cron admits that the change is desirable, but contends that it is not necessary. If the traditional reading is kept, σώματος must depend on πραγματεῖαν, the whole clause meaning, "as regards the treatment of the body."

518 a. τότε: B T S. τοτὲ the eds.

518 a. ὅτε: S after Madvig (Heindorf had already suggested it). ὅτι B T.

518 d. δῆ: S after Heindorf. δὲ B T.

519 d. καὶ: B T. καίτοι S after Heindorf. The τοι might easily have fallen out before τούτων.

521 a. Καλλίκευς: B T. ὁ Καλλίκευς S after codd. and Bekker.

521 b. εἴ σοι Μυσὼν γε ἥδιον καλεῖν κτέ.: since Bekker, this passage has been explained as in the text. Before him, the editors vexed themselves greatly over it. Heindorf remarks: Locum mendosissimum 'verisimillima, opinor, emendatione sanavit Cornarius, corrigens, Εἰ μὴ σοι Μυσῶν γίγνεσθαι ἥδιον λείαν . . . Unus tamen in hac lectione verborum ordo non satis placet, propiusque etiam videtur ad veritatem accessisse magnus ille Casaubonus, cuius ex notulis hanc correctionem protulit Routhius: Εἰ μὴ σοι Μυσῶν γε ἥδιον εἶναι λείαν. . . Δεῖα inter Platonicas voces laudatus a Timaeo *Lex.* p. 174, ubi hanc vocem in Platone reperisise se negat Ruhnkenius. Huic igitur sedem suam inventam putamus.' The sense would then be: "If you do not prefer to fall a prey to the worst of mankind."

521 b. χρήσεται: B T. χρήσεται S.

521 c. δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες: Stephanus. δοκεῖ Σώκρατες B T. δοκεῖ Σωκράτης S. δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πιστεύεις (for πιστεύειν) Heindorf with Aldus and the two Basle editions.

521 d. δ: B T. ὦν S with cod. and Heindorf. Cf. 486 d.

521 e. ἀνὴρ: B T. ἀνήρ S after Bekker.

521 e. καὶ αὐτοὺς . . . διαφθείρει: is bracketed by S after Cobet.

522 a. ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ: is bracketed by S after Madvig and Cobet. By means of these omissions the connexion is made more exact, but there is also a loss to the description of several points which could hardly have been added by an interpolator. Madvig declares ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ to be an idea entirely foreign to medical theory; but while this may be technically true, the phrase is well adapted to describe that state of feeling into which the patient comes after taking nauseous medicines, the result of which is often choking and gasping. Cf. *Rep.* viii. 556 d ἄσθματός τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν. As opposed to this, διαφθείρει applies to heroic treatment which leaves traces or scars behind. The addition of these two varieties to κακὰ εἰργασταὶ certainly gives color to the picture.

522 a. πώματα: S after Bekker. πόματα B T. In his collection of examples, vol. xii. *praef.* § 2, Schanz shows that πώματα is found everywhere except in *Phaedo* 117 b, *Gorg.* 522 a.

522 a. ηὔωχουν: S. εὐώχουν B T Cron.

522 a. εἰ εἴποι: S after codd. Stephanus. εἴποι B T.

522 a. πόσον: S after codd. Dobree. ὀπόσον B T Cron. Schanz conjectures τί.

522 a. οἰεσθῆαι γε χρή: has been transferred perhaps to the wrong place in the course of the tradition. It would suit much better at the close of the preceding words of Socrates, but is hardly appropriate in the mouth of Callicles after ἴσως. Hence Heindorf and Ast unite it closely with ἴσως. Hirschig and Cobet omit it.

522 c. ἐν: S after Heindorf and Coraës. ἐν B T.

522 d. γὰρ τις: B T. γὰρ ἡ S after Cobet.

523 b. οἱ ἐκ μακάρων: S after Plutarch. ἐκ μακάρων B T.

523 b. σφίσιν: S after Stobaeus, Plutarch. σφίν B. σφιν T.

523 e. ἐρήμον: S. ἐρημον B T. See 510 b.

524 c. οὐλᾶς: is bracketed by S after Heindorf. *

524 c. καὶ κατεαγότα: S. κατεαγότα B T. κατεαγότα τε Cron, Thompson.

524 e. Ῥαδάμανθυν: Ῥαδάμανθυν, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῆς Εὐρώπης παρὰ τὸν Αἰακόν cod.

524 e. οὐλῶν μεστὴν ὑπὸ ἐπιτορκίων καὶ ἀδικίας: Lucian probably had this passage in mind in *Cataplus* c. 24 ὅποσα ἂν τις ὑμῶν πονηρὰ ἐργάσθαι παρὰ τὸν βίον, καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀφανῆ στίγματα ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς περιφέρει. See Kitzredge, *Am. Jour. Phil.* vi. 165, and Gildersleeve, *Essays and Studies*, p. 344. The idea that after death the soul retains marks and scars resulting from evil deeds done in the body is said by Josephus to have been common among the Jews in his day.

525 b. παραδείγματι: S after cod. and Forster. παράδειγμά τι B T. παράδειγμα Eusebius, approved by Cobet.

525 d. **τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων**: Eusebius, Thompson. *τοὺς τούτων τῶν παραδειγμάτων* B. *τοὺς τῶν παραδειγμάτων* T. *τούτων* S after Heindorf. *τύπους τῶν παραδειγμάτων* Madvig.

525 e. **οὐ γὰρ . . . οἷς ἐξήν**: is bracketed by S after Morstadt. In favor of the omission is the rather difficult ellipsis, as well as the disagreement of the remark with 473 d *δυοῖν ἀθλίοιν εὐδαιμονέστερος οὐκ ἂν εἴη*, according to which we should have *ἤττον ἄθλιος* instead of *εὐδαιμονέστερος*.

526 b. **ἀρετὴν τήν**: cod. S. *ἀρετὴν* B T.

527 a. **ἐλλιγγιάσεις**: B S. *ἑλλιγγιάσεις* T Cron. See on 486 b.

527 a. **καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως**: B T. *ἐπὶ κόρρης* S after Cobet.

527 c. **ὁ λόγος**: cod. S. *ὁ σὸς λόγος* B T.

527 d. **πατάξαι**: B T eds. The insertion *σύ γε θαρρῶν* has caused the editors some trouble in the construction of *πατάξαι*. It is easiest and most natural to supply *ἑασόν τινα*. Stephanus, however, wrote *πάταξαι*. This was objected to by Routh and championed by Van Heusde. It is doubtful whether there is any authority for using the middle in the sense "allow yourself to be," etc. Cobet also feeling some difficulty proposes to insert *πάρεχε*. But the explanation offered in the note, renders emendations unnecessary.

527 d. **ὡς τι ὄντας**: S. *ὡς τι ὄντας* Cron and eds. Cf. 472 a.

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
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
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